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STATE OF IDAHO 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
Vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW;GILBERT KING,As Trustee of 
the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO 
FALLS, INC.; THE ESTATE OF GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
Defendants/Respondents, 
GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ROSE M. KING, as 
Beneficiary of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA 
DECEMBER 28, 2012, 
Counterclaimants, 
Vs. 
JOHN E. RUQUAY; CLINTON WARD FUQUAY and 
HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY 
Counterdefendants, 
Appealed from the District of the Third Judicial District 
for the State of Idaho, in and for Owyhee County 
Honorable THOMAS J. RY AN, District Judge 
Matthew R. Cleverly 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200-6th Ave, Ste 620 Seattle, WA 98101 
Attorney for Appellants 
Ronald Rainey 
110 N. Ninth St. Caldwell, ID 83707 
S. Bryce Farris 
1101 W. River St. Ste. 110 Boise, ID 83707 
Attorney for State Of Idaho 
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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan 
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal. 
User 
TRINA New Case Filed - Other Claims 
TRINA Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District 
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F and 
H(1) Paid by: Matthew R. Cleverley, Attorney 
Receipt number: 0002703 Dated: 8/11/2014 
Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: Fuquay, Hailey 
Rose (plaintiff), Fuquay, John E. (plaintiff) and 
Ward, Clinton (plaintiff) 
TRINA Complaint Filed ( Prescriptive Easement) 
TRINA Summons lssued/6 
TRINA Plaintiff: Fuquay, Clinton Ward Appearance 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
TRINA Plaintiff: Fuquay, Hailey Rose Appearance 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
User: RFAHEY 
Judge 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
TRINA Plaintiff: Fuquay, John E. Appearance Matthew R. Christopher S. Nye 
Cleverley 
TRINA Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Christopher S. Nye 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Cheri Draper, Hawley Troxell Receipt number: 
0002797 Dated: 8/18/2014 Amount: $53.00 
(Credit card) 
TRINA Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Christopher S. Nye 
Paid by: Cheri Draper, Hawley Troxell Receipt 
number: 0002797 Dated: 8/18/2014 Amount: 
$3.00 (Credit card) 
TRINA File Sent To Caldwell basket Christopher S. Nye 
TRINA Exparte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Christopher S. Nye 
TRINA Motion for Telephonic Hearing Appearance Christopher S. Nye 
TRINA Declaration of Raymond Jayo in Support of Christopher S. Nye 
Exparte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
TRINA Declaration of John Fuquay in Support of Exparte Christopher S. Nye 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
TRINA Declaration of Matthew Cleverley in Support of Christopher S. Nye 
Exparte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
TRINA Order On Motion for Telephonic Hearing Christopher S. Nye 
Appearance 
TRINA Order Granting Motion for Restaining Order and Christopher S. Nye 
Setting Date for Hearing on Preliminary Injunction 
TRINA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Christopher S. Nye 
09/18/2014 01 :30 PM) for temporary restraining 
order 
TRINA Notice Of Appearance Christopher S. Nye 
TRINA Defendant: King, Gordon G. Appearance Ronald Christopher S. Nye 
P. Rainey 




Time: 03:00 PM 






















Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan 
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal. 
User 
TRINA Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Ronald 
Rainey Receipt number: 0003053 Dated: 
9/8/2014 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: King, 
Gordon G. (defendant) and King, Rose M. 
( defendant) 
TRINA Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Sawtooth 
Law Office, PLLC Receipt number: 0003076 
Dated: 9/9/2014 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: 
Low, Cal (defendant) and Low, Susie (defendant) 




Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
CINDYH Return Of Service/ Served First American Title on Christopher S. Nye 
8/29/2014 
CINDYH Murphy Envelope - Filing Of This Date Christopher S. Nye 
CINDYH Return Of Service/served Cal Low Christopher S. Nye 
CINDYH Murphy Envelope - Filing Of This Date Christopher S. Nye 
TRINA Answer and Counterclaims by Defendants Christopher S. Nye 
Trustees for the Heart King Ranch Trust UT A 
December 28, 2012 
TRINA Declaration of Mail Person in Support of Christopher S. Nye 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Ex-Parte 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
TRINA Affidavit of Gilbert King Christopher S. Nye 
TRINA Affidavit of Rose King Christopher S. Nye 
TRINA Declaration of Denice Collett in Support of Christopher S. Nye 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Ex Parte 
Restraining Order 
TRINA Objection to Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Christopher S. Nye 
Restraining Order 
TRINA Notice of Intent to Cross Examine and Produce Christopher S. Nye 
Witnesses 
TRINA Defendants' Counterclaimants' Memorandum in Christopher S. Nye 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request for Temporary 
Restaining Order 
TRINA Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey Christopher S. Nye 
LENA Amended Order Requiring All Attorneys to Appear Christopher S. Nye 
in Person for the Hearing Scheduled September 
18,2014 
TRINA Order on Motion to Deposit Funds into the Court Christopher S. Nye 
Registry 
TRINA Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Conference Christopher S. Nye 
09/18/2014 01:30 PM) telephonic-recorded in 
Murphy 
TRINA Motion to Deposit Funds Into the Court Registry Christopher S. Nye 
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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan 
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal. 
User 
TRINA Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3131 Dated 
9/12/2014 for 1000.00) 
TRINA Return of Service - 2 
TRINA Declaration of Schwann Delivery Person 
TRINA Response and Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction 
TRINA Affidavit of Susie Low 
TRINA Defendants'/Counterclaimants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Request for Preliminary 
Injunction 
CINDYH Personal Return Of Service/S. Low served 
9/3/2014 
CINDYH Personal Return Of Service - R. King served 
8/28/2014 
CINDYH Murphy Envelope - Filings Of This Date 
LENA Answer of Defendants Susie and Cal Low and 
Counterclaim 
LENA Notice Of Service 
LENA Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction 
TRINA Declaration of Scott Snyder 
TRINA Return of Service - Susie Low 
TRINA Return of Service - Rose M. King 
TRINA Declaration of Scott Snyder 
TRINA Declaration of Seth Thomas 
TRINA Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
09/18/2014 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Tammy Weber - held in Caldwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
TRINA Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction 
TRINA Order to File Stipulated Trial Dates 
TRINA Motion To Quash Subpoena and Motion for 
Protective Order 
TRINA File Sent withJudge Grober to Nampa Court for 
Caldwell to pick up 
TRINA Notice of Hearing 
TRINA Notice of Non-Opposition to Subpoena 
Concerning ITD Records 
TRINA Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/20/2014 09:00 
AM) Plaintiffs Motion to Quash Subpoena and 
Motion for Protective Order 
User: RFAHEY 
Judge 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan 
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal. 
User 
TRINA Motion for Default 
TRINA Declaration of Matthew Cleverley in Support of 
Motion for Default 
TRINA Reporters Transcript 
TRINA Notice of Compliance- Defendant Rose Kings 
First Responses to Plaintiffs First Interrogatories 
and Requests for Productions 
TRINA Notice of Compliance- Defendant Gilbert King's 
First Responses to Plaintiffs First Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production 
TRINA Order of Default 
TRINA Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
against Susie Low and Cal Low 
TRINA Declarations of Matthew Cleverley 
TRINA Declarations of John Fuquay 
TRINA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 12/23/2014 10:30 AM) 
TRINA Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial 
TRINA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/28/2015 09:00 
AM) 3-day trial setting 
TRINA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
03/27/2015 10:30 AM) 
TRINA Response and Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
TRINA Affidavit of Rose King 
TRINA Affidavit of Samuel V.C.Steiner 
TRINA Affidavit of S. Bryce Farris 
TRINA Withdrawal of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Against Lows 
TRINA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment 
scheduled on 12/23/2014 10:30 AM: Hearing 
Vacated MSJ/Lows 
TRINA Notice of Service -Defendants Susie and Cal 
Law's Responses to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories 
and Request for Production of Documents to 
Susie Low and Cal Low 
TRINA Amended Order Setting Case for Trial and 
Pretrial 
TRINA Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 
04/28/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 3-day 
trial setting 
TRINA Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled 
on 03/27/2015 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
User: RFAHEY 
Judge 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Christopher S. Nye 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan 
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal. 
User 
TRINA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/15/2015 09:00 
AM) 4-day trial setting 
TRINA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
04/24/2015 10:30 AM) 
TRINA Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/27/2015 10:30 
AM) Motion to Amend Complaint 
TRINA Change Assigned Judge (batch process) 
TRINA Plaintiffs Motion For Leave to File Amended 
Complaint 
LENA Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
LENA Notice Of Hearing 
LENA Defendant Heart K Ranch's Memorandum in 
Support of Notion for Summary Judgment 
LENA Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey 
User: RFAHEY 
Judge 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
LENA Affidavit of Rose King in Support of the Defendant Thomas J. Ryan 
Heart K Ranch's Motion for Summary Judgment 
LENA Affidavit of Gilbert King in Support of the Thomas J. Ryan 
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
LENA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment 02/27/2015 10:30 AM) Heart K Ranch 
TRINA Heart King Ranch Defendants' Memorandum in Thomas J. Ryan 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File 
Amended Complaint 
LENA Defendant Lows' Response and Objection to Thomas J. Ryan 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint 
LENA Defendant Lows' Response to Kings' Motion for Thomas J. Ryan 
Summary Judgment 
TRINA Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to Thomas J. Ryan 
File Amended Complaint 
TRINA Plaintiffs Response to Heart K. Ranch's MSJ Thomas J. Ryan 
TRINA Compilation of Testimony Thomas J. Ryan 
TRINA Reply Memorandum in Support Defendant Heart Thomas J. Ryan 
K Ranch's Motion for Summary Judgment 
TRINA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
scheduled on 02/27/2015 10:30 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Heart K Ranch 
TRINA Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Thomas J. Ryan 
02/27/2015 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion to Amend Complaint 
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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan 
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal. 
User 
DORLA Notice Of Hearing 3/17/15@ 11 :00 a.m. In 
chambers. 
LENA Clarification of Oral Ruling Re: Motion to Amend 
Complaint 
DORLA Memorandum Decision upon King defendants' 
motion for summary judgment 
DORLA Order referring case for mediation 
DORLA Amended Complaint Filed/First amended 
DORLA Mediation Ordered 
User: RFAHEY 
Judge 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
DORLA Hearing Scheduled (Mediation 04/30/2015 01:00 Thomas J. Ryan 
PM) 
DORLA Order vacating and rescheduling pretrial Thomas J. Ryan 
conference 
DORLA Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Thomas J. Ryan 
on 04/24/2015 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
DORLA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Thomas J. Ryan 
05/22/2015 10:30 AM) 
DORLA Notice of service of second set of interrogatories, Thomas J. Ryan 
requests for production of documents and request 
for admission to defendant owyhee county 
DORLA Motion/King Defendant's motion for Thomas J. Ryan 
reconsideration under rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of decision 
denying motion for summary judgment 
DORLA Affidavit in support of motion for reconsideration Thomas J. Ryan 
DORLA Continued (Mediation 04/29/2015 01 :00 PM) Stephen S. Dunn 
DORLA Amended notice of hearing, re:Mediation Thomas J. Ryan 
LENA Memorandum in Support of King Defendant's Thomas J. Ryan 
Motion for Reconsideration Under Rule 11(a) 
(2)(8) of Decision Denying Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
LENA Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion in Thomas J. Ryan 
Limine 
LENA Defendant's Motion in Limine Thomas J. Ryan 
DORLA Affidavit of service; letter, depositiopn subpoena Thomas J. Ryan 
DORLA Order SETTING case for hearing Thomas J. Ryan 
DORLA Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine Thomas J. Ryan 
05/14/2015 02:30 AM) 
DORLA Plaintiff response to King's motion in limine Thomas J. Ryan 
DORLA Plaintiffs' response to Kings motion for Thomas J. Ryan 
reconsideration 
DORLA Motion to vacate trial setting and reset Thomas J. Ryan 




Time: 03:00 PM 






























Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
User: RFAHEY 
Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan 
























Plaintiffs' response to King's motion to continue Thomas J. Ryan 
trial date 
Notice of hearing on motion Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Mediation 05/14/2015 02:30 Thomas J. Ryan 
PM) 
Memorandum/Reply memorandum in support of Thomas J. Ryan 
King defendants' motion for reconsiteration under 
Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of decision denying motion for 
summary juddgment 
Continued (Motion in Limine 05/14/2015 02:30 Thomas J. Ryan 
PM) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Thomas J. Ryan 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Gil/Angelia King Receipt number: 0005455 
Dated: 5/12/2015 Amount: $48.00 (Check) 
Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on Thomas J. Ryan 
05/14/2015 02:30 PM: Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 10/26/2015 
09:00 AM) 
Order vacating and rescheduling court trial 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 
06/15/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4-day 
trial setting 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Thomas J. Ryan 
on 05/22/2015 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Mediation scheduled on Thomas J. Ryan 
05/14/2015 02:30 PM: Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Mediation scheduled on Stephen S. Dunn 
04/29/2015 01 :00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Christopher S. Nye 
10/20/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Held Plaintiffs 
Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for 
Protective Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/28/2015 10:30 Thomas J. Ryan 
AM) 
Declaration of Matthew Cleverley Thomas J. Ryan 
Plaintiffs Motion for summary judgment against Thomas J. Ryan 
Susie Low and Cal Law's conterclaims 
Notice of hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 06/26/2015 01 :00 PM) Plaintiffs 
motion 
Amended as to time only. Notice of hearing 
Resonnse and objection to plaintiffs motion for 
sumary judgment agains Susi and Cal Law's 
counterclaims 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan 
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal. 
User 
DORLA Affidavit of Steve Murdock 
DORLA Affidavit of Cal Low 
DORLA Reply/Plaintiff, in support of motionf for summary 
judgment against Susie and Cal Low's 
counterclaims 
DORLA Memorandum Decision upon King Defendatnts' 
motion for reconsideration 
DORLA File Sent To Caldwell 
DORLA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment 
scheduled on 06/26/2015 01 :00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Plaintiff's motion 
LENA Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the 
Court's June 19, 2015 Memorandum Decision on 
King's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Request for Reconsideration 
LENA Deposition of Rose King 
LENA Deposition of Gilbert King 
DORLA Judgment 
LENA Transcript Filed/May 14, 2015 
User: RFAHEY 
Judge 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
LENA Susie and Cal Lowe's Memorandum in Support of Thomas J. Ryan 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
LENA Motion For Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
LENA Notice Of Hearing Re: Susie and Cal Lowe's Thomas J. Ryan 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
LENA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment 08/20/2015 02:00 PM) 
DORLA Notice Of Hearing motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J. Ryan 
and request for reconsideration 
DORLA Memorandum/King Defendants' memorandum in Thomas J. Ryan 
opposition to the Fuquay Plaintiff's Motion for 
reconsideration 
DORLA Notice Of Hearing Thomas J. Ryan 
DORLA Memorandum/King Defemndant's memorandum Thomas J. Ryan 
in Support of motion to strike the Fuquay plaintiffs' 
motion for consideration 
DORLA Motion/KingDefendant's motion to strike the Thomas J. Ryan 
Fuquay Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration 
DORLA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Thomas J. Ryan 
08/20/2015 02:00 PM) 
DORLA Notice Of Hearing Thomas J. Ryan 
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Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan 
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal. 
User 
DORLA Motion/Plaintiffs' motion to allow late filed 
declaration in support of motion for 
reconsideration 
DORLA Motion/Plaintiffs' motion to shorten time for 
hearing on motion to allow late filed declaration in 
support of motion for reconsideration 
DORLA Declaration of Matthew Cleverley 
DORLA Plaintiffs' response to King's motion to strike 
deposition submissions 
DORLA Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/20/2015 02:00 
PM) Plaintiffs motions 
DORLA Reply/Plaintiffs' reply in support of motion for 
reconsideration of the court's June 19, 2015 
memorandum decision of King's motion for 
summary judgment and request for 
reconsideration 
DORLA Memorandum/The King Defendants' reply 
memorandum on their motion to strike the 
Fuquay Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration 
DORLA Susie and Cal Law's reply in support of miotion 
for partial summary judgment 
RFAHEY Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment scheduled on 08/20/2015 02:00 PM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
RFAHEY Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled 
on 08/20/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
RFAHEY Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
08/20/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel1 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Plaintiffs motions 
RFAHEY Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
09/25/2015 10:30 AM) 
RFAHEY Hearing result for Status scheduled on 
08/28/2015 10:30 AM: Continued 
RFAHEY Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion 
For Summary Judgment Against Susie Low and 
Cal Low's Counterclaims 
RFAHEY Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion 
For Reconsideration Filed July 6,2015 
RFAHEY Memorandum of Costs 
User: RFAHEY 
Judge 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
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Date: 6/21/2016 
Time: 03:00 PM 



















Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan 
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal. 
User 
RFAHEY Memorandum Decision Upon Low Defendants' 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
RFAHEY Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled 
on 09/25/2015 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter:laura Whiting 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
RFAHEY Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled 
on 09/25/2015 10:30 AM: Hearing Held 
RFAHEY Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on 
10/26/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
RFAHEY Order on Low Defendants' Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment 
RFAHEY Stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment on King's 
Counterclaims 
RFAHEY NOTICE OF APPEAL 
User: RFAHEY 
Judge 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
RFAHEY Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Thomas J. Ryan 
Supreme Court Paid by: Cleverley, Matthew R 
(attorney for Fuquay, Clinton Ward) Receipt 
number: 0007098 Dated: 10/21/2015 Amount: 
$129.00 (Check) For: Fuquay, Clinton Ward 
{plaintiff), Fuquay, Hailey Rose {plaintiff) and 
Fuquay, John E. (plaintiff) 
RFAHEY Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Thomas J. Ryan 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Matthew Cleverley Receipt number: 0007099 
Dated: 10/21/2015 Amount: $100.00 (Check) 
RFAHEY Judgment - Final Entered RE: counterclaims Thomas J. Ryan 
against Plaintiffs 
RFAHEY NOTICE OF APPEAL-AMENDED Thomas J. Ryan 
RFAHEY Request For Status Conference Thomas J. Ryan 
RFAHEY Order Setting Case For Telephonic Status Thomas J. Ryan 
Conference 
RFAHEY Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/26/2016 11 :00 Thomas J. Ryan 
AM) Telephonic 
RFAHEY Order Granting Motion To dismiss Appeal From Thomas J. Ryan 
Supreme Court 
RFAHEY Kings' Memorandum In Support Of Proposed Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment 
RFAHEY Plaintiffs' Memorandum Regarding Entry Of Final Thomas J. Ryan 
Judgment On Kings' Counterclaims 
RFAHEY Remittitur Thomas J. Ryan 




Time: 03:00 PM 









Third Judicial District Court - Owyhee County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0000278-M Current Judge: Thomas J. Ryan 
John E. Fuquay, etal. vs. Susie Low, etal. 
User 
RFAHEY Memorandum Decision Upon Request For Final 
Judgment 
RFAHEY Remittitur 
RFAHEY Civil Disposition entered for: Fuquay, Clinton 
Ward, Plaintiff; Fuquay, Hailey Rose, Plaintiff; 
Fuquay, John E., Plaintiff. Filing date: 3/29/2016 
RFAHEY STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk 
action 
RFAHEY Judgment - Final Entered 
RFAHEY Bond Transferred To County: (Transaction 
number 67 dated 4/19/2016 amount 1,000.00) 
RFAHEY NOTICE OF APPEAL 
User: RFAHEY 
Judge 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
Thomas J. Ryan 
RFAHEY Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Thomas J. Ryan 
Supreme Court Paid by: Cleverley, Matthew R. 
(attorney for Fuquay, John E.) Receipt number: 
0001083 Dated: 5/2/2016 Amount: $129.00 
(Check) For: Fuquay, Clinton Ward {plaintiff) 
RFAHEY Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Thomas J. Ryan 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: Fuquay, Clinton Ward Receipt number: 
0001084 Dated: 5/2/2016 Amount: $100.00 
(Check) 
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200 - 61h A venue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Fl.~f.£ P.M. ---
AUG 11 2014 
AN~~~ERK 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 




NATURE OF THIS PROCEEDING 
1. This is an action for a declaratory judgment to establish an easement to the real properties 
owned by 1) John E. Fuquay and 2) Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay. The 
Properties are accessed via a private roadway commonly known as King Lane. 
2. Some of the Defendants own or have an interest in the parcels of property that are 
burdened by King Lane. Others may be burdened by the roadway, depending on the 
specific location of the roadway, if there is a dispute as to its actual location on the 
COMPLAINT- I 
ASSIGNED JUDGE 
CHRIS10PHER S. NYE 
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ground. Those Defendants whose property is determined not to be burdened by the 
roadway or any easement will be dismissed from this action. 
3. This action does not seek any monetary damages or to change any property boundaries. It 
seeks only to confirm that the Plaintiffs have the right to access their properties over King 
Lane. 
PARTIES 
4. The properties at issue are located east of the city of Oreana, Idaho in Owyhee County. 
5. A street map showing the general location of the area is attached as Exhibit "A." An aerial 
map showing the Owyhee County Assessor's lot boundaries is attached as Exhibit "B." A 
Google Earth map showing an aerial view and general road boundaries and identities of 
the affected parcel owners is attached as Exhibit "C." 
Clinton Ward Fuguay and Hailey Rose Fuquay 
6. Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuquay 
Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once part of the John Fuquay Parcel. The 
legal description for the Clinton Fuquay Parcel is shown on the warranty deed attached as 
Exhibit "D." 
John Fuquay 
7. John Fuquay owns the parcel (the "John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the 
Clinton Fuquay Parcel. The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the 
Trustee's Deed dated October 13, I 989 attached as Exhibit "E," (less the Clinton Fuquay 
Parcel). 
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Susie Low and Cal Low Parcel 1 
8. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel I") located south of King Lane. 
There are two parcels which were conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for 
the Low Parcel 1 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F." 
Avco Financial Services of Idaho Falls, Inc. 
9. Avco Financial Services ofldaho Falls, Inc. may claim some right, title or interest in the 
Low Parcel 1 by virtue of a Real Estate Mortgage in the amount of $68,000 which was 
recorded on or around March 18, 1996 as Owyhee county records no. 218373. The 
Mortgage was executed by Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner, husband and wife 
and encumbers Low Parcel I. It is possible that this mortgage was paid but was never 
released. A copy of the Mortgage is attached as Exhibit "G." 
Susie Low and Cal Low Parcel 2 
I 0. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2") located south of King Lane. 
Oreana Loop Road crosses the northwest corner of Low Parcel 2. The legal description 
for the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "H." 
Heart K Ranch Trust 
11. The Heart K Ranch Trust UT A December 28, 2012 owns the parcel to the north of King 
Lane (the "Heart K Ranch Parcel"). The legal description got the Heart K Ranch Parcel is 
shown on the Gift Deed attached as Exhibit "I." 
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Gordon G. King and Rose M. King 
12. Gordon G. King and Rose M. King may claim some right, title or interest in the Heart K. 
Ranch Parcel by virtue of a Deed of Trust in the amount of $86,500 in favor of One West 
Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as Owyhee County records no. 248616 and 
encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit 
"J." The deed of trust was assigned to Gordon G. King and Rose M. King on September 
12, 2005. A copy of the Assignment of Deed of Trust is attached as Exhibit "K." 
First American Title Insurance Company 
13. First American Title Insurance Company may claim some right, title or interest in the 
Heart K. Ranch Parcel by virtue of being named as the trustee under a Deed of Trust in the 
amount of $86,500 in favor of One West Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as 
Owyhee County records no. 248616 and encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy 
of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit "J." 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
14. The properties at issue in this Complaint are located in Owyhee County, Idaho. They are 
located approximately three miles east of Oreana and are south of Highway 78. The 
closest public roadway to the properties is Oreana Loop Road. 
15. Oreana Loop road runs in a generally west direction from Highway 78 to a point near a 
location where Low Parcels l and 2 and the Heart K Ranch Parcels intersect. Near that 
COMPLAINT- 4 FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
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' ..,. l 
location, Oreana Loop Road turns and continues in a southwesterly direction through Low 
Parcel I. 
16. King Lane is a private roadway that continues westerly from where Oreana Loop Road 
turns southwest Oreana Loop Road and provides the access to the Clint Fuquay Parcel and 
the John Fuquay Parcel. 
17. The Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay 
Parcel since at least 1989. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
(PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT) 
18. The use of King Lane for access by owners of the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John 
Fuquay Parcel has been open and continuous over the same route for more than 5 years, 1 
and was without permission from adverse land owners. 
19. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment declaring that they have established a prescriptive 
easement for access and utilities from Oreana Loop Road over King Lane for access to the 
Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay Parcel. 
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS PRAYS AS FOLLOWS 
1. For a Judgment declaring that they have an easement for ingress, egress and utilities to 
over King Lane for access to Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay Parcel. 
1 J.C. 5-203 was amended from 5 years to 20 years in 2006, but the 5 year time frame still 
applies to prescriptive claims before 2006. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Id 212, 222. 
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2. For a Judgment Declaring that each of the Defendants rights in their parcels are 
subject to and servient to the easement for access to Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John 
Fuquay Parcel. 
3. For a Judgment declaring that the easement runs with the land and is binding and 
inures to the benefit of all subsequent owners, transferees, and assigns of the Clint 
Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay Parcel. 
4. For a Judgment declaring that the easement runs with the land and is binding and that 
all subsequent owners, transferees, and assigns of Defendants shall be subject to the 
easement. 
5. For a Judgment enjoining any defendant from impeding or interfering with Plaintiffs' 
access rights over King Lane. 
Dated: August 6, 2014 
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When Recorded Return to: 
SUSIE LOW 
CALLOW 
21220 Oreana Loop Road 
Oreana, ID 83650 
Instrument # 254987 
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO 
2006-01-27 04:35:41 No. of Pages: 4 
Recorded for : PIONEER TITLE COMPANY 
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN A~ ~Fae: 12.00 
Ex-Officio Recorder Daputy~~-----4-o------
lndn to: DEED. WARRANTY 
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED (this "Deed"), made as of the 61h day of January, 2006, is between 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"), 
whose legal address is: 21220 Oreana Loop Road, Oreana, ID 83650. 
WITNESSETH, That Grantor, for and in consideration of One Dollar and No/100 ($1.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, 
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and 
confirm, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever, all the real property, together with 
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State of Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
See legal description described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
Futher Granted Water Rights as Defined in Attachment "Water Rights" 
TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in 
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and 
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in 
law or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of 
way and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water, 
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which are 
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the 
property (collectively, the "Property"). 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the 
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors 
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors and assigns, 
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises 
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in law, in fee 
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in 
manner and fonn as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants, 
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature 
whatsoever, as of July 15, 2005 . 
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above-bargained premises in the quiet 
and peaceable possession of Grantee, its successors and assigns, against all and every person or persons 
claiming the whole or any part then:of BY, THROUGH OR UNDER Grantor. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Grantor has executed this Special Warranty Deed as of the date set 
forth above. 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
By: Pioneer 1031 Company, Member 
By: 
ST A TE OF IDAHO 




The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 61hday of January, 2006, by Alicia 
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer I 031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer 
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company. 
WJTNESS my hand and official seal. 
My commission expires: 9.9.09. 
-Notary Public 
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·- .. .. EXHIBITX 
P07036 
In Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho. 
Section 34: E1/2 SE1/4, SE1/4 NE 1/4 
Section 35: W1/2 SW1/4, SW1/4 NW14 
EXCEPTING 1-1/2 acres in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35, 
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as 
follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
of said Section, running thence in a Westerly direction 630 feet; thence in a Southerly 
direction 104 feet; thence in an Easterly direction 630 feet; thence in a Northerly direction 
104 feet to the PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
In Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho. 
Section 2: Lot 4 
Section 3: Lot 1 
First American nue Insurance 
Sehedule a 
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... · . --. -· • • EXHIBIT.Ji_ 
WATER RIGHTS 
l. No. 57-89. 4-1-1874 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation and Stock Water. 0.240 CFS. 
2. No. 57-95. 4-1-1885 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation. 0.360 CFS. 
3. No. 57-!04. 4-1-1887 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.200 CFS 
4. No. 57-116. 4-1-1895 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.100 CFS 
5. No. 57-120. 4-1-1896 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.300 CFS 
6. No. 57-127. 4-1-1899 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation. 0.400 CFS 
7. No. 57-149. 4-1-1906 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.200 CFS 
8. No. 57-2104. 10-5-1920 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. I.280 CFS 
Total 3.080 CFS . 
Total Acres: 145. 
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REAL ESTATE :\lORTGAGE 
I··,,: \":,lu..- H,-c,·,no!, SAMUEL V.C. STBINER AND HIIR'l J. STEINm, lnJSIWm AND WIFE 
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lndtx to: DEED. WARRIINlY 
SPACE ABOVE THIS UNE FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED (this "Deed"), made as of the 6th day of January, 2006, is between 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"), 
whose legal address is: 21220 Oreana Loop Road, Oreana, ID 83650. 
WITNESSETH, That Grantor, for and in consideration of One Dollar and No/I 00 ($1.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, 
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and 
confirm, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever, all the real property, together with 
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State of Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
Township 4 South, Range I East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; Section 35: Northeast Quarter 
Southwest Quarter; Southwest Quarter Northeast Quarter; Southeast Quarter Northwest Quarter; Northwest 
Quarter Southeast Quarter ; Including Water Right #57-10045 and #57-10046 
TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in 
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and 
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in 
Jaw or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of 
way and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water, 
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which are 
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the 
property ( collectively, the "Property"). 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the 
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors 
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors and assigns, 
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises 
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in Jaw, in fee 
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in 
manner and form as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants, 
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature 
whatsoever, as of July 15, 2005 . 
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above-bargained premises in the quiet 
and peaceable possession of Grantee, its successors and assigns, against all and every person or persons 
claiming the whole or any part thereof BY, THROUGH OR UNDER Grantor. 
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IN WJTNESS WHEREOF, Grantor has executed this Special Warranty Deed as of the date set 
forth above. 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
By: Pioneer 1031 Company, Member 
ST A TE OF IDAHO 




The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 6thday of January, 2006, by Alicia 
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer 1031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer 
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
My commission expires: 9.9.09. 







Intending a gift, ROSE M. KING, a single person, Grantor, does hereby grant, bargain, 
sell and convey to GILBERT GENE KING, AS TRUSTEE (or any successor Trustee 
thereof) OF THE HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012, Grantee, whose 
current address is Post Office Box 36, Murphy, Idaho 83650, the following real property located 
in Owyhee County, Idaho, as described on Exhibit A, attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
SUBJECT TO current taxes and assessments and all subsequent years, together with any 
and all existing easements, rights-of-way, reservations, restrictions and encumbrances of record, 
to any existing tenancies, to all zoning laws and ordinances, and to any state of facts an accurate 
survey or inspection of the premises would show. 
This conveyance shall include any and all appurtenances, tenements, hereditaments, 
reversions, remainders, easements, rights-of-way and water rights in anywise appertaining to the 
property herein described. 
All income and gain derived from such property shall be the sole and separate property of 
said Grantee. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has hereunto subscribed her name to this 
instrument this 28th day of December, 2012. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
On this 28th clay of December, 2012, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in and for 
said State, personally appeared ROSE M. KING, known or acknowledged to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed 
the same. 
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the clay and year first 
above written. 
My Commission Expires 6 'ii, · 1,,Q IS 




In Township 4 South, Range I Fat, Bois~ Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho 
Section 26: Southwest Quarter, South Half of the Northwest Quarter, North Half of the Southeast 
Quarter; Southwest Quarter of the Southeast QUarter. South Half ofth~ Northeast Quarter. Northeast 
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter 
Section 27: Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
Section 34: Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter 
Section 35: North Half of the N<lrthwest Quarter, and a parcel in the Southwest Quarter of the 
No(thwest Quarter described as follows: Beginning at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter, Sec. 3S, T48, R1B, B.M.; thence In a Westerly direction 630 feet; thence in a 
Southerly direction 104 feet; thence In an Easterly direction 630 feet; thence In a Northerly dfreotion I 04 
feet to the PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM: 
A ·portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35 fn Township 4 South, Range I 
&st, Boise Meridian, Owybeo County, Idaho. described as follows: 
COMMBNCJNO at the Section comer common to Sections 26, 27, 34 and 35 of Township 4 South,. 
Range 1 Bast, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; 1henoe 
· South 1320 feet along the Section line common to Sections 34 and 3S a distance of 1320 feet to 
the Southwest comer ·of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 35; 1bcmcc 
East along tho South line of said Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of SS8 
feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
North parallel with the West line of said Section 3S a distance of 165 feet; thence 
But and parallel with the South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Nonhwest Quarter a distance 
of 175 feet; thence 
South and parallel with the West line of said Section 3~ a distance of 16S feot to a point on the 
South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section JS that Is Bast a distance of 
175 feet from the POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
West along said South Une of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of l 7S 
feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Tractll: . 
A portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35 in Township 4 South, Range I 
Eas~ Boise Meridian. Owyhee County, Idaho, described as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Section comer common to Sections 26, 27, 34 and 3S of Township 4 South, 
Range 1 Bast, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; thence 
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South 1320 feet along the Section line common to Sections 34 and 35 a distmwe of 1320 feet t.o 
the Southwest comer of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 35; thence 
East along the South line of said Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of SS8 · 
feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
North parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 16S feet; thence 
East and parallel with the South line of the Northwe.,t Quarter of tho Northwest Quarter a distance 
of l 7S feet; thence 
South and parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet to a point on the 
South line of~e Northwe.tt Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 3S that is Bast a ttistance of 
l 7S feet from the POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
West along said South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a cllstance of l 7S 
feet to the 1RUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Tract Ill: 
In Township 7 South, Range I East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho 
Section 9: East Half of the Northeast Quarter 
Tract IV: 
In Township 7 South, Range 2 East, Boise Mmidian, Owyhee County, Idaho 
Section 30: West Half of the Northeast Quarter 
Tract V: 
In Township 8 South, Range I East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho 
Section 6: Government Lot 7, Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter, Southwest Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter 
Section 7: Government Lot I, Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter, North Half of the 
Northeast Quarter 
Section 18: Government Lots 2, 3, S, 6 and 7, Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
Section 19: Government Lots I, 2 and 3, East Half of the Northwest Quarter, Northeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter, North Half of 1he Southeast Quarter 
Tract VI: 
In Township 8 South, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Owyhee Couniy, Idaho 
Section 1: East Half of the Southeast Quarter 
Section 12: East Half of the Northeast Quarter, East Half of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast . 
Quarter 
Section 13: South Half of the NorthH~ North Half of the South~ Government Lots 1, 2, 3 and 
4 
Section 18: Southeast Quarter, East Half of the Southwest Quarter, Government Lots 3 and 4 
Section 19: North Half of the Northeast Quarter, Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter, 
Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter, Government Lot I, East Half of the Southeut Quarter 
Section 20: Southwest Quarter of dle Northwest Quarter, Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter 
Section 22: Northwest Quarter of 1he Southeast Quarter, South Half of the Sou1heast Quarter 
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Section 24: Northwest Quarter, North Half of the Southwest Quarter 
Section 26: Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
Section 27: Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter 
TOGETHER WITH a grant of Basement for a well, ditch and cooling pond located in the NWNE, Sec. 
34, T4S, RIE, BM, as granted by the.United States, Dept oflnterior, Bureau ofLand Management, on 
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DEED OF TRUST 
DEFINITIONS 
Words used in muhiple sections of this document are defined below and other words are defmed in Sections 3, 11, 
13, 18, 20 and 21. Certain rules regarding the usage of words used in this document are also provided in Section 16. 
(A) "Security Instrument" means this document, which is dated July 19, 2004 
together with all Riders to this document. 
(B) "Borrower" is Karla Kay King love, an umarried w:nan 
. Borrower is the trustor under this Security Instrument. 
(C) .. Lender" is Bank of the West , a california Corporation 
Lender is organized and existing under the laws of 
California . Lender's address is 1977 Saturn Street 
{bene), Monterey Park, CA 91755 
Lender is the beneficia,y under this Security Instrument. 
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(D) "Trustee" is First Anerican Title Insurance Crnpany, a COI:pOration 
(E) "Note" means the promissory note signed by Borrower and dated July 19, 2004 
The Note states that Borrower owes Lender Eighty Six Thousand Five Hundred and 
ID/lOOths Do1Iars(U.S.$ 86,500.00 ) 
plus interest. Borrower has promised to pay this debt in regular Periodic Payments and to pay the debt in full not 
laterthan August 1, 2024 
(F) "Property" means the property that is described below under the heading "Transfer of Rights in the 
Property." 
(G) "Loan" means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest, any prepayment charges and late charges due 
under the Note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest 
(H) "Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instnnnent that are executed by Borrower. The following 
Riders are to be executed by Borrower [check box as applicable]: 
0 Adjustable Rate Rider 
0 Balloon Rider 
0 1-4 Family Rider 
0 Other(s) {specify] 
0 Condominium Rider 
D Planned Unit Development Rider 
D Revocable Trust Rider 
D Second Home Rider 
0 Biweekly Payment Rider 
{I) "Applicable Law" means all controlJing app1icable federal, state and local statutes, regulations, ordinances 
and administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable final, non-appealable 
judicial opinions. 
(J) "Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments" means all dues, fees, assessments and other 
charges that are imposed on Borrower or the Property by a condominium association, homeowners association or 
similar organization. 
(K) "Electronic Funds Transfer" means any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check, 
draft, or similar paper instrwnent, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, computer, 
or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an account. Such term 
includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale transfers, automated teller machine transactions, transfers initiated by 
telephone, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse transfers. 
(L) "Escrow Items" means those items that are described in Section 3. 
(M) "Miscellaneous Proceeds" means any compensation, settlement, award of damages, or proceeds paid by 
any third party ( other than insurance proceeds paid under the coverages described in Section 5) for: (i) damage to, 
or destruction of, the Property; (ii) condemnation or other taking of all or any part of the Property; (iii) conveyance 
in lieu of condemnation; or (iv) misrepresentations of, or omissions as to, the value and/or condition of the Property . 
. (N) "Mortgage Insurance" means insurance protecting Lender against the nonpayment o( or default on, the 
Loan. 
: 3984002 
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(0) "Periodic Payment" means the regularly scheduled amount due for (i) principal and interest under the 
Note, plus (ii) any amounts under Section 3 of this Security Instrument. 
(P) "RESPA" means the Real Est.ate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. §2601 et seq.) and its 
implementing regulation, Regulation X (24 C.F.R. Part 3500), as they might be amended from time to time, or any 
additional or successor legislation or regulation that governs the same subject matter. As used in this Security 
Instrument, "RESP A" refers to all requirements and restrictions that are imposed in regard to a "federally related 
mortgage loan" even if the Loan does not qualify as a "federally related mortgage loan" llllder RESP A. 
(Q) "Successor in Interest of Borrower'• means any party that has taken title to the Property, whether or not 
that party has assumed Borrower's obligations under the Note and/or this Security Instrument. 
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY 
This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and 
modifications of the Note; and (ii) the peifonnance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security 
Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust. with power 
of sale, the following described property located in the county 
[Type of Rttr:ording Jurisdiction] 
of Owyhee 
[Name of Recording Jurisdiction] 
SEE A'IT.AO!ED HEREIO AND MADE A PARI' HEREDF 
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A portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35 in Township 
4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Section corner common to Sections 26, 27, 34 and 35 of Township 
4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; thence 
South 1320 feet along the Section llne common to Sections 34 and 35 a distance 
of 1320 feet to the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
of said Section 35; thence 
East along the South line of said Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a 
distance of 558 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
North parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet; thence 
East and parallel with the South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter a distance of 175 feet; thence 
South and parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet to 
a point on the South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said 
Section 35 that Is East a distance of 175 feet from the POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
West along said South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a 
distance of 175 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 11: 
An easement for ingress and egress over a parcel of land located in the Northwest Quarter 
of Section 35, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho. 
Being further described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point on the Northerly right-of-way of Oreana Loop Road from which the 
East Quarter corner of said Section 35 bears South 68° 05'05" East a distance of 3,483.22 
feet; 
thence along said right-of-way on a curve to the left with a radius of 456.77 feet 
and a central angle of 13° 02'31", an arc length of 103.97 feet (with a chord bearing of 
South 74° 35'55" West, and a chord distance of 103.75 feet); 
thence leaving said right-of-way North 89° 44'39" West a distance of 34.65 feet; 
thence South 86° 52'41" West a distance of 101.22 feet; 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 956.00 feet and a central angle 
of 08° 09'05", an arc length of 136.01 feet (with a chord bearing of South 82° 48'09" West, 
and a chord distance of 135.89 feet); 
thence South 78° 43'37" West a distance of 16.97 feet; 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 190.00 feet and a central angle 
of 34° 08'57", an arc length of 113.24 feet (with a chord bearing of North 84° 11'54" West, 
and a chord distance of 111.57 feet); 
thence North 67° 07'26" West a distance of 132.56 feet; 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 162.00 feet and a central angle 
of 57° 53'42", an arc length of 163.69 feet (with a chord bearing of South 83° 55'43" West 




and a chord distance of 156.82 feet); 
thence Into a tangent reverse curve to the right having a radius of 139.00 feet and 
a central angle of 16° 00'01 "' and a length of 38.82 feet. (with a chord bearing of South 62° 
58'52" West, and a chord distance of 38.69 feet); 
thence along a cure to the right having a radius of 474.00 feet and a central angle 
of 18° 35'17"; 
thence westerly along the arc, a distance of 153.78 feet (with a chord bearing of 
South 80° 16'32" West, and a chord distance of 153.10 feet); 
thence South 89° 34'10" West a distance of 364.49 feet; 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 60.45 feet and a central angle of 
80° 02'33", an arc length of 84.45 feet (with a chord bearing of North 51° 23'44" West, and 
a chord distance of 77.75 feet); 
thence South 85° 29'29" East a distance of 30.23 feet; 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 32.45 feet and a central angle of 
65° 16'28", an arc length of 36.97 feet (with a chord bearing of South 58° 46'46" East, and 
a chord distance of 35.00 feet); 
thence North 89° 34'10"' East a distance of 364.49 feet; 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 446.00 feet and a cental angle of 
18° 35'17", an arc length of 144.69 feet (with a chord bearing of North 80° 16'31" East, and 
a chord distance of 144.06 feet); 
thence along a curve to the left having a radius of 111.00 feet and a central angle 
of 16° 00'01", an arc length of 31.00 feet (with a chord bearing of North 62° 58'52"' East, 
and a chord distance of 30.90 feet); 
thence along a curve to the right having a radius of 190.00 feet and a central angle 
of 57° 53'42" and a length of 191.99 feet, (with a chord bearing of North 83° 55'43" East, 
and a chord distance of 183.92 feet); 
thence South 67° 07'26" East a distance of 132.56 feet; 
thence along a circular curve to the right with a radius of 162.00 feet and a central 
angle of 34° 08'57", an arc length of 96.55 feet (with a chord bearing of South 84° 11 '55" 
East, and a chord distance of 95.13 feet); 
thence North 78° 43'37"' East a distance of 16.97 feet; 
thence along a circular curve to the right with a radius of 984.00 feet and a central 
angle of 08° 09'05", an arc length of 139.99 feet (with a chord bearing of North 82° 48'09" 
East, and a chord distance of 139.87 feet); 
thence North 86° 52'41" East a distance of 102.04 feet; 
thence South 89° 44'39" East a distance of 135.37 feet to the POINT OF EGINNING. 
First American Title 
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TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, 
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and additions shall also be 
covered by this Security Instrument All of the foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as the "Property." 
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the 
right to grant and convey the Property and that the Property is 1.lllencumbered, except for encumbrances of record. 
Borrower warrants and will defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to any 
encumbrances of record. 
THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform 
covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a unifonn security instrument covering real property. 
UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows: 
1. Payment of Principal, Interest, Escrow Items, Prepayment Charges, and Late Charges. 
Borrower shall pay when due the principal of, and interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment 
charges and late charges due under the Note. Borrower shall also pay funds for Escrow Items pursuant to Section 3. 
Payments due llllder the Note and this Security Instrument shall be made in U.S. currency. However, if any check or 
other instnnnent received by Lender as payment under the Note or this Security Instrwnent is returned to Lender 
unpaid, Lender may require that any or all subsequent payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument be 
made in one or more of the following forms, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order, (c) certified check, 
bank check, treasmer's check or cashier's check, provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose 
deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer. 
Payments are deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at such 
other location as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15. Lender may 
return any payment or partial payment if the payment or partial payments are insufficient to bring the Loan current. 
Lender may accept any payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan current, without waiver of any 
rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or partial payments in the future, but Lender is not 
obligated to apply such payments at the time such payments are accepted. If each Periodic Payment is applied as of 
its scheduled due date, then Lender need not pay interest on unapplied funds. Lender may hold such unappJied 
funds until Borrower makes payment to bring the Loan current If Borrower does not do so within a reasonable 
period of time, Lender shall either apply such funds or return them to Borrower. If not applied earlier, such funds 
will be applied to the outstanding principal balance under the Note immediately prior to foreclosure. No offset or 
claim which Borrower might have now or in the future against Lender shall relieve Borrower from making payments 
due llllder the Note and this Security Instrument or performing the covenants and agreements secured by this 
Security Instrument. 
2. Application of Payments or Proceeds. Except as otherwise described in this Section 2, all payments 
accepted and applied by Lender shall be applied in the following order of priority: (a) interest due under the Note; 
(b) principal due under the Note; (c) amounts due Wlder Section 3. Such payments shall be applied to each Periodic 
Payment in the order in which it became due. Any remaining amounts shall be applied first to late charges, second 
to any other amounts due under this Security Instrwnent, and then to reduce the principal balance of the Note. 
If Lender receives a payment from Borrower for a delinquent Periodic Payment which includes a sufficient 
amount to pay any late charge due, the payment may be applied to the delinquent payment and the late charge. If 
more than one Periodic Payment is outstanding, Lender may apply any payment received from Borrower to the 
repayment of the Periodic Payments if, and to the extent that, each payment can be paid in full. To the extent that 
any excess exists after the payment is applied to the full payment of one or more Periodic Payments, such excess 
may be applied to any late charges due. Voluntary prepayments shall be applied first to any prepayment charges and 
then as described in the Note. 
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Any application of payments, insurance proceeds, or Miscellaneous Proceeds to principa] due wider the 
Note shall not extend or postpone the due date, or change the amount, of the Periodic Payments. 
3. Funds for Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day Periodic Payments are due 
under the Note, until the Note is paid in full, a sum (the "Funds") to provide for payment of amounts due for: 
(a} taxes and assessments and other items which can attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien or 
encumbrance on the Property; (b) leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c) premiums 
for any and all insurance required by Lender and (d} Mortgage Insurance premiums, if any, or any sums 
payable by Borrower to Lender in lieu of the payment of Mortgage Insurance premiums in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 10. These items are called "Escrow Items." At origination or at any time during the 
term of the Loan, Lender may require that Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any, be 
escrowed by Borrower, and such dues, fees and assessments shall be an Escrow Item. Borrower shall 
promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under this Section. Borrower shall pay Lender 
the Funds for Escrow Items unless Lender waives Borrower's obligation to pay the Funds for any or all 
Escrow Items. Lender may waive Borrower's obligation to pay to Lender Funds for any or aD Escrow Items 
at any time. Any such waiver may only be in writing. In the event of such waiver, Borrower shall pay 
directly, when and where payable, the amounts due for any Escrow Items for which payment of Funds has 
been waived by Lender and, if Lender requires, shall furnish to Lender receipts evidencing such payment 
within such time period as Lender may require. Borrower's obligation to make such payments and to 
provide receipts shall for all purposes be deemed to be a covenant and agreement contained in the Security 
Instrument. H Borrower is obligated to pay Escrow Items directly, pursuant to a waiver, and Borrower fails 
to pay the amount due for an Escrow Item, Lender may exercise its rights under Section 9 and pay such 
amount and Borrower shall then be obligated to repay to Lender any such amount. Lender may revoke the 
waiver as to any or all Escrow Items at any time by notice and, upon such revocation, Borrower shall pay to 
Lender all Funds, and in such amounts, that are then required. 
Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount (a) sufficient to permit Lender to 
apply the Funds at the time specified under RESPA, and (b) not to exceed the maximum amount a lender can 
require under RESP A. Lender shall estimate the amount of Funds doe on the basis of current data and 
reasonable e~-timates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise in accordance with Applicable Law. 
The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, 
instrumentality, or entity (including Lender, if Lender is an institution whose deposits are so insured) or in 
any Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the Escrow Items no later than the time 
specified under RESPA. Lender shall not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually 
analyzing the escrow account, or verifying the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the 
Funds and Applicable Law permits Lender to make such a charge. Unless an agreement is made in writing 
or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on the Funds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower 
any interest or earnings on the Funds. Borrower and Lender can agree in writing, however, that interest 
shall be paid on the Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the 
Funds as required by RESPA. 
If there is a surplus of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall account to 
Borrower for the excess funds in accordance with RESPA. If there is a shortage of Funds held in escrow, as 
defined under RESPA, Lender shall notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to 
Lender the amount necessary to make up the shortage in accordance with RESPA, but in no more than 12 
monthly payments. If there is a deficiency of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall 
notify Borrower as required by RESP A, and Borrower shall pay to Lender the amount necessary to make up 
the deficiency in accordance with RESPA, but in no more than 12 monthly payments. 
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund 
to Borrower any Funds held by Lender. 
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4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay an taxes, assessments, charges, fines, and impositions 
attributable to the Property which can attain priority over this Security Insttument, leasehold payments or ground 
rents on the Property, if any, and Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any. To the extent that 
these items are Escrow Items, Borrower shall pay them in the manner provided in Section 3. 
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless 
Borrower: (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable to 
Lender, but only so long as Borrower is performing such agreement; (b) contests the lien in good faith by, or 
defends against enforcement of the lien in. legal proceedings which in Lender's opinion operate to prevent the 
enforcement of the lien while those proceedings are pending, but only until such proceedings are concluded; or (c) 
secures from the holder of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender subordinating the lien to this Security 
Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien which can attain priority over this 
Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying the lien. Within 10 days of the date on which 
that notice is given, Borrower shall satisfy the lien or take one or more of the actions set forth above in this 
Section 4. 
Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for a real estate tax verification and/or reporting 
service used by Lender in coIU1ection with this Loan. 
5. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the 
Property insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage," and any other haz.ards 
including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be 
maintained in the amounts (including deductible levels) and for the periods that Lender requires. What Lender 
requires pursuant to the preceding sentences can change during the term of the Loan. The insurance carrier 
providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's right to disapprove Borrower's choice, 
which right shall not be exercised unreasonably. Lender may require Borrower to pay, in connection with this Loan, 
either. (a) a one-time charge for flood zone determination, certification and tracking services; or (b) a one-time 
charge for flood zone determination and certification services and subsequent charges each time remappings or 
similar changes occur which reasonably might affect such detennination or certification. Borrower shall also be 
responsible for the payment of any fees imposed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in comection with 
the review of any flood zone determination resulting from an objection by Borrower. 
If Borrower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above, Lender may obtain insurance coverage, 
at Lender's option and Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any particular type or amount 
of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might not protect Borrower, Borrower's 
equity in the Property, or the contents of the Property, against any risk, hazard or liability and might provide greater 
or lesser coverage than was previously in effect. Borrower acknowledges that the cost of the insurance coverage so 
obtained might significantly exceed the cost of insurance that Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts 
disbursed by Lender under this Section 5 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security 
Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable, 
with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment 
All insurance policies required by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lender's right to 
disapprove such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an 
additional loss payee. Lender shall have the right to hold the policies and renewal certificates. If Lender requires, 
Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and renewal notices. If Borrower obtains any 
form of insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, for damage to, or destruction of, the Property, such 
policy shall include a standard mortgage clause and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional loss 
payee. 
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may 
make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any 
insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall be applied to restoration 
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or repair of the Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. 
During such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such insurance proceeds until Lender 
has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, 
provided that such inspection shall be undenaken promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and 
restoration in a single payment or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is 
made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such insurance proceeds, Lender shall not be 
required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such proceeds. Fees for public adjusters, or other Urird parties, 
retained by Borrower shall not be paid out of the insurance proceeds and shall be the sole obligation of Borrower. If 
the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the insurance proceeds 
shall be applied to the smns secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, 
paid to Borrower. Such insurance proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2. 
If Borrower abandons the Property, Lender may file, negotiate and settle any available insurance claim and 
related matters. If Borrower does not respond within 30 days to a notice from Lender that the insurance carrier has 
offered to settle a claim, then Lender may negotiate and settle the claim. The 30-day period will begin when the 
notice is given. In either event, or if Lender acquires the Property under Section 22 or otherwise, Borrower hereby 
assigns to Lender (a) Borrower's rights to any insurance proceeds in an amount not to exceed the amounts unpaid 
under the Note or this Security Instrument, and (b) any other of Borrower's rights (other than the right to any refund 
of unearned premiwns paid by Borrower) under all insurance policies covering the Property, insofar as such rights 
are applicable to the coverage of the Property. Lender may use the insurance proceeds either to repair or restore the 
Property or to pay amounts unpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. 
6. Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal residence 
within 60 days after the execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as 
Borrower's principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender otherwise agrees in 
writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, or unless extenuating circumstances exist which are 
beyond Borrower's control. 
7. Preservation. Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Inspections. Borrower shall not 
destroy, damage or impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the Property. Whether 
or not Borrower is residing in the Property, Borrower shall maintain the Property in order to prevent the Property 
from deteriorating or decreasing in value due to its condition. Unless it is determined pursuant to Section 5 that 
repair or restoration is not economically feasible, Borrower shall promptly repair the Property if damaged to avoid 
further deterioration or damage. If insurance or condenmation proceeds are paid in connection with damage to, or 
the taking of, the Property, Borrower shall be responsible for repairing or restoring the Property only if Lender has 
released proceeds for such purposes. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single 
payment or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. If the insur.ince or condemnation proceeds 
are not sufficient to repair or restore the Property, Borrower is not relieved of Borrower's obligation for the 
completion of such repair or restoration. 
Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. If it has reasonable 
cause, Lender may inspect the interior of the improvements on the Property. Lender shall give Borrower notice at 
the time of or prior to such an interior inspection specifying such reasonable cause. 
8. Borrower's Loan Application. Borrower shall be in default if, during the Loan application process, 
Borrower or any persons or entities acting at the direction of Borrower or with Borrower's knowledge or consent 
gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements to Lender (or failed to provide Lender 
with material information) in connection with the Loan. Material representations include, but are not limited to, 
representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the Property as Borrower's principal residence. 
9. Protection of Lender's Interest in the Property and Rights Under this Security Instrument. If 
(a) Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, (b) there is a legal 
proceeding that might significantly affect Lender's interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security 
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Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condenmation or f01feiture, for enforcement of a lien 
which may attain priority over this Security Instrument or to enforce laws or regulations), or (c) Borrower has 
abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's 
interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument, including protecting and/or assessing the value of 
the Property, and securing and/or repairing the Property. Lender's actions can include, but are not limited to: 
(a) paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument; (b) appearing in court; and 
(c) paying reasonable attorneys' fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or rigltts under this Security 
Instrument, including its secured position in a bankruptcy proceeding. Securing the Property includes, but is not 
limited to, entering the Property to make repairs, change locks, replace or board up doors and windows. drain water 
from pipes, eliminate building or other code violations or dangerous conditions, and have utilities turned on or off. 
Although Lender may take action under this Section 9, Lender does not have to do so and is not under any duty or 
obligation to do so. It is agreed that Lender incurs no liability for not taking any or all actions authorized W1der this 
Section 9. 
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured 
by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and 
shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment 
If this Security Instrument is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the lease. If 
Borrower acquires fee title to the Property, the leasehold and the fee title shall not merge unless Lender agrees to the 
merger in writing. 
10. Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan, 
Borrower shall pay the premiwns required to maintain the Mortgage Insurance in effect. If, for any reason, the 
Mortgage Insurance coverage required by Lender ceases to be available from the mortgage insurer that previously 
provided such insurance and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments toward the premiums 
for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage substantially equivalent to the 
Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially equivalent to the cost to Borrower of the Mortgage 
Insurance previously in effect, from an alternate mortgage insurer selected by Lender. If substantially equivalent 
Mortgage Insurance coverage is not available, Borrower shall continue to pay to Lender the amount of the separately 
designated payments that were due when the insurance coverage ceased to be in effect. Lender will accept, use and 
retam these payments as a non-refundable loss reserve in lieu of Mortgage Insurance. Such loss reserve shall be 
non-refundable, notwithstanding the fact that the Loan is ultimately paid in full, and Lender shall not be required to 
pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such loss reserve. Lender can no longer require loss reserve payments if 
Mortgage Insurance coverage (in the amount and for the period that Lender requires) provided by an insurer selected 
by Lender again becomes available, is obtained, and Lender requires separately designated payments toward the 
premiums for Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan and 
Borrower was required to make separately designated payments toward the premiums for Mortgage Insurance, 
Borrower shall pay the premiwns required to maintain Mortgage Insurance in effect, or to provide a non-refundable 
loss reserve, until Lender's requirement for Mortgage Insurance ends in accordance with any written agreement 
between Borrower and Lender providing for such termination or until termination is required by Applicable Law. 
Nothing in this Section 10 affects Borrower's obligation to pay interest at the rate provided in the Note. 
Mortgage Insurance reimburses Lender (or any entity that purchases the Note) for certain losses it may 
incur if Borrower does not repay the Loan as agreed. Borrower is not a pany to the Mortgage Insurance. 
Mortgage insurers evaluate their total risk on all such insurance in force from time to time, and may enter 
into agreements with other parties that share or modify their risk, or reduce losses. These agreements are on terms 
and conditions that are satisfactory to the mortgage insurer and the other party (or parties) to these agreements. 
These agreements may require the mortgage insurer to make payments using any source of funds that the mortgage 
insurer may have available (which may include funds obtained from Mortgage Insurance premiums). 
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As a result of these agreements, Lender, any purchaser of the Note, another insurer, any reinsurer, any other 
entity, or any affiliate of any of the foregoing, may receive (directly or indirectly) amounts that derive from (or 
might be characterized as) a portion of Borrower's payments for Mortgage Insurance, in exchange for sharing or 
modifying the mortgage insurer's risk, or reducing losses. If such agreement provides that an affiliate of Lender 
takes a share of the insurer's risk in exchange for a share of the premiums paid to 1he insurer, the arrangement is 
often tenned "captive reinsurance." Further: 
(a) Any such agreements will not affect the amounts that Borrower has agreed to pay for Mortgage 
Insurance, or any other terms of the Loan. Such agreements will not increase the amount Borrower will owe 
for Mortgage Insurance, and they will not entitle Borrower to any refund. 
(b) Any such agreements will not affect the rights Borrower has - if any - with respect to the 
Mortgage Insurance under the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 or any other law. These rights may 
include the right to receive certain disclosures, to request and obtain cancellation of the Mortgage Insurance, 
to have the Mortgage Insurance terminated automatically, and/or to receive a refund of any Mortgage 
Insurance premiums that were unearned at the time of such cancellation or termination. 
11. Assignment of Miscellaneous Proceeds; Forfeiture. All Miscellaneous Proceeds are hereby 
assigned to and shall be paid to Lender. 
If the Property is damaged, such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of the 
Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. During such 
repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such Miscellaneous Proceeds until Lender has had 
an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided 
that such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may pay for the repairs and restoration in a single 
disbursement or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing 
or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such Miscellaneous Proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay 
Borrower any interest or earnings on such Miscellaneous Proceeds. If the restoration or repair is not economically 
feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by 
this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid to Borrower. Such Misce1laneous 
Proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2. 
In the event of a total taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall 
be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid to 
Borrower. 
In the event of a partial talcing, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market value of 
the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is equal to or greater than the amount 
of the sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately before the partial talcing, destruction, or loss in value, 
unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, 1he sums secured by this Security Instnnnent shall be 
reduced by the amount of the Miscellaneous Proceeds multiplied by the following fraction: (a) the total amount of 
the sums secured immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value divided by (b) the fair market 
value of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value. Any balance shall be paid 
to Borrower. 
In the event of a partial talcing, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market value of 
the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is less than the amount of the sums 
secured inunediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value, Wlless Borrower and Lender otherwise 
agree in writing, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the smns secured by this Security Instnnnent 
whether or not the sums are then due. 
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the Opposing Party 
(as defined in the next sentence) offers to make an award to settle a claim for damages, Borrower fails to respond to 
Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender is authorized to collect and apply the Miscellaneous 
Proceeds either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or 
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not then due. "Opposing Party'' means the third party that owes Borrower Miscellaneous Proceeds or the party 
against whom Borrower has a right of action in regard to Miscellaneous Proceeds. 
Borrower shall be in default if any action or proceeding. whether civil or criminal, is begun that, in 
Lender's judgment, could resuh in forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment of Lender's interest in the 
Property or rights under this Security Instrument. Borrower can cure such a default and, if acceleration has 
occurred, reinstate as provided in Section 19, by causing the action or proceeding to be dismissed with a ruling that, 
in Lender's judgment, precludes forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment of Lender's interest in the 
Property or rights wder this Security Instnnnent The proceeds of any award or claim for damages that are 
attributable to the impairment of Lender's interest in the Property are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender. 
All Miscellaneous Proceeds that are not applied to restoration or repair of the Property shall be applied in 
the order provided for in Section 2. 
12. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time for payment 
or modification of amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument granted by Lender to Borrower or 
any Successor in Interest of Borrower shall not operate to release the liability of Borrower or any Successors in 
Interest of Borrower. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against any Successor in Interest of 
Borrower or to refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortiz.ation of the swns secured by this 
Security Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower or any Successors in Interest of 
Borrower. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy including, without limitation, Lender's 
acceptance of payments from third persons, entities or Successors in Interest of Borrower or in amounts less than the 
amount then due, shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy. 
13. Joint and Several Liability; Co-signers; Successors and As~igns Bound. Borrower covenants and 
agrees that Borrower's obligations and liability shall be joint and several. However, any Borrower who co-signs this 
Security Instrument but does not execute the Note (a "co-signer"): (a) is co-signing this Security Instrument only to 
mortgage, grant and convey the co-signer's interest in the Property under the tenns of this Security Instrument; (b) is 
not personally obligated to pay the smns secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lender and any 
other Borrower can agree to extend, modify, forbear or make any accommodations with regard to the terms of this 
Security Instrument or the Note without the co-signer's consent. 
Subject to the provisions of Section 18, any Successor in Interest of Borrower who assumes Borrower's 
obligations under this Security Instrument in writing. and is approved by Lender, shall obtain all of Borrower's 
rights and benefits under this Security Instrument. Borrower shall not be released from Borrower's obligations and 
liability under this Security Instrument unless Lender agrees to such release in writing. The covenants and 
agreements of this Security Instrument shall bind (except as provided in Section 20) and benefit the successors and 
assigns of Lender. 
14. Loan Charges. Lender may charge Borrower fees for services performed in connection with 
Borrower's default, for the pUipOse of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security 
Instrument, including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees. In regard to any 
other fees, the absence of express authority in this Security Instrument to charge a specific fee to Borrower shall not 
be construed as a prohibition on the charging of such fee. Lender may not charge fees that are expressly prohibited 
by this Security Instrument or by Applicable Law. 
If the Loan is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges, and that law is finally interpreted so that 
the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the Loan exceed the permitted 
limits, then: (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the 
permitted limit; and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded 
to Borrower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal owed under the Note or by making a 
direct payment to Borrower. If a refund reduces principal, the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment 
without any prepayment charge (whether or not a prepayment charge is provided for m1der the Note). Borrower's 
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acceptance of any such refund made by direct payment to Borrower will constitute a waiver of any right of action 
Borrower might have arising out of such overcharge. 
15. Notices. All notices given by Borrower or Lender in connection with this Security Instnnnenl must be 
in writing. Any notice to Borrower in connection with this Security Instrument shall be deemed to have been given 
to Borrower when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to Bonower' s notice address if sent by other 
means. Notice to any one Borrower shall constitute notice to all Borrowers unless Applicable Law expressly 
requires otherwise. The notice address shall be the Property Address unless Borrower has designated a substitute 
notice address by notice to Lender. Borrower shall promptly notify Lender of Borrower's change of address. If 
Lender specifies a procedure for reporting Borrower's change of address, then Borrower shall only report a change 
of address through that specified procedure. There may be only one designated notice address under this Security 
Instrument at any one time. Any notice to Lender shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail 
to Lender's address stated herein unless Lender has designated another address by notice to Borrower. Any notice 
in connection with this Security Instrument shall not be deemed to have been given to Lender until actually received 
by Lender. If any notice required by this Security Instrument is also required under Applicable Law, the Applicable 
Law requirement wiJl satisfy the corresponding requirement under this Security Instrument 
16. Governing Law; Severability; Rules of Construction. This Security Instrument shall be governed 
by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. All rights and obligations contained 
in this Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and limitations of Applicable Law. Applicable Law 
might explicitly or implicitly allow the parties to agree by contract or it might be silent, but such silence shall not be 
construed as a prohibition against agreement by contract. In the event that any provision or clause of this Security 
Instrument or the Note conflicts with Applicable Law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security 
Instrument or the Note which can be given effect without the conflicting provision. 
As used in this Security Instrument: (a) words of the masculine gender shall mean and include 
corresponding neuter words or words of the feminine gender; (b) words in the singular shall mean and include the 
plural and vice versa; and (c) the word "may" gives sole discretion without any obligation to take any action. 
17. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be given one copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument. 
18. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 18, "Interest 
in the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not limited to, those beneficial 
interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or escrow agreement, the intent 
of which is the transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser. 
If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred ( or if Borrower is not a 
natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior written consent, 
Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument. However, this 
option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law. 
If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide 
a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15 within which 
Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to the 
expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security Instrument without further 
notice or demand on Borrower. 
19. Borrower's Right to Reinstate After Acceleration. If Borrower meets certain conditions, Borrower 
shall have the right to have enforcement of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time prior to the earliest of: 
(a) five days before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in this Security Instrument; (b) such 
other period as Applicable Law might specify for the termination of Borrower's right to reinstate; or (c) enlry of a 
judgment enforcing this Security Instrument. Those conditions are that Borrower: (a) pays Lender all sums which 
then would be due under this Security Instrument and the Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any 
default of any other covenants or agreements; (c) pays all expenses incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument, 
including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees, and other fees 
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incurred for the purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument; and 
(d) talces such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure that Lender's interest in the Property and rights 
under this Security Instrument, and Borrower's obligation to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument, shall 
continue unchanged. Lender may require that Borrower pay such reinstatement sums and expenses in one or more 
of the folJowing forms, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check, bank check, treasurer's 
check or cashier's check, provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured by a 
federal agency, instrumentality or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer. Upon reinstatement by Borrower, this 
Security Insttument and obligations secured hereby shall remain fully effective as if no acceleration had occurred. 
However, this right to reinstate shall not apply in the case of acceleration under Section 18. 
20. Sale of Note; Change of Loan Semcer; Notice of Grievance. The Note or a partial interest in the 
Note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Borrower. A 
sale might result in a change in the entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that collects Periodic Payments due under 
the Note and this Security Instrument and performs other mortgage loan servicing obligations under the Note, this 
Security Instrument, and Applicable Law. There also might be one or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated 
to a sale of the Note. If there is a change of the Loan Servicer, Borrower will be given written notice of the change 
which will state the name and address of the new Loan Servicer, the address to which payments should be made and 
any other infonnation RESPA requires in connection with a notice of transfer of servicing. If the Note is sold and 
thereafter the Loan is serviced by a Loan Servicer other than the purchaser of the Note, the mongage loan sen:icing 
obligations to Borrower will remain with the Loan Servicer or be transferred to a successor Loan Servicer and are 
not assumed by the Note purchaser unless otherwise provided by the Note purchaser. 
Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence, join, or be joined to any judicial action (as either an 
individual litigant or the member of a class) that arises from the other party's actions pursuant to this Security 
Instrument or that alleges that the other party has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by reason of, this 
Security Instrument, until such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party (with such notice given in 
compliance with the requirements of Section 15) of such alleged breach and afforded tbe other party hereto a 
reasonable period after the giving of such notice to take corrective action. If Applicable Law provides a time period 
which must elapse before certain action can be taken, that time period will be deemed to be reasonable for purposes 
of this paragraph. The notice of acceleration and opportunity to cure given to Borrower pursuant to Section 22 and 
the notice of acceleration given to Borrower pursuant to Section 18 shall be deemed to satisfy tbe notice and 
opportunity to take corrective action provisions of this Section 20. 
21. Hazardous Substances. As used in this Section 21: (a) "Hazardous Substances" are those substances 
defined as toxic or hazardous substances, pollutants, or wastes by Environmental Law and the following substances: 
gasoline, kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides and herbicides, volatile solvents, 
materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials; (b) "Environmental Law" means federal 
laws and laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that relate to health, safety or environmental 
protection; (c) "Environmental Cleanup" includes any response action, remedial action, or removal action, as 
defined in Environmental Law; and (d) an "Environmental Condition" means a condition that can cause, contribute 
to, or otherwise trigger an Environmental Cleanup. 
Borrower shall not cause or pennit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any Hazardous 
Substances, or threaten to release any Haz.ardous Substances, on or in the Property. Borrower shall not do, nor allow 
anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property (a) that is in violation of any Environmental Law, (b) which 
creates an Environmental Condition, or (c) which, due to the presence, use, or release of a Hazardous Substance, 
creates a condition that adversely affects the value of the Property. The preceding two sentences shall not apply to 
the presence, use, or storage on the Property of small quantities of Hazardous Substances that are generally 
recognized to be appropriate to normal residential uses and to maintenance of the Property (including, but not 
limited to, hazardous substances in consumer products). 
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Borrower shall promptly give Lender written notice of (a) any investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit or 
other action by any governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any Hazardous 
Substance or Enviromnental Law of which Borrower has actual knowledge, (b) any Environmental Condition. 
including but not limited to, any spilling, leaking, discharge, release or threat of release of any Hazardous Substance, 
and (c) any condition caused by the presence, use or release of a Hazardous Substance which adversely affects the 
value of the Property. If Borrower learns, or is notified by any governmental or regulatory authority. or any private 
party, that any removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Property is necessary, 
Borrower shall promptly take all necessary remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law. Nothing 
herein shall create any obligation on Lender for an Envirorunental Cleanup. 
NON-UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 
22. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following 
Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument (but not prior to acceleration 
under Section 18 unless Applicable Law provides otherwise). The notice shall specify: (a) the default; (b) the 
action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to 
Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or before the date 
specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument and sale of 
the Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the 
right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or any other defense of Borrower to 
acceleration and sale. H the default is not cored on or before the date specified in the notice, Lendu at its 
option may require immediate payment in ful] of all sums secured by this Security Instrument without 
further demand and may invoke the power of sale and any other remedies permitted by Applicable Law. 
Lender shall be entitled to collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22. 
including. but not limited to. reasonable attorneys• fees and costs of title evidence. 
H Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall execute or cause Trustee to execute written notice 
of the occurrence of an event of default and of Lender's election to cause the Property to be sold, and shall 
cause such notice to be recorded in each county in which any part of the Property is located. Lender or 
Tnistee shaU mail copies of the notice as prescribed by Applicable Law to Borrower and to other persons 
prescribed by Applicable Law. Trustee shall give public notice of sale to the persons and in the manner 
prescribed by Applicable Law. After the time required by Applicable Law, Trustee, without demand on 
Borrower, shall sell the Property at public auction to the highest bidder at the time and place and under the 
terms designated in the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in any order Trustee determines. Trustee 
may postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public announcement at the time and place of any 
previously scheduled sale. Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale. 
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property without any covenant 
or warranty, expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the 
truth of the statements made therein. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale in the following order: 
(a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable Trustee's and attorneys' fees; (b) to all 
sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the person or persons legally entitled to it. 
23. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall request 
Trustee to reconvey the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured 
by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property without warranty to the person or 
persons legally entitled to it Such person or persons shall pay any recordation costs. Lender may charge such 
person or persons a fee for reconveying the Property, but only if the fee is paid to a third party (such as the Trustee) 
for senrices rendered and the charging of the fee is pennitted under Applicable Law. 
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24. Substitute Trustee. Lender may, for any reason or cause, from time to time remove Trustee and 
appoint a successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor 
trustee shall succeed to all the title, power and duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by Applicable Law. 
25. Area and Location of Property. Either the Property is not more than forty acres in area or the 
Property is located within an incorporated city or village. 
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this Security 














------------- [Space Below This Unr, For Acl<nowledgment} -------------
State of ~VL() 




Before me the undersigned authority, on this day persona1ly appeared 
knmn1 to me (or proved to me through an identity card or other docwnent) 
to be the person(s) whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instnnnent, and acknowledged to me that he/she/they 
executed the same for the purposes iWiliiQVsideration therein expressed. 
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ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST 
Bank of the West , a California corporation ("Bank of the Wesr), the 
beneficiary under that certain deed of trust executed by Karla Kay King Love, a 
single individual, as grantor/trustor, in favor of Bank of the West, as beneficiary, 
securing a promissory note in the original principal sum of $86,500.00, recorded 
July 28, 2004, as instrument no. 248616, in the records of Owyhee County, Idaho 
(the "Deed of Trust"), does hereby assign and transfer unto Gordon G. King and 
Rose M. King, husband and wife, whose address is 1912.f King Lane. Murphy, 
Idaho 83650, all right, title, and interest in and to the Deed of Trust, without Bank 
of the West's warranties, express or implied, as to the priority of the Deed of 
Trust, but with Bank of the West's warranty that it is the legal and lawful owner 
and holder of the Deed of Trust and the promissory note and other loan 
documents associated therewith. 
DATED this (2. 'ti day of September, 2005. 
ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST - 1 
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STATE OF HAWAII ) 
: 55. 
City &County of Honolulu ) 
On the f2t"' day of September, 2005, before me, the undersigned notary 
public in and for said state, personally appeared GARY v. KAWAMtJJO , 
known or identified to me to be the A$SISTANJ VICE msioon of First 
Hawaiian Bank, the company that executed the within instrument or the person who 
executed the same on behalf of said company, and acknowledged to me that said 
company executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day 
and year first above written. 
ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST - 2 
No ary blic for Hawaii 
Residingat Honoluh..• HI 
Commission expires: N dv 1 4 2005 
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200- 6th Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Cleverley@fuf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-14-0278 
DECLARATION OF RAYMOND JAYO 
IN SUPPORT OF EXP ARTE MOTION 
FOR TEMORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER 
Under penalty of perjury wider the laws of the state ofldaho, the undersigned declares: 
I . I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in this action and am not 
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and 
could testify to them in a court proceeding. 
2. I am a friend of the Plaintiffs and have used King Lane to get to Plaintiffs houses for more 
than 5 years. 
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3. On or Around August 21, 2014, someone installed a gate across King Lane. Prior to the 
installation of this gate, there had never been any obstruction of the roadway or any 
prohibition of access. 
4. On or around August 22, 2014, I attempted to cross the gated roadway to get to John 
Fuquay's house. Rose King confronted me and told me I was not allowed to use King 
Lane to get to the Fuquay's house. 
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF 
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE 
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENAL TY OF PERJURY. 
Dated: August 27, 2014 
COMPLAINT- 2 FIDELJTV NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
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SEATTLE, WA 98101 
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200- 6th Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -14-0278 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY IN 
SUPPORT OF EX PARTE MOTION FOR 
TEMORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Oregon, the undersigned declares: 
Properties and Parties 
1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this action. I am submitting this declaration in support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (the "Motion") preventing any of the 
Defendants from blocking access to our property over King Lane. 
2. A street map showing the general location of the area is attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Motion. An aerial map showing the Owyhee County Assessor's lot boundaries is attached 
as Exhibit "B" to the Motion. A Google Earth map showing an aerial view and general 
COMPLAINT- I FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 




road boundaries and identities of the affected parcel owners is attached as Exhibit "C" to 
the Motion. 
3. Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuquay 
Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once part of the John Fuquay Parcel. The 
legal description for the Clinton Fuquay Parcel is shown on the warranty deed attached as 
Exhibit "D" to the Motion. 
4. I own the parcel (the "John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the Clinton Fuquay 
Parcel. The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the Trustee's Deed 
dated October 13, 1989 attached as Exhibit "E" to the Motion (less the Clinton Fuquay 
Parcel). 
5. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel l ") located south of King Lane. 
There are two parcels which were conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for 
the Low Parcel 1 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F" to the 
Motion. 
6. Avco Financial Services of Idaho Falls, Inc. may claim some right, title or interest in the 
Low Parcel 1 by virtue of a Real Estate Mortgage in the amount of $68,000 which was 
recorded on or around March 18, 1996 as Owyhee county records no. 2183 73. The 
Mortgage was executed by Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner, husband and wife 
and encumbers Low Parcel 1. It is possible that this mortgage was paid but was never 
released. A copy of the Mortgage is attached as Exhibit "G" to the Motion. 
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7. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2") located south of King Lane. 
Oreana Loop Road crosses the northwest corner of Low Parcel 2. The legal description 
for the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "H" to 
the Motion. 
8. The Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 owns the parcel to the north of King 
Lane (the "Heart K Ranch Parcel"). The legal description got the Heart K Ranch Parcel is 
shown on the Gift Deed attached as Exhibit "I" to the Motion. 
9. Gordon G. King and Rose M. King may claim some right, title or interest in the Heart K. 
Ranch Parcel by virtue of a Deed of Trust in the amount of $86,500 in favor of One West 
Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as Owyhee County records no. 248616 and 
encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit 
"J." The deed of trust was assigned to Gordon G. King and Rose M. King on September 
12, 2005. A copy of the Assignment of Deed of Trust is attached as Exhibit "K" to the 
Motion. 
10. First American Title Insurance Company may claim some right, title or interest in the 
Heart K. Ranch Parcel by virtue of being named as the trustee under a Deed of Trust in the 
amount of $86,500 in favor of One West Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as 
Owyhee County records no. 248616 and encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy 
of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit "J" to the Motion. 
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11. The properties at issue in this Complaint are located in Owyhee County, Idaho. They are 
located approximately three miles east of Oreana and are south of Highway 78. The 
closest public roadway to the properties is Oreana Loop Road. 
12. Oreana Loop road runs in a generally west direction from Highway 78 to a point near a 
location where Low Parcels 1 and 2 and the Heart K Ranch Parcels intersect. Near that 
location, Oreana Loop Road turns and continues in a southwesterly direction through Low 
Parcel 1. 
13. King Lane is a private roadway that continues westerly from where Oreana Loop Road 
turns southwest Oreana Loop Road and provides the access to the Clint Fuquay Parcel and 
the John Fuquay Parcel. 
14. The Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay 
Parcel since at least 1989. 
15. King Lane has been an unobstructed roadway used by Plaintiffs and the general public 
since at least 1989. 
Blockage of King Lane by Defendants 
16. On or Around August 21, 2014, one or all of the Defendants installed gates across King 
Lane to prevent us from accessing King Lane to our properties. One gate was installed at 
the northeast corner of the Clinton Fuquay Parcel and a second gate was installed near the 
intersection of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
17. Pictures of the gated area are attached as Exhibit "K" to the Motion. 
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18. On or around August 22, 2014, a friend of ours, Raymond Jayco, attempted to cross the 
gated roadway to get to our house. Rose King confronted the friend and told him he was 
not allowed to use King Lane to access our property. 
19. We are in immediate need of access to their properties over King Lane. 
20. The gates interfere with norm.al delivery services used by Plaintifls such as Federal 
Express, UPS and Schwann's. 
21. The gates interfere with Plaintiffs' access to emergency services such as police, fire and 
ambulance services. 
22. Defendants' installation of the gate across King Lane was done after this lawsuit was 
filed, and we were not consulted prior to the installation of the gate. None of the 
Defendants will be harmed or damaged by allowing us to continue the same uninterrupted 
access over King Lane that we have used for 25 years. Therefore, we should not be 
required to post a bond for the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order. 
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF 
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE 
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENAL TY OF PE Y. 
Dated: August 27, 2014 
John FuquaY, 
COMPLAINT- 5 FIDELl1Y NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200- 6th Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Cleverley@fuf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-14-0278 
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW 
CLEVERLEY IN SUPPORT OF EX 
PARTE MOTION FOR TEMORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER 
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state ofldaho, the undersigned declares: 
1. I am the attorney for Plaintiffs in this matter. 
2. I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in this action and am not 
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and 
could testify to them in a court proceeding. 
3. This case was filed on August 11, 2014. The Summons and Complaints for each named 
party were sent for service shortly after that. I have received confirmation that First 
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American Title has been served, but I have not received confirmation of service on any of 
the other defendants. 
4. I have not received any communications from any of the defendants or any attorneys for 
the defendants. I do not have phone numbers for any of the defendants. 
5. On September 3, 2014, my office overnighted copies of the Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and exhibits, Declaration of John Fuquay, Declaration of Raymond 
Jayco, Declaration of Matthew Cleverley and the proposed Order to each of the 
defendants to give them notice of the motion. 
6. Because the blocking of the roadway presents an immediate threat to the health and safety 
of Plaintiffs because it blocks emergency vehicles, and a delay in giving notice to the 
defendants creates an undue risk, I believe that entry of the Order is appropriate without 
additional notice to defendants. 
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF 
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE 
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY OF PERJURY. 




RONALD P. RAINEY -ISB # 1022 
Attorneys at Law 
110 North Ninth Avenue 
Post Office Box 26 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 or 459-6147 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
FiL~~ ____ AM.. . P.M. 
SEP O 9 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 






SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K ) 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;) 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN ) 




GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ) 
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the ) 
HEARTKRANCHTRUSTUTA ) 





CASE NO. CV 2014-0278 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS 
BY DEFENDANTS TRUSTEES FOR 
THE HEART KING RANCH TRUST 
UT A DECEMBER 28, 2012 
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) 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
COMES NOW, the Defendants, GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ROSE M. KING, as 
Beneficiary,bothonbehalfoftheHEARTKRANCHTRUSTUTADECEMBER28,2012HEART 
K RANCH (hereinafter, "Heart K Ranch"), by and through its attorney of record, Ronald P. Rainey, 




1. The Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. 
II. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. Unless specifically admitted herein, The Defendant Heart K Ranch denies each and 
every allegation contained in the Plaintiffs' complaint. The Defendant Heart K Ranch specifically 
responds to the numbered allegations of the complaint as follows: 
3. The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits the nature of the proceeding, as alleged in 
paragraph 1 of the complaint, but denies the validity of those claims as later specifically alleged 
within the complaint. 
4. The Defendant Heart K Ranch denies the allegations made in paragraph 2 of the 
complaint as made specifically to it concerning "parcels of property that are burdened by King 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS BY DEFENDANT HEART K RANCH -PAGE 2 
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Lane," and further denies all allegations as to any burden of any easement, as alleged in that 
paragraph. The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without specific knowledge to admit or deny the 
allegations as to property it does not own or occupy and therefore denies the same on that basis. 
5. The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits the allegation made in paragraph 3 that the 
Plaintiffs' claims seek neither monetary damages nor to change any property boundaries. The 
Defendant Heart K Ranch denies the allegation that the Plaintiffs have any "right" to access their 
properties over King Lane, as alleged in that paragraph. 
6. The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits that the general location of the properties is as 
alleged in paragraph 4 of the complaint. 
7. In response to paragraph 5 of the complaint the Defendant Heart K Ranch only admits 
that the referenced Exhibits, "A," "B,", and "C," are attached to the complaint, but does not 
otherwise admit or deny the genuineness or accuracy of those documents, and specifically relies upon 
the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36(a) declaring that, "The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document 
attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make 
a verified denial thereof by a responsive pleading or affidavit." 
8. The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the 
allegation made in paragraph 6 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal 
description attached as Exhibit "D" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or 
accuracy of that document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R. C .P. 36( a) declaring that, 
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as 
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive 
pleading or affidavit." 
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9. The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the 
allegation made in paragraph 7 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal 
description attached as Exhibit "E" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or 
accuracy of that document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36( a) declaring that, 
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as 
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive 
pleading or affidavit." 
10. The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the 
allegation made in paragraph 8 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal 
description attached as Exhibit "F" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or 
accuracy of that document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36( a) declaring that, 
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as 
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive 
pleading or affidavit." 
11. The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the 
allegation made in paragraph 9 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal 
description attached as Exhibit "G" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or 
accuracy of that document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36(a) declaring that, 
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as 
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive 
pleading or affidavit." 
12. The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the 
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allegation made in paragraph 10 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal 
description attached as Exhibit "H" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or 
accuracy of that document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36( a) declaring that, 
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as 
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive 
pleading or affidavit." 
13. The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits the allegations made in paragraph 11 of the 
complaint, and as to the legal description attached as Exhibit "I'' to the complaint, does not admit 
or deny the genuineness or accuracy of that document, and specifically relies upon the provision of 
l.R.C.P. 36(a) declaring that, "The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a 
pleading shall not be deemed as admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified 
denial thereof by a responsive pleading or affidavit." 
14. The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the 
allegation made in paragraph 12 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal 
description attached as Exhibits "J" and "K" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the 
genuineness or accuracy of those documents, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P. 
36(a) declaring that, "The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading 
shall not be deemed as admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial 
thereof by a responsive pleading or affidavit." 
15. The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the 
allegation made in paragraph 13 of the complaint and therefore denies the same, and as to the legal 
description attached as Exhibit "J" to the complaint, does not admit or deny the genuineness or 
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accuracy of that document, and specifically relies upon the provision ofl.R.C.P. 36( a) declaring that, 
"The genuineness, accuracy or truth or any document attached to a pleading shall not be deemed as 
admitted by the other party by reason of failure to make a verified denial thereof by a responsive 
pleading or affidavit." 
16. The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits the allegations made in paragraphs 14 and 15 
of the complaint. 
17. The Defendant Heart K Ranch admits that King Lane is a private roadway as alleged 
in paragraph 16 of the complaint that continues westerly from where Oreana Loop Road turns 
southwest, and further admits that King Lane provides "an" access to the Cling Fuquay Parcel and 
the John Fuquay Parcel as alleged in that paragraph of the complaint. 
18. The Defendant Heart K Ranch is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny 
whether the Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Cling Fuquay Parcel and John Fuquay 
Parcels since at least 1989, as alleged in paragraph 17 of the complaint, and therefore deny the same. 
19. The Defendant Heart K Ranch denies the allegations made in paragraph 18 of the 
complaint, and further responds that while the footnote attached to paragraph 18 of the complaint 
may or may not be a correct statement of the law, it does not apply to the facts of this case, and 
therefore in response to the allegations of paragraph 18 denies the application of that statement of 
the law to the facts of this case, if so intended to be alleged in that paragraph. 
20. The Defendant Herat K Ranch denies the allegations made in paragraph 19 of the 
complaint. 




As declared in, Fuhriman v. State Dept. of Transportation, 14 3 Idaho 800, 15 3 P. 3d 480, 483 
(2007), under I.R.C.P. 8(c), "An affirmative defense is '[al defendant's assertion raisin& new 
facts and amments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff's or prosecution's claim, even if all 
alleeations in the complaint are true.' Blacks Law Dictionary 186 (2d Pocket ed.2001)." 
( emphasis added). Therefore, this answering defendant, "Heart K Ranch," as declared and described 
above in the opening paragraphs of in this I.R.C.P. 7(a) pleading, further alleges the following 
affirmative defenses to the Fuquay Plaintiffs' claims, as made in this complaint: 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
21. A "trust" is not itself a separate legal entity that can itself own property, or that can 
be named as a party in a lawsuit under Idaho law, but instead, a ''trust" merely describes a 
relationship having certain attributes. See e.g., In re Thompson, 454 B.R. 486,492 (Bkrtcy.D.Ida. 
2011) ( citing Idaho case law). Therefore, the Fuquay Plaintiffs' claims must fail as having been only 
alleged against directly against the Heart K Ranch Trust itself, rather than having been brought and 
alleged against the trustees of that trust. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
22. Gordon King, was named as a "coparty" Defendant by the Plaintiffs to this action, 
but was actually deceased on the date the complaint commencing this action was filed, August 11, 
2014, and therefore could not be named as a party Defendant in this civil action. Inasmuch as the 
claims placed at issue by the Fuquay Plaintiffs' complaint appear to survive Gordon King's death 
without the need of substitution, and as further provided by I.R.C.P. 25(a)(2), "The death shall be 
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suggested upon the record and the action shall proceed in the favor or against the surviving parties." 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
23. Inasmuch as Gilbert King is the sole trustee of the Herat K Ranch Trust, and he has 
not been named as a defendant in this action in a representative capacity under LR. C.P. 17 (b ), in his 
standing as trustee of the Heart K Ranch, the Fuquay Plaintiffs' claims must fail as having been only 
alleged directly against the Heart K Ranch Trust itself, rather than having been brought and alleged 
against the trustee of that trust. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
24. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has been entirely permissive, and not by, 
or under, any claim of right. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
25. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has NOT BEEN open and notorious, as 
is required as one of the five elements that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence in order 
to establish a prescriptive easement. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
26. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has NOT BEEN continuous and 
uninterrupted, as is required as one of the five elements that must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence in order to establish a prescriptive easement. 
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SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
27. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has NOT BEEN adverse and under a claim 
of right, as is required as one of the five elements that must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence in order to establish a prescriptive easement. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
28. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has NOT BEEN with the actual or imputed 
knowledge of the owner of the servient estate, as is required as one of the five elements that must 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence in order to establish a prescriptive easement. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
29. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has NOT BEEN for the applicable 
statutory period, as is required as one of the five elements that must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence in order to establish a prescriptive easement. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
30. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has in fact been undertaken in common 
with the servient landowner over which King Lane passes. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
31. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint has been without the knowledge or adverse 
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and prescriptive claim sufficient to place the servient landowner on notice of that claim so as to have 
the opportunity to assert his or her rights against the development of an easement by prescription. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
32. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint did not meet the necessary requirements 
of a prescriptive right before the change in the statutory adverse period to twenty years in 2006, such 
that any prescriptive right claim must be established by a use that has persisted for a period of 
twenty years. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
33. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint, was of a limited character and use, as 
undertaken by a limited number of individuals and vehicles, such that any prescriptive right that 
might be recognized is limited to the nature and use established by that limited number of individuals 
and vehicles that persisted during the prescriptive use period. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
34. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint is limited in scope and purpose. to the 
length, width, location, and character of the prescriptive easement during the period of prescriptive 
use. 
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
35. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint DID NOT constitute an invasion or 
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infringement upon the rights of the servient owner over which King Lane crossed, and therefore no 
presumption arose that the use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs was in any way adverse to the to 
servient owners, as a necessary element of their prescriptive easement claim. 
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
36. Any and all use of King Lane by the Plaintiffs, and by their predecessors in interest, 
at all times relevant to the matter alleged in the complaint was only occasional and sporadic and 
therefore did not rise to the level of use required to meet the requirement of "continuous and 
uninterrupted use" that is necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. 
IV. 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
3 7. The Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants John E. Fuquay, Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey 
Rose Fuquay (hereinafter, "the Fuquays") previously used King Lane in common with the 
Defendants and the Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants. The Fuquays use of King Lane was infrequent 
and sporadic and mostly for incidental residential use, such as taking their children to school. 
38. Recently the Fuquays use of King Lane changed dramatically both as to frequency 
and type of use, by increasing that use to almost daily use and from use by passenger vehicles to very 
heavy commercial trucks used in hauling commercial construction materials. 
39. As a result of this change in use the nature and extent of the prior permissive use that 
the Fuquays had been allowed by the Defendants in this action, and particularly by the Heart K. 
Ranch Counterclaimants, has been greatly exceeded. 
40. The Fuquays have no right to make use of King Lane for the uses that they are 
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currently making of that access road by use oflarge commercial trucks on a daily basis, either by way 




41. The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants reallege all of the foregoing as if fully set forth 
42. The Idaho Declaratory Judgments Act, I.C. § 10-1201 et seq., provides for the 
determination of rights, status, and other legal relations between parties to an action, including the 
interpretation of contracts (I.C. § 10-1203), deeds, and other writings (I.C. § 10-12012), and also 
provides that the court may grant either negative or affirmative relief (I.C. § 10-1201 ), or such other 
relief as may be requested between the parties (I.C. § 10-1205). 
4 3. Further relief may be granted on a petition for declaratory judgment whenever deemed 
necessary or proper (LC. § 10-1208), whether or nor that further relief has been, is, or could be 
claimed (I.C. § 10-1201). 
44. The Court can, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights will be 
adjudicated by the proposed declaratory judgment, to show cause why further relief should not be 
granted. (I.C. § 10-1208). 
45. The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants seek declaratory relief establishing that the 
Fuquays Counterdefendants have exceeded the nature and scope of their permissive right to use King 
Lane for ordinary and infrequent residential use. 
46. The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants seek declaratory relief establishing that the 
Fuquay Counterdefendants have no legal or equitable right to use King Lane for the current uses 
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4 7. The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants reallege all of the foregoing as if fully set forth 
48. As alleged in the general factual allegations supporting these counterclaims, the 
actions of the Fuquay Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants in using King Lane as it crosses the property of 
the Heart K Ranch is in direct violation of the protectable property rights of the legal and equal 
ownership rights held by the owners of Heart King Ranch. 
49. There is no adequate remedy at law for the injury that is being inflicted by the actions 
and conduct of the Fuquay Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants. 
50. Unless enjoined the continued actions and conduct of the Fuquay Plaintiffs/ 
Counterdefendants will produce great irreparable injury upon the Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
51. When the right at issue has is clearly defined, and the possibility of future and on-
going interference remains, then the entry of a permanent injunction is the appropriate remedy. 
52. A permanent injunction is an especially appropriate remedy when the transgressing 
party retains the means of promptly resuming a prohibited practice, even if he declares that he no 
longer intends to do so. 
53. A permanent injunction can be granted under Rule 65(e), I.R.C.P., "When it appears 
by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief, or any part 
thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the actions complained of ... 
perpetually. 
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54. The bond requirement under Rule 65(c) only applies to "restraining orders" or 
"preliminary injunction[ s ]" such that no bond is required for the issuance of a permanent injunction. 
5 5. The Fuquay Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, including their employees, invitees, agents, 
and other representatives should be ordered and restrained by entry of permanent injunction as 
follows: 
herein. 
a. From any entry onto, or use of, King Lane by means of any motor vehicle, 
whatsoever, as the private roadway is owned by and held out only for the use of, the 
Heart K Ranch and its invitees; and 
b. From any in any way, or by any means, interfering with or obstructing the gates, 
chains, or any locks, or other hardware related to the structure and operation of those 
gates, which may have been placed across the entries to King Lane; and 
c. By undertaking to obstruct, by any means, or to molest or harass the users, in the 
rightful use of King Lane by the owners and invitees of Heart K Ranch. 
THIRD COUNTERCLAIM 
QUIET TITLE 
56. The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants reallege all of the foregoing as if fully set forth 
57. The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants request a determination that no prescriptive or 
adverse rights exist in King Lane as it crosses their property, and that a decree quieting title in them, 
and extinguishing any such claims, or easements, be entered by this Court, such as can be recorded 
in the land title records of Owyhee County. 
WHEREFORE, this Court is requested to entered judgment for the Defendant/ 
Counterclaimants Heart K Ranch, as set forth below: 
1. Denying all the claims made by the Fuquay Plaintiffs in this action. 
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2. Granting the Heart K. Ranch declaratory relief as requested in this action. 
3. Granting the Heart K Ranch a permanent injunction as requested in this action. 
4. Quieting titled in the Heart K. Ranch as requested in this action. 
5. For such other relief as this Court may find is merited in this action. 
Respectfully submitted tru:fZ-- day of September, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this t? day of September, 2014,a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served upon tliefullowing: 
Matthew R. Cleverley [ ] 
Fidelity National Law GROUP [ ] 
1200 6th A venue, Suite 620 [ ] 
Seattle, Washington 98101 [ ] 
Telephone: 206-224-6003 [ ] 
Facsimile: 877-655-5281 
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf.com 
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Attorney ut Luw 
P.O. Box 26 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Phone (208)459-3659 
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K. Rnnch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
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R9SE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN ) 
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GILBERT KING, u~ Trustee; and 
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JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
DECLARATION OF DENICE COLLETT -1 
DECLARATION OF ENICE 
COLLEIT IN SUPPO OF DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTIONTOPLA TIFFS' EX-PARTE 
MOTION FOR TEM RARY 
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FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) ______________ ) 
R 20882 '051 PAGE. 2/ 3 
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Jdaho, the ndersigned declares: 
t. I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in t is action and am not 
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events · this declaration and 
could testify to them in a court proceeding. 
2. I reside on Collett Lane, Orennn, Idt1ho nnd huve been " bu::1 driv r for the Grundview 
School DiRtrict for 33_years. 
3. I start my bus route at my residence by driving down Collett L nc to Oreana Loop, 
driving west on Oreana Loop to the Fuquay mail box where I pick up 
_.,.,0.""'4-« _,.,..,,4.......,0 ___ Fuquay, son of J.C. Fuquay. l proceed west on reana Loop through 
(7 
the village of Oreana up to the west end of Oreana Loop and High ay 78 east to the east 
of Oreana Loop where I make another stop. J do not make a sch ol bus stop at Kings 
Lane. When I return the children home, I reverse the route on Orea a Loop and Highway 
78 dropping off ~ Fuquay at the Fuquay mailbox and tlle1 I go to my residence 
•/. - . ~ ~,aA- !JC. d- ~ ~ ~ 
on Collett L.rne. 7 ,IV~~ · "' (7 / ~ . 
~ ~ c<.X. .~ ,_.~. 
I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO HE LAW OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AN CORRECT. 
Dated this <j' day of September, 2014. 
Denice Collett 
DECLARATION Of DENICE COLLETT ·2 
86
Se~.09.201a 08:25 AM Kil KATTLE KORRAL R 2088? ""051 PAGE. 3/ 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I. Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certify that on this_ day of Sept· nber, 2014, J caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be delivered to the dverse party, via the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid _Facsimile Transmission Delivery 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 020 




Ronald P. Rainey l 
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RONALD P. RAINEY ISB #1022 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 26 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Phone (208)459-3659 
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K. Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, ) 








SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K. ) 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, ) 
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ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN ) 





GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and 
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the 
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA 













JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING -1 
Case No. CV-2014-0278 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Owyhee ) 
Rose King, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the defendants\counterclaimants in the above-entitled matter, I am over 
the age of majority, and I make this Affidavit based upon facts within my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. My deceased husband, Gordon King and I purchased our ranch which included 
King Lane on September 17, 1973. At the time of purchase, King Lane was only a path through 
grass and weeds. My husband and I constructed what is now King Lane, an all weather road. 
We use this road several times a day in our family and ranching operation. 
I later named this road King Lane. 
3. Attached to this affidavit are true and correct copies of photographs that I recently 
took of the area in question concerning King Lane, Castle Lane, the gates on King Lane, and the 
current location of the school bus stop, where children who attend the local school are picked up 
and dropped off. Each individual photo is captioned as to what it reveals 
DATED This 9th day of September, 2014. 
-L~ 
Rose King ~ff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certify that on this 6 day of September, 2014, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrumen~livered to the adverse party, 
via the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
X U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid Facsimile Transmission _Hand Delivery 
Matthew ·R. Cleverley 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620 
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View of the East Gate to King Lane 
Looking to the West 
View of the East Gate to King Lane 
Looking to the West 
91
Current West Gate to King Lane Being Constructed 
Looking to the West 
Area of the Current West Gate to King Lane Before Construction 
Which Indicates the Location of the Former Wire Gate 
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View of Castle Lane 
All Weather Surface Road 
Looking to the North 
View of Castle Lane 
All Weather Surface Road 
Looking to the North from its 
Intersection with Oreana 
Loop Road 
93
Entry to Castle Lane All-Weather Surface Road from the Oreana Loop Road 
Looking to the North 
Mail Boxes at the Intersection of the Oreana Loop Road and Castle Lane School Bus Stop 
Looking to the South 
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View of the Castle Lane All-Weather Surface Road 
Looking to the North 
View of the Castle Lane All-Weather Surface Road 
Looking to the North 
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RONALD P. RAINEY - ISB # 1022 
Attorneys at Law 
110 North Ninth A venue 
Post Office Box 26 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 or 459-6147 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
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GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ) 
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the ) 
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA ) 
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JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Canyon ) · 
GILBERT KING, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am a party in the above-captioned action, over the age of majority, competent to 
testify, and I make this affidavit upon personal knowledge. 
2. Attached as Exhibit A to this affidavit is a true and correct copy of a "Bing Map" as 
obtained and downloaded from the Internet, which provides an accurate representation of the Oreana 
Loop Road. 
3. State Highway 78 is highlighted in yellow on Exhibit A with the Oreana Loop Road 
itself highlighted in green. King Lane is highlighted in orange and another access from the Oreana 
Loop Road to King Lane that is known as Castle Lane is highlighted in blue. Although the size of 
this map does not reveal the actual location of the connection, the Oreana Loop road connects with 
State Highway 78 at both ends of that loop road. 
4. Attached as Exhibit B to this affidavit is a true and correct copy of the same "Bing 
Map" in a closer view, which reveals the actual names of the roadways in question, but this closer 
view no longer reveals the location of State highway 78 to the north. 
5. Attached as Exhibit C to this affidavit is a true correct copy of an Owyhee County 
reference map which shows the same area with a an overlay of sections, quarter sections, and 
AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT KING-PAGE 2 
97
indications of townships and ranges. 
6. I have indicated the approximate location of the Fuquay Plaintiffs' properties on 
Exhibit B. 
7. As indicated on Exhibit B, the approximate length of King Lane is Yi mile, whereas 
Castle Lane has a length of approximately 1 3/4 miles. 
8. As should be apparent from the maps that have been attached to this affidavit, and 
by the photographs attached to Rose King's affidavit, and by the other declarations that have been 
made and submitted by affected parties in this action, the Fuquay Plaintiffs property is neither 
landlocked, nor dependent upon the use of King Lane in order to access their property, but instead 
is readily accessible for all purposes by the all weather Castle Lane road. 
9. The Fuquay Plaintiffs have no legal right to compel the continued use of the private 
King Lane, which use has at all times has been entirely permissive. 
10. In the absence of any demonstrated necessity, or any manifest adverse claim, the 
Fuquay Plaintiffs have no right to any continued use of King Lane. 
11. Because King Lane is an entirely private roadway, as the owners of that roadway, the 
Heart K Ranch is entirely within its rights to place gates across that entries to that roadway in order 
to limit and restrict its use the owners, their invitees, and other given express permission. 
12. I have received neither written nor oral notice from the Plaintiff's attorney explaining 
what the nature and extent of any "immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage" that will result 
to the Fuquay Plaintiffs if a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) is not issued, without first allowing 
our attorney to be heard in opposition to the issuance of that requested order. 
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.. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
SUBSCRIBED ANO SWORN to before me this ~eptember, 2014. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho . 
My Commission expires: /.ft /;;r,/9 C/ ff' 
7 ;, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this r/ day of September, 2014,a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served upon th~ following: 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
Fidelity National Law GROUP 
1200 6th A venue, Suite 620 
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' 
RONALD P. RAINEY -ISB # 1022 
Attorneys at Law 
110 North Ninth A venue 
Post Office Box 26 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
e 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 






SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K ) 
RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;) 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN ) 




GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ) 
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the ) 
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA ) 
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vs. ) 
) 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
T-518 P003/004 F-663 
RONALD P. RAINEY, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am counsel for the Defendant and Counterclaimant, Heart K. Ranch Trust, in the 
above-captioned action, am over the age of majority, competent to testify, and I make this affidavit 
upon personal knowledge. 
2. On or about ________ (date) Gilbert King provided to me the Plaintiff 
Fuquay' s paper's in request for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). 
3. At no time since the serve of those papers, has the attorney for the Fuquay Plaintiffs, 
Matthew Cleverly, made any attempt to contact any of the King Defendants, nor has he provided to 
this Court, as required by I.R.C.P. 65(b), an explanation of the efforts, if any, that he has made and 
the reasons why notice should not be required before the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. 
4. As supported by the complaint filed in this action, the Fuquay Plaintiffs have no 
colorable right to the claimed prescriptive easement, nor will they suffer any "immediate and 
irreparable harm," in the absence of the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). 
5. As supported by the Affidavit of Gilbert King, the Fuquays have had at all times 
immediate and adequate access to their property through alternate routes, primarily Castle Lane. 
6. Because the Fuqauy Plaintiffs have not established the requirements for the issuance 
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of either a TRO or a preliminary injunction under I.R.C.P. 65( c), their motion should be denied. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 




Notary Publi or Idaho 
Residing at ,..p.,,, , Idaho 
My Commission expires: 117-tlf---J/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this~ day of September, 2014,a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served upon the following: 
Matthew R. Cleverley [;,<.] 
Fidelity National Law GROUP [ ] 
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620 [ ] 
Seattle, Washington 98IOI ( ] 
Telephone: 206-224-6003 [ ] 
Facsimile: 877-655-5281 
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@inf.cQ_m 
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RONALD P. RAINEY ISB #1022 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 26 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Phone (208)459-3659 
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K. Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
T-528 P002/003 F-683 
Flt.ED 
,J.t.Sl_A.i,.1. ___ PJ.Ji. 
SEP 15 201~ 
Af(JGG~"IJ! A~ 1_r; r::.,:,·· ~- ..... ~, ....... ,-.. ,t., 
Depuf\. Clerk ·-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, 
FUQUAY and IWLEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K. 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
















) _______________ ) 
GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and 
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the 
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA 
DECEMBER 28, 2012, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
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) _________________ ) 
T-528 P003/003 F-683 
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the undersigned declares: 
1. I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in this action and am not 
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and 
could testify to them in a court proceeding. 
2. I have been delivering Schwann products to people in the Oreana area for approximately 
five years. 
3. I have delivered Schwann products to John Fuquay and Clinton and Hailey Fuquay by 
traveling up Oreana Loop Road then Castle Lane to their residences. The road was 
completely passable allowing me to travel it all year round. I was prevented from using 
this road when the gate was locked across Castle Road. I would still use Castle Road 
to make deliveries if the locked gate was not there. 
I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO THE LAW OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
Dated this IZ'.,..L,..day of September, 2014. 
Shawn~r...> 
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S. BRYCE FARRIS 
[ldilho State Bar No. S636] 
FILED 
~.M._. ____ P.M. 
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Golden Eagle Building 
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110 
P. 0. Box 7985 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 629-7447 
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559 
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low 
SEP 16 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD Case No. CV-2014-0278 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. 
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; 
Defendants. 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
A I ) ss. 
County of l:J.!j ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSIE LOW 
Susie Low being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says that: 
1. I am over the age of 18 and I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge 
and I am competent to testify to the matters contained herein. 
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2. I have lived at 21101 Oreana Loop Road in Murphy, Idaho since September of2005 
and I am familiar with the roadway located on or between the property currently owned by Heart 
K Ranch Trust and the property currently owned by myself and my husband which as been 
referenced in this matter as "Kings Lane." 
3. Since I have lived there, and during my observations of the roadway referenced as 
"Kings Lane" there has always been a minimum of two gates across the roadway which have been 
closed to prevent livestock from roaming onto and off of the property owned by Heart K Ranch 
Trust. Any person attempting to utilize the roadway has had to stop, open and close the gates. 
~ 
DATEDthis ;r day,of ~~~ ,2014. 
Susie Low 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this i£fa; of fUN"6.r, 2014. 
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Residing in /lkrllk, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: ?../:'~C::: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the 
following on this &day of September, 2014 by the following method: 
MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200 - 61h Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
Telephone: {206) 224-6003 
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
RONALD P. RAINEY 
RONALD P. RAINING PA 
110 N. 9th Ave. 
PO Box 26 
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile; (208) 459-9067 
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and Rose 
King 
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[ ><J U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
Ll Hand Delivery 
L] Facsimile 
[x] Electronic Mail or CM/ECF 
lXJ U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
[_] Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 
Lt] Electronic Mail or CM/ECF 
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S. BRYCE FARRIS 
[Idaho State Bar No. 5636] 
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Golden Eagle Building 
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110 
P. 0. Box 7985 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
Telephone: (208) 629-7447 
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559 
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low 
FILED 
--A.M.1 JQ P.M. 
SEP 1 ? 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD Case No. CV-2014-0278 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY; 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. 
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; 
Defendants. 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS SUSIE 
AND CAL LOW AND COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW Defendants, Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
'"Low"), by and through their attorneys of record, Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC, and hereby answers 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, and complains and alleges as follows: 
The Lows hereby deny each allegation contained in the Complaint unless specifically 
admitted herein. 
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1. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the first 
sentence of the paragraph appears to be a statement by Plaintiffs and to which no response from the 
Lows is required. To the extent, a response is required or necessary, the allegations and 
characterizations contained therein are denied. With regard to the second sentence of paragraph 1 
the Lows deny the allegations contained therein and affirmatively assert that the properties of 
Plaintiffs are not accessed, and have not been historically accessed via the disputed roadway which 
Plaintiffs have referred to as King Lane. 
2. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the 
paragraphs appears to be statements by Plaintiffs and to which no response from the Lows is 
required. To the extent, a response is required or necessary, the allegations and characterizations 
contained therein are denied. 
3. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Lows 
admit the allegations contained therein. 
4. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Lows 
admit that Exhibits A, B and C appear to show the general area of the properties in dispute but the 
Lows deny the remainder of the characterizations or allegations contained therein or which have been 
imposed upon said Exhibits by Plaintiffs. 
5. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the 
Lows are without sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny the allegations contained 
therein and therefore the allegations or characterizations are denied. The Lows affirmatively assert 
that the documents referenced in said paragraphs speak for themselves. 
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6. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 8 and 10 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the 
Lows admit that the Lows own certain real property located south of'"King Lane" and that Exhibits 
F and H contain legal descriptions of said real property. The Lows deny any further allegations or 
characterizations contained therein. 
7. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Lows 
deny that Avco Financial Services of Idaho Falls, Inc. claims an interest in the real property 
identified in Exhibit F and affirmatively assert that any interest of Avco Financial Services ofldaho 
Falls, Inc. has been satisfied and paid. The Lows deny any further allegations or characterizations 
contained therein. 
8. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, such allegations appear to be directed towards other parties to this action and the Lows 
are without sufficient knowledge or information to admit the allegations and therefore deny the 
allegations or characterizations contained therein. 
9. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 14 and 15 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
the Lows admit the allegations contained therein. 
10. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 16, 17, 18 and 19 of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, the Lows deny the allegations contained therein. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The following defenses are not necessarily stated separately as to each claim for relief or 
allegation made by Plaintiffs' Complaint. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where 
appropriate, to any and all of Plaintiffs' claims for relief. In addition, the Lows, in asserting the 
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following defenses, does not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained 
in the defenses are upon the Lows but, to the contrary, assert that by reason of denials and/or by 
reason of relevant statutory and case authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of 
the defenses and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the 
defenses is upon Plaintiffs. Moreover, in asserting any defense, the Lows do not admit any 
responsibility or liability of the Lows but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations 
or responsibility and liability in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
(Failure to State a Claim) 
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
(Waiver, Estoppel, Laches, Consent and Unclean Hands) 
Plaintiffs are prevented from recovering damages or relief sought, if any, pursuant to laches, 
waiver, estoppel, abandonment, consent and unclean hands. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
(Permissive Use) 
Any claimed easement or right-of-way by Plaintiffs was not adverse, was at most permissive, 
and was not for the prescriptive period as required by I.C. sections 5-203 et seq. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
(Failure to Mitia=ate and Preventative) 
The Lows deny that any relief alleged or requested by Plaintiffs in this action are appropriate 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS SUSIE AND CAL LOW AND COUNTERCLAIM - 4 
117
but Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate by reason of Plaintiffs failure to properly secure access to 
Plaintiffs' property via alternative routes which have been historically used to access Plaintiffs' 
property and which do not involve access across or over the property of Lows. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
(Reservation of Additional Affirmative Defenses) 
The Lows reserve the right to amend this Answer to assert additional defenses or abandon 
affirmative defenses once discovery has been completed. 
COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
As a result of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Lows have retained attorneys to defend the 
Complaint and are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs against Plaintiffs pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 12-121, and any other applicable statute or rule. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW, the Lows/Defendants/Counter-Claimant, and as a Counterclaim against the 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendant, complains and alleges as follows: 
1. Counter-Defendants own real property in Owyhee County, Idaho adjacent to the real property 
owned by Counter-Claimant. Said real property is more particularly described in the Complaint filed 
by Counter-Defendants which initiated this action and which relates to the roadway referred to in 
said Complaint as Kings Lane. 
2. Counter-Defendants use of their property has resulted in Counter-Defendants' livestock 
damaging fences between the property of Counter-Claimant and Counter-Defendants. Counter-
Defendants have also failed to control their livestock to prevent damage to Counter-Claimant's 
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fences and other property and from coming onto Counter-Claimant's property without the consent 
of Counter-Claimant. 
3. Counter-Defendants have allowed other animals, namely dogs, debris and trash from 
Counter-Defendant's property to come onto Counter-Claimant's property or to be deposited on 
Counter-Claimant's property without the consent of Counter-Claimant. 
4. Counter-Defendants use of the roadway, referred to as Kings Lane, has exceeded the scope 
of any historic use and Counter-Defendants are using the roadway for hauling livestock and with 
large trucks which did not and have not historically used Kings Lane for access to the Counter-
Def endants' real property and there has been no prescriptive or historic use of said roadway by these 
large trucks. Such use by Counter-Defendants, which is beyond the scope of any prior use, is 
causing damage to the roadway, culverts and bridges and causing additional maintenance which 
would not be necessary but for Counter-Defendants' unauthorized use. 
COUNT ONE - TRESPASS 
5. Counter-Claimant incorporates all of the foregoing allegations set forth in this Counterclaim 
as though fully set forth herein. 
6. Counter-Defendants have exceeded the scope of any historic use of Kings Lane causing 
additional maintenance and damage to the roadway, bridge and culverts for said roadway. Such 
unauthorized use, beyond an prior, historic or prescriptive use, exceeds the scope of any rights of 
Counter-Defendants and results in an illegal trespass upon the property of Counter-Claimant. 
7. Counter-Defendants have allowed their personal property, consisting oflivestock, dogs, trash 
and debris to trespass onto Counter-Claimant's property without the consent of Counter-Claimant. 
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Counter-Defendants have allowed such trespass to continue and have failed to take necessary actions 
to control the use or trespass on Counter-Claimant's property. Counter-Defendants have also 
allowed livestock to damage fences of Counter-Claimants and have failed to take necessary action 
to control said livestock and prevent the unnecessary damage to Counter-Claimant's property and 
fences. 
8. As a result of Counter-Defendants' trespass, Counter-Claimants have been damaged in an 
amount to be proven at trial, including all costs and attorney fees incurred for prosecuting this action. 
COUNT TWO - INJUNCTION AND AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF 
9. Counter-Claimant incorporates all of the foregoing allegations set forth in this Counterclaim 
as though fully set forth herein. 
10. The unauthorized use and/or trespass by Counter-Defendants is in violation of Counter-
Claimant's property rights and Counter-Claimant is entitled to an order enjoining Counter-
Defendants from any further trespass and an order which mandates that Counter-Defendants control 
their personal property, including livestock and dogs, to prevent such property from damaging 
Counter-Claimant and/or from trespassing on Counter-Claimant's property. 
11. Counter-Claimant is entitled to an order from this Court compelling Counter-Defendants to 
immediately cease any unauthorized use of Counter-Claimant's property including use ofKings Lane 
by commercial or large trucks and trailers which cause damage to the roadway and which have 
increased the maintenance for Kings Lane. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Counter-Claimant is entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in the prosecution 
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hereof pursuant Idaho Code § 12-121 and any other applicable statute or rule. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendants/Counter-Claimant hereby demands a trial by a jury of not less than twelve jurors 
on all issues triable before a jury. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Lows respectfully prays as follows: 
1. That this Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety and that Plaintiffs take 
nothing thereby. 
2. For an Order of this Court restraining Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' agents from trespassing 
on the Lows' property with livestock, dogs, debris, trash and unauthorized vehicles as well as 
compelling Plaintiffs to control their livestock to prevent further damages to the fences between their 
adjoining property. 
3. For a money judgment against Plaintiffs in an amount to be proven at trial for the 
damage caused by Plaintiffs. 
4. That the Lows be awarded their reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
defense of Plaintiffs' Complaint and in prosecution of the Lows' Counterclaim. 
5. For such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable in the 
premises. 
r I ·fr 
DATED this __j__}Q_ day of September, 2014. 
SA ~TH L.:: OFFIC~S, PLLC 
by: ~,.,,-0 r----
~Farris 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby cert,ipr that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the 
following on this Jf day of September, 2014 by the following method: 
MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200 - 6th A venue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
Telephone: (206) 224-6003 
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
RONALD P. RAINEY 
RONALD P. RAINING PA 
110 N. 9th Ave. 
PO Box 26 
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and Rose 
King 
12S] U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 
~ Electronic Mail or CM/ECF 
[~] U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
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[ .Kl Electronic Mail or CM/ECF 
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RONALD P. RAINEY !SB #1022 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 26 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Phone (208)459-3659 
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K. Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
T-547 P002/004 F-709 
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JOHNE. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, ) 
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RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCJAL SERVICES Of ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING) 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN ) 
TITLE INSURANCE CONIPANY, ) 
Defendants. 
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) ______________ ) 
GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and 
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the 
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA 
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Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the undersigned declares: 
l. 
2. 
I am over the age of 18. I am nor rela,ed to any of the parties in this action and am not 
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of che events in this declaration and 
could testify to them in a court proceeding. 
I am a deputy sheriff of Owyhee county had ave been in law enforcement for _q~_years. 
3. On May 29, 2014, I was dispatched to the residence of Gilbert King, 19100 King Lane. 
Oreana and the residence of John Fuquay at 18907 Castle Lane, Oreana, regarding a dispute 
concerning fences on private property. Then I met with Gilbert King and John Fuquay. 
4. Attached as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of my incident report regarding this 
matter. 
I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO THE LAW OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECf. 
Dated this /7 day of September, 2014. 
DECLARATION OF SCOTT SNYDER -2 
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09-17-'14 18:52 FROM- T-547 P004/004 F-709 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE 
I, Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certify that on this _JJ_'d.ay of September, 2014, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be delivered to the adverse party, via the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid _.A_.facsimile Transmission _Hand Delivery 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620 




S. Bryce Farris 
P.O. Box 7985 





2911 S. Holden Ave 
Boise, Idaho &3706 
Telephone: 336-4433 
Email: Oceanbreez.es75@gmail.com 
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SGP.;12.2014 U~:U~ AN K1 
• I 
.KATT L.h: KUK.k.A.L. 
OWY).JBB COUNTY SHEP..1fF•g omcE 
Report l40l450.001 
T-548 P003/003 F-711 
K ~u~~- ~u~~ ~a~~. ~, 
NATURE OF COMPLAINT: Civil Dispute of Fences and Gates 
On 5/29/2014 I was dispatched to King Lone, and 18907 Catillo Lan Oreana, Ow)'hee 
County, Idaho for a neishboT dispute conocrning fences on private propeny. 
I fint mAde (;Ontact with John Edmund Fuquay at his residence, 18907 Cas e Lane. On the 
way to John', re~idence, from the King's property, I had passed through two fences with the 
gates closed. I also observed cattle in the area. I asked John ifhe had any t e of easement for 
the private road that is routed from the King property to John's residence. J hn advised he does 
have easement that came from many years past. I advised John. the Kings a vised there was no 
legal easement, but permission was given to John use the road at any time, a long as if the gates 
were closed. they needed to remain closed due to taU\e in the area. 
1 advised John of Idaho Code 3 5-112 Establishment of gates ... , in which if any damoges 
occurred to fences or gates. any claims made by the propeny owner, would c doubled ln a coun 
of law. John advised if any damages were to occur to any fence or gates, or o any canle related 
to an open gate. he would take full responsibility. John advised he was not oing to close any 
gates on the road in question, as he felt he had a right of way or easement. J hn also advisod he 
would not close any gates, because he didn't want his older relatives to have to strugsle with the 
gate, or step in cattle manure. John advised he was involved with multiple a tomeys ooncernine 
the propeny and easements. 
l tln~n IGft John's residence, and returned to the King residence. f made co tact with Gilbert 
Gene King. 11nd advised Gilbert of my discussion with Jahn. mainly to infor Gilben of possible 
gates left open while Gilberts' cattle were •n the area. I also advised Gilbert of Johns intentions 
of possibly not dosine the gates. Gilbert did have cows in the area that wo d be affected if 
gates were left open. 
S2.QJ! Snyder 203 l ocsg 
omcer·s Signature 
Pu c J 
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09-18-'14 07:55 FROM-
Sep:1?.2014 07:46 ~M KXl KATTLE KORRAL 
RONALD P. RAlNEY lSB #1022 
Attorney tit Lt1w 
P.O. Box 26 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell. Idaho 83606-0026 
Phone (208)459 .. 3659 
Pnc~imile Transmission No:459-9067 
Attorney for Oef end ants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K. Ranch Trui,t UT A December 28, 2012 
T-552 P002/005 F-717 
R ~U88~ Jb1 YAGL, it a 
- FILED i·.Vf _A.M. P.M. 
SEP 18 2014 
AN~ {l~Ej~' ~RK 
Deputy Clerk 
1N THE DISTR1CT COURT OF 'THE THIRD JUDICIAL DtS1RICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 'THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD. ) 







SUSTE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K. ) 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO PALLS, JNC.; OORDON G. l<lNO) 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN ) 




OlLBERT KING, as Trustee: 1md 
ROSE M. KING, as Benefiuiur)' 1>f the 
HEART K RANCH TRUST UT A 













JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
DECLARA TlON OF SETH THOMAS .. 1 
Ci.Hie No. CV·2014·0278 
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~9-18-'14 07:55 FROM-
sop.17.2014 07:46 PM K1 I<ATTLE KORRAL 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY ) 
) 
CounterdefemJmts. ) 
) ____________ .) 
T-552 P003/005 F-717 
H. :.t!U~8. :Ub.L .i,1Ab.1!,;. ~/ ~ 
Under penalty of perjul'y under the luws of the stnte of Idaho, the undersigned declm·es: 
1. I am ovt=r the age of 18. I an, not related to any of the parties in this action and am not 
involved in the l1ligation. I have personal knowledge of the e\lents in Chis declaration and 
could testify to them in at. court proceeding. 
2. Please see the attached Exhibit "A" for my statem~nt, 
1 CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO THE LAW OF THE 
STATE OF 1DAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
Dated this 16th day of Sept~mber, 2014. 
'1eihthomas 
OECLARA TlON OF SETH THOMAS -2 
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09-18-'14 07:56 FROM- T-552 P004/005 F-717 
Sep.17.2014 07:46 PM KI, KATTLE KORRAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1
1 
Ronald P. Rainey, hereby cenify that on this_ day of September, 2014, l caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be delivered to the adverse parry. via the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows; 
_U.S. Mail, Postllge Prepaid .. X •. _Fncsimile Trnnsmi~ition _Hand Delivery 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
Fidelity Nation1l Low Group 
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620 




S. Brye~ F~tri~ 
P.O. Box 7985 




Ronald P. Rainey 
DECLARATION OF SETH THOMAS -3 
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09-18-'14 07:56 FROM-
Sep.17.2014 07:46 PM Kl 
To Whom It May Concern: 
KATTLE KORRAL R ~U88 
T-552 P005/005 F-717 
tObl. l' A(.;.!!; • 4 I 
September 13, 2014 
Our winter range is adjacent to the property of Heart K Ranch Trust. we graze our 
cattle there during the winter months. It is beneficial to us if an landowr,ers that border 
us keep their gates closed. This helps to insure cattle are secured on our property and 
not out. 
Thank you, 
("' , A/ .,.~d ~-&1'4~--j 
Seth Thomas 




Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200-61h Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
• 
FILED 
_ __.A.Me,-J'- P.M. 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING~ FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-14-0278 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW 
I. MOTION 
Pursuant to IRCP 56, Plaintiffs moves this court for a summary judgment against Susie 
Low and Cal Low (the "Lows") as to Plaintiffs' easement rights against Low Parcel l and 
Low Parcel 2 because there are no disputed issues of material fact and Plaintiffs are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. This Motion is limited to Plaintiffs' claims of prescriptive 
easement as to the Lows' parcels and does not address Plaintiffs' prescriptive rights as against 
the King Parcels. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST LOWS - 1 
0 
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Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access their properties since 1977 and have established 
prescriptive rights over Low Parcel 1 and Low Parcel 2. Those prescriptive rights accrued 
before the Lows acquired the property and are therefore superior to the Lows rights. Because 
the prescriptive easement was established long before the Lows became the owners of their 
property, whatever rights the Lows acquired in their prope1ties are subject to Plaintiffs' 
previously established prescriptive rights. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The properties at issue in this case are located east of the city of Oreana, Idaho in Owyhee 
County. For illustrative purposes, a street map showing the general location of the area is 
shown on Exhibit "A."1 An aerial map showing the Owyhee County Assessor's lot boundaries 
is shown on Exhibit "B." A close-up aerial view and showing the general road boundaries and 
identities of the affected parcel owners is shown on Exhibit "C." 
A. Property History 
1. Clinton Fuquay Parcel 
Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuquay 
Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once pait of the John Fuquay Parcel. The legal 
description for the Clinton Fuquay Parcel is shown on the wmnnty deed attached as Exhibit 
"D." Clinton and Hailey Fuquay purchased the Clinton Fuquay Parcel from John Fuquay on 
June 24, 2014. Prior to that time, the Clinton Fuquay Parcel was part of the Jolm Fuquay 
Parcel. 
1 The documents referred to are attached to the Declaration of Matthew Cleverley. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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2. John Fuguay Parcel 
John Fuquay owns the parcel (the "John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the 
Clinton Fuquay Parcel. The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the 
Trustee's Deed dated October 13, 1989 attached as Exhibit "E," (Jess the Clinton Fuquay 
Parcel). 
Pdor to John Fuquay's purchase of the John Fuquay Parcel, it was owned by James C. 
Fuquay, John Fuquay's father. John Fuquay has lived continuously on the John Fuquay 
Parcel since about January 1, 1977. 
3. Low Parcel 1 Ownership Histonr 
Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel l'') located south of King Lane. 
There are two parcels which were conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for the 
Low Parcel 1 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F." 
• Based on the public records, on January 17, 1973, Elmer 0. Johnston and May M. 
Jolmston conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Charles W. Steiner and Florence W. Steiner. 
• Based on the public records, on March 21, 1980, Charles W. Steiner and Florence W. 
Steiner were divorced and Low Parcel 1 was awarded to Florence W. Steiner. 
• Based on the public records, on September 20, 1987, Samuel Steiner, as personal 
representative of Florence W. Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel Steiner. 
• Based on the public records, on January 23, 1995, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane 
Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner. 
• Based on the public records, on July 15, 2005, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner 
conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST LOWS - 3 
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• Based on the public records, on January 27, 2006, Pioneer Exchange Accommodation 
Titleholder #69, LLC conveyed Low Parcel 1 to the Lows. 
4. Low Parcel 2 
Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2") located south of King Lane. 
Oreana Loop Road crosses the northwest comer of Low Parcel 2. The legal description for 
the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "I-1." 
• From the public records, on May 6, 1942, D. Fred Henderson acquired Low Parcel 2. 
• From the public records, between May 6, 1942 and March 18, 1997, the Low Parcel 2 was 
owned by D. Fred Henderson, individually. 
• From the public records, on March 18, 1997 D. Fred Henderson conveyed the Low Parcel 
2 to D. Fred Henderson and Mary F. Henderson as husband and wife. 
• From the public records, on February 11, 2000, Mary F. Henderson conveyed the Low 
Parcel 2 to Mary F. Henderson, individually. 
• From the public records, on July 8, 2005, Mary Frances Henderson conveyed the Low 
Parcel 2 to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC. 
• On January 27, 2006, Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC conveyed 
Low Parcel 2 to the Lows. 
B. Plaintiffs' Use of King Lane 
John Fuquay has lived continuously on the John Fuquay Parcel since about January 1977, 
when he was 12 years old. At that time, he lived with his father, James C. Fuquay. John 
Fuquay purchased the John Fuquay Parcel from the bankruptcy court on October 13, 1989. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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From January 1977, John Fuquay, his family and guests have regularly and continuously used 
King Lane to access the John Fuquay and Clinton Fuquay parcels. 
Between 1977 and the present, Plaintiffs and their families have openly and continuously 
used King Lane for the following types of purposes to benefit the owners and residents of the 
Jolm Fuquay Parcel and the Clint Fuquay Parcel: 
• Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily basis 
for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking up mail 
from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and from 
personal errands. 
• Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John Fuquay 
Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when James Fuquay had his trucks and 
the use continued when John Fuquay began operating the John Fuquay Trucking 
Company. 
• Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving fann equipment from 
one location to another. 
• Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop previously 
located at the comer of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
• Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' properties. 
Plaintiffs never asked any of the prior owners of Low Parcel 1 or Low Parcel 2 for 
permission to use King Lane. Plaintiffs have always used King Lane as a matter of right for 
access to their properties. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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C. Utilities Along King Lane 
The overhead electric lines that service the houses located on the Clint Fuquay Parcel run 
from Oreana Loop Road along King Lru1e to the Clint Fuquay Parcel. 
The underground Centurylink telephone lines run from Oreana Loop Road along King 
Lane to the Clint Fuquay Parcel. It then runs south along Castle Lane to my house on the Jolm 
Fuquay Parcel. 
Overhead electric lines for the house on the John Fuquay parcel run north through the 
prope1iy to the south of the John Fuquay Parcel. 
D. Use of King Lane 
At its west end, King Lane connects to Castle Lane. There are no other properties that use 
King Lane for access. 
Ill. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Motion for Summary Judgment 
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all facts and inferences from the 
record in favor of the non-moving party and the moving party has the burden of proving the 
absence of genuine issues of material fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 
165, 168 (1997). S1mm1ary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach 
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian 
Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,718,918 P.2d 583,587 (1996). 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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B. Prescriptive Easement 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by presciiption "must prove by clear 
and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open and 
notmious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4) with 
the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory 
period." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). 
The statutory period in question is five years.2 LC. § 5-203; Weaver, 134 Idal10 at 698, 8 
P.3d at 1241. A claimant may rely on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse use by the 
claimant's predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such 
predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite five continuous years 
of adverse use." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,230, 76 P.3d 969,973 (2003). 
Once the claimant presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began, he 
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Wood v. Hoglund, 
131 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,680, 
946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to 
show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. 
Wood, 131 Idaho at 703, 963 P.2d at 386; Marshall. 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. The 
nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property." 
Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 975. The state of mind of the users of the alleged 
2 I.C. 5-203 was amended from 5 years to 20 years in 2006, but the 5 year time frame still 
applies to prescriptive claims established before 2006. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Id 212, 222. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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easement is not controlling; the focus is on the nature of their use. Id. at 231-32, 76 P.3d at 
975-76. Akers v. D.L. White Const.. Inc., 142 Idaho 293,303, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs Have Established Prescriptive Rights as to the Low Parcels. 
The key for this case is to look at any 5-year time pedod from Plaintiffs' first use of King 
Lane in 1977 to the present. Once Plaintiffs present evidence that their use was open, 
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted for those 5 years, the burden of proving permissive use 
shifts to the Lows. That means that the Lows must present evidence of permissive use for 
petiods prior to the Lows' ownership. If they do not do so, then Plaintiffs presumption stands 
and Plaintiffs prevail against the Lows as a matter oflaw. 
If Plaintiffs prescriptive rights matured against any of the prior owners of Low Parcel 1 or 
Low Parcel 2 during any 5-year period between 1977 and 2006, then Lows cannot prevail in 
this matter because they cannot defeat Plaintiffs' prescriptive easement which was established 
prior to the Lows acquisition in 2006. 
Plaintiffs' prescriptive easement matured as to Low Parcel 1 during any of the following 
alternate time periods: 
• Between January 1, 1977 and March 20, 1980 as against Charles W. Steiner and 
Florence W. Steiner. 
• Between March 20, 1980 and September 30, 1987 as against Florence W. Steiner. 
• Between September 30, 1987 and November 1, 1995 as against Samuel Steiner. 
• Between November 1, 1995 and July 8, 2005 as against Samuel V.C. Steiner and 
Mary Jane Steiner. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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• Between July 8, 2005 and January 6, 2006 against the Pioneer Exchange 
Acconunodation Titleholder #69, LLC. 
• January 6, 2006 to the present as against the Lows. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs established the elements of a prescriptive easement as to Low Parcel 2 
at any of the following times: 
• Between 1977 and 1997 as against D. Fred Henderson. 
• Between 1997 and 2005 as against Mary Frances Henderson. 
• Between July 8, 2005 and January 6, 2006 against the Pioneer Exchange 
Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC. 
• January 6, 2006 to the present as against the Lows. 
In this case, the ownership history of Low Parcel 1 and Low Parcel 2 is undisputed and a 
matter of public record. Based on John Fuquay's declaration, Plaintiffs' use of King Lane as 
to the prior owners of Low Parcel 1 and Low Parcel 2 met the elements of a prescriptive 
easement as to those parcels at many different 5-year periods, the earliest beginning in 1997. 
Plaintiffs' prescriptive rights of access over King Lane were established by operation of law 
as soon as Plaintiffs met the elements of a prescriptive easement. Those rights were 
established long before the Lows purchased Low Parcel 1 or Low Parcel 2. It does not matter 
whether the prescriptive rights were recorded or whether Plaintiffs sought prior judicial 
declaration of those rights. The prescriptive easement was conclusively established as a matter 
of law. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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As a matter oflaw, Plaintiffs are entitled to their declaratory judgment as to the Lows that 
their prescriptive rights of access over King Lane matured prior to the Lows acquisition of 
Low Lot 1 or Low Lot 2 and Plaintiffs access rights are superior to any rights of the Lows. 
C. Alternate Access over Castle Lane is It-relevant 
The defendants in this case may argue that Plaintiffs have access to their properties over 
Castle Lane, and that Plaintiffs therefore do not need access over King Lane. The argument is 
iITelevant and fails for several reasons: 
1. "Necessity" is not a requirement for establishment of a prescriptive easement. It 
doesn't matter whether the Plaintiffs' need access over King Lane. The only issue is 
whether they established prescriptive rights by prior use of King Lane. 
2. Castle Lane is not a public road. It crosses other private property as well as land 
owned by the US Government. This court has no jurisdiction to order the US 
Government to let Plaintiffs use King Lane. It is entirely possible that the US 
Government could decide to close all road access through the BLM property. If it 
were to do so, Plaintiffs would be without any access to their property at all-thus that 
could create an element of necessity. However, Plaintiffs are not required to wait to 
be landlocked before seeking a declaration of their rights over King Lane. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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Plaintiffs established prescriptive easement rights over Low Parcel 1 and Low Parcel 2 
against the predecessors to the Lows prior to the Law's acquisition of their prope1ties. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to smnmary judgment that they have prescriptive rights over 
King Lane as to the Lows. Final determination of the exact location of the roadway can be 
accomplished by a survey at a later time. 
Dated: October 27, 2014 
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Attorney for Plaintiffs 
FlDELIT\' NATIONAL L.\W GIIOUI' 
1200-6rn AVENUE,SUITE (i21} 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the supporting Dec1arations of Matthew Cleverley and Jolm Fuquay 
on the following individuals in the manner indicated: 
Ronald P. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attorney for Kings 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W, River Street, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83707 
208-629-7447 
brvce02sawtoothlaw. com 
Attorney for Lows 
Dated: October 28, 2014 
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DI EXPRESS DELIVERY 
DI FACSIMILE l 
Kriste 
Fll>F.I.IT\' NATIONAL LAW Gtmm• 
1200 - 6"' A VENUE, SIJITE 620 




Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
I 200 - 6th A venue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew. Clever1ey@fnf.com 




OCT 2 9 2014 
ANG'~~l.E~K 
~u\tc1erk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-14-0278 
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW 
CLEVERLEY IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
LOWS 
Under penalty of pe1jury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the 1.mdersigned declares: 
1. I am the attorney for Plaintiffs in this matter. 
2. I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in this action and am not 
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and 
could testify to them in a court proceeding. 
3. The documents attached to this Declaration are copies of public records and are not in 
dispute. 
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW CLEVERLEY - 1 
lJ ORIGINAL 
FlllELITY NATIONAl. L\W GIIOUI' 
l2lll)-6ru AVENUE, SUJTE62{) 




4. The properties at issue in this case are located east of the city of Oreana, Idaho in Owyhee 
County. For illustrative purposes, a street map showing the general location of the area is 
attached as Exhibit "A." An aerial map showing the Owyhee County Assessor's lot 
boundaries with identifying labels is attached as Exhibit "B." A close-up of the Owyhee 
County Assessor lots boundaries with identifying labels is attached as Exhibit "C." 
John Fuguav Parcel 
5. A copy of the Warranty Deed from Bob. D. Collett and Ruth M. Collett to James Fuquay 
dated December 31, 1976 and recorded on October 30, 1989 as Owyhee County 
Instrument Number 200901 is attached as Exhibit "D.'' 
6. A copy of the Personal Representatives Deed from Jolm Fuquay to John Fuquay dated 
January 1, 1987 and recorded on April 2, 1987 as Owyhee County Instrument Number 
191948 is attached as Exhibit ''E." 
7. A copy of the Bankruptcy Tmstee's Deed for the Estate of .Tames Fuquay to Jolm Fuquay 
dated October 19, 1989 and recorded on October 19, 1989 as Owyhee County Instrument 
Number 200795 is attached as Exhibit "F." 
Clinton Fuquay Parcel 
8. A copy of the Warranty Deed from Jolm Fuquay to Clinton Fuquay and Hailey Fuquay 
dated June 24, 2014 and recorded on June 26, 2014 as Owyhee County Instrument 
Number 284171 is attached as Exhibit "G." 
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW CLEVERLEY - 2 FIDELITI' NATIONAL LAW Gnour 
1200-6rn AVENUE,SUITE62!1 
SMlTLE, WA 981111 
{206) 223-4525 
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Low Parcel 1 
9. A copy of the Deed from Elmer 0. Johnston and May M. Johnston to Charles W. Steiner 
and Florence W. Steiner dated November 15, 1972 which was recorded on January 17, 
1973 as Owyhee County Instrument Number 134636 is attached as Exhibit "I-1." 
10. A copy of the Divorce Decree dated March 20, 1980 between Charles W. Steiner and 
Florence W. Steiner which was recorded on March 21, 1980 as Owyhee County 
Instrument Number 162981 is attached as Exhibit "I." 
11. A copy of the Quitclaim Deed dated September 30, 1987 from Samuel Steiner as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Florence W. Steiner to Samuel Steiner, individually, which 
was recorded 011 September 30, 1987 as Owyhee County Instrument Number 214740 is 
attached as Exhibit "J." 
12. A copy of the Quitclaim Deed dated January 11, 1995 from Samuel V .C. Steiner and 
Mary Jane Steiner to Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane Steiner which was recorded on 
January 23, 1995 as Owyhee County h1strument Number 214740 is attached as Exhibit 
''I(." 
13. A copy of the Wananty Deed dated July 8, 2005 from Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. 
Steiner to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69 LLC which was recorded 
011 July 15, 2005 as Owyhee County Instrument Number 252608 is attached as Exhibit 
"L." 
14. A copy of the Special Warranty Deed dated January 6, 2006 from Pioneer Exchange 
Accommodation Titleholder #69 LLC to Susie Low and Cal Low which was recorded on 
January 27, 2006 as Owyhee County Instrument Number 254987 is attached as Exhibit 
"M." 
DECLARATION OF MA TTI-IEW CLEVERLEY - 3 FIDELITY NAl'IONAL I.AW GllOLII' 
1200-6'" AVENUE, Smn: 620 




Low Parcel 2 
15. A copy of the Gift Deed dated May 6, 1942 from Bessie Stein to D. Fred Henderson 
which was recorded on June 15, 1942 as Owyhee County Book 32 Page 398 is attached as 
Exhibit "N." 
16. A copy of the Quitclaim Deed dated March 18, 1997 from D. Fred Henderson to D. Fred 
Henderson and Mary F. Henderson which was recorded on March 18, 1997 as Owyhee 
Cmmty Instrument Number 221274 is attached as Exhibit "0." 
17. A copy of the Personal Representatives Deed dated February 9, 2000 from Mary F. 
Henderson to Mary Frances Henderson which was recorded on February 11, 2000 as 
Owyhee County Instrument Number 231423 is attached as Exhibit "P." 
18. A copy of the Warranty Deed dated July 8, 2005 from Mary Frances Henderson to 
Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69 LLC which was recorded on July 15, 
2005 as Owyhee County Instrument Numbe1· 252607 is attached as Exhibit "Q." 
19. A copy of the Wananty Deed dated January 6, 2006 from Pioneer Exchange 
Accommodation Titleholder #69 LLC to Susie Low and Cal Low which was recorded on 
January 27, 2006 as Owyhee County Instrument Number 254988 is attached as Exhibit 
"R." 
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF 
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND THAT 1 UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE 
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY OF PER.JURY. 
Dated: October 27, 2014 
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW CLEVERLEY-4 FlllEU'f\' NATIONAL LAWGROUI' 
1200-6"' AVF.NUE, SUITE62ll 





Map A!lclress: j18907 castle lane, oreana, Id ~ [ Search J [ Clear J 
For Map Address Searcn. Please enter Street Address, City, Slate. ORZip.(Ex: 312 N vine st. Anallelm, CA 92B05) 




















































• • • ·.~ 
WARRAN'.l'Y DEED 
FOR VALUE RT~CRIVF.D, HOB D. COLLE'i"I' ilnd !~!IT!! '.\. •'OLLI'.':":', hu:::ban..: 
southwest (!un!~·:·:.:r o( t.;l·'.::- ···o~··.::~.i.!~~· 
:,,,est Ouar-tcr (1.:" th-.~ :-:c:.i·.::·.(::~!.~-::-. ·.·,·',...;.;l: .•..• -;·, 
•}ua!."'tcr r>f t!'"io ~r.,\t!:!·~\,:: . .::;:;:: \_; :--t:·· -~~ 
Qunrt.,:1r of ::h::..~ !':o~lti;::-·~;~:.: (·:12:--:·.---~-
rrownsh.i.n .:; ~ti:..t~:L, 1!.:ii·: 1::,·: 
d.i.an. · 
:· ~t-·.":. .. 
/ogl~d:h-cr '-·.tit.h ,:;.] .t \·.·;.:1., .. :.r .1:·d: ·= , .. .-!~; 
of \,'!'21y fa1- wat, .. :d· ;1;-•. 1 ;i :. ~.,.·:·.-:~;-;, 
of Rc.:!clamatir::1! r-:-if" t lt.-.. :~· ... ~tt l ... 
Buo:i, 11494, ::.s::2. ·;, 1,:.., :,: 1 ,:, , .. :,, 
appurtenant to .rL~?~1 •. ·::-::~~: ····-'.· ..... 
i:.iropet·r.y iH•.'nt.!c! b:/ :n1- !; 
To~rcthcr \•!itl·. a I! :,t; 
ment:!.:; anr.': -:1~J!)nrtc·nn:1,·, 
\•.t.i.!:a:i ap!11'..:rtui11.:i11c. 
!;~Uhj i:.~C !... L-..:i t:!~-! t ·. :· 1 
-..cro:;;s !)\!.:! St·· 1. "!! 
Ru 118' i:: f\J s o :. :: .--~~-_. .''. · 
'I 
contint!i:~i: opt.:.-1-.~~:~ir.•n i :· .• ·••· ;; 
spect:.ion Q?':i~= i""·-~tJl,.1r ... r•,::.··~·;:;_ 
dist:i:ibution ,'l:-:c.! ,.,;J._·t·':c,: 
t..:o the 1 dah:::- ?•Y.·:,:-: i· C·:~:--:, 
July :!1, 195<.) ir. ;j,f,./·. 
Coun I;~-' Heco r-::~ :::; . 
Subject: l ch.-: .. t·_ .-.: .. ::r ! :1 
and Hut!: '·!. Coll,::,~~, 
·.:.,_ 
: i. ) •. ~ • 
fer tcr1~ 1 of ~.:c~:·, ~:·1.1 • .-! 1·-~ · ······· __ ... , ... ··.;;-·;. 
prov131ons t :°,:'1r- ~Jif~ 
tho Pl·~r.:isGS i <:!;;-:: .._ .:1 ·-L 
p::.·oducin~, -:.ir:: l:,:.: .::.;~.: :>·r _ ·~. ~ __ 
s tor. i nq, t1t::il i z i n:.:1, .i:.-:,,,_~i., ~.; .. _.; !. :--
sh.i.pp ing ,1nc1 n::i.:·::c~ in,~: .-1 ~ -~ -;- . .-,.-
resourcs-r-;, and srd1 Ji..l·:t- Lt.., t.lh:· ~::c::; :'.·.:; 
recoi:ded J'une !B, !.97 3 ;,.is, J.:.:,;cci-~_,·,,:.,H· 
Coi1nty Rccorcl s. 
Suhjcct. to r;as cind D: l 1,,:::1:,sL '" :. 
Huth~-\. C~llc-tt:. his ·.·~_ ... fr:!( -r. ti~·:_-.···· 
ter~ of ten i~brs t~~~ ~)~~! t) 
of c~~piori.r.q t~~ qc:o-phy.;;i..::~: i:.:-: --~-~·---~·· 
:.inti producirlo g~,~ and f":.11, 2.?.·.-.in(: ~,!;:·.;s.-:.--.:-;! :·:· 
tel-egraph li~es, builrJ.tn9 t.c.:1}:s, ~·\ 1 '.\ii:.:., ··-:·:ei.,i·,,.::.·r 
r0latcc! facilit.ic::; .:ind :; tr>.:cLurc,; ,,11•.l ,.,11;., ;u;I,; ,,,.· 
and conditicrns 1.:ontai.ncd t:wr,~in; :··::-,,,;!,·:·! :i.,i·. 
as In::;t:.rumeni: Eo. 13?:'.)ft..-;, i.°'~·-·yhc, .. 1 t~n 1.:r- 1 .·: l~:··r·r·.1-.·~ 
155
• • • 
'l'O I-IAV!: ,i:!D :'O !!OLD the sair~ µi:c:r,isos, 1d.tl,. UK1r app1.1rte1·,-
1.1ncc,s ar~to t.h<? said Gran tee, 
th-1t they c:.r~ the m,·nei:s in :.::-:: sinplc~ of sai.cl pro:~i.ses; ::h~t sair: 
f. pr.:;mises arc free from all incumbranc~is and that thor will warrant 
E and defend the sam~ fr~u nll lawful claims whatsopv~r. 
7 Dat8d this Jlst day of nocc,-;a.b~?r, 197€. 
I .' 
Ai":""'" .r 





14 County of Canyon 
On this 3.ts\: d.:i~· of Dccc.w,bor, 197G, before me, the undersigned, 
!6 n ~ot~~Y Public in and £or said State, personally appeared BOE D. 
17. COLLE.frT and RJJ~~H ~.~. COLLET?, husband and wife, knot•rn to rne to be 
16 the persons v~ose names arc subscribed to the within instru~cnt, 
·19 illHI acl~nowledgcd ta ma that they executed the: same. 
ro Iii NITHESS Hl!EREOP, I have hereunto set my hand and affi;.:ed 









Notary Public ·for, Idaho 
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho 
c::::, ..,, 
"' ~ n - r . : ...... r.: 
,~/o/ c:::, 0 I 
r-.l ;o 
rr 
jT1 ..... n .r::-












!>Cl_~)tl.1;.! Hf.r'RESE1~·rt.'l'I1/E 'S DE::c 
't'H,,; U!D!::'.lrdiU,, Madc- ,,,; of this 1st day of Janu,1ry, 1987, b;· ,ind 
J ,\:·\:·:::; '- . FUQU!\'f, :ictin.g Personal 
't':pr-c,.;,::1t,1t. 'Ji'! nf t.h~ F::::tate vf l·Jzinda 1:. 1>uguay, deceased, tnc part.; 
0( I:!\~ first µ,1rt, iH\d ,1,\MF:S C. !"UQIJ:1':', a single man, of Box :?240, 
Mur~ny, Idaho, the party of the 3Ccond pact; 
WITNESS ETH: 
WH!RCAS, under date ~anuary 17, 1905, Ap~lication for Informal 
~ppointm~nt of an Administratn~ w~s duly and regularly filed for 
pro~dt~ in the nl~trict Court of th~ Third Judlcidl District uf the 
in ~nd for the :a~nty of Owyhee, and on J~nuary 18, 
1905 ~~ctars of Administration and n~th ~er~ issuwd by said court, in 
sJld Matc~r, ta J~mos C, Fuquay, and the said James C, Fuguay ls now 
d~ly 1udliEled and acting personal repres~ntctive of the estat0 of the 
said ~anda e. Puqu•y, deceasedi and, 
NOW, 'l'HEHEr'OR.13 1 in consideration of the pcemises and in 
distribution of said decedent's estat~, the party of the first parL 
de,;;;~ hcc~by set over, grant and convey unto the said party of the 
s~cond part, his heirs and assigns forever, all of the t:'ight, title, 
interest and estate of the said ~anda E. Fuquay, deceased, at the time 
of nee death, and also all of the ri9ht, title and interest that tne 
naid estate, by operation of the law o, otnerwise, may have acquir~d, 
oth~r than ur in addition to that part ~f the said decedent at the 
time of 11,;r de.:ith, and to9ether ·.Jitl1 al;, eight, title and interest 
whi~h said decedent ac her estate shall hereafter acquire, in and to 
1111 r.hat (eal property sit1rnte in the County of Owyhee, St.;te of 
PERSON/\L. Rl,PHESl,Wl't\'rIVE 'S DEED - l 
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Idaho, and particularly described as follous, to-wit: 
The SW1:;NE14, the W~SEl:i, and the 5El:1St·I\ nf Sectir.1 34, T. 4 
S., R, l E., B.M., Owyhee County, Idaho. 
To have and to hold, all and singular, the above mc:nt.ll)ned ~nd 
described premises, together wit1, tile appurtenances, unt•) the :.;,;,id 
party of the second part, his h~irs and assigns forever. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, che said party of the first part, personal 
representative as aforesaid, ha~ hereunto subscribed h;s nam~ the day 
and year herein first abova writte". 
/~.:t1-f~u~¢~7-----------
C......persona1 Repre 1ntative of the 
Estate of Wanda E, Fuquay, Deceased. 




s·rNrF. OF CDAllO J 
) ss. 
COUN'rY OP OVl'!HEI!: ) 
on !:!1is .J.f.fi!:. day ?f 2?6£~:-: ., 
undersigned, a Notdry ?ublic 
appea c ed ,1 l\tlE5 c. !:llQUr<i, 1tnow•1 ':,, ,r.1! to ll•~ i: r,e p•~ c:;un ,,,hos,:; nam,;, .. s 
subscribed to r.he wi::nin lnstrum,ant, ,"'!,, tiH~ [NI', ')lliil r~pr;l!rnnt.ati•:s, of 






















TI\\JSTF.l".' S lll'.l'.D 
rrn1 VALUE llEC:E[V@ 
.IO!l.'I J:tmliNE!Hllll'.I:, .as cruse.::.., for ti,.., hanl;r1111c 
\::;t11tc ,:,f .f.tClCli C. l'ltl\11.'l:' 
(;f«,U!'rllttf.••}, dt.h.•:;{d11j ht:n!hy tii{.U~l, li,\H1·:,\i.:;. SEi.t Hild CO~~VE\' 
,iii 1~y right, Lilt.,. au,1 luU.!r<?st u11L11 . 
. Jnha Ell1nu11d l'sJqu,r-.1 ;1ni! ;..:;:lft.~H l.,.:1· r111pi;.I:',,' 1 
hu:,b.·~nd .:11Hl w.i i' 1_1 
u,.._, :~it-J111..dng d1·]~,;rih;•d r1;.d p~i,itt.•rv; ii! d ..... 1·L1.:1,., c'.t!i.l!iL~·, :i1..n ... • .,: ~J.1b·1 
::1ur"'· 1Hltt !cHldrl:, tlcr,1-:-rJi,~·d .-1:; 11,l In ... ·:,-,, l11 t...tit.: 
j~' 'fO\-;fi!~HJ!• ,-, ~;;,1v·1n. i{:1~~i;l; j L\~~T. n.:1. ti~\'.'dlt·J; CHi'.;:;v. ;11:dh) 









;'i.:. ..... _ 




'l1• h:i-'·h' dlld l .; 1)1_•l•I !,il·-· ·. +i=il •, \ ! ~ :'. IHI t In" ; ; :!)· .• l,,1.:, .. \ll;>!;• .1::, 
11?,;; i.t~lll~l!S ! :I !'.-:l, I~/ 1 
·i r 1.1 ·~t 1.'t' • f,· ·., i rt , !l' 
;,r i:,hnuld i., Ji ·:i· _, •. ·1,n·:,, 
I~~ ~flTHE.S;_; ~-;Hl',l~l~(,:·p i :.;;i,L }i'H:-l~:,.·, n.1·:i r,•,:1·,r-





• • Instrument# 284171 
~o~~:0~!2s0 vti~~~~2i0~~f Pa es: 1 
Recorded for. ALLIANCE T!TLE • ~OISE PRODUCTIC 
ANGELA BARKELL Fee: S10.00 
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy: map 
lnoo, To: DEED WARRANTY 
Electronically Recorded by Simplifila 
WARRANTY DEED 
Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. Order No.:217172 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED 
John E Fuquay , a divorced man 
thegrantor(s), do{es) hereby grant, bargain, sell end convey unto 
Clinton Ward Fuquay and Halley Rose Fuquay, Husband and Wife 
whose CJ.!ITent address is 
18907 Castle Lane 
Oreana, ID 83650 
the grantee(s), the following described premises, in Owyhee County, Idnho, TO WIT: 
In Township 4 S0ut11, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho. 
Section 34: The Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter and the North,vest 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
EXCEPT any mobUe home or house trailer located thereon 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the snid premises, with their appurtenances unto the snid 
Grantee, heirs and assigns forever. And the snid Grnntor does hereby covenant to and with the 
said Grantee{s), that (s)he is/are the owner(s) in fee simple of snid premises; that they are free 
from all encumbrances Except: Current Year Taxes, conditions, c:ovennnts, restrictions, 
reservations, easements, rights and rights of way, apparent or of record. 
And that (s)he will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 




$TATE OF IDAHO 











l'or Vnhte Recei~cd 
E:LMER o. JOHtlSTOt! and MAY M. JOHllS'!Otl, husband and wife, 
I s/k/a ViARGARE:'l' M. JOHNS'l'Otl 
h.ireb)' I\Tilllt, b11ri::1in, sell nnd con,•cy unto 
CHARL:::S W. ST::'!NE:!l and PLOREHCi:: \•l, STETNE:R 1 husband and wife, 
th~ ~r:intees , lite fn\lowlnit de1<c1·ibed prcmlaus, to-wit: 
IN 'IOW?1Sli!li' 4 SOUTH I RAI-IG5 l E::\ST, B. 1-1., 0\1YHEE COUN'rY, !D"HO 
Section 34: s:~s::;~, SE.\NS~ 
Sec ::i:m 35: Wl!SW!:;, swl.N'.·1;. EXCE!?TING l~ acres in ~he sWl!NWi,1 of 
Soc tion 35, Township 4 Sou ch, Range 1 East I B. M., 
descri!:le::! as follow.;: Commencing a:: the NL cornet: 
of the SWl.llW;..; of said Sec ti:>:. 1 i:unning th.:nce in a 
w1;:sterly direcclon 630 :fee~; thence in a southerly 
direction 104 feet; ::hence in an easterly dirc~tion 
630 feet; thence in a northerly di~c~tion 104 feet 
to the pluce of beginning. 
:m TO,WSHI? 5 Sou:h, RANG:: l E:AST, a. M., o:·l'iH:EE: COUN'r:t, IDAHO 
Sec~io~ 2: Loe 4 
Se=t~on 3: Lo~ 1 
II! w:•/:ISHIP 
Se:-;cion 1:: 




S 30UTH, RANG:: 2 i'let.t, 5. l':. 1 O'tlYHEE COUNTY' 1 IDAHO 
~!Lm::;., i-1l1ss;,, s~1;:;s::J;. 
W;, S'rh., sw; .. s::,. ;~?!\1~f• • Sl~!/E:l.; 1 :-M;,1, S:C:i,. 
Ta:-: L.:.:~s !tu.::be:.:e:d , a~d ! .ir. sec!:i.~:is 14, 23 ::HH! 21s, 'rowr:shlp 
7 5cu~t 1 Ra~ge l Wes~, s. M., as shew~ by the =ec~rds in ~h~ 
c:=:.!..c~ ::J= :.!'".: .;~se:::sor c: t:·.-,yhc~ C-:!.!:i.-::,, l.:laho and :n~cc par-
:!.c,..1.1.a~!.y :!esc.~:.becl a:i ~ht; e:.::~h !.edc M!.r.~ng c1a:..rr. 1 Thr.- s1,.1.c 
.Jar Lccle !·:1::!.nq !::ii.!.~ 1 l'i" .. E- s~nse:: !..~de Mir.ir.g Claim, The :•Jr~:, 
L:ie !1~~~~g C:9!~ 1 T~e !~?ari~l L~tc Min~~; Clniffi 1 Tha Magpie 
!..::~l-~ ?•:ir.:i~; :1a.:.:r~, T:'.~ Bl'..!·:: .:ay :,;i:..: Sit~ and -:h~ Eirr.:h. Mill 
Si~e, all ~i~ua~c !~ =h~ P~~l~1 s~~~~ ~!!11!ng Dis:ri=~ !n 
c·,·:;•:i::-e C.:.H;:i.:::,·, !,;a:"".io. 
TO l!A '.'E A1'D TO i!OLlJ the s:1id pi,:misc,, with their npJ!Ut"lcnanc~s 11nto the said Granl1:e ::_, 
,he:.::- h~ir$ ;,nd a.s,i,:'11,, forc·,·~r. Anti the s11id Grantur.: do herebr co\•e11ant to mul 
witi1 th,, said GmnteoS , that · he•, thr, ownct·:; in fE1, simple of ~:tld prcmiscn; thnt $1:ld 
Jin:m1bt:s ~ac fret: fron: nll incumhrnnci::s 





·;.-::-_ - - --"'-' ,..- •••• -- ...... ' •••.. 1.· _ :--; . ·-------- _, ___________ l 
Dat~d: • 
,;;xn: 1;;- mMm, cou~n· or C~r;!: ,,~-
1)n thL~ 15-:-_:-: ,iu;,; uC ;;:'.'.;.,:.. • i~.1 72, 
t,•:fo:r. :!:::-•• 1- r;1J~:u-.,· ~ubhc. ,n £\1111 for !<~id ,tit:d ... ·• fH:-r-:-.11r1t1il1 
~p~ati~I ~:~~: C. ~ch~:-~:1 a~~! 
. :~;\'\/':.h~!J·:?c, 
.-· ............ '•,,•'It 
/::i(-~,' ·. _/ ·. 
=:~y\\:~~".r; tu ti,:< U;.e-.t"'it~"ln wh•.1:rc r.:..11\,. ;-: a~."€.'; 
i-=!ri::i-1:11 t,i thr.c:,,uin l~!ltntmr:nl •. ~nil 111::ic.11.i:i-,1."ii:dt:f.'•I tc 
:i~;t'. f.:.t :.OiiiJ\ .. \ ·:.':i~_':: c(t·.r.:u.tr.:,J the: :1-un,•. 
•• ~·· •• ~ .. • ~.:.··.,,,,. ...... • ! .• ,. ;·Y.l .• : • .,;_·:·~ ... _ ...-••. - .,4/· 
.... t'°I~ ./}, ....-.'."""': 
· ' ,.,.,· !',:r1:a.ry 1·~1bl1c 
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Pursuant to the Lai:;t Hill and Tes-c.aruent of F.1.orencG \•1, 
Steiner, now deceased, THE ESTATE OF I-'LOllENCE \'1, S'l'E:INER, acting 
through its Personal Representative, Samuel v.c. Steiner, the 
G:ranto::, dces hereby conve:'l', :re.lease, reinise, and foJ.·evar 
quitclaim unto SAMUEL v.c. STEINER, jndividually, the Grantee, 
whose address is H.C. 7!>, Box 2235, Oreana, Idaho 03650, tbe 
following described premises, t:o-wit: 
IN TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 ti\ST, B, M., 
OW~HEE COUNTY, IDAHO 
Section 34: El/2S£1/4, SEl/4NEl/4 
Section 35: W1/2SWl/4, SWl/4NWl/4 EXCEPTING 
l. l/i! acres in the SW1/4Ul'll/4 of 
section J5, 'l'ownship 4 South, 
Range 1 E~st, B. M., described aa 
follows: Commfmci ng at the HE 
corner ::>f the SWl/4NIH/'1 of said 
section, running thence in a 
westerly di~ection 630 feet; 
thence in a southerly ::lirecti.on 
10.-. fnot: thence in an easterly 
Jirectlon 6JO feet; thence in a 
northerly direction 10.; fact to 
the place of beginning. 
IN TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, R.J\HGE l EAST, B, H, 1 
O'WYHEE COUHT¥, IDAHO 
Section=: LOt 4 
Section J: Lot l 
DI TOWNSHIP 9 SOUTH, Rl\UGE 2 WEST, B. H,, 
OWYHEE COUU'l''t, IDAHO 
Section 15: ~1/2 
Section 21: EW1/4HE1/4, Nl/2SB1/4, SWl/~SEl/4 
Section 22: tn./2, SWl/4, Cl-ll/4SE1/4 
Section 27: NWl/4NEl/4, S1/2HE1/ll, N\oil/11, SEl/t, 
Section 34 ! Nl/211El/ 4 
Tax Lots Numbered l. and 2 in Sections 14, JJ 
and 21,, Township 7 S01.\th 1 Re::ige 1 West, B. H., 
as shown bi the records in the office of tho 
Assessor of owyhee county, Idaho. 
Together with their appurtenances. 
E>.'.CLUDIMG, HDi·1EVER, THE MIIIERAL Iq:GH'J'~J_Q_THE 
FOREGOING PR0PEP.Tf, 
QUITCLAIM DEED - l 
CAl:l.~8 
175
THE EST;.TE OF FLORENCE W. STEIHER 
By:~mukr-v:c .:,~fin~~, .. J h.~~ 
Persona] Representative 
ST.'\'!'E OF IDAHO 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
h . :::..',,. ~ .. d . _. . r··. . ,-7· . ·'on)~ ;s)· ~-,:--:=:'- ay or -:,,;.~~;'+:!.!,!'.(.:L, 1:137, b';?fore ine, ~; .. L'.ft /LbJ..:cZl: .. _., ,i Notary Publ10 in and for said State, 
person~} y appeared SAMUEL v.c. STC:ItlER, known o:: identified to 
me to be the pel.·son whose nume is subscribed to the within 
instrument as Peroonal Representative of The Estate of Florence 
N. Steiner, deceased, and acknowledg"d tone that he executed the 
same as ?ersonal Represcnt:ai:ive of said Estate. 
~. ',. 
.. \' }· 
(SEAL(· . 
. , .• ; .. · r ~ ~ '· , • 
QUITCLAIM DEED - 2 
CAl: 1. ,:a 
-" ~,,.:-,,.:1,/ ~ . __ . __ ?.,: • ."t,~ .-'"'r· 
Uotary P,u\3'iic ~or Idaho 
Residing at _.:/t,.Z;?'i__, Idaho 
comnlission Expires: ./ •, . ,,,:1 ,,;-,.;.i 













THI$ rC"'JIM Fs.'itt~l~UE:0 COll"-TESY Of: 
STEWART TITLE 
READ A APPIIO\!El.i 1!\' GM•1Tms1: --- ---
__________________ ...:,. ___ SPACE l,DOl/f TIPS Ll!lE ran nECORD!l,O DATIi 
Ordet" NO.: S'rE-!.14052553 ~ 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED SAl-!UE!.. V.C. STE:I.NER (AICA SA1•1 STEINER) J\ND MMY JANE 
STEINER, HUSBAND AND WIFE 
dotes) ll!lrcbv CONVEY, RELEASE, REMISE and FOREVER QUIT CLAIM unto 
STEINER AND MJ'\.RY J. STEINER, IIUSBAND AND WIFE 
GRANTOR(SI 
S/\MU,:L V .C. 
GRANTEE(Sl 
whose currcr;t mallino oddrcss is: HC 79 BOX 2235, OREANA, ID 83650 
lho followino dcscrlt>ed propcny tocatod in OWYHEE Coumy, St1110 c,f ld.:iho, 
more roniculurly described ns follows, to wit: 
As sot forth on the attached EXHIBIT "A", which by reference 
bocomea a part hereof. 
togatllcr with choir appurumonc:cs. 
Oatlld: January 11, 1995 
,..., 
STATE OF IOMfO 




On 1hls /.?-IJ:. day of ::fp,.,t'/lf't , in tho vunr of I ?7> , bcloro me, tho ,mdorainnucJ. a Newry 
P11bllc in nnd for saicl S1010, pur.onally oppc.ircd 9AHUEL V. C. STEINER and M/\ltY J/\NE S'l'EitlE.R 
known, or illcnliUncJ 10 me to be tho pe:so11lsJ whose namc!s) is/oro subscrib11d,to .tJ,.u within Instrument. and 
~cknowludood 10 mo 1hn1 holshclthuy ;,xacutud the samo. , , . :: :·. ,> . 
Sio11a1uro: }_"/4,!f ~?$,;&,~-: .---·----
Nome: _L!!.! ..!}I~~ ti -:1'; .fti/1J (~,.,_: ___ _ 
.. -~·· .. -~·:.,,·.,.,1,~ti •. ~si~, 
Ro:.idinCJ ~r, !!J:11i;,;.,b.uf,!::,~--·---·-.. - .. _ 




















































/09/1995 12;06 '320 a•NI-EE Tl TLE 0 'Hr P/1•:::E 03 ._ ... , 
C O M Pf I · . E N T f O A T I T L E I N 5 U A A N C I; 
SCHEDULE 0 
.=110 Humber: ~E_.Q.._..8.._7._.1 _____ _ 
ThO lond' roforrGd to Jn 1n10 comn111mon1 ID 11oso111101.1 us rcllowo: 
PARCEL NO, lt 
A parcel of lantl Gituate in the SE3SEt of Section 34 and 
sw!sWl of section JS, 'l'ownship 4 South, Range 1 Ennt, n.M., 
Owyhee County, Idaho, more particularly desc,:ibed aG follown: 
COMMENCING al: a braso cap mar:klng t.he Waal: 1/16 corner on 
the Sout~ line of Section JS, ~4S, RlE, D,M,; thence Nor~1 
60"26'36" West a distance of 1•163.74 f1;1et to a 1/2 inch irol\ pin 
in a fence line on the Wentarly Right-of-Wny line of Castle Creek 
Road' ancl. the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING i ttrnnce Mor th 2 7" J s I 39 11 
E~st a distance of 208,71 feet to a 1/2 inch i~on pin, thence 
North 62q24 1 21" West a distance of 208,71 feet to a 1/2 inch iron 
pin1 thence South 27~35 1 39~ West a diatnnoo of 20B,71 foet to a 
1/2 inch iron pint thence South 62°24'21" Eaat a diatanae of 
208.11 feet to the nEl\L l?OltlT OF BEGINNING, 
Together with an easement for maintaining and uno of a well, 
This easement to be 10.00 feet on either side of the following 
described power line: COMMENCING at a 1/2 inch i.ron pin marking 
the Northeast corner of the previously d~scribed parcel1 thence 
North 62"2•1'21" west a distance of 93,26 feet to the REJ\L POINT 
OF BEGIHN!NGr thence North 9°32'~0" East a distance of 151,00 
feet to a point1 thence North 5°02 1 00" East a diat:anoe of 222,00 
feet to the end of aaid eaaement, 
PARCEL NO II 1 
IM TOWNSHIP 4 SOOTH, RAUGE 1 EAST, B.M., OWYHEE COUNTY, IDl\l!O 
section 341 SElNEl, E~SEj EXCEPTING a tract of land det1cribr;id as 
folJ.ows: COMMENCING .:it sectjon corner common to Sectionns 
34 and 35, T4S, RlE, and Sections 2 and 3, T5S, RLE, B.M.7 thence 
North 89"59' West a distance of 550 foet to t~e REAL POIH'r OF 
BEGINNING1 thence North B9°59 1 Wost a dist~nce of 208 feet tc a 
point1 thence North 0°B9 1 Wast 208 feet to a point; thence South 
89~59' East 208 feet ton point1 thence South o•ag- Enst to tho 
REAL POINT OF BEGINNING, 
nI TOWNSHIP 4 SOU'l'H, MNGE l EI\S'l', H. M, , OH:!'IIEE COUN'rY, IPAJIO 
Section 351 W\ Sl'll, SWiUW! EXCEl?TUtG 1 1/2 acres in SWlHWl 
described as follows I COMMEHCING at the ~lortheast corner of 
SWlNW!, Sec. 351 thence in a westerly direction 630 feet; thence 
in a southerly direction 104 feet, thence in a easterly direction 
630 feet: thence in o. northerly direction l04 feet to the PLl\CB 
OF ElEGINNING, 
LESS the following doaoribed parcel of land; 1\ pnrcel. of 
land situato in the 6E!6~l of Section 34, and swlsWl of Section 
J5, T4S, n1E, B.M., Owyhee county, Idaho, more particularly 
described as follows: COMMEHCING at a h.raas cap mn.rk.ing the 











81/09/1SS5 12:05 1206d' '320 CM1·£E TllLE C 'IN 
'\t.ro· · ......... 
COMMITMENT FOR TITLE JNSUl:JANDE 
CONTINllAilON 
SCHEDULE~...._~~~~ 
R!;J Numban PO 871 Cc;mnltmont l\\umb(in ___________ _ 
thence North 60°26'36" West a distance of 1463.74 feat to ft l/2 
inch iron pin in a fence line on the Weste~ly Right-of-Way line 
of Castle Creek Road, and the REAL POINT OF I3EGINNUIG: th1;1ncC:1 
North 27°35'39" East a distunce of 201l.71 feet ton 1/2 inch i.rnn 
pin, thence North 62"24 1 21" West a distance of 2013. 71 feet to a 
1/2 inch iron oinJ thence south 27"J5 1 39" Wcot a dist:ancc of 
208.71 £net to a i/2 inch iron pin; thence Soul:h 62°24'21 11 Enst 11 
distance of 208, 71 feat to the RF.:AI, POIN'r OF DEG!NN.ING, 
TOGETHER with an ~asemont for malntalning and use of a well. 
This easement ie to be 10.00 feat on either s!ae of the following 
c!esc:i:ibed powe:r line; Cornmancing nt 11 i inch iron pin marking the 
Northeast corner of the previou9ly described parool1 thence N 
62°24'21" W a distance of 93,26 feet to the Real Point of 
Beginning; thence N 9"32'00" E A distance of 151.00 feet to u 
point, thence M 5"02 1 00" En distance of 222.00 fnat to the end 
of said easement, 
IN TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH I RJ\NGE l EI\.ST, D. M. 1 OWYHEE COUNTY, IDi\llG 
Section 2; Lot 4 
Section 31 Lot l 
PARCEL NO. 3 ~ 
rN 'l'OWNSliIP 4 SOUTII, AANGg 1 EI\S'l' 1 B. M., OWYHEE COUNTY, IDAHO 
Section 34: co~~IENC!NG at section cornor oormion to secs. 34 
and 35, T4S, RlE, and Secs, 2 and J, TSS, nlE, B, H,1 thence 
l1orth ll9"59' West a distance of 550 feet to the RE1\.L POHl'l' OF 
BF.GlNtHHG; thence North 09°59' West a distt1nce: of 206 feet to o 
point1 thence Horth 0°09' lfa!lt 208 feet to ll poinl:t thenca south 
n9•59• East 209 feet to a point; thence South o•eg• East to the 
REAL POINT OF BEGINHZNG, 
* 
P~go 3 1Jf. 6 
CONTIIIUATIOH 
C'CITU",'lllt:itf\l 






• •---------, Jnstrument # 252608 
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO 
Recorded for : PIONEER TITLE CO 
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN :'B b Fee: 9.00 
Ex.(>fficlo R ecordor Ouputy • l!I. Jt.p 
lndu I<>: DEED. WARRANTY 
WARRANTY DEED 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED SAMUEL V C STEINER and MARY J STEINER, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE 
the GrantorS, do hl?rcby gr:1111, lm~ain, sell and convey unto~~~~~x_ti~ 
HlJ.SEm'NIJ.~~X PTOl\'FF.ll FYCPI\.NC:F, ACCOl'-!.1'10DATTOl\' TTTI F.Hfll DER /I fio, ll r. 
the Grantees, whose address is 2511 EAST HIT,L ROAD, EAGLE, ID 83616 
the following described premises, to-wit: 
SEE ATTACHED LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
FURTHER GRANTED WATER RIGHTS AS DEFINED IN ATTACHMENT "WATER 
RIGHTS" 
TO HAVE AND TO l!OLD 1he said premises, wi1h their appurtenances unto lhe said GramccS, THEIR heirs and 
assigns forever. Ami the saiLI GrantorS do hereby covenam Lu and with the said GranleeS, tl1at TheY ARE the owners in fee 
simple of said premises; that sn id premises ari: free from all encumbrances; except for general taxes and assessments for che year 
2005 and subsequent years, covenants, conditions, restrictions and easements of record; and that TheY will warrant and defend 
the same from 1111 lawfol cl:1im, wl1:11~ncver. 
100 10TH AVE SOI 'Tl! 
NAMPA, IDAHO ,' 51 
~_A,'-t;2 d~ / MARY J STE:CNER 
PIONEER TITLE COMPANY 
OF CANYON COUNTY 
423 SOUTH KIMBALL 




In Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho. 
Section 34: E1/2 SE1/4, SE1/4 NE 1/4 
Section 35: W1/2 SW1/4, SW1/4 NW14 
EXCEPTING 1·1/2 acres in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35, 
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as 
follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
of said Section, running thence in a Westerly direction 630 feet; thence in a Southerly 
direction 104 feet; thence in an Easterly direction 630 feet; thence in a Northerly direction 
104 feet to the PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
In Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho. 
Section 2: Lot 4 
Section 3: Lot 1 





1. No. 57-89. 4-1-1874 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation and Stock Water. 0.240 CFS. 
2. No. 57-95. 4-1-1885 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation. 0.360 CFS. 
3. No. 57-104. 4-1-1887 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.200 CFS 
4. No. 57-I I 6. 4-1-1895 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0. 100 CFS 
5. No. 57-120. 4-1-1896 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.300 CFS 
6. No. 57-127. 4-1-1899 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation. 0.400 CFS 
7. No. 57-149. 4-1-1906 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.200 CFS 
8. No. 57-2104. 10-5-1920 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 1.280 CFS 
Total Acres: 145. 









Recording Requested By and 
When Recorded Return to: 
SUSIE LOW 
CAL LOW 
21220 Oreana Loop Road 
Oreana, ID 83650 
Instrument # 254987 
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO 
• 
2006.01-27 04:35:41 No. of Pag11s: 4 
Recorded for: PIONEER TITLE COMPANY 
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN IL ~ ~Foe: 12.00 
Ex-Officio Recordor Ooputy__,.".:..o::-"-"-'"-t-=-=.c.----
1nd .. 10: CE~D. WARRANTY 
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED (this "Deed"), made as of the 6th day of January, 2006, is between 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"), 
whose legal address is: 21220 Oreana Loop Road, Oreana, 1D 83650. 
WITNESSETH, That Grantor, for and in consideration of One Dollar and Noll 00 ($1.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, 
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and 
confirm, unto Gmntee, its successors and assigns forever, all the real property, together with 
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State ofldaho, more particularly described as follows: 
See legal description described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
Futhcr Granted Water Rights as Defined in Attachment "Water Rights" 
TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in 
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and 
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in 
law or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of 
wuy and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water, 
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which are 
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the 
property (collectively, the "Property"). 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the 
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors 
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors and assigns, 
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises 
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in law, in fee 
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in 
manner 1111d form as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants, 
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature 
whatsoever, as of July 15, 2005 . 
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above-bargained premises in the quiel 
and peaceable possession of Grantee, ils successors and 11Ssigns, against all and every person or persons 
claiming tile whole or any part thereof BY, THROUGH OR UNDER Grantor. 
186
•. • • 
.. .. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Grantor has executed this Special Warranty Deed as of the date set 
forth above. 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
By: Pioneer 1031 Company, Member 
By: 
ST A TE OF IDAHO 




The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 6d'day of January, 2006, by Alicia 
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer 1031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer 
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company. 
WJTNESS my hand and official seal. 




. ~ . '. 
EXHIBITX 
P07036 
In Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho. 
Section 34: E1/2 SE1/4, SE1/4 NE 1/4 
Section 35: W1/2 SW1/4, SW1/4 NW14 
EXCEPTING 1-1/2 acres in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35, 
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as 
follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
of said Section, running thence In a Westerly direction 630 feet; thence in a Southerly 
direction 104 feet; thence in an Easterly direction 630 feet; thence in a Northerly direction 
104 feet to the PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
In Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian. Owyhee County, Idaho. 
Section 2: Lot 4 
Section 3: Lot 1 





.-... .. .. 
EXHIBIT~ 
WATER RIGHTS 
1. No. 57-89. 4-1-1874 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation and Stock Water. 0.240 CFS. 
2. No. 57-95. 4-1-1885 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation. 0.360 CFS. 
3. No. 57-104. 4-1-1887 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.200 CFS 
4. No.57-116. 4-1-1895 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0. 100 CFS 
5. No. 57-120. 4-1-1896 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.300 CFS 
6. No. 57-127. 4-1-1899 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation. 0.400 CFS 
7. No.57-149. 4-1-1906Priority. CastleCreek. Irrigation. 0.200CFS 
8. No. 57-2104. 10-5-1920 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 1.280 CFS 
Total 3.080 CFS 
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F'or Value Received D. ~re...d He.Y"\de..'rSOf\ 
do hereby convey, release, remise and forever quit claim 
unto Q. F<ed \-\ende,rson a!"ld Man; f '1endert)on J 
\-\u~bctr-,d a.nd \.ui~e..- 1 \lOS &t..\-\w11,.,41o, fiaod1n;,I.D the following described premises to-wit: \J 8 33,3 O -
Sl.3(., 
NcSWJSWN~JSENW)~W0E 
.Sec..t,of\ 35.) )own6hif Lt ..3ou.i.hJ ~nqe. \ Ett~t. 
Ch,.fd-he-e__ C,u.Y\~, ldQhu 
together 
DATED: 
with their appurtenances. 
\SUt[rz I 7 ~ 
S'rATE OF IDAHO, CO\JNTY OF o~yllm A 
On this /%ri.- clay of J.'(Mt. , 19fl, 
before me, a notary public in and for sa i.cl 
State, personally appeared l:> . ..i;:cc.~ ~"}'\.~c. ... "'"°"""-
\l.~ ~ ~L-:n~1;c.:;.=n known to me to be the 
per~ name subscribed to the within 
~~:i;;legd~!~c~~.~·t~~·=•••· 
u r. ~.~~ .,;IC.) '7) ' 
county of Owyhee, State of Idaho t ,. 1~"'«;-
~ ... m t6J,e,.t- . 
-., 






PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S DEED 
TfDS DEED, mnde by Mary Frances Henderson, Pcrsonnl Representative oftbe estate of D. 
Fred Henderson, deceased, Grontor, to Mary Frances Henderson, whose :iddre&s is 1705 Stnte 
HWY46, Gooding, ID 83330, Grantee, 
WHEREAS, Grantor is the qualified p crSOnal representative of said estate, filed ns 
Probate Number 99-SP-00-0000 I, in Gooding County, Idaho; 
THEREFORE, in accordance with the will of the deceased filed herein and for vllluable 
consideration received, Grantor sells and conveys to Grantee the following described real 
property in Owyhee County, Tdaho: 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF OWYHEE, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, 
BOISE MERIDIAN 
Section 35: SWl/4 NEJ/4, SEl/4 NWl/4, NWI/4 SEl/4, NEI/4 SWJ/4 
with u1J appurtenances. 
EXECUTED this _f J1. day of Fehrunry, 2000. 
STATE OFIDAIIO ) 
)ss. 
County of Gooding ) 
ces Henderson 
Per al Representatives of the estate of 
Fred Henderson 
On this f ~ay of Febnuuy,2000, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally 
qppcared Mary Frances Henderson, lcnown to me or proved to me on oath, to be the personal 
representative of the estl1te of Fred Henderson, and the person whose numes are subscnoed to 
the witl1in instrument, and aclcnowledged to mi: that he/she executed the some as said personal 
representative. 
IN WTTNES S WHEREOF, I I1ave set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and year 
above written .. 
AT SW. ENSON, JR. 
OTARY PUBLIC 
/\TC Of· ID/\HO 
H"'skJing nt l.,1XJdi11g 
Commission expires 03/13/2004 
. ~tiqb_-,1~ 
' .:J,:;:0 
9'1 :111,v •. , 8'"'1 
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WARRANTY DEED 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED MARY FRANCES HENDERSON, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN 
the Grantor, doES hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey untc1~xm~~stN¥.mH~' 
~X~~I~ Pioneer Exchange Accommodation 'J'j tlehol.cler f'f, 0 
the Grantees, whose address is 2511 EAST HILLROAD, EAGLE, ID 83616 
the following described premises, to-wit: 
SEE ATTACHED LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with 1heir appurtenances unto the said Gnm1L-cS, THEIR heirs end 
assigns forever. And the said Grantor doES hereby covenant to and with the said Grantees, !hat She IS the owner2005 in fee 
simple of said premises; that said premises are free from all encumbrances; excc:pt fur general laxes and assessments fur the year 
Sand subsequent years, covenanL~. conditions, restrictions and easements of record; and that he will warrant and defend the same 
from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
DATED: 
PIONEER TITLE COMPANY 
OF CANYON COUNTY 
I 00 I 0TH A VE SOUTH 
NAMPA, IDAHO 83651 
423 SOUTH KIMBALL 
CALDWELL, ID 83605 
Instrument # 252607 
MURPHY,OWYHE~IDAHO 
zoo5.07-1 5 04:38:JJ No. of Pages: 2 
Recorded for: PIONEER TITLE CO 
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN ~ < _ _Fee: &.00 
Ex-Ofticlo Recorder Deputy~. ~ 
lndnb>: DEED, WARRANTY ....z:c...:_..::..;:..;:;.:=----
197
.. • • 
P07066 
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; 
'ciPI 
Section 35: Northeast Quarter Southwest Quarter; Southwest Quarter Northeast Quarter; 
Southeast Quarter Northwest Quarter; Northwest Quarter Southeast Quarter ~ 
****INCLUDJNr, WATER 'R.IC:f!T fl 57-HI045 and /157-1004fi ~ 1 -;, • 









Recording Requested By and 
When Recorded Return to: 
SUSIE LOW 
CALLOW 
21220 Oreana Loop Road 
Oreana, JD 83650 
Instrument# 254988 
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO 
2006--01-27 04:38:59 No. of Pages: 2 
Recorded for: PIONEER TITLE COMPANY 
• 
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN ~ ~ .JJeo: 6.00 
Ex.Officio Rocordor Deputy !J!. _...&a.L. 
Index lo: DEED. W~llRAM'Y 
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED (this "Deed"), made as of the 6111 day of January, 2006, is between 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"), 
whose legal address is: 21220 Oreana Loop Road, Oreana, ID 83650. 
W ITNESSETH, That Grant or, for and in consideration of One Dollar and No/I 00 ($ 1.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sutliciency of which are hereby acknowledged, 
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and 
confirm, unto Grantee, its successors nnd assigns forever, all the real property, together with 
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State ofidaho, more particularly described as follows: 
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; Section 35: Northeast Quarter 
Southwest Quarter; Southwest Quarter Northeast Quarter; Southeast Quarter Northwest Quarter; Northwest 
Quarter Southeast Quarter; Including Water Right 1157-10045 and #57-ID046 
TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in 
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and 
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in 
Jaw or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of 
way and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water, 
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which arc 
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the 
property (collectively, the "Property"). 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the 
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors 
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors nod assigns, 
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises 
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in law, in fee 
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in 
manner and form as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants, 
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature 
whatsoever, as of July 15, 2005 . 
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above-bargained premises in the quiet 
and peaceable possession of Grantee, its successors and assigns, against all and every person or persons 




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Grantor has eicecuted this Speciul Warranty Deed as of the date set 
forth above. 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER#69, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
By: Pioneer IOJ I Company, Member 
STATE OF IDAHO 




The foregoing instrumen1 was acknowledged before me this 61liday of January, 2006, by Alicia 
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer I 031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer 
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
My commission expires: 9.9.09. 
(NOT ARIAL SEAL) 
201
Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200 - 6th A venue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 9810 l 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew. CJeverJev<@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-14-0278 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the undersigned declares: 
1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this action. I have personal knowledge of the facts in this 
declaration, and I am competent to testify at tdal as to the matters herein. 
2. I am submitting this declaration in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment against Defendant Lows. 
3. Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuquay 
Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once part of the John Fuquay Parcel before I 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 1 
D ORIGINAL 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LA w Gnom• 
120ll-6TII A\'ENUE,SU1TE620 
SE:Ant.1·:. WA 98101 
(2116) 2!3-4525 
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sold it to Clinton and Hailey Fuquay. The legal description for the Clinton Fuquay Parcel 
is shown on the waITanty deed attached as Exhibit "D" to the Motion. 
4. I also own the parcel (the ••John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the Clinton 
Fuquay Parcel. The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the 
Trustee's Deed dated October 13, 1989 attached as Exhibit ·'E" to the Motion (less the 
Clinton Fuquay Parcel). 
5. I began living on the John Fuquay Parcel in January 1977 when it was purchased by my 
father. I was about 12 years old when we first moved onto the John Fuquay Parcel. My 
parents bought a mobile home and put on the property and we lived in that for years. 
6. From January 1977 forward, my family continuously used King Lane for access to Oreana 
Loop Road. My parents drove personal vehicles of all types over King Lane. From the 
time I was 12, we also walked over King Lane to get to the bus stop at Oreana Loop Road 
and to pick up mail from the mail box which is at the comer of King Lane and Oreana 
Loop Road. 
7. Our family's guests regularly and continuously used King Lane to access our house. 
8. My father, James Fuquay, owned large semi-trucks and cattle trucks that he used in his 
famung and ranching operations. He would regularly drive those trucks over King Lane 
to and from Oreana Loop Road. 
9. At about age 14, I began driving large trucks for my father. Those included cattle trucks 
and semi trucks. I would drive them over King Lane to and from Oreana Loop Road. 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 2 FIDELITY NATIONAi. l~.\W GROUP 
1200-6"' AVENUE, Srnn: 620 
SEATTLE, WA 98101 
(206) 223--1525 
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IO. At about age 21, I obtained my Idaho chauffeur's license which is the predecessor to the 
CDL license. It pem1itted me to drive commercial trucks. I started driving large trncks 
commercially at that time and have done so ever since. I currently drive commercial 
trucks under the assumed business name of John Fuquay Trucking. 
11. Since 1977, I have continuously used King Lane to access both tl1e John Fuquay Parcel 
and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel. 
12. I have always believed that I have the right to access the John Fuquay Parcel and the 
Clinton Fuquay Parcel over King Lane and I have always acted in accordance with that 
belief. 
13. At its west end. King Lane c01mects to Castle Lane. Castle Lane continues south until it 
reached Oreana Loop Road again. There are no other properties that use King Lane for 
access. 
LOWPARCELl 
14. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel l ") which is located south of 
King Lane and east of the Clinton Fuquay Parcel. There are two parcels which were 
conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for the Low Parcel 1 is shown on the 
Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F" to the Motion. 
15. Prior to the Lows ownership of Low Parcel l, my family openly and continuously used 
King Lane to access the John Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for more than 
5 years. 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 3 flDELIT\' NATION,\L L\\V Gl!Olll' 
1200-6"' A VENUE, SUITE 620 
SEATTI.E, WA 98101 
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16. Based on the public records, on January 17, 1973, Elmer 0. Johnston and May M . 
.Johnston conveyed Low Parcel I to Charles W. Steiner and Florence W. Steiner. 
17. Based on the public records, on March 21, 1980, Charles W. Steiner and Florence W. 
Steiner were divorced and Low Parcel l was awarded to Florence W. Steiner. 
18. Based on the public records, on September 20, 1987, Samuel Steiner, as personal 
representative of Florence W. Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel Steiner. 
19. Based on the public records, on January 23, 1995, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane 
Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner. 
20. Based on the public records, on July 15, 2005, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner 
conveyed Low Parcel I to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC. 
21. Based on the public records, on January 27, 2006, Pioneer Exchange Accommodation 
Titleholder #69, LLC conveyed Low Parcel I to the Lows. 
22. From January I, 1977 through March 21, 1980, I never asked Charles W. Steiner and 
Florence W. Steiner for permission to use King Lane. Charles W. Steiner and Florence 
W. Steiner never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane. 
23. From January I, 1977 through March 21, 1980, my family used King Lane for access to 
the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily basis 
for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking up mail 
from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and from 
personal en-ands. 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 4 FmEl,JT'I' NA l'lONA L LAW GROUP 
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b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-tmcks to and from the John Fuquay 
Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his trucks and 
continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment from 
one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop previously 
located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
properties. 
24. From March 21, 1980 through September 20, 1987, I never asked Florence W. Steiner for 
pem1ission to use King Lane. Florence W. Steiner never gave my family, my guests or 
me permission to use King Lane. 
25. From March 21, 1980 through September 20, 1987, we used King Lane for access to the 
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the Jolm 
Fuquay Parcel. Th.is use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 5 FIDELITY NATION,\!. LAW G1tour 
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c. Regular farn1 vehicle use of King Lane for cattle tmcks, moving fann equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the comer of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
properties. 
26. From September 20, 1987 through January 23, 1995, I never asked Samuel V.C. Steiner 
and Mary Jane Steiner for permission to use King Lane. Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary 
Jane Steiner never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane. 
27. From September 20, 1987 through January 23, 1995, we used King Lane for access to the 
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the Jolm 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY-6 Fm£LITY NATIONAL L\\V Guour 
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e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
properties. 
28. From January 23, 1995 through July 15, 2005, I never asked Samuel V.C. Steiner and 
Mary Jane Steiner for penuission to use King Lane. Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane 
Steiner never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane. 
29. From January 23, 1995 through July 15, 2005, we used King Lane for access to the 
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal e1Tands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
c. Regular fann vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving fann equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
properties. 
30. From July 2, 2005 through January 27, 2006, I never asked Pioneer Exchange 
Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC for permission to use King Lane. Pioneer 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY- 7 FIDELIT\' NATIOlXAL LAW GROUP 
l!D0-6"' AVENUE,SUITI:: 620 
Sunu:, w A 98101 
(2(1(j) 223-1525 
208
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC never gave my family, my guests or me 
pennission to use King Lane. 
31. From July 2, 2005 through January 27, 2006, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay 
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
prope1ties. 
32. From January 27, 2006 through the present I never asked the Lows for pennission to use 
King Lane. The Lows never gave my family, my guests or me pennission to use King 
Lane. 
33. From January 27, 2006 to the present, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay Parcel 
and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
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a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, talcing children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the Jolm Fuquay Trucking Company. 
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle tmcks, moving fann equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the comer of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
properties. 
LOWPARCEL2 
34. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2") located south of King Lane. 
Oreana Loop Road crosses the northwest comer of Low Parcel 2. The legal description 
for the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "H" to 
the Motion. 
35. Prior to the Lows ownership of Low Parcel 2, my family openly and continuously used 
King Lane to access the Jolm Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for more than 
5 years. 
36. From the public records, on May 6, 1942, D. Fred Henderson acquired Low Parcel 2. 
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3 7. From the public records, between May 6, 1942 and March 18, 1997, the Low Parcel 2 was 
owned by D. Fred Henderson, individually. 
38. From the public records, on March 18, 1997 D. Fred Henderson conveyed the Low Parcel 
2 to D. Fred Henderson and Mary F. Henderson as husband and wife. 
39. From the public records, on February 11, 2000, Mary F. Henderson conveyed the Low 
Parcel 2 to Mary F. Henderson, individually. 
40. From the public records, on July 8, 2005, Mary Frances Henderson conveyed the Low 
Parcel 2 to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC. 
4 I. On January 27, 2006, Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC conveyed 
the Low Parcel 2 to the Lows. 
42. From January 1, 1977 through March 18, 1997, I never asked D. Fred Henderson for 
pe1mission to use King Lane. D. Fred Henderson never gave my family. my guests or me 
permission to use King Lane. 
43. From January 1, 1977 through March 18, 1997, we used King Lane for access to the 
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. 1l1is use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
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c. Regular fanu vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving fann equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
properties. 
44. From March 18, 1997 through July 8, 2005, I never asked D. Fred Henderson or Mary F. 
Henderson for permission to use King Lane. D. Fred Henderson or Mary F. Henderson 
never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane. 
45. From March 18, 1997 through July 8, 2005, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay 
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
tmcks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
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e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
prope11ies. 
46. From July 2, 2005 through January 27, 2006, J never asked Pioneer Exchange 
Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC for permission to use l(jng Lane. Pioneer 
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC never gave my family, my guests or me 
pem1ission to use King Lane. 
47. From July 2, 2005 through January 27, 2006, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay 
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the maiJ box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use bas been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Tmcking Company. 
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle tmcks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the comer of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
properties. 
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48. From January 27, 2006 through the present I never asked the Lows for pennission to use 
King Lane. The Lows never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King 
Lane. 
49. From January 27, 2006 to the present, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay Parcel 
and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the fo11owing types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
c. Regular frum vehicle use of King Lru1e for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of IGng Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
properties. 
UTILITIES 
50. The overhead electric lines that service the houses located on the Clint Fuquay Parcel run 
from Oreana Loop Road along King Lane to the Clint Fuquay Parcel. 
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51. The underground Centurylink telephone lines run from Oreana Loop Road along King 
Lane to the Clint Fuquay Parcel. It then runs south along Castle Lane to my house on the 
John Fuquay Parcel. 
~ l/ ,e.rf ""~ 52. Je&gr8ffl'ld electric lines for the house on the John Fuquay parcel run north through the 
property to the south of the Jolm Fuquay Parcel. 
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF 
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE 
AS EVIDENCE 1N COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY OF PERJURY. 
Dated: Octobe,_,2014 U V. ~~ pohn Fuquay "'" 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD Case No. CV-2014-0278 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
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2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. 
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; 
Defendants. 
RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendants, Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Low"), by and through their attorneys ofrecord, Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC, and hereby submits 
this response and objection to the motion for swnmruy judgment filed by Plaintiffs. The Low's 
response and objection are supported by the Affidavits of Rose King, Samuel Steiner, and S. Bryce 




Farris filed concurrently herewith, as well as the record already before this Court, including, but not 
limited to, the Declarations of Rose King, Gilbert King, the Mailperson and Denice Collett 
previously filed with the Court on or about September 9, 2014. 
I. INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY 
On or about October 28, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Low 
but not against the other Defendants named in this action (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"King"). However, Plaintiffs' motion is inappropriate and ought to be denied for following reasons: 
1. Prior Testimony and Decision of this Court. This Court bas already ruled that 
Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence for a preliminary injunction following a hearing on 
September I 8, 2014 which included the testimony of John Fuquay, Clint Fuquay and J.C. Fuquay. 
Plaintiffs have not provided any new evidence and in fact have failed to acknowledge or address 
their prior testimony at the hearing before this Court. As discussed in more detail below, Plaintiffs 
own testimony establishes material issues of fact which would preclude summary judgment and there 
have been no additional facts presented which are undisputed and which would warrant summary 
judgment as requested by the Plaintiffs. 
2. Motion only as to Low. Plaintiffs have only sought summary judgment against the 
Lows and not against the Kings. Presumably, Plaintiffs believed that because Lows have owned 
their property for less time than the Kings they are less likely to rebut their allegations. However, 
by not including Kings and by not establishing/surveying the ownership of road in question there are 
obvious material issues of fact which exist. Plaintiffs cannot establish their alleged use of the 
roadway was adverse under a claim of right if they cannot identify the owner of the road they are 




supposedly adversely using. 1 Moreover, just because Plaintiffs have not sought summary judgment 
against the Kings does not mean that the Kings cannot rebut Plaintiffs' allegations of use which they 
have specifically done through the Affidavit of Rose King filed concurrently herewith. Ms. King's 
affidavit rebuts the alleged use of the road by the Plaintiffs regardless of whether it is owned by 
Lows or the Kings. Finally, Samuel Steiner, Law's predecessor in interest, has submitted an 
affidavit rebutting Plaintiffs claims that the use was regular and under a claim of right. 
3. Prescriptive Easement Elements. Plaintiffs must show that there are no material 
issues of fact AND that they have established each and every element by clear and convincing 
evidence in order for the Court to grant summary judgment. As discussed in more detail below, 
there are numerous material issues of fact and Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence the elements of a prescriptive easement More specifically, Plaintiffs' 
motion is based primarily upon the allegations or statements contained in the affidavit of John 
Fuquay concerning the alleged use of the road. However, these allegations are unequivocally 
rebutted by Rose King, Samuel Steiner, Plaintiffs' own testimony and others that there has not been 
regular, continuous or adverse use of the road by Plaintiffs. To the contrary, any use has been 
occasional, with implied permission and has not interfered with the joint or common use by the 
servient estate holders. As to some of the statements of such alleged use by delivery folks, 
mail persons or large trucks, these allegations are completely rejected and denied because said use 
Plaintiffs are currently attempting to survey the location of the road but the deadline under Rule 
56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to submit affidavits in support of their motion for summary 
judgment has passed. In any event, and as discussed herein, there remain material issues of fact even if 
Plaintiffs had submitted a survey of the road which would preclude summary judgment. 




simply did not occur or it is completely impossible for the alleged use to occur. In fact, the Affidavit 
of Rose King makes it clear that use of the road as alleged by Plaintiffs was impossible during much 
of the period alleged by Plaintiffs because the road was in reality simply a muddy path which is 
impassable during much of the year. 
II. DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT 
Plaintiffs have summarized the facts supporting their motion for summary judgment in five 
(5) bullet points which support their contention that between 1977 to presentthey have prescriptively 
used King Lane. Plaintiffs' Motion, page 5. These points can be combined and summarized into 
two points which relate to alleged use by personal vehicles and alleged use by large trucks. These 
points are Listed below and facts rebutting/disputing each point are stated subsequent thereto: 
I. Regular personal vehicle use to and from Oreana Loop road on a near-daily basis for regular 
residential purposes such as eoin2: to and from the store, picking up mail from the mail box. 
taking children to and from the bus stop. going to and from personal errands. 
a. Samuel Steiner, who lived at the property since 1959, has stated that the use was not 
regular but rather was occasionally used as a short cut. Mr. Steiner further states that the road was 
an old "fann access roadway" which would become muddy in wet weather and the majority of the 
vehicle use was down Castle Road to Oreana Loop Road. 
b. Rose King, who has lived at the property since 1973, states that there has not been 
regular use of the road, that the primary access for Plaintiffs' properties has been Castle Lane, that 
the "road" was only a path when the purchased the property, was muddy and impassable most of the 




year,2 and that Plaintiffs and their children catch the bus at the end of Castle Lane. Ms. King goes 
on to state that she can observe and hear all traffic that uses King Lane from 1973 to present and she 
disputes any allegations "that King Lane has been used since 1977 for regular personal vehicles on 
a near daily basis ... pedestrian traffic to and from the bus stop and guests going to and coming from 
the Fuquay properties." Affidavit of Rose King, paragraph 16, pg. 6. The Affidavit of Rose King 
also rebuts any alleged use of King Lane by guests, delivery persons. mail persons, UPS or Schwans 
to the Fuquay properties with the exception of the one time Ms. King gave permission to the 
Schwans' delivery person. Affidavit of Rose King, paragraphs 11 and 12. 
c. The declaration of the Mail person filed on or about September 9, 2014 states that mail 
to the Fuquays at one mail box on Oreana Loop at the end of Castle Lane and that the only people 
that receive mail at the end of King Lane is the King family. 
d. The declaration of Denise Collett filed on or about September 9, 2014 states that she 
has been the bus driver for the Grandview School District for 33 years and the bus stop for the 
Fuquays, which is currently J.C. Fuquay's son Jess, and which included Clint and J.C. Fuquay when 
they went to school was at the end of Castle Lane. She does "not make a school bus stop at Kings 
Lane." 
2 Rose King's Affidavit states that the road in question was a path which was muddy and 
impassable when they purchased the property and that even her own children when the rented the houses 
currently occupied by Plaintiffs could not use the road to come to her house. This is further evidenced by 
the testimony of Plaintiffs' own witness Raymond Jayo who testified that lane was marsh, a big mud hole 
and "pretty messy" for at least I 0-15 years while it was being improved. See Affidavit of S. Bryce Farris, 
Exhibit A (Tr. pg. !OS, Ins. 16-24). 




e. Testimony of Plaintiffs.3 
1. As to Clint Fuquay's property, Clint Fuquay testified that he has lived in his 
current house for the past eight years (Tr. Pg. 48, lns. 1-6). This is clearly outside the prescriptive 
period, which as explained below, must be for 5 years prior to July 1, 2006. J.C. Fuquay, who 
occupies the other residence on Clint Fuquay's property testified that he has only lived on the 
property in the past eight years also, which again means this other residence, and any alleged use, 
is outside the prescriptive period. (Tr. pg. 72, Ins. 12-16). 
11. John Fuquay, Clint Fuquay and J.C. Fuquay testified that their addresses and 
mailboxes are located at the end of Castle Lane and that Castle Lane is an all weather road used to 
access their properties. (Tr. pgs. 25-26, Ins. 18-25 and 1-3; pg. 48, lns. 11-15). 
2. Reirular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John Fuguay Parcel. 
This use has been consistent since 1977 when J an1es Fuguav had his trucks and the use 
continued when John Fuquay began operating the John Fuquav Trucking Companv. 
a. Samuel Steiner, again who lived at the property since 1959, states that "I don't believe 
I ever saw anyone take a large truck out tlmt way, logging trucks or cattle trucks." Affidavit of 
Samuel Steiner, paragraph 8. 
b. Rose King has emphatically states in her affidavit that from 1973 to 1989 there were 
"never" large trucks on King Lane because King Lane was not suitable for said use given that it was 
3 References herein to testimony refers to the testimony previously provided by Plaintiffs at the 
hearing on September 18, 2014 in which this Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 
A transcript of said hearing and said testimony is attached to the Affidavit of S. Bryce Farris filed 
concurrently herewith. 




muddy and there were two welded barrels across the lane. Rose King Affidavit, paragraph 16.4 Ms. 
King then goes on to state from 1989 to 2011 she has not observed any large trucks, cattle trucks or 
farm equipment of the Fuquays using King Lane and that the use oflarge trucks has only been in the 
past four to five years. Id. 
c. Testimony of Plaintiffs. Perhaps the most telling evidence on this issue is the prior 
testimony of J.C. Fuquay at the hearing on the preliminary injunction in which he testified that he 
and his brother have only been driving large trucks or cattle trucks down the lane in the last five 
years, and his brother, Clint Fuquay has been doing it for less than five years. (Tr. Pg. 92, Ins. 1-25). 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment must be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Friel v. Boise 
City Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484,485,887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). The court must liberally 
construe the facts in the Ii2ht most favorable to the party opposing the motion, (Defendants/Lows], 
drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Friel, 126 Idaho at 485,887 
P.2d at 30 (citing Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,272, 869 P.2d 1365, 
1367 (1994); Harris v. Dept. qf Health and Welfi1re, 123 Idaho 295,298,847 P.2d 1156, 1159 
( 1992)) ( emphasis added). If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence. a summary judgment motion must be denied. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 
4 Again, Ms. King's statements that the road was a muddy path are substantiated by the Affidavit 
of Samuel Steiner and the testimony of Plaintiffs' own witness, Raymond Jayo. 




at 272,869 P.2d at 1367. (emphasis added). 
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Prescriptive Easement Law. An easement "is the right to use the land of another for a 
specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property owner." Beckstead v. 
Price, 146 Idaho 57 (2008) (citations omitted). lnAkersv. D.L. White Construction, Inc., 142 idaho 
293, 303, 197, 127 P.3d 196 (2006), the Idaho Supreme Court succinctly laid out the elements for 
a prescriptive easement. Easement by Prescription requires the party seeking the easement to prove 
bv clear and convincine: evidence the use is: 
a. Open and Notorious; 
b. Continuous and Uninterrupted; 
c. Adverse and Under a Claim of Right; 
d. With Actual or Imputed Knowledge of the Owner of the Servient Tenement; 
and 
c. For the Statutory Period [20 years at the time of Filing pursuant to LC. § 5-
203]. 
"Recognizing that '[p]rescription acts as a penalty against a landowner[.]' this Court has 
stated prescriptive rights 'should be closely scrutinized and limited by the courts."' Beckstead v. 
Price, 146 ldaho 57, 64. Accordingly, "[e]ach element is essential to the claim, and the trial court 
must make findings relevant to each element in order to sustain a judgment on appeal." Hodgins 
v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,229 (2003). Moreover, "where there is more than one claimant [i.e. Jolm 
and Clint Fuquay] to a prescriptive easement, the trial court must make findings sufficient to support 




each claim." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court went on to explain that "where, as here, the claimants 
purchased their property at different times and used the subject property for different purposes and 
with different frequency, the trial court must make findings specific to each Property Owner's claim. 
Such findings are necessary, in part, because prescriptive rights are defined by actual prescriptive 
use of the property over the statutory period."' Id ( citation omitted). Thus, both John Fuquay and 
Clint Fuquay must prove each of the essential elements by clear and convincing evidence as to their 
respective use and this Court must make specific findings as to each. This is important for purposes 
of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because Plaintiffs have made no specific allegations, 
nor provided any evidence, of use of the property owned by Clint Fuquay. 5 
1. Statutory Period. An initial question which must be addressed is the statutory period 
which applies to the other elements of a prescriptive easement. As Plaintiffs correctly point out, 
Idaho Code § 5-203 was amended, effective July 1, 2006, to provide that the statutory period for 
adverse possession and prescriptive easement is now twenty years. In Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 
212,280 P.3d 715 (2012), cited by Plaintiffs, the Court explained that the twenty year period does 
not apply to an easement by prescription acquired prior to the amendment and thus the party claiming 
the prescriptive easement must prove "the elements of an easement by prescription for a five year 
period prior to July 1, 2006." Id. at 222. This means the prescriptive elements must be proven as far 
back as at least July 1, 2001. This date is important because Clint Fuquay has only lived on his 
5 Again, Clint and J.C. Fuquay have occupied the residences for less than the prescriptive period 
and Rose King's Affidavit states that her children previously occupied the residences and did not, and could 
not, use King Lane on a regular basis because it was simply impassible. Affidavit of Rose King, paragraphs 
7 and 8. 




property in the past eight years and Plaintiffs have not attempted to offer any evidence of specific 
use of King Lane by residences currently owned or occupied by Clint Fuquay and J.C. Fuquay. 
2. Use by Each Plaintiff. A prescriptive easement arises because of the adverse "'use" 
of another's land. It is the "use" that creates the easement and the scope of the easement. A claimant 
may: (a) rely on his own '"use" for the prescriptive period; (b) rely on the adverse "use" by the 
claimant's predecessor for the prescriptive period; or (c) combine the predecessor's "'use" with the 
claimant's own use to establish the requisite period of continuous adverse use. Akers v. D. L. While 
Construction, Inc., supra. However, and as discussed, supra, the use must be established for each 
claimant independently. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,229. 
3. Adverse Under a Claim of Riz:ht. Plaintiffs have not surveyed the road referred 
as King Lane and have not identified those portions owned by Low which they claim to have 
adversely used under a claim of right. In other words, if the Plaintiffs do not know and have not 
provided a survey to determine the ownership of the road, how can they meet their burden of 
showing their use was adverse and under a claim of right? This is a threshold question before 
Plaintiffs can meet their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that their use was 
adverse and under a claim of right as to the Lows. At a minimum, a material issue of fact exists as 
to the ownership of the road and whether Plaintiffs have adversely used said road under a claim of 
right as against Low. 
a. Joint/Common Use. In Becksread v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 64, the Supreme 
Court reiterated that Idaho law has recognized two exceptions to an adverse use presumption when 
the roadway was jointly used or used in common with the underlying property owner. First, "the 




adverse use presumption has been rebutted by evidence of 'use of the driveway in common with the 
owner and the general public, in absence of some decisive act on the user's part indicating a separate 
and exclusive use .... "' id. ( citations omitted). Second, "when 'a landovvner 'constructs a way over 
[the land] for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way 
interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of ... permission"' Id. The Court, referring 
to its prior decision in Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,481 (2006), stated such exceptions remain 
applicable as an "approach to determining whether a claimant had met the elements for a prescriptive 
easement by clear and convincing evidence." id. In other words, the joint or common use of the 
roadway by Lows/Kings and/or the construction of roadway by Lows/Kings remains applicable to 
determining whether Plaintiffs use of the road was in fact adverse. It is within the province of the 
district court to weigh such conflicting evidence concerning such joint/common use. Id. More 
importantly, and for purposes of Plaintiffs summary judgment motion, the Lows/Kings joint use of 
the roadway creates conflicting evidence and/or a material issue of fact which renders Plaintiffs' 
motion inappropriate. It is undisputed in this case that the roadway, King Lane, has been jointly used 
by Lows and Kings to access their respective properties. Plaintiffs' assertions of occasional use in 
common with the Lows and Kings fails to meet their burden by clear and convincing evidence that 
such "casual" use is adverse under a claim of right.6 
6 In determining whether a prescriptive easement had been acquired for a public roadway 
the Court in Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497,502 (2010) stated "[t]his Court has repeatedly 
found that casual or sporadic use is not enough - the use must be regular and continuous." The 
Court cited to Kirk v. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 282-84 (1941 ), which held that "casual and desultory" 
use by "miners, hunters, fisherman, and persons on horseback, even ofa well-marked road was not 
public use." 




b. Adverse Use. 
Since the use must be more than simply casual use and it must be regular and continuous use, 
Plaintiffs' suggestion that their use of Castle Lane is irrelevant is misplaced. While Plaintiffs have 
not asserted an easement of necessity, and which has been essentially rejected by this Court already 
when it denied Plaintiffs' motion for an injunction, the fact that Plaintiffs have regularly used Castle 
Lane for regular access to their respective properties rebuts Plaintiffs' claims of regular, 
"continuous" use of what has been termed King Lane. Since Castle Lane is an all weather road 
accessible by each of the Plaintiffs' residences, which provides access to the Plaintiffs' mail boxes 
and the Plaintiffs' bus stop and which, according to the A_ffidavits o.fSamuel Steiner and Rose King 
is the primary access for the Plaintiffs' properties, it is more than relevant concerning Plaintiffs' 
allegations of regular and continuous use. At a bare minimum, there is a material issue of fact as 
to the regular, continuous use by Plaintiffs of King Lane when they have acknowledge and admitted 
that their primary access to their properties is via Castle Lane. 
Finally, Plaintiffs themselves have acknowledged that their alleged use of King Lane has not 
been adverse to the servient estate owners. John Fuquay previously testified that he has never done 
anything to kick the Kings off the disputed property or "interfered" with the use of the property. (Tr. 
pg. 37, Ins. 2-15). Likewise, Clint Fuquay testified that he has never attempted to exclude the Kings 
or to interfere with the use. (Tr. pgs. 66-67, Ins. 20-8). Finally, J.C. Fuquay testified that no one 
from his family has done anything that '·interrupted" or interfered with the use of King Lane. (Tr. 
pgs. 86-87, lns. 16-14). 
II 




4. Scope of the Easement. 
Again, the scope and character of a prescriptive easement is defined by the use. While the 
scope and character can be defined by the use, it is also necessary to define the width and location 
of the easement. "[A]judgment determining the existence of an easement across the land of another 
must also set forth the width and location of the easement." Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 
570, 572, 114 P .3d 128, 130 (2005). The width of an easement is a question of fact which will not 
be disturbed on appeal ifit is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. In Argosy Trust, 
the Court analyzed several cases in which it remanded those cases to find and decree the character, 
location, width and length of the easement. Thus, not only have Plaintiffs not identified the owners 
of the road to which they claim to adversely used under a claim ofright, they have not defined the 
scope and location of the alleged easement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ought to be DENIED. 
DA TED this 8th day of December, 2014. 
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• FILED 
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DEC O 9 2014 
~G~~ERK 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD nIDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, ) 






SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K. ) 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING ) 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN ) 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ______________ ) 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Owyhee ) 
Case No. CV-2014-0278 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING 
Rose King being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and says that: 
1. I am a Defendant in the above-titled action, over the age of 18 and I make this 
affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and I am competent to testify to the matters 
contained herein. I have reviewed the Declaration of John Fuquay dated October 28, 2014. The 
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statements set forth by Mr. Fuquay in his declaration are inaccurate for the reasons hereinafter 
set forth: 
2. My deceased husband, Gordon King and I purchased our ranch on September 17, 
1973 which included a field lane which has been refe1Ted to as "King Lane" in this litigation. 
At the time of our purchase, King Lane was only a path through grass and weeds and was wet 
and muddy most of the year with a culvert constructed of 55 gallon barrels at the west end. We 
desired to access our fields through the use of this field lane, therefore, we started hauling rocks 
to build a base for this road so that it would be passable for our farm equipment. We did this 
annually until we decided to sell the ranch in 1982. 
3. My husband and I sold our ranch to Zane Block in 1982 but had to repossess it 
in 1986. During this four year period I was still familiar with the use of King Lane as I 
frequently observed the property and the operations of the ranch. After we repossessed the ranch, 
the lane was in terrible condition and we had to construct and improve the road and tl1e crossing 
where the road crosses an irTigation ditch which provides water to our ranch. There was a 
culvert made from 55 gallon barrels at the west end of the land and these were rusty and leaky. 
We replaced the welded barrel culvert in 1988-1989 with a concrete culvert. Prior to that time 
it was impossible for large trucks to cross over the welded barrels. This lane still requires annual 
maintenance to make it passable for our ranching operation. 
4. The path/road which has been referred to as "King Lane" was not named King 
Lane until 2002 when emergency 911 came into existence and Gary Aman requested a name for 
the lane to access of emergency vehicles. I informed him that the access would be named "King 
Lane." At that time, addresses were provided for the four houses located on the King 
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property/ranch with an address of King Lane. Mailing addresses for the four residences on the 
King property/ranch then became King Lane. There was no determination that the path/road be 
named King Lane would continue any further than the access to our residences. For purposes 
of the rest of this Affidavit I will refer to the roadway at issue as King Lane but this does not 
alter my understanding that King Lane ends at the residences for my ranch. 
5. What has been refened to as King Lane for purposes of litigation bas also been 
used by Cal and Susie Low, who own the property generally to the south of the King 
property/ranch and their predecessors in interest. When my husband and I purchased our ranch 
in 1973, the property now owned by Lows was owned by the Steiner family, and the Steiners 
used the road to access their property to get to and from their fields. This use has continued 
since 1973 to present, including now that the property is owned by Cal and Susie Low. 
6. I am familiar with the property currently owned by John Fuquay and Clint and 
Hailey Fuquay which is located generally to the south and west of the King ranch. 
7. My son, Greg King, rented the house which is now occupied by J.C. Fuquay from 
1979 to 1982. During said time my son worked for us and could not use King Lane on a regular 
or frequent basis because the road was wet and impassible approximately ninety percent (90%) 
of the time. Many times when he came to our house or for work he had to walk or drive a 
tractor to do so because the road was not suitable for regular vehicle use. It was not until the 
concrete culvert mentioned above was installed in the irrigation ditch that allowed more frequent 
use of the roadway. 
8. Our daughter, Karla Love, rented the main house on the Fuquay property for a 
couple months in the 1980's. She traveled up and down Castle Lane to Oreana Loop for access 
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even when coming to visit us because King Lane was so impassible. 
9. From 1973 to present the primary access for the properties owned by John and 
Clint Fuquay has been Castle Lane. Any use by the Fuquays of King Lane has been occasional 
use, but not on a dai]y or regular basis. This use has been casual use on occasion as a matter of 
convenience. This is because, among other things, as mentioned above, King Lane is in fact 
impassible dming certain times of the year and cannot be used because it becomes too muddy. 
Such occasional/casual use by the Fuquays has been allowed because we wanted to be 
neighborly, their use did not interfere with our use of the road and it was done so with implied 
permission. The Fuquays use has been so infrequent that is has not bothered us until recently, 
or more specifica11y within the past five years, when the Fuquays have attempted to increase their 
use by bringing large trucks through our (King) property. 
10. There has always been a fence and a gate on the west end of our property along 
what is referred to as King Lane to prevent our livestock from getting to the BLM property to 
the west. We have also used this fenced area where King Lane is located for our own livestock 
to graze and to pen up for sorting. While the Fuquays have occasionally/casually used the road 
on an infrequent basis they have previously respected the fence and gates across the roadway. 
It was not until recently, within the past year, that John Fuquay asserted they did not have to 
close the gate. 
11. Prior to this lawsuit, I am not aware of any use by UPS, post office or other 
delivery services of King Lane to provide services to the Fuquay properties. To the contrary the 
mailboxes for the Fuquays are located at the end of Castle Lane and I have not observed any 
services using King Lane to provide deliveries to the Fuquay properties. The only mailbox at 
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the end of King Lane is for the Kings. Since this lawsuit has been initiated by the Fuquays, I 
have been asked if Schwans delivery person can use King Lane to access the Fuquay property 
because John Fuquay has locked the gate on Castle Lane directing them to use King Lane. I 
verbally gave permission to the Schwans delivery person to use King Lane that one time which 
was within the past six months. 
12. I am not aware of any guests of the Fuquays using King Lane to access the Fuquay 
properties. Since my husband and I have owned the King ranch, there has been occasional use 
of King Lane by hunters or others who have asked permission. 
13. Any use by Clint Fuquay of the road/King Lane to access the property now owned 
by Clint Fuquay has been in the last 8 years. Again, any use been occasional and not on a 
regular or primary access. 
14. With regard to children catching the school bus at the end of King Lane, my 
children caught the bus there. I do remember that on occasion Megan, John's sister, did come 
down King Lane to catch the bus. I do not recall John Fuquay ever catching the bus at the end 
of King Lane. If he rode the school bus, he caught the bus at the bus stop at the end of Castle 
Lane. Clint Fuquay's children and J.C. Fuquay's children catch the bus at the end of Castle 
Lane. 
15. Until the spring of 2014, I have never seen the Fuquays operate farm equipment 
on King Lane. 
16. From 1973 to 1988-1989 there were never any large trucks used on King Lane 
because, among other things, the trucks could not use the Jane and pass over the welded barrels 
mentioned above and King lane was not suitable for said use. From 1988-89 to 2011 I have not 
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observed any large trucks or for that matter much traffic at all from the Fuquay properties using 
King Lane. The heavy truck traffic seemed to commence about 2011. 
In summary I have lived on the King Ranch from 1973 to current except for the four 
years between 1982-1986. I can observe and hear all of the traffic that uses King Lane. I 
dispute Mr. Fuquay's allegations that King Lane has been used since 1977 for regular personal 
vehicles on a nearly daily basis, semi trucks consistently since 1977, regular farm vehicles such 
as cattle trucks and moving farm equipment, pedestrian traffic to and from the bus stop and 
guests going to and comeing from the Fuquay properties. 
The King family uses King Lane several times a day in our ranching/farming operations. 
Any use if any of King Lane by other people including the Fuquays has never interfered with our 
use of King Lane and in order to be neighborly we have allowed the use by others. Such use 
has been with implied pennission. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a tme and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the 
following on this E' day of,~J;G/,nM·~ 2014 by the following method: 
MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200 - 6'h A venue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
Telephone: (206) 224-6003 
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorneys for Plaintif.(s 
RONALD P. RAINEY 
RONALD P. RAINING PA 
110 N. 9111 Ave. 
P0Box26 
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and Rose 
King 
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S. BRYCE FARRIS 
[Idaho State Bar No. 5636] 
• 
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Golden Eagle Building 
1101 W.RiverSt.,Ste.110 
P. 0. Box 7985 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 629-744 7 
Facsimi]e: (208) 629-7559 
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low 
• 
FILED 
- - 1•;11~11_ ·"' P.M. _}\.IV\. 
OEC O 9 20\4 
IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD Case No. CV-2014-0278 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. 
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO } 
) 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL V.C. 
STEINER 
SAMUEL V.C. STEINER being first duly sworn, deposes and states that: 
1. I and my wife Mary are the predecessors in title for Cal and Susie Low who purchased 
our properties located adjacent to Oreana Loop Road in Owyhee County in 2006. 
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2. I was born 1957. My parents purchased these properties in 1959. I was two (2) or 
so when we moved onto the parcel in 1959 that is located across Oreana Loop Road from where 
Lows built their residence. Our farm reside.nee was within a half mile of the road everyone is 
referring to as King Lane. 
3. I inherited the properties from my mother in 1984. I had lived on the parcel referred 
to above until 1975 when I lived in Boise and went to college. I returned to the property in 1980. 
4. There was an old one-room school building located on what is referred to as Castle 
Road close to the Foreman Reservoir, but c1asses were not held there. I believe the building was 
moved off sometime in the 1980s. I understood that it had been an active school site for a number 
of years before being closed down when another school building was built that was more convenient. 
5. I do not know who, if anyone, constructed King Lane. This was an old fann access 
roadway that was used occasionally by a variety of people. My dad always told me that he thought 
the lane belonged to him. Neither my parents nor myself tried to stop anyone from using the road. 
As long as they did not interfere with our operations, we didn't object to them using the lane. 
6. Sometimes hunters used it to go back to the reservoir on the BLM ground. Kings 
used it to go to the geothermal well they had leased on the BLM ground. Renters on the old Munger 
property, now owned by Fuquays and previously owned by Bob Collett used it occasionally as a 
short-cut to Grand View. I think that Jim Fuquay used it occasionally when he lived in the mobile 
home located near the rental property now owned by Clint Fuquay. Jim and John Fuquay lived in 
the old Foreman fatm residence down by the Foreman Reservoir for many years and while they 
generally drove out Castle Road, they also used the lane as a short-cut to Grand View. When Jim 
Fuquay moved on a mobile home at the corner of what would be King Lane and Castle Road, he 
would occasionally use IGng Lane, probably as a sho11-cut when he went out to Grand View. 
7. However, the majority of the vehicle use was down Castle Road to Oreana Loop Road 
to the west. This was especially true during wet weather because there is a slough at the common 
west comer of the F ouquay, Low' s and King's properties that was pretty muddy in wet weather. It 
was pretty difficult to get through then. When Zane Block had the King property m1der contract, he 
and Jim Fuquay did some work on the lane one year. 
8. While there was some use of King Lane by passenger vehicles and pickup trucks, I 
don't believe I ever saw anyone take a large truck out that way, logging trucks or cattle trucks. 
Those kind of vehicles always went out Castle Road. However, I think that John Fuquay may have 
brought an empty cattle truck in that way a few times. 
DATED this ff) f.~y of November, 2014. 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ft day of November, 2014. 
Au,11,"'A ~ lf.ctit tz!Jtc( 
NOTARY PUBaI~ FD,~ THE. STATE OF IDAHO 
Residing at .~ il l,'4-t , Idaho 
My Commission ex.pi.res: Ci I -,J / ~ i 7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served 
on the following on this 8th day of September, 2014 by the following method: 
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MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW 
GROUP 
1200 - 61h A venue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
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E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorneys for Plai11tifls 
RONALD P. RAINEY 
RONALDP.RAININGPA 
110 N. 911t Ave. 
P0Box26 
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attomeys for Defendants Gordon and 
Rose King 
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S. BRYCE FARRIS 
[Idaho State Bar No. 5636] 
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Golden Eagle Building 
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110 
P. 0. Box 7985 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
Telephone: (208) 629-7447 
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559 
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low 
• 
FILED/ 
~.M . .:.2,hi.P.M. 
DEC O 9 20t4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD Case No. CV-2014-0278 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. 
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF S. BRYCE FARRIS 
S. Bryce Farris being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says that: 
1. I am the attorney for the Defendants, Cal and Susie Low, in this matter, I am over the 
age of 18 and I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and I am competent to testify 
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to the matters contained herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the hearing 
held on September 18, 2014 in the above-captioned matter and before the above titled Court. 
/)· -/1- -;-,.,. 
DATED this 6 day, of ( )t,CU!Jtk~. 2014. 
/ 
/? 
/ ~ /.;;:#U,Z.,,-/ ~-
/,..~ - /-=--
S. Bryce Farris 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this_[_ day of bl<.. eit,-tu; 2014. y;~ 
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Notary Publi~ for Idaho . 
Residing int'&, 5,'S , Idah~ /'7,,, J ,_ 
My Commission Expires:~ 
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King 
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• • {Proceedings begin at 1:28 p.m.) 
COURT: All right. We're taking up the case of 
John Fuquay and others versus Susan Low, Heart Ranch and 
others. Mr. Cleverley; Is that correct? 
MR. CLEVERLEY: That is correct, Your Honor. 
COURT: He's here for the plaintiffs. Mr. Ralney's 
here for the defendants. Today is not a hearing to 
determlne the merits of the case. It's only a hearing 
today to determine whether there should be a preliminary 
Injunction Issued. 
In other words, we'll get a lriul set several 
months down the line and today we're going to determine 
whether·· what happens to the road between now and then. 
So Is there any-· do you care to make any discussion 
amongst yourself for an accomodatlon between now and then 
or do you want the Court to make a decision on the use of 
the road pending the trlal? 
MR. RAINEY: We're prepared to go ahead, Your 
Honor. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: We'll go ahead, Your Honor. That's 
fine. 
COURT: Plaintiffs were granted a temporary 
injunction so they can go forward. Go ahead and proceed. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, how would the Court 
like to proceed? Just go ahead and call witnesses? 
4 
COURT: Sure. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: Al! right. We call John Fuquay to 
the stand, please. 
(JOHN FUQUAY is sworn.) 
COURT: So kind of step behind the seat and you can 
swing in that way. 
WITNESS: Okay. 
COURT: Start out by stating your name and spell 
your last name. 
WITNESS: It's John Fuquay, F-u-q-u-a-y. 
COURT: Thank you. Go ahead and proceed. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
Q Thank you. Mr. Fuquay, you're a plaintiff In this 
case? 
A Correct. 
Q Where do you live? 
A 18907 Castle Lane, Oreana, Idaho. 
Q And can you give me kind of a thumbnail sketch of 
where that Is? 
A It's off of Oreana Loop Road. 
Q Okay. 
A And off of Castle Creek. 
Q What's the closest city to you? 




















































Q And how long have you lived there? 
A Thirty-seven years. 
Q Okay. And do you own the property where you live? 
A Correct. 
Q And you recently said a part of your property to 
Clint Fuquay? 
A Correct. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: May I approach, Your Honor? 
COURT: Sure. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, I have a copy. Would 
the Court !Hee a copy? 
COURT: Yeah, go ahead. Thanks. This Is No. 1? 
MR. CLEVERLEY: This will be Exhibit 1. 
BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
Q Mr. Fuquay, do you recognize what that Is? 
A Yeah. It's a map of Highway 78 and Oreana Loop 
Road. 
Q Okay. Does that show generally where you live? 
A ln general, yeah. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, we'd ask 1 to be 
admitted. 
COURT: Any objection? 
MR. RAINEY: No, Your Honor. 
COURT: Okay, l's admitted. 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1 admitted.) 
6 
BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
Q Mr. Fuquay, I'm handing you what we're going to be 
marking as Exhibit No. 2. Do you recognize what that is? 
A Yeah. It's a map of my property It looks like and 
some of Lows' property and some of Kings' property and 
Oreana Loop Road. 
Q Okay. And on that map, there are some lines In 
blue? Can you explain what those llnes In blue arei' 
A They look to me to be the Oreana Loop Road and then 
also the lane going to and from our property and to -- in 
and out of our property there. 
Q And you say your property. That's-~ your property 
is off to the left-hand side of that? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. And Is that the one that's marked John 
Fuquay? 
A Correct. 
Q And the one above It, was that the property that 
you sold to Clint? 
A Correct. 
Q And that one's labeled with Clint Fuquay? 
A Correct. 
Q Now, to the best of your knowledge, is the property 
marked Susie and Cal low parcel 1, Is that generally the 
location of the Lows' property? 
7 
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A Correct. 1 
2 Q And then farther to the east, there's a property 
3 marked Susie and Cal Low, parcel 2. Is that, to the best 
4 of your knowledge, about where that property is? 
5 A Correct. 
6 Q And then to the top or to the north, there's a 
7 property that's marked Heart K Ranch Trust. Is that 
8 generally your understanding of what that property Is? 
9 A Correct. 
10 Q And then a small square that's labeled with Rose M. 
, ·11 King, is that generally where her property would be 
12 located? 
13 A Yeah, correct. 
14 MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, we'd offer 2. 
15 COURT: Any objection? 
16 MR. RAINEY: Your Honor, 2 somewhat duplicates --
17 we'll explain that this King's Lane Is not where It's 
18 located on this map. 
19 COURT: Is it on the King side or the Low side? 
20 WITNESS: lt's in the middle. 
21 COURT: Are the Lows here? 
22 MR. RAINEY: I can't hear you. 
23 COURT: Are the Lows here? 
24 MR. RAINEY; Yes. 
25 MR. FARRIS: Yes, Your Honor. 
B 
1 COURT: Oh, okay. Are they represented by you, Mr. 
2 Rainey, as well or do you just represent the Kings? 
3 MR. RAINEY: No. Lows are represented by Bryce 
4 Farris. 
5 COURT: I'm sorry. Okay. All right. For 
6 Illustrative purposes, do you have any objection? 
7 MR. RAINEY: Well, l want the record clear that 
8 what is called King's Lane is not accurate. 
9 COURT: You can take that up on cross-examination. 
10 MR. RAINEY: Okay. 
11 COURT: We'll let it in just for illustrative 
12 purposes. 
13 MR. RAINEY: Okay. 
14 {Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2 admitted.) 
15 BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
16 Q And Mr. Fuquay, I'm handing you what we'll mark at 
17 Exhibit 3. And does this show the same information as the 
18 prior map? 
19 A As best I c:an tell, yeah. 
20 Q A little closer detail? 
21 A Yeah. 
22 MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, we'd offer 3 for 
23 illustrative purposes. 
24 COURT: And Mr. Farris, Mr. Rainey, do you have any 





MR. RAINEY: Well, with the same caveat, correct. 
COURT: Right. So we'll let 3 in for illustrative 
3 purposes. 
4 {Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 3 admitted.) 
BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 5 
6 Q Mr. Fuquay, could you take a look at Exhibit 3 for 
7 me, please? 
8 COURT: Let me get it marked real quick. He's got 
9 a copy, 
WITNESS: I'm ready. 
BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
10 
11 
12 Q Can you explain and show on this map where you 
13 live? 
14 A I live on the south side of the BO there marked 
15 John Fuquay. 
16 Q Okay. So there's a parcel marked John Fuquay and 
17 it's got a red square around that? 
18 A Correct. 
19 Q You would be on the left-hand side of that? 
20 A Correct. 
21 Q There's a little dark spot there. Can you explain 
22 what that Is? Is that close as a good marker for where you 
23 live? 
24 A Correct. The house and trees. 
25 Q So Is there a road that runs through your property? 
10 
1 A Correct. 
2 Q And what's that road that runs through your 
3 property? 
4 A I believe that's called Castle Lane. 
5 Q Okay. And how long has that road run through your 
6 property? 
7 A Thirty-seven years that I know of. I don't know 
8 how much longer. I can only say for how long I've been 
9 there. 
10 Q Where does that road go if you follow It south? 
11 A It will bring you out on -- it forks up there a 
12 little ways from my house and then it goes out to Oreana 
13 Loop Road. 
14 Q Okay. And how far ls it from your house to Oreana 
15 loop Road? 
16 A Going that way --
17 Q Going south. 
18 A -- probably approximately four miles. Three or 
19 four miles. 
20 Q Okay. And then if you follow that road north, 
21 where does it go? 
22 A It will hook into Castle Lane -- or it goes into 
23 Oreana Loop Road also. 
24 Q So if we follow that road north out of your 
25 property, what's the first thing that you would come to 
11 
10/22/2014 l 1 :13:04 AM 
246
• 
1 'after yo\J pass -- let'~ just kind of walk it through. 
2 After you pass your property, where are you? 
3 A Then I would -- atter I go out of my property, I 
, 4 would hit the BLM land. 
5 Q Okay. 
6 A And then I would go to -- stay on the SLM land and 
7 it would come up to Clint's house, goes around Clint's 
B house toward the east and then you would hit Clint's other 
9 rental house and then It goes from there into Castle Lane 

















There's four of them there I believe. 
Q And If you keep going east, where does that take 
you? 
A You'll cross the creek, Castle Creek, right there 
by their yard and it would end up on Oreana Loop Road. 
Oreana Loop Road would venture on up and connects into 
Highway 78. 
Q Can you describe, please, what Castle Lane looks 
like as far as what type of a road or how wide It ls? 
A It's just a gravel -- gravel dirt road all the way 
from Loop to Loop Road. It's just all gravel. 
Q And about how wide is It? 
A The actual road part, I'm going to say maybe 20 
feet In gravel maybe. 
Q Okay. Are there any fences along Castle Lane? 
12 
A There's fences that border us there on my property 
2 and then It borders Cl!nt's property and then lt turns Into 
3 a lane where Lows are on one side of the lane and Kings are 
4 on the other side of the lane. 
5 Q So what I'm dolng so we can have the record reflect 
6 where you're talking about -- somebody reading this wlll 
7 understand where you're talking about so if I ask a few 
8 questions llke this asking you to explain, that's partly 

















Q So when you're talking about the road getting up to 
Clint's property, you're talking about the northwest corner 
of Clint Fuquay's property? 
A Correct. 
Q And then when that road turns east, does it change 
condltion? Does it change how wide it is? 
A lt varies In and out but it's basically the same . 
I mean It's just a gravel road. 
Q Now, what Is -- let's take this kind of in 
sections. From the corner -- the northwest corner of 
Clint's property to the northeast corner of Clint's 
property, are there any fences along that road? 
A Just along Clint's side -- Clint's property llne. 
Q So there's a fence on Clint's side of the properly 
that follows the road all the way across lhe north side of 
• 
1 Clint's property? 
2 A Correct. 
3 Q Okay. And when that fence gets to the Intersection 
4 of Clint's property and the Lows' property, does that fence 
5 continue? 
6 A Yes. But It changes ownership I believe there and 
7 goes to Lows' on easterly. 
8 Q So from the northwest corner of Clint's property, 
9 there's a fence that runs all the way along what would be 
10 the south side of the lane? 













Q And that runs from Clint's property how far east? 
A Approximately a half a mlle. 
Q Okay. Does that fence go all the way through the 
Lows' property? 
A Oh, no. It would be about a quarter mile. I was 
wrong. It continues into Lows' property, yes. 
Q Okay. And then does that -- where does that fence 
line end? 
A Clint's fence or Lows' fence? 
Q Well --
A Or the continuing fence? 
Q The continued fence. 
24 A It must end down on Oreana Loop Road. 
25 Q So if you were to follow that fence line from the 
14 
1 northwest corner of Clint's property, that fence line would 
2 continue along the south side of Oreana Loop -- excuse me, 
3 off King's Lane or Castle Lane all the way to Oreana Loop 
4 Road? 
5 A Correct. 
6 Q Are there any other fences along what's marked as 
7 !(Ing Lane? 
8 A There's a fence on the north side of that road. 
9 Q So there's a fence on the south side of the road 
10 and then there's a fence on the north side of the road? 
11 A Correct. 
12 Q Where does that fence start? Take from the west --
13 if you would, the west side. Where does It start on the 
14 west side? 
15 A It would start approximately where Clint's property 
16 ends, in that gt?neral area, and it runs east to -- crosses 
17 the creek and 1 assume lt hooks Into Oreana Loop Road there 
18 somewhere. 
19 Q Okay. So if you're driving down King's Lane on 
20 this roadway from Oreana loop Road to Clint's property, 
21 would there be a fence on both sides? 
22 A Correct. 



























































a fior 37 years? 
A Correct. 
Q Have you ever had any gates -- let me -- have there 
ever been any gates across that section of road between 
Clint's property and Oreana Loop Road? 
A Yes. 
a Okay. What have they been? 
A The last few years, they've been like a four or 
five-wire·- barbed Wire strand gate. 
Q Okay. And before the last four or five years, so 
between the time when you bought your property and the last 
four or five years, have there ever been any gates across 
there? 
A No. It's always been open. 
Q In the last four or five years, when did you start 
noticing that there was a gate being put up? 
A Well, the kids would call or we would see that they 
had cattle locked in the lane so they would fence them in 
there so they wouldn't escape I guess and eat the lane 
down, eat the grass or the forage. 
Q When you say there was a gate, describe what this 
five-wire gate Is. What Is that? 
A It's just a five -- four or five-wire stick gate 
and lt just kind of crosses the lane, approximately 10 feet 
IDng, 15 feet long I guess. I don't know. 
16 
Q Is lt made of barbed wlre7 
A Barbed wire and there may be some metal stakes or 
sticks that vary probably. 
Q So yDu would have, explain, five strands of barbed 
wire? 
A Yes. 
Q And then how would it attach to the fence on either 
side? 
A They had just loops that you would loop over the 
end stick and you would have to put the bottom in and push 
the post up and put a loop across the top and that would 
hold the gate up. 
Q So on either end of the barbed wire, It was 
attached to sticks on either end? 
A Or the fence. 
Q Or the fence? 
A Or a post or something there, yeah. 
Q And In order to open that, how would you open·-
have to open that? 
A You would 11ave to get out and just push the post 
in, lift the loop up, pull the gate around off of the road, 
drive through, pick it up -~ pick it up and hook It all 
back up. 





















































• Q And where were they located? 
A One was on the end of that lane and then the other 
one would have been on the east side of the lane kind of 
next to I guess it would be their shop or kind of where it 
makes a corner there or turn right there. Kind of the 
closest narrowest part of the lane. 
Q Okay. And so the west -- the fence on the west 
side would be approximately where Clint's property ends and 
connects with the Lows' property? 
A Correct. 
Q And then on the east side, would it be -· can you 
kind of point out where it would be on the east side? 
A Well, It would be Just -~ just kind of behind their 
shop building and maybe kind of across the way from Gil's 
house now. 
Q You're pointing to the small squares on the map? 
A Yes. Yeah. 
Q And how long would those gates be up? 
A I think It varied. Anywhere -- it started out for 
a few days and then it would be a week and then the next 
time, It might be a couple weeks and It just kind of varied 
on how many -- I think probably how many cattle he put in 
there. 
Q When you say cattle, where were those cattle 
located? 
18 
A They were Inside that lane. 
Q Okay. In between the two fences that are bordering 
the road? 
A Correct. 
Q And then a fence gate on both sides -- both ends? 
A Correct. 
Q Would that be considered normal pasture area for 
those cattle? 
MR. RAINEY: Objection, Judge. There's no 
foundation for him to be an expert on pasture. 
COURT: I'll sustain It. 
BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
Q Okay. Do you have cattle, Mr. Fuquay? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you graze caltle? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know what good grazing land ls for cattle? 
A Sometimes. 
Q Okay. And how many cattle do you own? 
A I don't have very many. Maybe 15. 
Q And how long have you had cattle? 
A Most of my life. 
Q Based on your knowledge and experience of having 
cattle, would you say that the area in between the fences 
where the road ls Is a normal cattle grazing area? 
19 




A Some times of the year, sure. 
Q Okay. And for how long? 
• 
3 A Again, it would depend on th_e number of cattle that 
4 you put in that area, you know. If you put too many or a 
5 lot, It would last a few days and if you put a handful, it 
6 might last a month. 
7 Q What would be the PUrPOSe of putting cattle in that 
8 area? 
9 MR. RAINEY: Objection, Judge. He doesn't know 
0 what the Kings l1ave in mind. 
11 COURT: I'll let him answer. 
2 WITNESS: l would assume to grow beef. To produce 
3 livestock, weight. 
14 MR. RAINEY: Your Honor, I'd further object. We're 
5 getting beyond the purpose of their allegations that 
.6 supported this temporary restraining order and the proposed 
17 injunction. They have specific allegations In their 
8 affidavits -- in the memorandums and affidavit by Mr. 
,9 Cleverley himself setting out the emergency. 
20 COURT: Okay. 
1 MR. RAINEY: Now describing the land and all 
: 22 this --
. "3 COURT: Let's go ahead and move along. I get it 




























BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
20 
Q So when was the first time that -- that there was a 
permanent fence anywhere -- excuse me, a permanent gate 
anywhere along what -- between Clint's property and Oreana 
Loop Road? 
MR. RAINEY: Judge, again, I object. They made 
specific --
COURT: I think that goes to the -- I think when 
the gate was put up goes towards the injunction. So I'll 
allow him to answer that. When the permanent gate -- not 
the barbed wire gate. You can go ahead and answer that. 
WlTfllESS: The permanent gates I believe has been 
about a month ago, a month and a half ago approximately. 
BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
Q Did anybody tallc to you about that gate being 
installed? 
A They installed them while I was gone. 
Q Okay. Did you know that they were going to be 
installing the gates? 
A 1 didn't know that they were going to be installing 
them, no. 
Q Does the Installation of those gates create a 
problem for you? 
A Yes. 
Q Why? 
A It's interfering with our normal dally activity of 
21 
• 1 coming and going and accessing the property. 
2 Q Okay. So where do you typically -- how do you 
3 access the property that -- yours and Clint's property? 
4 A Through -- through that lane. From Oreana Loop 
5 Road through the lane to Clint's property to my property 
6 and beyond. It depends on what direction I'm going. 
7 Q And how long have you regularly used that area to 
8 access your property? 
9 MR. RAINEY: Again, Your Honor --
10 WITNESS: Thirty-seven years. 
11 MR. RAINEY: -- the issue on the restraining order 
12 was the emergency. The extreme emergency and dire health. 
13 That's what we focused our affidavits on. 
14 COURT: Right. 
15 MR. RAINEY: Not this easement. He's trying to 
16 prove the easement rlght now. 
17 COURT: I understand. I'll go ahead and allow him 
18 to answer the question. I'm not going to make a ruling on 
19 the permanency on the use of the land. Just whether there 
20 should be use of the road pending the trial. You said 37 
21 years. 
22 WITNESS: Thirty-seven years . 
23 COURT: Go ahead. 
24 BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
25 Q Are you aware of any emergency vehicles that have 
22 
1 ever had to come down to your properties or in that area? 
2 A Yeah. Over the years, they've come and gone 
3 through that way. 
4 Q Okay. Where is the nearest ambulance located? 
5 A Grand View. 
6 Q And where is that in relationship to you? 
7 A It would be east of us approximately 15 miles. 
B Q Okay. And If an ambulance was to come from Grand 
9 View to your house, how would it need to get to your house? 
10 MR. FARRIS: Objection. Calls for speculation. 
11 COURT: Are there other accesses to your house? 
12 WITNESS: There are. 
13 COURT: Can you explain what those are? 
14 WITNESS: They would go -- If they couldn't come 
15 that way, they would have to continue on Oreana Loop Road 
16 and follow the creek down. I think all the way around 
17 there, it's another four miles. 
1 B COURT: What's the difference in mileage? 
19 WITNESS: About four miles. 
20 COURT: Okay. 
21 BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
22 Q So in order -- an ambulance would have to take an 
23 additional four miles to the Loop Road or It would be a 
24 total of four miles that it would be? 
25 A It would be an additional four miles. From the 
23 
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1 , lane all the way around, lt would be approximately four 







And how long would that take in minutes? 
Ten minutes I guess. Ten minutes. 
Okay. So the other road, the Castle Lane Road, can 
6 you drive -- is that a paved surface? 
7 A No. It's gravel. Castle Lane is all gravel. 
8 Q But if there was an emergency, it would take at 
9 least -- take ten minutes more for them to go and traverse 







A Approximately. Depending on which way they're 
coming I guess, you know. 
Q To the best of your knowledge, would an emergency 
vehlcle have to stop at each one of those gates to open it? 
A As It is currently, yes. 
Q Have you had any conversations with any of the 
17 defendants about your ability to get through or whether or 
1 B not those gates were going to be locked? 
·19 A I haven't -- since they've put up these gates, I 




MR. CLEVERLEY; I don't have any further questions 
23 for you, Mr. Fuquay. 
24 
25 
COURT: Who would like to do cross first? 





COURT: Mr. Rainey, Go ahead. 
MR. RAINEY: Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
4 QUESTIONS BY MR. RAINEY: 
5 Q Mr. Fuquay, first of all, let's be clear. That 
6 Castle Lane has been t11ere for years and years and years. 
7 It's an ancient road, isn't it? 
8 A As far as I know, yeah. 
9 Q In fact, there was a schoolhouse up there by your 
10 house. Isn't that correct? 
A Correct. 11 
12 Q So Castle Lane is basically a public road, Isn't 
13 it? 
14 A I don't know. 
15 Q Isn't It what we call the ancient -- let's see. An 
16 SR247T,' 
17 A I don't know. 
18 Q There is an all-weather road that goes right to 
19 your house, isn't there? 
20 A There's a gravel road that goes --
21 Q It's all-weather, isn't lt7 
22 A I guess. 
23 Q And It goes on around to In front of Clint's place 
24 and then In front of J.C.'s place. Isn't that correct? 
25 A Correct. 
25 
• 1 Q Okay. And all of your addresses are on Castle 
2 Lane. Isn't that correct? 
3 A Correct. 
4 Q In fact, give me the address for Clint. 
5 A I think his is 18902. 
6 Q Castle Lane? 
7 A Castle Lane and I think the rental house Is 18903 I 
8 believe. 
9 Q Okay. 
10 A I think. 
11 Q So again, all three of your -- you and your two 
12 sons live on Castle Lane. 




Okay. And there's no gates. You don't gate that 
Somebody --
I gate mine -- on my piece of property, I gate that 
17 at times, yes. 
18 Q So you would be obstructing the emergency vehicle 
19 corning up Castle Lane then, huh? 
20 
21 
A If they come up that Castle Lane, yes. 
Q Okay. In your affidavits -- let me start out, in 
22 your motion for this temporary restraining order, you 
23 stated that you are in Immediate need of access to the 
24 property over King Lane. Do you remember saying that? 





Q Do you remember? 
A Sure, yeah. I don't know. Sure. 
Q Okay. But you have access on Castle Lane, don't 
4 you? 
5 A Correct. 
6 Q All the way up. 
A Correct. 7 
8 
9 
Q All three houses. 
A Correct. 
10 Q So you don't have an immediate need for King's Lane 
11 because you could use Castle Lane, right? 
12 A Correct. 
13 Q Okay. You also say -- and this is paragraph 20 of 
14 your motion. 
15 MR. CLEVERLEY: I'm going to object to the extent 
16 that counsel's rererrlng to the motion. If he wants to 
17 refer to Mr. Fuquay's declaration, l have no problem with 
18 that. 
19 MR. RAINEY: This motion was made on his behalf. 
20 COURT: Go ahead and ask the question and see what 
21 it Is. 
22 MR. RAINEY: Yeah. 
23 BY MR. RAINEY: 
24 Q "The gates interfere with normal delivery services 
25 used by plaintiffs such as Fed Ex, UPS and Schwann's." 
27 
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1 A Correct. 
2 Q We did get an affidavit from the Schwann delivery 
3 man. He would come up --
4 MR. CLEVERLEY: Objection. We don't know what he 
5 would say. 
6 MR. RAINEY: The affidavit's in record. 
7 COURT: Go ahead and ask the question. 
8 MR. RAINEY: Yeah. 
9 BY MR. RAINEY: 
























MR. CLEVERLEY: Objection. There's no foundation 
for that. 
COURT: Does the Schwann guy use the road? 
WITNESS: Correct. 
BY MR. RAINEY: 
Q Okay. And then so UPS and Fed Ex would come right 
up Castle Lane too, wouldn't they? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. Then you say that they interfere With the 
children's ability to get to school. 
A Correct. 




Q He's, what, five or six? 
A Correct. 
Q And he's picked up at Oreana right across from 
S Castle Lane, isn't he? 
, 6 A Actually, he was picked up -- until the gates went 
7 up, he was picked up at Highway 78 where Oreana Loop Road 
8 connects to Highway 78 and refer to that as the top of the 
9 hlll and that's where he was picked up. 
Q That's clear up on the highway? 
A Correct. Until they put up the gates. 
Q Okay. So now the bus driver picks him up right 
13 below your house then? 
~4 A I guess so, yes. 
5 Q Okay. So rather than driving clear to the highway, 











your·· to Oreana Road -- Oreana Loop, right? 
A Sure. 
Q And that's where your mailbox Is, Isn't it? 
A The current one, yes. 
Q As of today's date, your ma!lbox Is on Oreana Loop 
and the boy going to school ls picked up on Oreana Loop 
right by Castle Lane. 
A Correct. 
Q So then you say that the emergency vehicles --
29 
• 
1 excuse me. The gates interfere with plaintiffs' access to 
2 emergency services such as police, fire and ambulance. You 
3 say that? 
4 A Correct. 
5 Q Well, these emergency vehicles can come up castle 
6 Lane all the way up to J.C.'s house, can they not? 
7 A Correct. 
8 Q Okay. So going through King Lane doesn't interfere 
9 with you and your family getting emergency services up 
10 through Castle Lane. Isn't that right? 
11 A No. It delays IL 
12 Q It doesn't Interfere; is that right? 
13 A It delays it. 
14 Q Well, you're really not telling the judge It takes 
15 ten minutes to go four miles, a vehicle drlvlng 60, 70 
16 mlles an hour. 
17 A Not on Oreana Loop Road, It's not. 
18 Q You just got one curve and right down into your 
19 place. Isn't that right? 
20 A There's two curves, three curves, four curves. 
21 Q Anyway, the whole point Is that you have access to 
22 emergency vehicles, general services, school and all 
23 those -- the bus stop. Yeah. All those services are right 
there at Castle Lane. 24 
25 A Hlstorfcally, they've come through Klngs'. 
30 
1 Q They are coming right there to your place down 
2 below the hill on Castle Lane, aren't they, as of today's 
3 date? 
4 A Sure. 
5 Q Now, that's the same allegation that you made in 
6 your affidavit, isn't it? 
7 A Okay, 
8 Q Pardon me? 
9 A Okay. 
1 O Q But the truth of the matter is that all those 
11 services and all those people can get to Castle Lane and up 
12 to your house as of today's date, right? 
13 A I guess, with a delay. 
14 Q I'm not going to argue with it. Judge Nye knows 
15 how long it takes to go four mlles. 
16 A Okay. 
17 MR. CLEVERLEY: Objection. Argumentative. 
18 COURT: Let's move on. 
19 BY MR. RAJNEY: 
20 Q In fact, the police department or sheriff's office 
21 has been to your house, have they not? 
22 A Lots. 
23 Q And they come right up Castle Lane, don't they? 
24 A They come up both ways. 




1 ' A Sure. 
2 Q He's been to your house? 
3 A Sure, lots. 
4 MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I didn't 




in the room. 
COURT: Do you want to have them excluded? 
MR. CLEVERLEY: I would. 
9 COURT: He would like to exclude all witnesses 
10 until they're called and I'll -- I think that's Mr. Aman 
' 11 walking out there. So I'll go ahead und grant that 
12 request. If anybody's scheduled to testify In this 
13 hearing, you got to wait outside till you're called. Don't 
14 discuss your testimony until you're called. 
15 MR. FARRIS: If I may, you're referring to non-
16 parties. 
17 COURT: Yes, parties can stay here. Parties can 
18 stay here. Just witnesses. Non-party witnesses. 
19 Okay. Go ahead. 
20 BY MR. RAINEY: 
21 Q Just to make the record clear, the only hindrance 
22 on Castle Lane going all the way up with emergency vehicles 
23 would be your locked gates. 
24 A Kings' locked gates. 
25 Q Pardon me? 
32 
1 A Kings' gates. Castle Lane goes all the way through 
2 to the Oreana Loop Road. To Oreana Loop Road is my 
3 understanding. 
4 Q Well, you've been calling the part on Kings' 
5 property King's Lane. That's what you said in all your 
G pleadings. 
7 A Okay. 
8 Q So I'm talking about the Castle Lane going up to 
9 the last-· you call It the rental house. 
10 A Okay. 
'11 Q And the only hindrance on coming up through that 
12 area Is just your locked gates. 
13 A Okay. 
14 Q So you're creating any delay in the use of Castle 
15 lane, isn't that correct? 
16 
17 
A At certain times of the year I guess, yeah. 
Q What time of year do you lock your gates? 
18 A Hunting season. 






But It's open other than hunting season? 
22 A In general, if you can open the gate, yeah. 
23 They're not locked. They're just shut. 
24 Q Okay. Now, you do admit there were wire gates 
25 across this King's Lane -- what you're calling King Lane. 
33 
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1 We'll explain that here in a few minutes. 
2 A Okay. 
3 Q Isn't that correct? 
4 A Yep. 
5 Q You had to get out and you had to lift the loop up 
6 over·· 
7 A Sure. 
B Q -- the fence post to get the gate out. 
A Sure. 9 
10 Q Now, the new gates are metal. They're metal gates 
1 'I and they have a plunger lhat goes into the hole in the gate 
12 on the opposite side of the plunger. Isn't that correct? 
13 A I have no idea. I haven't went up to them gates. 
14 Q Well, didn't you tell the deputy sheriff you were 
15 not about to lock the gates or close the gates? 
16 MR. CLEVERLEY: Objection. Foundation. 
17 MR. RAINEY: Well, okay. 
18 BY MR. RAINEY: 
19 Q Didn't GIibert l<ing call a deputy out because you 
20 were fussing with him about having the gates put up and the 
21 gates closed? 
22 A Correct. 
23 MR. CLEVERLEY: Objecting as to time and -· 
24 MR. RA[NEY: I'll get to that. 
25 COURT: Go ahead and set the time. 
34 
1 MR. RAINEY: Yeah. 
2 BY MR. RAINEY: 
3 Q Tell me when that conversation took place. 
4 A Approximately May. 
5 COURT: This year. 
6 WITNESS: This year. 
7 BY MR. RAINEY: 
8 Q So In May, you had a conversation with Gilbert and 
9 he was going to shut the gates to keep his cattle In, 
10 right? 
11 A Correct. 
12 Q And also the gate keeps the range cattle, the BLM 
13 cattle from corning into the Kings' place, right? 






You know it's rented this year. 
I've heard that. 
Your cattle were out there on that range for a 
20 A Sure. 
21 Q Then you told the deputy sheriff you're not about 
22 to close the gates. Isn't that right? 
23 A Correct. 
24 Q Okay. And in order to make sure the gates were 
25 closed, then Gilbert put a lock on it, correct? 
35 
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1 A I,don't know. I've never seen them locked. 
2 Q So you haven't gone back there since the 
3 conversation? 
4 A Since I went back through there, the gates have 
5 been -- I've been gone for the last month so I mean he put 
S the cattle in there and I assume he opened the gates back 
7 up and there's not been an issue. 
8 Q Well, let's make the record clear, Mr. Fuquay. The 
9 Kings use that lane to graze cattle and to actually corral 
0 the cattle too, don't they? 
11 A Yeah. I don't know what they -- yeah, sure. They 
2 graze it. 






I don't know what -- I don't know about that but --
A 
Well, there's cattle in there . 
Yep. 17 
8 Q There's cattle in there an awful lot of tile year, 
19 isn't that correct? 
20 A Sometimes, yeah. 
1 Q Okay. And they also -- Kings use that road to get 
22 to their flelds, don't they? 
"3 A Correct. 
4 Q They've used that road ever since you've lived ln 





Q And never have you tried to kick the Kings off the 




A Not that I recall. 
Q Well, you never have, have you? 
A Not that I recall, no. 
7 Q So in other words, you've never interfered with the 




A other than the gates. 
Q Pardon me? 
Other than the issue with the gates. 
2 
A 
Q Well, they put up gates. Particularly when they 






Q Okay. Now, you can't tell Judge Nye whether it's 
·7 easier to open the metal gate than to put the wire over the 
8 posts with the loop, can you? 
19 A I've not opened them metal gates. I haven't been 
0 through there since. 
1 MR. RAINEY: That's all the cross I have, Your 
'22 Honor. 
I 
. 3 COURT: Mr. Farris . 
MR. FARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try not 
to be redundant. Let me see if I can put a fine point on 
37 
• 1 some of these. 
2 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
3 QUESTIONS BY MR. FARRIS: 
4 Q Mr. Fuquay, my name is Bryce Farris and I represent 
5 the Lows. 
6 A Okay. 
7 Q You've been talking about this roadway that they've 
8 referred to or referred to as Castle Lane and from what I 
9 understand is that lane comes off Oreana Loop up to your 
10 property? If you'd look at probably Exhibit 3 if you have 
11 it in front of you. 
12 A Okay. 
13 Q You see where there's an arrow that says Castle 
14 Lane? 
15 A Yeah. 
16 Q That Castle Lane originates at Oreana Loop further 
17 to the south of the area of your property? 
18 A Correct. 
19 Q That's the road you've been talking about and it 
20 comes up, goes through your property'? 
21 A Correct. 
22 Q And then goes up to the property that you've --
23 that someone's identified as Clint Fuquay? 
24 A Correct. 
25 Q Okay. With respect to that Casl:1e Lane, from what 
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1 I'm understanding your testimony is, that's where your 
2 mailbox is currently? 
3 A Currently, yes. 
4 Q Okay. That's your address? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q That's where Schwann's or other delivery folks 
7 deliver to? 
8 A Currently. 
9 Q Okay. Currently. As we sit here today. And if 
10 you'd look at Exhibit 1, do you have that In front of you? 
11 
12 
A This one? 
Q Yes, yeah. 
13 COURT: Oh, I've got it. It's this one here. 
14 Yeah. 
15 WITNESS: Okay. 
16 BY MR. FARRIS: 
17 Q You see where at the top of that it says "map 
18 address" and it says 18907 Castle Lane? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q That's your address? 
21 A Correct. 
22 Q So that's -- if you want to put In your address to 
23 find your property, that's the address you put in, Castle 
24 Lane? 
25 A Correct. 
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• 1 , Q ~nd that would be the same if it's an emergency 
2 vehicle trying to find your residence, wouldn't It be? 
3 A Correct. 
4 Q Okay. Now, the other thing I want to make sure 
5 that I'm understanding is that you don't dispute there's 
6 been fences across this -- we'll call it King's Lane for 
7 now. 
8 A Okay. 
9 Q You don't dispute there's been fences across there? 
10 A No. 
·11 Q It's been for four or five or more years? 
12 A Five -- yes. 
13 Q They have been there for cattle, to keep cattle 
14 inside that lane? 
15 A Correct. 
16 Q Okay. There's been a fence at each end. 
17 A Correct. 
18 Q Okay. There's new fences that have been 
19 constructed more recently, right? 
20 A Correct. 
21 Q And the way l understand your testimony there at 
22 the end of your discussion with Mr. Rainey is that you 
23 don't know whether those new fences are easier or more 
24 difficult to open at this polnt. 
25 A Correct. I've not been out there. 
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1 Q Okay. The other thing I wanted to make sure I 
2 understand Is that for the Castle Lane, the first lane that 
we talked about coming up Oreana Loop to your property 3 
4 
5 
where your mailbox --
A Okay. 
6 Q -- your address, deliveries come from, It's not 
7 uncommon for you to put gates across that lane? 
A Correct. 8 
9 Q And it's not uncommon for you to put a lock across 













A locked gate? 
Correct. 
Okay. 
MR. FARRIS: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
COURT: Thank you. Redirect. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
18 QUESTlONS BY MR, CLEVERLEY: 
19 Q Mr. Fuquay, as Mr. Rainey said and as Mr. Farris 
20 said, as we sit here today, those things are the way that 
21 things are and I want to ask you did things recently change 
22 from the way that they are today? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q So as they are today, the Schwann's guy delivery 





















































MR. RAINE't': Objection, Your Honor. He's got an 
affidavit In there. 
COURT; I'll give lt the weight that It takes. He 
can answer that. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, I'm going to object to 
him referencing the affidavits. 
COURT: Just go ahead and ask your question. 
BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
Q Does the Schwann's person, historically has he come 
up Castle Lane? 
A No. 
Q Where has he come? 
A Up what they're referring to as King Lane. 
Q And do you receive UPS packages? 
A Correct. 
Q Where does that dellvery driver come today? 
A Today, I guess they would have to come up Castle 
Lane. 
Q Okay. A month ago, where did he come? 
A He would -- historically, he would come through 
King Lane. 
Q Okay. And for the 37 years before that? 
A King Lane. 
Q Same thing with the Schwann's delivery? 
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A Yes. 
Q Have you ever seen the Kings use Castle Lane to get 
to their property on a regular basis? 
A I've seen them come through there, yes. 
Q Okay. Is that frequent? 
A A few times a year maybe. 
Q Has anyone ever questioned your use of the gate 
across Castle Lane? 
A No. 
a Have you ever seen cattle grazing free on the BLM 
property? 
A No, other than ours when they get out. 
Q Are you aware of any cattle that have gone from BLM 
or your property Into what's the King Lane fenced area? 
A Just not -- just Kings' cattle. None come -- I've 
not seen any come -- outside cattle come In there, no. 
Q The only cattle that would have been in there would 
have been placed in there? 
A Probably, yes. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: I don't have any further questions 
for Mr. Fuquay. 
COURT: Thank you. Next witness. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: Clint Fuquay, please. 
WITNESS: Do I leave these here? 
COURT: Yes, leave those there. 
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(CLINT FUQUAY Is sworn.) 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
3 QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
4 Q Mr. Fuquay, you are also one of the plalntlffs in 
S this action? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Can you tell me where you live? 
B A 18903 Castle Lane. 
9 Q And you purchased that property recently from your 
0 father? 
11 A Yes. 
2 Q Have you lived on that property for -· prior to 
3 your purchase? 
14 A Yes. 
5 Q For how long? 
.6 A Eight years. 
17 Q And where did you llve before that? 
8 A In his house. 
19 Q Okay. And so have you lived your entlre life In 
20 that area? 
1 A Yes. 
22 Q And did you go to school? 
A Yes. 
Q Where did you go to catch the bus for school? 
A When we were little, we caught the bus on King Lane 
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1 down by the Loop Road. 
2 Q And you have a child? 
·3 A I do. 
4 Q Okay. And how old is he? 
5 A Two. 















And he has a child as well? 
Yes. 
How old is that child? 
Six. 
Six? And do either of those children go to school? 
The six-year-old son does, yes. 
And do you know where he caught the bus? 
I\ He used to catch the bus on the top of the hill on 
Highway 78. 




Q When was that? 
3 A June of 2013. 
4 Q Can you explain briefly what happened? 
S A Gil's son Jeff wrecked his motorcycle and was 
6 knocked unconscious. 
7 Q If you take a look at Exhibit 3, can you give me an 
8 Idea of where that was? 
9 A It would be right on the corner of my -- there's a 
10 little box there In the northwest corner and that's my 
11 house and it was just on the outside of my property line 
12 right there on BLM. 
13 Q Okay. Were you present when that accident 
14 happened? 











I did not, no. 
Okay. Were you there when they came? 
Yes. 
Where did they come from? 
21 A Gil and Joe asked what my address was and I gave 
22 them my address and they came down what they're calling 
23 King Lane from Grand View. 
24 Q so It came from Grand View over Oreana Loop Road? 








And then they would have turned onto the King 
Yes. 
-- area? And then ended up at your house? 
Yes. 
Okay. And do you recall how long that took for the 
7 emergency services to arrive? 
8 A Not from the phone call, I don't. I can't remember 
9 how long it took. 
10 Q From your understanding, would it take longer if 
11 they had to go all the way down to King ·- to Castle Lane 
12 and then come back up? 
13 A I feel like it would take longer. Where that 
14 accident was, it would have taken longer to go around. 
15 Q Okay. Do you know about how much longer? 
16 A I don't. 
17 Q Do you know how long It t.ikes for you to drive from 
18 the comer of Oreana Loop and King Lane around to your 
not, that's okay. Do you know when the change was made to 19 house? 
pick him up at the Castle Lane and Oreana Loop Road? 20 
A I do know that he changed after the gates -- the 21 
new gates were put up a month ago. 22 
23 
24 





Okay. Where do you typically get to and from your 
I usually went down King Lane -- what they're 
Q How long have you -- back up. Are you aware of any 
accidents or injuries to anyone that has occurred near your 
property? 
45 
25 referring to as King lane. 
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1 Q And how long have you used that as -- I mean ls 
2 that your primary access? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q And how long has that been your primary access? 
5 A Since I've lived there so for eight years, my wife 
6 and I have lived there. 
7 Q Does -- do the fences interfere with your mail 
8 delivery -- the gates on either side of what we're calling 
9 King Lane, do they interfere with your mail delivery? 
10 A I would say UPS, yes. 
11 Q Okay. And where is your mailbox currently? 
12 A My mailbox is the same as John's. 
13 Q Okay. And that's located at the corner of Oreana 
14 Loop and Castle Lane? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And since you've purchased that property, is there 
17 an Intent of changing that mailbox? 
18 A Yes. I want to put -- my mailing address right now 
19 ls 18907 and I plan to change It to 16903 to where the old 
20 mailbox is still existing. 
21 Q So you used to receive mail at King Lane and Oreana 
22 Loop Road? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And there's still a mailbox there? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q Do the -- have you seen the cattle grazing inside 
2 the boxed area of King Lane? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q Would it be normal for that •• those cows to be in 
5 there year round? 
6 A No. 
7 Q How long In your experience have you seen cows 
8 within that boxed area? 
9 A They'd put them on and off there only in the 
10 summertime. 
: 11 Q And for how long at a time? 















he puts In there. Sometimes a week, sometimes a couple 
weeks. 
Q Okay. And when there's cows and cattle in there, 
are there other means of keeping those cattle in other than 
fences? 
A No. 
Q Okay. And when there are cattle In there, have you 
in the past opened and closed the gates? 
A Yes. 
Q What about in January? Would there be cattle in 
that road in January? 
A No. 
Q When you say that they're there during the summer, 
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• 
1 what time periods are you talking about? 
2 A I would say from the end of May to the first of 
3 October. 
4 Q Would you expect to see cattle penned in there 
5 during the times other than the summertime? 
6 MR. RAINEY: Object to that, Judge. That's 
7 speculation. 
8 WITNESS: No. 
9 COURT: I'll allow him to answer. 
10 WITNESS: No. 
11 BYMR.CLEVERLEY: 
12 Q All right. How cold does It get in this area? 
13 MR. FARRIS: Objection. Calls for --
14 (Fire alarm. Recess taken.) 
15 MR. RAINEY: Judge, before we start, l have one 
16 witness that has been in here but because of the testimony 
17 we've just heard and I had not intended to call her but she 
18 is going to be a rebuttal witness. I can have her step out 
19 now. 
20 COURT: If you could. So we're back on the record. 
21 I get this all printed out as she's typing It and the last 
22 questions were how cold does it get in the area? 
23 MR. CLEVERLEY: I'm sorry, Judge. What was the 
24 last question? 
25 COURT: "How cold does It get in the area?" You 
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1 were talking about cattle and whether they're there in the 
2 summertime, In the w·intertime and when the fence Is there. 
3 That's kind of where we left off. 
4 BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
5 Q All right. Mr. Fuquay, let me go back to the 
6 accident that we were talking about earlier and you recall 
7 telling us that that was a motorcycle accident In front of 
8 your house? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q And that was -- who was the person Involved in 
11 that? 
12 A Jeff King, GIi's son. 
13 Q Okay. Do you know where he llved at the time? 
14 A He lives down at Kings'. l think he has his own 
15 house there within the four homes that are there. 
16 Q Okay. Was that-· was that a serious accident? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q How serious was It? 
19 A He was unconscious or fn and out of consciousness. 
20 Q And emergency medical was called? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q And an ambulance came? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And what did the ambulance do -- what did the EMS 
25 workers do from the ambulance? 
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1 A ;rhey stabilized Jeff. 
2 Q And did they transport him to the hospital? 
3 A No. 
4 Q Who did? 
5 A Life Flight came. 
6 Q And was that a helicopter? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Where did that land? 
9 A Next to their hot pond on BLM next to my house. 
0 Q And then they transported him to the hospital? 
11 A Yes. 
2 Q About how long was It from the time that the 
3 ambulance arrived to the time that the helicopter arrived? 
14 A I would say ten minutes. 
5 Q If the ambulance would have gone all the way down 
.6 and around, based on your estimate of the time that that 
J 17 takes, which would have occurred first, the ambulance 
8 arriving or the helicopter arriving? 
119 A I would say the helicopter. 
20 Q And you indicated that you have small children? 
i 
1 A ' Yes. 
122 Q How old are they? 
'?J A Two and three months. 
4 Q Okay. Are you concerned about being able to call 
j zs and have emergency access for them if you need it? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Up until the installation of the gates last month, 
3 were you concerned about the time that it would take for 
4 emergency service personnel to arrive if you called for 
5 assistance? 
6 A If the gates would have been dosed, yes. 
7 Q If the gates were open, that would be less time? 
e A Yes. 
9 Q For as long as you can remember up until four or 
1 ·,o five years ago, were there ever gates locking the road? 
11 A No. 
2 Q And from the time four or five years ago when you 
113 started seeing gates, how long would It be for those gates 
~4 to be closed? 
I 5 A l11ey would keep them closed with cattle in there 
116 for a day or three days. 
'. •7 Q And then what would happen with the gates? 
8 A They would open them and take the cattle out. They 
119 would leave them in for two or three days and then take 
.o them out because the grass was ate. 
1 Q They would do that a couple times a year? 
\ 22 A Yes. 
.3 Q So they weren't in there all the time? 




















































• at this point, Your Honor. 
COURT: Thank you. Mr. Rainey. 
MR. RAINEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
QUESTIONS BY MR. RAINEY: 
Q With regard to Jeff's accident, that actually 
happened on SLM ground, did it not? 
A Yes. 
Q And actually his mother's the one that called the 
emergency. 
A Yes. 
Q And she -- do you know whether or not she even knew 
your address? 
A l know she did. 
Q How do you know that? 
A She asked me what my address was. 
Q And that's after she got the ambulance coming? 
A Or before. 
Q The whole point Is that the Kings came first 
through that lane and they opened the gates so the 
ambulance would come through to their son, right? 
A They weren't closed at that time. There was no 
cattle there and they were not closed to my recollection. 
Q Are you sure of that? 
A Yes. 
54 
Q lf the Kings disagree, are they more accurate than 
you? 
A I wouldn't say they was. 
Q Now, let's talk about this Castle Lane. You know 
that -- excuse me. Let me back up. I'm sorry, Judge. 
I'll strike that question and ask -- how old are you? 
A Twenty-seven. 
Q And you say you've lived on the property for eight 
years? 
A I've lived In that address 18903 for eight years 
and the house I'm currently living ln. 
Q So you were 19 years old then? 
A Yes. 
Q And then where did you live before that? 
A In the 18902 address. 
Q Okay. And did you at any time live off the 
property? 
A Yes. 
Q When was that? 
A From when I was 12 to 18 -- or 13 to 18. ! lived 
on the other side of Oreana. 
Q Okay. So from 12 to 18, you didn't even live on 
that property. 
A r stayed on the weekends. 
Q My question is from 12 to 18, you didn't live on 
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1 'that pro·perty? 
2 A Not permanently. 
3 Q Okay. Then you moved back when you were 18 and 




Q Where did you llve? 
7 A 18902 address. Then that's what Is the rental 
8 house. 
9 Q You moved Into the rental house first. 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Okay. Now, Castle Lane has been there all your 
12 lifetime; Is that correct? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And it's an all-weather road, isn't it? 
15 A What do you mean by all-weather? 
16 Q You can get up and down any time of the year. 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q And it's wide enough for emergency vehicles to get 
19 up and down? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q It's wide enough for the Schwann man to get up and 
22 down? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And the Fed Ex man to get up and down? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q And the UPS person can get up and down? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And the pollce cars have actually been up to your 
4 property, haven't they? 
5 A 18903? 





Q They came up Castle Lane. 
A Not to my recollection. I've seen them use both 
10 ways. 
11 Q The police cars that come up Castle Lane. 
12 A From Kings', I've seen them come that way and 
13 Castle Lane. 
14 Q Okay. You admit that they use Castle Lane? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Okay. So that road is good enough for emergency 
17 vehicles? 
18 A Yep. 
19 Q Okay. So whether King's Lane Is closed or not, you 




A Yes, yes. 
Q Okay. And so all of these things, the emergency 
24 vehicles, the Schwann deliveries, the mall person -- excuse 
25 me, the mail person delivers the mail down at the bottom of 
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1 castle Lane. Isn't th,H right? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And the bus driver is Denise Collett, Isn't it? 
4 A Yeah. 
5 Q And Denise lives up on Collett Road. 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q She just comes down to Oreana, correct? 
8 A To Oreana Loop Road you mean? 
9 Q Oreana Loop. 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Makes a left-hand turn and goes c1bout 100 feet to 
12 your bus stop? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Okay. And that's where your son gets on the bus --
15 A Not my son. 
16 Q Your nephew then. 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Okay. So the gate on King's Lane doesn't interfere 
19 with your son getting on the bus stop at the stop where 
20 Denise picks him up? 
21 A It did. That's why my brother said that he changed 
22 where he gets on the bus. 
23 Q My question Is where he gets on the bus right now 
24 Isn't interfered by King Lane, Is that correct? 
25 A No. 
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1 Q And I suppose somebody has to drive the boy down to 
2 the bus stop. 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q Is that your sister-rn~law? 
5 A We all have. 
6 Q Okay. So you folks drive him down to the bus stop. 
7 The bus comes and picks him up right on Oreana Loop·. 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q So all of these emergency conveniences -- have you 
10 seen your motions? 
11 A No. 
12 Q You're one of the plaintiffs. Has your attorney 













I've seen them, yes. 
You l<now the allegations In the motions? 
Yes. 
That the gate interferes with access to emergency 
20 vehicles. You've Just told me they can come up and clown 






Q Right? So that isn't true, is It? 
A No. 
Q Okay. Also the Fed Ex, UPS and Schwann man is 
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• 1 • coming' up and down Castle Lane, isn't that correct? 
2 A They have, yes. 
3 Q Okay. So the gate on King's Lane doesn't interfere 
4 with those delivery people, does It? 
5 A No. 
6 Q And we talked about emergency vehicles. You agree 
7 that they can come up and down Castle Lane? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And the gate on King's Lane does not interfere with 
0 the emergency vehicle? 
11 A Well, I would say it interferes. 
2 Q Pardon me? 
3 A I would say that lt interferes. 
14 Q How does it interfere with them coming up and down 
5 Castle Lane? 
A It don't, no, not down Castle Lane, no. 
Q They can come up and down Castle Lane no problem. 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. So all the allegations you've set forth here 
20 are untrue, aren't they? 
1 A No. 
22 Q That gate doesn't interfere with any of these 
?J people using Castle Lane? 




Q Well, you're taking ten minutes to open gates? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. And that's opening and closing them? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q So it's about the same time as coming up Castle 
6 Lane any way you look at it? 
7 A Yeah. 
8 Q And you know the Kings are ranchers. They're 
9 cattle ranchers, aren't they? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And they raise a lot of cattle. 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q And there's times of year that they have the cattle 
14 on the mountain? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And then they bring them home for a period of time? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q And when they bring them home, they have just about 
19 every Jot filled up, don't they? 
20 A Sure. 
21 Q They have a lot of cattle, don't they? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q So you wouldn't dispute the fact that they use that 
24 Jane to sort and work their cattle either, would you? 
25 Lane continues all the way down from Oreana Loop to Oreana 25 
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Loop. 
Q Why is it called -- why rs the address at Kings' 
called King's Lane? 
A Because they put a sign up that says l<'.ing Lane. I 
remember a sign that said Castle Lane there at one time. 
Q You Folks have called it King Lane in your 
pleadings, haven't you? 
A I can't recall. 
Q Do you want to see your motions? 
A No. 
Q How long does it take you to stop and open the 
gates that the Kings are entitled to have on their Jane? 
13 MR. CLEVERLEY: Objection to the characterization. 
14 MR. RAINEY: I'll rephrase it. 
5 BY MR. RAINEY: 
16 Q How long does it take you to stOJl and open the 
'7 gates on l<!ng Lane? 
8 A I'd say five minutes per gate. 
119 Q And there's three gates, aren't there? 
0 A There was only two last time I saw. I haven't been 
1 through there since. 
I 22 Q There's still a wire gate half way down the Jane, 




A I can't recall. I haven't been down there since 
the new ones. 
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1 Q Would you dispute the fact that they put them in 
2 there to hold them for a period of time while they're 
3 working cattle? 
4 A They're In there. I haven't seen them work them or 
5 nothing like that. 
6 Q Okay. So when you use King's Lane, you got to 
7 dodge cattle then. 
8 A What's that? 
9 Q You have to dodge around cattle. 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q So you open at least two gates and dodge the cattle 
12 to use King lane? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q But on Castle Lane, you can drive straight up, 
15 correct? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q No Interference at all on Castle Lane; Is that 
18 correct? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Not any cattle roaming around there that you have 
21 to watch out and dodge? 
22 A No. 
23 Q That would be the same way with any of these 
24 vehicles. Emergency vehicles, delivery people. They would 
25 have to stop and open gates and dodge cattle, correct? 
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Coming up Castle Lane, that's a straight shot 










Q Now, when did you get your driver's license? 
A When I was 15. 






So that's twelve years ago? 
Yes. 



























So It's just a matter of convenience for you --
Yes. 
-- to go through the Kings'? 
Yes. 








It's easter, yes. 
Okay. So you want to use King's lane just because 
13 It's convenient. 
14 Because that's what I've always used. 14 
15 
16 
A No. Eight. Since I was 19. 15 




You don't claim any right to it, do you? 
What's that? 
17 when to when? 
18 
19 
A I would say from 2001 to 2005. 
Q Well, that's five years. 
20 A Four. I don't remember when in 2001. Moved back 
21 the summer of 2005. 
22 Q When you got your driver's license, you were gone. 
23 You didn't even live on that property. 
24 A I stayed there on the weekends. 
25 Q Other than weekends but you didn't live there on a 
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1 day-to-day basis. 
A Correct. 2 
3 Q You were not watching the Kings' operation on a 











In fact, you've never watched Kings on a day-to-
Correct. 
Is that right? 
Correct. 
11 Q Just occ:aslonally seeing what's going on, right? 
12 A Correct. 
13 Q So when you say that they've never had cattle in 
14 there, you don't know, do you? 
15 A What are you talking about? 
16 Q Well, there's periods of times you said they never 
17 had cattle and never locked gates. You don't know because 
18 you're not there on a day-to-day basis, are you? 
19 A I drive that road on a day-to-day basis but In that 
20 time, I wasn't there on a day-to-day basis so at that time, 
21 I can't say what tl1ey did on a day-to-day basis. 
22 Q Okay. And is there any reason you don't go down --
23 when you're driving, you don't go down to Oreana through 
24 Castle Lane? 
25 A It's quicker to get where I'm going going that way. 
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17 Q You don't claim any right to King's Lane, do you? 
18 A I've been using it so I just always assumed that I 
19 could. 
20 Q Have you ever excluded the Kings from using that 
21 lane? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Have you ever told them to get off? 
24 A No. 
25 Q Have you ever told them that they couldn't use it 
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1 if you're using ft? 
2 A No, 
3 Q So In a way, have you interfered with the Kings? 
4 A No. 
5 Q Have you given them any hassle about when you use 
6 the lane? 
7 A No. 
8 Q Okay. 
9 MR. FARRIS: Your Honor, I don't have anything to 
10 add. 
11 COURT: Okay. Thank you. Redirect. 
12 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
13 QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
14 Q You Indicated that Castle Lane is what Mr. Rainey 
15 calls an all-weather road? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Is that -- who maintains that road? 
18 A We do. 
19 Q Do you maintain King Lane? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q How do you maintain it? 
22 A We've bladed it with a road grader and a land 
23 plane. 
24 Q What else? 
25 A We've -- a backhoe. FIiied in potholes with a 
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• 1 • backhoe\ 
2 Q Do you put gravel on it? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q Do you maintain it all the way to the entire length 
5 of the loop? 




























Have you ever seen the Kings maintain that road? 
Yes. 
And what have they done to maintain it? 
Gordon land planed It. 
What does tl1at mean? 
It's a leveler for a field behind a tractor. It 
smoothed it. 
Q And what else have you done ta want to maintain 
that road? 
A That's it. 
Q Does it take you longer to get where you need to go 
now that you've been blocked from using King Lane? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that different than what it's been In the past? 
A Yes. 




MR. CLEVERLEY: I don't have anything else. 
COURT: Thank you. 




COURT: Pardon me? 
MR. RAJNEY: He brought up some things that I 
8 didn't ask on cross-examination. 
9 
















COURT: On the road maintenance? 
MR. RAINEY: Yes. 
COURT: Yeah, go ahead. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
QUESTIONS BY MR. RAINEY: 
Q When did you grade that road, Mr. --
A I didn't personally grade It. My brother J.C. did. 
Q When did he do that? 
A In the fall of 2013. 
Q Just last winter? 
A A year ago, yeah. 
Q And when before that? 
A Just periodically in the spring, we would -- we 
would land plane it. 
Q I'm having a hard time hearing you. 
A Periodically every spring, we would try and blade 
It, land plane it. 
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I don't know. 
Okay. You're telling Judge Nye that you and your 
5 brother have done maintenance work on that road every year? 
6 A Yes. I might have skipped a year once in a while 
7 but just about every year, yes. 
8 Q Where did you buy your gravel? 
9 A From Rldley's but I never said I hauled gravel on 
10 it. 
11 Q Welt, you were asked if you put gravel on it. 
12 A My dad put gravel on it. He got It off the air 
13 base. 
14 Q When was that? 
15 A I don't remember the year. Maybe 2012. 
16 Q So you're saying the last three years, there's 
17 been gravel put on by your father? 
18 A A piece of it, yes. 
19 Q That was in exchange for hay? 
20 A I couldn't answer that. It was not me. 
21 Q Okay. You don't know why your father put the 
22 gravel on that? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Okay. 





COURT: Mr. Farris. 
MR. FARRIS: l don't have any. 
COURT: Any other questions for redirect based on 





MR. CLEVERLEY: No, Your Honor. 
COURT: Okay. Thank you. You may step down. 
WITNESS: Thanks. 
COURT: Go ahead. 
9 MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, we call J.C. Fuquay. 
10 COURT: Go ahead and come forward and we'll swear 
11 youin. 
12 WITNESS: All righty. 
13 (JOHN COLT FUQUAY is sworn.) 
14 COURT: Klnd of step behind this seat. It's 
15 easier --
16 WITNESS: It's nailed down there? 
17 COURT: Yeah, it is. 




COURT: If you would start out and state your name 
and spell your last name. 




COURT: Go ahead. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
25 QUESTJONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
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• • 1 ' . Q 'Mr. Fuquay, do you go by J.C.? 1 A Yes. When the gates were closed, there were cattle 
2 A I do. 2 in the lane. 
3 Q Do you mind If I call you that since we have a Jot 3 a How often would they be closed or how long of a 
4 of Fuquays? 4 time period? 
5 A That's fine. 5 A It varied from a week to ten days to a month. It 
6 Q Where do you reside? 6 just varied on how many head of cattle they had in the 
7 A 18902 Castle Lane. 7 Jane. 
8 Q And where Is that in proximity to Clint Fuquay's 8 a And were the cattle grazed in there? 
9 house? 9 A No, they weren't raised in there. They were put in 
10 A It Is probably a quarter of a mile east of my 10 there to feed them there. 
·11 brother's house. 11 Q So they were grazing? 
12 Q Is that on the property that Clint owns? 12 A They were grazing the grass, what grass was there. 
13 A Yes. 13 Q And did you have any issues with opening and 
14 Q How long have you lived there? 14 closing the gates during that time? 
15 A I've lived there since Clint owned it since June. 15 A Not at first, no. 
16 Prior to that, I've lived there almost eight years. 16 Q It became more problematic? 
, 17 Q And prior to that, where did you !Ive? 17 A As time went on, yes. 
I 
I 18 A I was in college in Twin Falls. 18 Q Okay. Why was that? 
19 Q Okay. Did you grow up in that area? 19 A It was just a hindrance mainly for my wife. I work 
20 A I grew up at the home place at my father's 20 out of town quite a bit so I mean when I was there, It was 
21 residence, 18907 Castle Lane. 21 a hindrance to me also but to the wives and friends and 
22 Q At John's house? 22 neighbors. 
23 A Yes. 23 Q You have a son? 
24 Q Until you were how old? 24 A Yes, I do. 
25 A I was -- I think I was 14 or 15 when they separated 25 Q And he lives with you in your house? 
72 74 
1 and we moved with my mother to across town. 1 A Yes, sir. 
2 Q Okay. During -- and did you regu{arly come back to 2 Q Does he go to school? 
3 your father's house -- 3 A He does. 
4 A Yes, I did. 4 Q Where does he go? 
5 Q -- after that? 5 A He goes to Grand View Elementary in Grand View, 
6 A Yes, I did. 6 Idaho. 
7 Q How often? 7 Q And when -- how does he get to school? 
8 A Pretty regular. I would say three or four times a 8 A He gets on the school bus. 
9 week I mean up untll I graduated high school and then after 9 Q Where does he get on the school bus? 
10 that, you know, a few times a month probably. It just 10 A As of right now, he gets on on the north side of 
11 varied. 11 dad's property at the end of Castle Lane. Prior to that, 
12 Q Do you recall there ever being any gates across 12 it was the top of the hlll -- what they call the top of the 
13 what we're calling l<ing Lane? 13 hill, Oreana Loop Road and Highway 78 on the east side of 
14 A No. 14 the Loop Road -- of that loop. 
15 Q Do you recall when the first time you saw a gate 15 Q How would you get him there? 
'16 across King Lane was? 16 A Through my house east down King Lane I guess 
17 A It's been four or five years ago when they started 17 they're calling It, around Kings' place, across the bridge 
18 putting up the wire gates. 18 onto Loop Road and east on up to the top of the hill. 
19 a Okay. And did -- how did you get through those 19 Q Why do you take him up there for the bus stop? 
20 gates? 20 A A couple -- last year -- last year I think, they 
21 A Same as any other gate. You pull up and get out 21 had some cutbacks at school and they had to cut back an 
22 and open the gate and drag it across the road and pull 22 some of the buses and they changed the routes around and 
23 through and drag It back and hang it back up. 23 that was originally his designated bus stop. 
24 Q Were there cattle enclosed in the pens during that 24 Q Prior to that, where did the school bus typically 
25 time? 25 stop? 
73 75 
21 or 35 sheets Page 72 to 75 of 126 10/22/2014 ll;lJ:M AM 
262
• 1 A Prior to that O well, last year, he was In pre K 
2 and that's where he got on the bus also. 
3 Q Okay. 
4 A Prior to that, I mean he didn't go to school so I 
5 mean that was -- when we started taking him to school is 
6 when·· 
7 Q When did he start -- did he change locations of 
8 where the bus is picking him up now? 
9 A We have, yes. 
0 Q When did that occur? 
l11 A That happened about three weeks ago, maybe four. 
2 I'm not 100 percent sure. When the gates went up -- the 
3 permanent gates went up, my wife contacted the bus driver 
114 and asked to pick him up over there until this matter was 
5 resolved. 
1 ·6 Q Okay. Did you have any conversations with anyone 
17 while those gates were going up? 
8 A I did. 
1 ·9 
Q What was -- what was the conversation you had with 
20 who? 
I 1 A I had a conversation with Gil when they were 
122 building the permanent gate on the east side of the bridge 
"3 of their property there. 
' 4 Q What was that conversation that you had? 
125 A He Just told me that he didn't have a problem with 
76 
1 me and Clint. It was with my father and that we'd been 
2 pretty good to get along with but he wasn't and that we 
! 3 were going to open and close gates and the first time that 
4 the gates weren't closed, he was going to lock them. 
5 Q And untll there had been these gates installed, had 
6 you ever had to worry about locked gates? 
7 A No. 
8 Q Have you ever maintained what we catl King Lane? 
9 A Yes. 
·,o Q What have you done to that? 
11 A We've hauled gravel -- a load of gravel once 
2 between the bridge and the Oreana Loop Road. And then l 
13 believe it was two years ago, I got a grader -- a motor 
~4 roto grader and graded the road from the west side of the 
5 bridge which goes into Kings' yard. There's a lfttle Y 
'16 there and I graded that road all the way to my dad's 
.. , 
property. Rebuilt -- regraded the road. 
8 Q Have you generally been the ones to maintain the 
19 road? 
! 
0 A Yeah. I mean we all do but I mean -- I mean yeah. 
1 From -- we've been the one to maintain the road from my 
I 22 house basically to my father's plus theirs also. 
3 Q Have you seen any obstacles placed in the 
I ~4 roadway --





















































Q -- recently? What have you seen? 
A There's a concrete block right next to the bridge 
where the gravel and the bridge meet right there. They put 
a concrete block there. 
Q Does that Interfere with your ability to access 
over the road? 
A Yes. 
Q How does that interfere with that? 
A It makes it extremely hard to get around that block 
with a trailer of -- even a gooseneck horse trailer up to a 
semi trailer. 
Q When was that block placed there? 
MR. RAINEY: Judge, we're way beyond the --
COURT: Is this on King Lane? 
BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
Q This is on King Lane? 
A This the right nex:t to their property -- right next 
to the bridge, yes. 
COURT: On the disputed road? 
WITNESS: On the disputed road, yes. 
COURT: I'll let him answer that. 
BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
Q When was that placed there? 
A I want to say six months ago. I'm not 100 percent. 
Somewhere in that vicinity. 
78 
Q Okay. Has It been consistently there since then? 
A Yes. 
Q Does It interfere with your ability to make it up 
and down the road? 
A Yes. 
Q You have one child who's six? 
A I have one child six and one that's about to turn 
three. 
Q Okay. And if you had any emergency medical -- let 
me ask, do they have any emergency medical issues? 
A My son is allergic to bees and, you know, 
penicillin, things like that but in our part of the world 
there, it's bees and he's deathly allergic to them. 
Q Okay. Have you had conversations with a physician 
about the impact of him getting stung by a bee? 
MR. FARRIS: Objection. Calls for hearsay, calls 
for opinion testimony. Calls for ail kinds of stuff . 
MR. CLEVERLEY: I asked whether he had any 
conversations. That's all. 
COURT: Okay. That's a yes or no question. 
WITNESS: Yes. 
BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
Q Are you aware if -- what would happen to your son 
if he were to get stung by a bee? 
MR. FARRIS: Objection. Calls for the same thing. 
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-1 •. Q They can get up Castle Lane, correct? 
2 A They can. 
J Q And there's no obstructions going up Castle Lane at 
4 all? 
5 A It depends on the year. 
6 Q Well, what happens In an off year then? 
7 A Weil, there's the ditch that can wash out. 
8 Q Who's locking you out? 
9 A I said there's a ditch that can wash out. 
0 Q Okay. And --
11 A And that's -- that's the only one I can think of at 
2 the moment. 
3 Q When was the last time the ditch washed out? 
14 A Two years ago I want to say and we replaced the 
5 culvert. 
,6 Q Okay. You got the culvert all replaced? 
17 A Uh-huh. 
8 Q And so it's a fine road now? 
19 A Uh-huh. 
20 Q Is that a yes? 
1 A Yes. 
22 Q Okay. So again, the emergency vehicles can go 
"'3 right up Castle Lane wlthout any obstructions, correct? 
4 A Yes. 
25 Q And these delivery people can go up Castle Lane 
84 
.1 without any obstructions, correct? 
2 A Yes. 
J Q And the mail person that defivers your mall right 
4 down at the bottom of Castle Lane and Oreana Loop. 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q So you have to go down the lane to get your mart. 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q And you do that at least once a day? 
9 A Can I say one thing? 
10 Q No. 
11 COURT: Wait until he asks you a question. 
2 WITNESS: Okay. Ari right. 
13 COURT: Your attorney can follow up. 
"'4 WITNESS: All right. 
5 BY MR. RAINEY: 
16 Q All these services are available through Castle 
·7 Lane; Is that correct? 
8 A Yes, yes. 
19 Q And one more time, there's not one obstruction 
0 other than maybe a ditch washing out once In a while or a 
1 culvert? 
22 A Uh-huh. 
J Q And that only washes out when you don't clean out 
.4 the debris, right? 




















































• the water . 
Q Okay. And that's happened once since --
A It's happened numerous times over the years. 
Q Do you know that this lane from the bottom of your 
house around the corner from your house to Oreana is Kings' 
private property? 
A No, I wasn't aware of that. It's always been an 
open lane since I've been around. 
Q You didn't know that Kings owned that property? 
A I knew that they owned the property on the north 
side of that lane. 
Q You didn't know that they owned the lane? 
A No. I did not. I always assumed it was an 
easement or private road ·- or an access point to our 
property. It's never been disputed up untll now. 
Q Wefl, have you ever Interfered with the Kings' use 
of that land? 
A No, I have not. 
Q Have you ever told them to get out? It's your 
lane. You're going to use it? 
A No, sir, I have not. 
Q Have you ever done anything that interrupted their 
use? And they being Kings. Have you ever done anything to 
interrupt the Kings' use of that lane? 
A No, sir, r have not. 
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Q Do you know if anyone in your family has ever 
interrupted the Kings' use of that lane? 
A Not to my recollection, no. 
Q And so bottom line is nobody from your family, as 
far as you know, have ever hindered or interfered with the 
Kings' use of that lane we're -- in the pleadings, it's 
called King's Lane. Do I need to rephrase that again? 
A Yeah, go ahead. Yeah. 
Q can you recall anybody in your family, you, your 
brother, father, that's lnterfered with Kings' use of that 
lane called Kings' Lane? 
A Between my house and their houses? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q So -- and you don't know who pays the taxes on that 
lane I take it? 
A No, I do not. 
Q You don't? 
A No, sir. 
Q Now, the gates you're talklng about, have you ever 
looked at those gates? 
A Which gates? 
Q The new gates. 
A Not up dose, no. 
Q Have you ever opened tile new gates? 
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1 • A ,I have not. I have not been through there since 
2 the new gates went up. 
3 Q So you're getting by going down to Castle Road 
4 then? 
5 A Forced to go around, yes. 
6 Q Well, my question was you're getting by going 
7 straight down Castle Road to Oreana Loop. 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q That is the adequate way, is that correct? 
10 A That's not the adequate way. That's the way that 
11 we are forced to go at this point in time. 
12 Q Now, why do you use this King Lane? Is It just for 
13 convenience? 
14 A We've always used It. 
15 Q Is that just a matter of convenience? 
16 A It is a matter of convenience and it is the 
i 17 shortest way to my •• to where I reside, where I llve from 
18 Grand View which is 85 percent of where I do my business is 
19 in that area. 
20 Q Okay. So it's just closer and more convenient to 
21 go down and use the Kings' property? 
22 A It Is. 
23 Q And that's the only reason you're using it? 
24 A No. 
25 Q Why? 
88 
1 A That's the way we've always gone since I can 
2 remember. 
3 Q But again --
4 A I've llved there for eight years and I've had no 
5 disputes up until recently about going that direction. 
6 Q So eight years ago would have been about --
7 A When I got married -- when I was married and 
8 moved -- officially moved into the house that I live in. 
9 Q You got married in 2007, didn't you'? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q So from 2007 till now, you're saying you use King 
12 Lane'? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And then before that, you were gone with your 
15 brother and mother somewhere else? 
1G A Yeah. Well, I moved -- when l was 15, as l said 
1 gone up and looked at the gates? 
2 A Because I've been waiting tfll this matter's 
3 resolved. 
4 Q Okay. So until this matter's resolved, you're 
5 content to go down Castle Lane? 
6 A I'm not content but I'm doing it. 
7 Q Okay. It doesn't hurt you, does it? 
8 A Yeah, it does. It costs more fuel and It's a 
9 hindrance. 
10 Q To go that extra mile down Castle Lane rather 
11 than --
12 A It's not an extra mile, sir. 
13 Q The length of Castle Lane is only a mile and three 
14 quarters. 
15 A You're referring to just the lane. I'm referring 
16 to the Loop Road as well all the way around. 
17 Q No, I'm talking about from your house down to 
18 Oreana Road -- Oreana Loop Road. 
19 A Okay. That's a mile, yes. 
20 Q That's about a mile. 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q And it's three quarters of a mile to go down 
23 through the Kings' property, isn't lt? 
24 A No, It Is -- I thought it was a mile -- three 
25 quarters of a mile from my house to the Loop Road. To go 
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1 around through my father's property, it's more than that. 
2 Q You said it was a mile. 
3 A No, sir, I'm sorry. I was wrong. It Is not. It 
4 is -- from my house, lt Is more like two miles from my 
5 house to Loop Road going through my father's property. 
6 Q So you objected to driving that extra mile? 
7 A Yeah. ln this day·· this day and age, fuel is 
8 expensive, sir. 
9 Q Does It cause you any hurt •• physical hurt'? 
10 A No, it does not cause any physical hurt. 
11 Q Just the inconvenience that l asked before. 
12 A Yep. 







-- was there to keep the trucks from running •• 
breaking the bridge down? Isn't that why il's there? 
17 
18 
earlier, I moved from my father's house to where my mother 17 
resides now. And then after that, after I graduated high 18 
A Nobody ever said one way or the other to us. 
Q You started driving trucks up and down that lane; 
19 school, I moved to Grand View and then I went to -- I lived 






and then in 2007, I guess you'd say, is when I moved back. 
Q Okay. So this continuous use has only been since 
2007. 
A My continuous use, yeah. 
Q Yeah. Okay. I guess I'm curious. Why haven't you 
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A We've always drove trucks up and down that lane. 
Q I mean these cattle trucks. 
A Yeah. 
Q And that's just been In the last five years, hasn't 
A Yeah. 
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• 1 ~ Q 'So In the last five years, you and your brother 
2 have started driving cattle trucks up and down King Lane. 
3 A Yes. 
,i Q And those cattle trucks are breaking in the bridge, 
5 aren't they? 
6 A No worse than theirs are, sir. 









A They are not helping it if that's how you want to 
put Jt. 
Q That's why you have a block there to keep you from 
running across the corner of the bridge. Isn't that right? 
A Those are your words. 
Q Well, Isn't that correct? 




trailers across that way. 











A There have been trucks in and out of that lane all 
along, sir. 
Q You've only been doing It for the last five years. 
A Yes. 




1 Q So since '06 Is when you-· at least '06 and past 
2 is when you started using the big trucks? 
3 A Yeah. Of my own, yeah. 
4 Q And you would agree that those big trucks are hard 
5 on the road and hard on the bridge? 
6 A They are extra weight than a typical vehicle, yes, 
7 but we also help to maintain the road. 
B Q My question is are those big trucks hard on the 
9 bridge and hard on the road? 
, ·10 A They're hard on everything, yes. 
'11 Q Okay. And that's an increase in use that you've 
2 been doing just In the last six years, five years? 
13 A I wasn't aware that the bridge was under question. 
•4 I thought it was the lane. 
5 Q But you've just Increased your use by driving the 
16 big trucks there? 
·7 A Yeah, I did. 
B Q Your brother did too? 
. 19 A That is how I make my living. 
0 Q And your brother also? 
1 A And that's how he makes his l!ving. 
22 Q And you and your brother could go up and down 
3 Castle Creek -- Castle lane with your big trucks? 
• 4 A We could. 
25 Q And there's nothing -- no obstructions that would 
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• 1 obstruct a big truck to go up and down Castle Lane? 
2 A No. 
3 Q And again, It's just convenience. Just shorter to 
4 drive down the Kings' property than go down Castle Lane? 
5 A That's the way we've always gone. 
6 Q Is it shorter? 
7 A It's shorter. 
8 Q And that's why you use it? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Okay. And you're well aware that the 911 vehicles, 
11 sheriff's office and such, have been up Castle Lane? 
12 They've been called to your·· 
13 A They have been called to the property, yes. 
14 Q And so they've made it up and down Castle Lane 
15 without any trouble? 
16 A The ones that I know of have came up King Lane. 
17 Q You're not aware of the ones that came to your 
18 brother's or father's place up through Castle Lane? 
19 A I wasn't there for all of them. 
20 Q And again, Kings' property being a cattle ranch, 
21 they have cattle everywhere, correct, all through the 
22 pastures and the corrals? 
23 A Who's this? 
24 Q Kings. 
25 A Yes. 
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If there's cattle in the Jane, yep. 
And you have to open the gates? 
Yep. 
Something you don't have to do on Castle Road? 
No, That is BLM. 
You're not dodging cattle on the BLM ground? 
9 A Not as of yet, no. 
10 Q And that road's been in there for what? As far as 
11 you know -- you're 31? 
12 A I'm 30. 
13 Q Thirty, okay. So as far as you know, it's been 
14 there 30 years? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Now, describe U,e school bus. Denise Collett is 
17 the school bus driver. 
18 Yes . 
19 
A 
Q And Collett Road Is just -- comes into Oreana Loop, 
20 what, 200 feet past your mailbox? 
21 A Yes. 
22 
23 
Q And Denise comes down Collett Road where she lives. 
A Yep • 
24 Q Turns left on Oreana Road. 
25 A Yes. 
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• 1 ' • Q Stops at the mailbox and picks up your ooy. 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q So·· 
4 A As of now, yes. 
5 Q So right now, the bus stop is convenient for 
6 everybody, isn't It? 
7 A lt's convenient for Denise, yes. 
8 Q And you don't have to drive clear to the top of the 
9 hill. 
10 A No. 
11 Q Because there is no bus stop at King Lane. You 
12 know that, don't you? 
13 A I do. 
14 MR. RAINEY: That's all I have. 
15 COURT: Mr. Farris. 
16 MR. FARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Just a few 
17 follow-up questions and maybe sum things up. 
10 CROSS-EXAMINATlON 
19 QUESTIONS BY MR. FARRIS: 
20 Q So the way I'm understanding things is what we've 
21 been talking about Is Castle Lane. You know, when l refer 
22 to Castle Lane, I'm talking about from Oreana Loop through 
23 John Fuquay's property and up to your residence. 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q That's what we've been talking about as Castle Lane 
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1 today? 
2 A Yeah. 
3 Q From what I'm understanding is Castle Lane is an 
4 adequate road to provide emergency services? Is that 
5 right? 
6 A It could be. 
7 Q It does. It has in the past. 
8 A It has, yeah. 
9 Q It provides deliveries whether It's Schwann's or 
10 UPS or anyone else? 
11 A As of a month ago, yes. 
12 Q It has In the past even before then also? 
13 A The majority that I can recollect, a majority of 
14 the UPS, Schwann's man and any other services have came In 
15 through l<ing Lane to my property, to my brother's-· to my 
16 house, to my residence, to my brot/1er's house and then ta 
17 my father's house. 
18 Q Don't they when they get your address, they look up 
19 your address and It's Castle Lane, isn't It? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q How do they know to even come down what you've 
22 called King's Lane anyways? 
23 A Because they've done that for years, sir. 
24 Q The point Is, at least currently, there's nothing 
25 that restricts that ac:cess. 
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• 1 A As of right now, no. 
2 Q And your mail comes there at the end of Castle Lane 
3 there at Oreana Loop, right? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And the way I'm understanding the bus stop is that 
6 you've changed -· 
7 A We changed It, yes. 








A The bus driver drd agree, yes. 
Q So It hasn't been an issue. 
A No. 
Q And the only issue is that it Is an extra mile 
drive for you? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. The blocks that you were talking about. Is 
16 it block or blocks? 
17 A It is one block. 
18 Q One block, okay. You're saying that's been there 
19 six months ago. 
20 A I can't for sure tell you. It's been·· It's 
21 been -- yeah, six months or maybe more. I'm not 100 
22 percent. 
23 Q It's not anything that's new? 
24 A Not as of rec:ently, no. 
25 Q So that is not something -- you didn't file a 
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1 lawsuit six months ago to address It. 
2 A No, we just worked around it. 
3 Q So It's not an issue and hasn't been an Issue --
4 A We just worked around it. 
5 Q -- for six months? 
6 A We just worked around It. 
7 Q Will you let me finish my questions? 
8 A Yeah. 
9 Q It hasn't been an Issue for the last six months, 
10 has it? 
11 A It has but private! y. 
12 Q Not anything that warranted you having to bring a 
13 legal action? 
14 A No. 
15 Q You mentioned that your son is allergic to bees. 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q And obviously anybody would want emergency services 
18 as quick as possible. 
19 A Sure, sure. 
20 Q Right? Okay. If an emergency service were to come 
21 down what we've been talking about as King's Lane, wouldn't 
22 they have to stop at gates and open those gates? 
23 A As of right now, yes. 
24 Q For tile last four or five years, you've said that 
25 there have been gates. 
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1, · A They were not steadily opened -- or closed. 
2 Q You've said there have been gates for the last four 
3 or five years. 
4 A There have been gates, yes, when there was cattle 
5 present. 
6 Q Okay. So depending on the day, an emergency 
7 service would have to stop at possibly two gates? 
B A Possibly. 
9 Q Dodge cattle. 
0 A Possibly. 
111 Q Make sure those gates are dosed before cattle get 
2 back out. 
3 A Possibly. 
I 14 Q Okay. How long would that take? 














would take an extra five minutes. 
Q That's been the situation for the last four to five 
years, hasn't it? 
A Yeah. 
Q That's your testimony. 
A Yes. 
MR. FARRIS: I think that's all I have. 
COURT: Thank you. Redirect. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
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1 Q J.C., did you ever drive trucks up and down King 
2 . Lane with your father? 
3 A I did. 
4 Q Prior to when you started driving trucks? 
5 A I did. 
6 Q To the best of your knowledge, how long have trucks 
7 been driven up and down that road Into King Lane? 
8 A All of my life. 
9 Q What type of trucks? 
I ·10 11 
! 2 
A Semi trucks, tractor traller trucks, dump trucks, 
ten-wheelers, single -- single-wheeled trucks, two-ton 
trucks to commercial vehicle trucks. 
13 Q Your using trucks of your own is not a new use? 
1 4 A No. 
5 MR. CLEVERLEY: I don't have anything further. 
16 
•7 
COURT: Thank you. 
MR. RAINEY: Judge, may I Inquire on that last one. 
COURT: Very briefly. 
MR. RAINEY: Real quickly. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
QUESTIONS BY MR. RAINEY: 
Q Now you and your brother are both driving trucks up 
and down this King's Lane. 
A Yes. 
Q Before, It was just your dad? 
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• 1 A It was. 
2 Q Okay. So you've Increased the use by at least two 
3 different drivers by two different trucks? 
4 A Yes, yes. 
5 Q That's been In the last five years? 
6 A Yes. 
7 MR. RAINEY: That's all. 
8 COURT: Any questions, Mr. Farris, based on that? 
9 MR. FARRIS: No, Your Honor. 
10 COURT: Mr. Cleverley, any questions? 
11 MR. CLEVERLEY: Nothing else, Your Honor. 
12 COURT: Thank you. 
13 MR. CLEVERLEY: And Your Honor, I have I believe 
14 just one quick witness. Raymond Jayo. 
15 COURT: All right. Sir, come on up. We'll swear 
16 you in and then you can take a seat here. 
17 (RAYMOND JAYO is sworn.) 
18 COURT: Step around that chair and start out by 
19 stating your name and spelling your last name. 
20 WITNESS: Raymond Jayo, J-a-y-o. 
21 COURT: Okay. Proceed. 
22 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
23 QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
24 Q Mr. Jayo, where do you live? 
25 A At the current time, I live at John Fuquay's In my 
102 
1 camp traller. 
2 Q Okay. And how long have you lived there? 
3 A Since May. 
4 Q Of~-
5 A Off and on. I work out of town too. 
6 Q Since May of this year? 
7 A Yeah. 
8 Q Did you live -- where have you lived before then? 
9 A Oreana all my life. Fifty-eight years. 
10 Q And have you known Mr. John Fuquay for a long time? 
11 A Ever since he moved to Oreana. 
12 Q Are you familiar with where his house is? 
13 A Yes, sir. 
14 Q Have you been there on numerous occasions? 
15 A Yes, sir. 
16 Q Okay. And you're familiar with what we're calling 
17 King Lane, the road between Oreana Loop Road and Clint 
1 B Fuquay's house? 
19 A Yes, sir. 
20 Q And did you have an occasion recently to see gates 
21 being installed? 
22 A Yes. I come home I think around the 13th of last 
23 month. I come around Oreana into John's house. The next 
24 morning, I went out Castle Lane and realized the gate was 
25 there and when I shut the gate, I see a no trespassing 
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• • T sign. l1hen I went on out and talked to Gil on the backhoe 
2 down there. 
3 Q Okay. And what did he tell you? 
4 A I told him, "I guess I was trespassing," and he 
5 said, ''Yeah, I guess you were," and he said he didn't think 
6 it would be any problem as long as I kept the gates shut. 
7 I just told him all right and then Rose come out and asked 
8 me when I come back to go around so then I told her I 
9 would. That's where I've been going ever since. 
10 Q She asked you not to go through the gates? 
11 A Yeah. Asked me to go around the other way when I 
12 come back from Grand View. 
13 Q Now you've gone all the way back around to get back 
14 to your place? 
15 A Camp trailer, yeah. 
16 Q In the 58 years that you've been in Oreana, have 
17 you seen gates on this road before? 
18 A Just recently. The barbed wire gates. I don't 
19 know how many years ago when I first went up that lane, 
20 there was no gates. Where Rose and Gil live, at that time, 
21 they run milk cows up there. Just turned them out. There 
22 was no gates. Cows come home at night. They'd milk them. 
23 Q The Installation of the gates that are there now 
24 are just new within the last six weeks or so? 
25 A Yes, sir. 
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1 MR. CLEVERLEY: I don't have any further questions, 
2 Your Honor. 
3 COURT: Cross. 
4 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
5 QUESTIONS BY MR. RAINEY: 
6 Q Mr. Jayo, are you telling us that you've been up 
7 and down the King's Lane --
8 A What's that? 
9 Q You've been up and down the King's Lane for 58 
10 years? 
11 A Yes, sir. First time I was 8 years old when I went 
12 with my dad. Went to where Kings llve then and Rollins 
i 13 Farmln (phonetic) lived there and then we went to where 
14 John Fuquay lives and talked to Kirby Foreman and then we 
15 went out across the desert back to Oreana. 
16 Q The truth is when the Kings moved onto that 
17 property, that lane was nothing but a marsh -- a big mud 
18 hole. Isn't that correct? 
19 A The first time I went there, yeah. 
20 Q And pretty messy? 
21 A It was pretty messy. 
22 Q And it was messy for at least 10 to 15 years while 
23 they fixed it up. Isn't that right? 
24 A Yes, yes. 
25 Q And the Kings are the one that put all the gravel 
105 
• 1 in there and fixed it up. 
2 A I have no idea who put it there. 
3 Q Okay. But at least It got fixed up? 
4 A It got fixed up. It's a lot better passing the 
5 road now. 
6 
7 
Q Yeah, so now it's usable. 
A Yeah. 
8 Q And how long have -- did you pause and talk to the 
9 Kings as you were driving through? 
10 A Yes, I wave at them. I've known Kings ever since 
11 they come here and the Lows. I've been neighbors. I got 
12 caught in the crossfire here is what happened. 
13 Q Well, what I'm getting at is you're well aware that 
14 the Kings use that road to access their fields. 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q That's their main road In the whole farm, isn't it? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q To get to the back area. That's their main 
19 driveway to get to the area --
20 A Their farm ground, yes. 
21 Q -· to the west side of the farm. 
22 A Yeah. 
23 Q And that's fairly obvious to anybody driving down 
24 that lane because they've got gates along there, isn't that 
25 right? 
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1 A Yeah. Lows got gates along their fence line too. 
2 That fence line's been there for as long as I can remember 
3 on both sides. 
4 Q Mr. Low has gates on hrs side of it? 
5 A Correct. 
6 Q That's how both of them access their property. 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Now, to your knowledge, the Kings are the only ones 
9 that put cattle in there? 
10 A What's that? 
11 Q Kings are the only ones that put cattle in this 
12 lane? 
13 A As far as I know, yeah. 
14 Q How often have you been up and down there In the 
15 last six years? 
16 A Oh, l couldn't really tell you. 
17 Q When did you move In with John Fuquay? 
18 A May. 
19 Q Of this year, 2014? 
20 A Yeah. Pulled my camp trailer over there and put it 
21 under a shade tree and whatnot and In the area, that's 
22 where I stay. 
23 Q And you're having no trouble driving from Mr. John 
24 Fuquay's house down to Oreana Loop Road, are you? 
25 A No. Not no more. 
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• 1' ' Q 'Pardon me? 
2 A Not no more. After Rose asked me to go around, I 
3 started going around, 
4 Q Okay. And that's what I'm getting at. You're able 
5 to go down from John Fuquay's house to Oreana Loop Road and 
6 there's no obstructions, right? 
7 A No. I got to go around that way because she asked 
8 me not to come down that lane no more. 
9 Q You're missing my point. Is there any obstructions 
0 on Castle Lane Road? 
















it's easier to go down that lane to go to Grand View but I 
go around now. It's four miles. 
Q So you go down to Oreana Road and hit the gravel --
or paved road. 
A Yes. 
Q And then you go on up the highway. 
A Yep. 
Q And so you're saying it's just more convenient to 
use the Kings' place? 
A Yeah. It has been for all my life but now it's 
not. 




Q No urgency that requires you to go through Kings'. 
A No. Not right at this point unless I have a heart 
attack or something. 
Q Well, the whole point Is that there's nothing wrong 
5 with Castle Lane Road. 
6 A No. 




























Yeah, you just got to go slow. 
Trucks. 
You got to go slow. 
Well, you go slow on King's Lane too, don't you? 
Yes, I do. 
You have to open gates on King's Lane, don't you? 
Now we do. 
Well, there were wire gates before. 
A Yeah, I never did go through there when those wire 
gates were closed thougl1. They didn't have cattle In there 
when I went through there. 
Q The times you've been through In the past, there 
were no cattle In there. 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. And you know that BLM ground west of 
the l<lngs'? 
A Yep, SLM ground clear to Oreana. 
Q You know that ranchers, property owners have to 
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• 1 ience cattle out in open range? 
2 A Correct. 
3 Q And that is open range out there, isn't it? 
4 A Yep. 
5 Q And so to keep the cattle from the SLM property 
6 from trespassing onto the Kings', they have to have a fence 
7 or a gate, right? 
A Yep. Yes, sir. B 
9 Q Okay. Did you stop and look at tlie gate, the new 
10 one? 
11 A Yes. I went through it. 
12 Q And it opens with a plunger, doesn't it? 
13 A Yeah. 
14 Q It's just got a hole in one post and a plunger? 
15 A Yep. 
16 Q And you just pull-· 
17 A Spring-loaded. 
18 Q And then a spring pushes it back In? 
19 A Yep. 
20 Q The old gates, the wire gates, you had to lift a 
21 wire up over the post? 
22 A Correct. 
23 Q And you had to push the post up close enough to get 
24 that done. 
25 A Yep. 
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1 Q So actually, the new gates are a lot more 
2 convenient, aren't they? 
3 A Yes, they .ire. 
4 Q And they swing open7 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q So like-· ol<ay. Bottom line Is the Kings have 










A Yes, they're easily opened. 
MR. RAINEY: Nothing further. 
COURT: Redirect·· or Mr. Farris. I'm sorry. 
MR. FARRIS: I don't have anything, Your Honor. 
COURT: Redirect. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: I have nothing else, Your Honor. 
COURT: Okay. You can step down. Thanks. Can 
16 this witness be excused? 
17 MR. CLEVERLEY: He may. -
18 COURT: You can be excused, sir. 
19 MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, I don't have any 
20 additional witnesses to call. 
21 COURT: Mr. Rainey, how many witnesses do you have? 
22 MR. RAINEY: Well, we've got five. 
23 COURT: You're going to wrap It up by 5:00. 
24 MR. RAINEY: Unlikely, Your Honor. I'd like to 
25 make a motion right now. 
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.. • i ' •COURT: Go ahead. 
2 MR. RAINEY: I understand that the plaintiffs have 
3 closed their case and rested. At this point, we would make 
4 a motion to dismiss their motion or quash their motion to 
5 grant a preliminary injunction. 
6 The temporary restraining order actually expires on 
7 its own terms tomorrow. I guess I'd be asking that the 
8 temporary restraining order be dissolved today, that the 
9 Court dismiss the motion to grant a preliminary injunction 
10 at this point. 
11 This temporary order, Your Honor -- and I can well 
12 see when you read these affidavits, it sounds horrible. We 
13 can't get emergency vehicles. We can't get mail. We can't 
14 get the deliveries. We can't get the child ta the school 
15 bus. When you read their affidavits and their brief that 
16 even the attorney put together, it makes it sound like 
17 they're landlocked and the only way they can get out Is 
18 through King's Lane. 
19 They didn't tell you, Judge, that they had an all-
20 weather road that went straight down to this Oreana paved 
21 road. There is absolutely no necessity shown and they 
22 certainly haven't proved any necessity today. 
23 Now, they use the language like "immediate need of 
24 access. The gates Interfere with normal deliveries." 
25 Well, all deliveries can come right up Castle Lane. They 
112 
1 admitted that. There's nothing that blocks the deliveries 
2 from coming up Castle L.ane. 
3 The ability of the children to go to the school bus 
4 stop. The bus stop is right down at the bottom of their 
5 property. It's just 100 feet from where -- 200 maybe from 
6 where the school bus driver makes the curve onto the paved 
7 road so it's convenient for everybody. There's no 
8 emergency there picking the chlld up at the mailbox.. The 
9 mailbox is down at the bottom of the hill. They admit they 
10 have to go down the hill to get to the mail so there's no 
·11 emergency there. 
12 And then these emergency services, police, fire, 
13 ambulances, everybody that they testified, all the Fuquays 
14 and their family and even Mr. Jayo admitted that Castle 
15 Lane is a good all-weather road that doesn't obstruct 
16 anybody. Their only reason they want to go through Kings' 
17 they say is it's more convenient and it saves them maybe 
18 five or ten minutes. 
19 The Kings are ranchers, Your Honor. They run a lot 
20 of cattle. l11ey wlll tell you how many cattle they run and 
21 
22 
they need every ind1 of that ground when they bring those 
cattle out of the hill. They have those fence gate --
23 excuse me. They have that lane gated. It used to be wire 
24 fences. Now, Gilbert King has installed these swinging 
25 gates that have a plunger. The plunger goes into a hole In 
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• 1 the post and all you have to do is pull the plunger back, 
2 open the gate. When you close it, you release the plunger 
3 and it goes back into the hole. 
4 There's no question because John Fuquay told the 
5 deputy sheriff he was not going to lock -· to close the 
6 gates. There's no question about it. Gilbert locked the 
7 gates. Right now, they're not locked but the landowners as 
8 a matter of law have a right to use their easements or use 
9 their entire !and. 
10 There's the testimony that they've never Interfered 
11 with the l<ings' use so the issue of whether or not there's 
12 this Immediate emergency that they allege in their 
13 affidavits over and over again just doesn't exist and we've 
14 proved ·- and the Court has read by now the affidavits of 
15 the Schwann man. He has no problem comlng up castle Lane. 
16 In fact, would do It until John started locking his gate 
17 but get back here. Again, in the affidavit --
18 MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, 1'111 going to object to 
19 reference to any affidavit. We have live testimony. 
20 COURT: This is just argument. Go ahead. I'll 
21 note the objection. Go ahead. 
22 MR. RAINEY: Okay. Well, what I'm getting at, Your 
23 Honor, their allegations ta you to get the temporary order 
24 were horrible. You know, they're blacking the roadway. 
25 They had immediate threat to health and safety of the 
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1 plaintiffs. It blocks emergency vehicles. Delaying and 
2 giving notice to the defendants. It blocks their access to 
3 all these services. None of that's true, Judge. 
4 We've proven through the affidavits and we've 
5 proven actually through their awn testimony. These 
6 Fuquay,, they have more than an adequate access to their 
7 own property.· There's not one reason to grant this 
8 preliminary injunction. They could use the Castle Lane 
9 like they've been doing and at the end of the day when we 
10 have the trial, you will decide whether or not they end up 
11 with an easement. 
12 But until that time, this is the Kings' property. 
13 They're entitled to gate lt as a matter of law. These 
14 people have other access. There's absolutely no emergency. 
15 No reason for preliminary injunction and I'm sure if you 
16 had all the facts on the September 4 or 5 when the 
17 restraining order was Issued, you would probably would not 
18 have issued a restraining order knowing all the facts that 
19 you do now. 
20 So I'm asking this Court, Your Honor, to dismiss 
21 the motion to grant a preliminary Injunction. Dissolve the 
22 temporary restTaining order and let's have the trial on 
23 this easement. Let's get to the full facts. 
24 We have -- this case has just barely begun. Our 
25 time for appearance just barely expired. We both ·- Mr. 
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.. • • 1 ···Farris and I have both filed Answers but we're Just 20 days 1 COURT: Thank you. Mr. Cleverley. 
2 Into this. We've got a lot of discovery. This will 2 MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, I think what the Court 
3 probably be a summary Judgment case but at this point, Your 3 has heard is that there is other access from Castle Lane. 
4 Honor, there is absolutely no reason to grant a prellmlnary 
5 injunction. 
6 COURT: Thank you. Mr. Farris, anything you'd llke 
7 to add? 
B MR. FARRIS: Yeah, just a few thlngs. I'd join In 
9 his motion. I think we could spend the next half hour 
0 listening to more testimony from the Kings and others 
11 lestifying aboul the use of the road or the lack of the use 
2 of the road but what is very clear from the witnesses that 
3 we've heard today Is there Is no irreparable -- immediate 
14 or irreparable injury which is the threshold requirement in 
5 order to issue a preliminary injunction. 
.6 It's an extraordinary relief to even grant a 
17 preliminary injunction and the threshold requirement --
8 we've gotten off tracl< on a lot of things today. 
19 Maintenance of the road, whether It was maintenance, 
20 whatnot. But when you got down to It, the bottom Hne on 
1 do they have access from a well-maintained road, Castle 
22 Lane, that connects to Oreana, yep, they do. They have It 
"3 for emergency services. That's where their addresses are. 
4 That's where their mailboxes are. That's where Schwann's 
25 can deliver. That's where UPS can dellver. That's where 
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1 they've moved their bus locatlon for the bus stop also for 
2 the boy to be picked up and that's actually more convenient 
3 for the bus driver who has agreed to do It. 
4 So there's been no showing of Irreparable Immediate 
5 Injury here and the status quo Is there's gates across 
6 there. They've all testified there's been gates there for 
7 at least the last four to five years. 
B Now, whether or not -- whether or not that will be 
9 relevant when we get to the ultimate issue on whether or 
I ·10 11 
2 
not there's a prescriptive easement, for purposes of today 
and whether or not we grant an injunction, a preliminary 
injunction, the testimony from them Is the status quo ls 
13 there's been -- there's been gates across these -- across 
4 4 this King's Lane, multiple gates. You have to stop and 







the cattle, et cetera, et cetera. 
There is no Immediate or Irreparable Injury being 
shown and there's no basis for a preliminary injunction. 
So you know, I think putting on this additional testimony 
and whatnot, based on their own testimony that there ls no 
1 such Irreparable injury, that they can access it from 




Inconvenience is not sufficient in this case or any other 
case to warrant granting the exceptional remedy of a 
preliminary injunction. Sol join In Mr. Ralney's motion. 
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4 I don't think there's ever been a dispute. It doesn't 
5 matter. It's not relevant. The Issue Is has there been a 
6 change in the status quo by the defendants where they put 
7 up gates to block access to a roadway that was otherwise 
8 used by the plaintiffs. 
9 Part of that reason is that the Supreme Court's 
10 addressed this particular Issue in Walker versus Boozer, 
11 140 Idaho 451. It's a 2004 case. The Suprerne Courl said 
12 that this Is an issue of discretion for the trial court, 
13 the issuance of this Injunction Is, and that It Is needed 
14 because the continual -- in this case, the continuance or 
15 allowing the Boozers' barriers to stay In place would 
16 reduce waste. The waste envisioned by the district court 
17 was that which might result to the Quaker Haven owners 
1 B because the barriers restricted the Quaker Haven owners 
19 reasonable access to their property. Therefore the 
20 district court dld not error by granting the preliminary 
21 injunction because the Boozers have not shown an abuse of 
22 discretion. 
23 This Court has the discretion to enter this 
24 preliminary injunction. Ali we've asked for is the status 
25 quo to be maintained. Obviously there's a dispute as to 
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1 this easement but the problem Is that you now have the 
2 defendants who have Installed these permanent gates who 
3 have now told the Fuquays not to go across the gates. 
4 Emergency services can't go in. They have to -- or are 
5 expected to go around. All of the delivery service people 
6 are now expected to go around. That's not the status quo. 
7 By denying the preliminary injunction, the Court 
8 would be granting the relief to the defendants and allowing 




ever been. It's not the way that It's been even accepting 
that there have been occasional gates there that were there 
for days at a time when they would have cattle in there but 
13 there was never any indication that there was ever any 
14 prohibition of access. 
15 The testimony was that the Kings and Mrs. l<lng In 
16 particular Is now denying access and told Mr. Jayo not to 
17 go through there. That's an absolute denial of his right 
18 of access. 
19 So what we're asking for is the court to simply 
20 Issue the Injunction prohibiting them from closing and 
21 locking the gates and prohibiting the Kings from denying 




always had. This Isn't something that's new that we're 
asking for. We're asking the Court to slmply allow what 
has always been to continue to be during the pendency of 
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• • 1 -·this trial. 
2 If at the end of the trial the Court decides that 
3 there's no prescriptive easement and that it's reasonable 
4 for the Kings to put gates at both ends and lock them and 
5 prohibit the Fuquays from using the road, that's a trial 
6 issue. But for today, an we're asklng Is the status quo. 
7 We're not asking for any relief other than to prevent the 
8 denial of access that's a[ways been there. That's an issue 
9 of discretion. 
10 There's nothing wrong with the Court issuing an 
•j•i order that says you leave your gates open. You can't lock 
12 the people -- the Fuquays out from accessing their house. 
13 At least for the status quo until we get done with trial, 
14 that's the way that it ought to be. 
15 This wasn't an issue until four weeks ago when they 
16 put the gates up. They're the ones that have created the 
17 issue. Just allow the Fuquays the reasonable unrestricted 
18 access that they've had and then we'll deal with all of the 
19 issues when we get to trial. But at least for now, until 
20 we get to trial, they ought to have the exact same rights 
21 that they had before those gates were put up. 
22 COURT: Thank you. I've reviewed the rule. The 
23 rule says -- this is Rule 65. "Preliminary injunction may 
24 be granted for the following cases when it appears by the 
25 Complaint that the plaintiff Is entitled to relief 
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1 demanded." Part 2 says, "When it appears by the Complaint 
2 or Affidavit that the commission or continuance of some act 
3 during litigation would produce waste or great irreparable 
4 harm to the plaintiff." And It appears -- part 3, "When it 
5 appears during litigation that the defendant ls doing or 
6 threatens to do something that's in violation of the 
7 plalntiffs' rights respecting the action." And 4, It talks 
8 about disposing of property. It doesn't apply. 
9 In this case, we will set this case for a trial and 
10 later next week, I'll send out a scheduling order asking 
11 the parties to give me their available dates. I'm not 
12 going to rule on the merits of the case at all today. 
13 Today, the only thing is what are we going to do about the 
14 road pending the trlal and how -- and who's going to use 
15 the road. 
·\6 It's a discretionary call, particularly when I read 
17 part 2 about whether there's acts that are likely to 
18 produce great or Irreparable harm. I don't see that here 
19 at all, with this caveat. I'll grant a preliminary 
20 injunction that prohibits the defendants from keeping 
21 emergency vehicles -- if the police, fire or ambulance come 
22 up and want to open a gate, open the gate. Otherwise, It's 
23 closed to the publlc. 
24 No one -- this is just for now. We'll have a 




















































easement and if there Is a prescriptive easement, then 
that's all undone. If there isn't a prescriptive easement, 
we'll cover it there, 
But for now, just for now, l'm granting a 
preliminary injunction that prohibits defendants from 
blocking police -- emergency vehicle access. Police, fire, 
ambulance. And they will make the call whether they want 
to use the road. If the police show up and say, ''Open the 
gate. We need to get through," open the gate or the fire 
or the -- if his child gets bit by a bee and goes into 
anaphylactic zhock, you're goino to let them go down the 
road that way too but it has to be an objective emergency. 
otherwise It's closed to the public. You're going 
to have to make the long route around until we style this 
case for trial and have a hearing. Until then, you got to 
make the long route. So Mr. Rainey and Mr. Farris, can you 
draft that? 
MR. FARRIS: One of us will. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: Your Honor, is the Court denying 
the Fuquays any access? 
COURT: Yes. Unless It's an emergency and an 
objective emergency and I'm going to allow emergency 
vehicles, police, ambulance, fire. They come up ·- and 
it's up to them whether they want to use It. If they think 
it's faster to go the other way, then that's it. But if 
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they knock on the Kings' door and say, "Open the gate. We 
need through," you open the gate. 
So would you guys consider mediation at all on this 
case? I've handled these kind of cases. There's usually 
something else underlying these cases. Judge Dunn I think 
will be In town In -- he does it for free. Anyway, I'm not 
going to force you into it. If you think you can mediate 
it, fine. If not --
MR. RAINEY: Okay. 
COURT: I'm just throwing that out there. You guys 
consider it. I'll send out a scheduling -- a request for 
unavailable dates next week so that we can get this styled 
for a trial. 
CLERK: He's here the 28th for mediation so I don't 
know if he'll be --
COURT: He's here the end of October. Just keep 
that in mind. Let me know. And Mr. Cleverley, Judge 
Dunn's a judge from Pocatello, other end of the state. He 
comes here about twice a year and mediates ten cases. Two 
every day for five days and he does a good job but some 
cases can't be mediated. lf this is one that can, then --
MR. FARRIS: Your Honor, could I ask a question for 
clarification? 
COURT: Sure. 
MR. FARRIS: There was a temporary restraining 
123 
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.. • 1 ··order .. That obviously would be quashed, dismissed, 
2 whatever you want to call it. 
3 COURT: Yes. It's modified to a preliminary 
4 injunction to allow -- to prohibit them from -- prohibiting 
5 you guys from blocking emergency vehicles. 
6 MR. FARRIS: Yeah. The temporary restraining order 
7 goes away. 























MR. FARRIS: The bond that has been posted, the 
thousand dollars, is that going to remain while this --
COURT: Yes. 
order? 
MR. FARRIS.: Okay. Okay. 
COURT: Anything else? 
MR. CLEVERLEY: Who would you like to prepare the 
COURT: Well, who wants to? 
MR. FARRIS: One of us will. 
COURT: Let's let the defendants do it. Anything 
else on this case? 
MR. RAINEY: We have nothing further. 
COURT: All right. We'll be in recess. Like I 
said, I'll got a request for scheduling dates out prollably 
next week. 
On the pretrials, Mr. Cleverley, I'll probably have 
you appear telephonically but It wouldn't have worked 
124 
today. This is being recorded In Owyhee County. 
MR. CLEVERLEY: I would have been here today 
~3 anyway. For the TRO, I would have been telephonic. 
4 COURT: The pretrial status conference, we might be 
5 able to have you appear telephonlcally. 
6 MR. CLEVERLEY: Thank you. Your Honor, can I 
7 request that -- although I think we're off the record, a 
8 quick trial date, are we looking at something -- do we 
9 know? 
I ·10 11 
2 
COURT: It would be a court trial I'm presuming and 
I don't know If we could get it set by the end of the year 
13 
~4 
or not. Maybe. 
MR. FARRIS: Your Honor --
COURT: It would be done in Murphy. 
5 MR. FARRIS: -- I filed the counterclaim but did 
16 request a jury trial related to damages. 
·7 COURT: Okay. 
8 MR. FARRIS: So something to keep in mind. 
119 COURT: So that puts it off till next year. 
i O MR. CLEVERLEY: Did we bifurcate --
: 1 COURT: You're asking me a lot of questions I'm not 
j 22 prepared to answer right now. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 






SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K ) 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;) 
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GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ) 
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary ofU1e ) 
HEARTKRANCHTRUSTUTA ) 
DECEMBER 28, 2012, ) 
) 
Counterclaim ants, ) 
CASE NO. CV 2014-0278 
AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT KING IN 
SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT 
HEART K RANCH'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AFFIDAVIT OF GILBERT KING IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT 






JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON \VARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY ) 
) 
Counterdcfendant.~. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
GILBERT KING, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am a party in the above-captioned action, over the age of majority, competent to 
testify, and I make this affidavit upon personal knowledge. 
2. I have previously submitted affidavits in this action in opposition to the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction (9/9/14). 
3. It was not until sometime in 2011 that the Fuquay Plaintiffs began any use of King 
Lane by large semi-trucks. 
4. This use appeared to be unrelated to uses occurring on the Fuquay property itself, but 
instead seemed to be for general commercial trucking purposes unrelated to the property itself. 
5. On or about f't.. ,. 1 5 - {? (date) I had a large cement block placed at or near the 
location of a bridge over C,M)*:4 crJ(..(state location) in any attempt eliminate this use of King Lane 
by the Fuquays which was contributing to damage to this bridge. 
6. On or about ti .. Z.Z, - I l.\ (date) I had two former wire gates on King Lane 
replaced with metal swing gates, so as to be able to better ~ontrol entry onto and through King Lane. 
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Further affiant sayeth net. 
stitA ~· 
Gilbert King[ 
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Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, ) CASE NO. CV 2014-0278 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING IN 
vs. ) SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT 
) HEART K RANCH'S MOTION FOR 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;) 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN ) 




GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ) 
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the ) 
HEARTKRANCHTRUSTUTA ) 
DECEMBER 28, 2012, ) 
) 
Counterclaimants, ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT 





JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FL QUAY ) 
) 
Counterdefcndants. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
ROSE KING, being first duly swam, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am a party in the above~captioned action, over the age of majority, competent to 
testify, and I make this affidavit upon personal knowledge. 
2. I have previously submitted affidavits in this action in opposition to the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction (9/9/ 14), and in response and objection to the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs request for summary judgment against the Low Defendants (12/9/14), each of those 
affidavits is incorporated by reference herein. 
3. I have reviewed the Declaration of John Fuquay, as filed with this Comt on October 
29, 2014, and submitted in support of the Fuquay Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against 
the Low Defendants, and the claims for prescriptive easement made in that declaration concerning 
the Fuquay Plaintiffs use of the roadway that has been identified in this action as "King Lane." 
4. As made and declared within the Declaration of John Fuquay, it appears that the 
Fuquay Plaintiffs are asserting a presciiptive easement claim to the use of King Lane for the period 
beginning January 1, 1977 to the present. 
5. As declared in my affidavit submitted in opposition to the Fuquay Plaintiffs' motion 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT 
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for summary judgment against the Low Defendants, the King Defendants have owned the property 
alleged to burdened by the alleged prescriptive easement claimed by the Fuquay Plaintiffs since 
1973, except for a four year period between 1982 and 1986. 
6. At all times prior to 2014 the Fuquay Plaintiffs' any use of King Lane, whether by 
regular passenger vehicles of the Fuquays and their guests, the infrequent use of semi-trucks in the 
course of the Fuquays' farm and ranch operations, other farm and ranch vehicle use, or simple 
pedestrian use, has been in common with, and without interference to or disruption of, the Kings' 
own use of that roadway, or without damage to that roadway or its bridges. As also stated in my 
earlier affidavit, the heavy truck traffic conducted by the Fuquay Plaintiffs on King Lane did not 
conunence until about 2011, and until the spring of2014 I had never seen the Fuquays operate fa1m 
equipment on King Lane. 
7. At no time prior to about 2011 did any of the Fuquay Plaintiffs ever overly assert or 
claim any right or use in respect to King Lane in derogation to the rights of the Kings, or that was 
in any way exclusive or proprietary, such that it was adverse to the rights of the Kings in that 
roadway. 
8. At no time prior to 2011 did any of the Fuquay Plaintiffs ever perform any act or 
make any declaration that would constitute a clear, open, and notorious assertion of a claim to an 
adverse and prescriptive right claim to the use of King Lane. 
9. It was only about in 2011 that the Fuquays did suddenly, and without explanation, 
attempt to drive large semi-trucks for commercial purposes which increased use began to damage 
a bridge at the east side of King Lane. It was at this time that a cement block placed at that location 
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e e 
which prevented further use of those trucks, and it was also at this time that the former wire gates 
were replaced with metal swing gates. 
10. As stated in my earlier affidavit, at no time prior to about 1988-89 could any large 
trucks use King Lane because the condition of the road and the welded-barrel culvert simple was not 
allow that use. 
11. Because any claim by the Fuquay Plaintiffs to a prescriptive easement based upon 
uses that commenced after 2006 would be subject to the 20 year statutory period for such easements, 
those uses could not ripen into an actual prescriptive easement claim at any time before 2026. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
Rose King 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
RONALD P. RAINEY, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am counsel for the Defendant and Counterclaimant, Heart K. Ranch Trust, in the 
above-captioned action, am over the age of majority, competent to testify, and I make this affidavit 
upon personal knowledge. 
2. Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is a copy of the cited testimony of J.C. 
Fuquay, John E. Fuquay and Clinton Ward Fuquay as given in open court on September 18, 2014 
during the preliminary injunction hearing. 
Fmther affiant sayeth not. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thisA'.'7/l day of January, 2015. 
blic for Idaho 
Residin at Caldwell, Idaho 
My Commission expires: 0,-tJ "i-19 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this £Oday of January, 2015,a true and coITect copy of the 
foregoing document was served upon the f~wing: 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
Fidelity National Law GROUP 
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620 
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2 A Tile'{ :an. 






A it dept:!rds an tr1e year. 
Q 1/./ell, what happens in an off ye,Jr then: 
A Weli, t:here·,; the ditc!1 that can wash ::JUt. 




; sa,d ther'i!·s a ditch chat can wash Gut. 
Ok.:3y. And --
1'.nd U1~1l:'i; · · Lh;1l'i, the only oi1r! I Cilfl think d. ;1l 
2 the moment. 














A Two years ago I want to say .Jnd we replaced the 
culvert. 
Q Okay. You got the culvert all replaced? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And so it's a fine road now? 
A Uh··huh. 
Q Is that a yes' 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. So again, the emergency vehicles can go 




And these dt!livery people can go up Castle Lnne 
84 

























Q And the mail person that delivers your mall right 
down at the bottom of Castle Lane and Oreana Loop. 
A Yes. 
Q So you have to go down the lane to get your mail. 
A Yes. 
Q And you do that at least once a day? 
A Can I say one thing? 
Q No. 
COURT: Wait until he asks you a question. 
WlTNESS: Okay. All right. 
COURT: Your attorney can follow up. 
vVITNESS: Ali right. 
IW MR. R1\INEY: 
Q All these services are available through C<1stle 
Lane; is that correct? 
A Yes, yes. 
Q And one more time, there's not one obstruction 
other than maybe a ditch washing out once in a while or a 
culvert? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q i\nd that only washes out when you don't clean out 
the debris, right? 







Q O!<av. -\r.,:: :c-1r:; happs::-Hic :nee sirice ·• 
A It's ~tapce~ ... _:.,j .1urre~cus times 1;ver ~~e ·,1ears. 
Q C!J you k:~ow th:J[ '.J11s ;ane frarT, the D·~ttom ::;f yoo..r 
5 hcG:,~ arownc! tht~ ccrn~r frcm vour house.: to C·re3r.a is K,n•Js 
6 priv:1t:: propert·("' 
7 A No, ! 'N:Jsn·~ aw;:;re of ct·,,Jt. It's al·.va·;s ::ie,::n :in 




































Q Yi:u di,::ri'~ k:,cw that :<lngs owned that pn::j:ertf' 
A I knev1 that thev ow112d the property on the north 
:;id,:. u/ t.11;:f: l.'1111 · 
Q You didn't know that they owned tt,e lane? 
A No. I dic:.J not. 1 always assumed it was an 
easement or private road -- or an access point to our 
property. It's never been disputed up until now. 
Q Well, have you ever interfered with the Kings' use 
of that lancP 
A No, l have not. 
Q Have you ever told lhern to get out? It's your 
l.ine. You're going to use it? 
A No, sir, I ha•,e not . 
Q Have you ever done anything that interrupted their 
use? And they being Kings. Hilve yoLJ ever done anything t.eo 
interrupt the l<ings' use of that 1.:ine? 
A No, sir, r have not. 
86 
Cl Do you know if anyone in yoLJr family has ever 
interrupted the Kings' use of that Ii.me? 
A Not to my recollection, no. 
Q And so bottom line is 11obody from your family, as 
far as you know, have ever hindered or interfered with tile 
Kings' m;e or t11at lane we're -- in the pleadings, it's 
cal!ed King's Lane. Do l need to rephrase that again? 
A Yeal1 1 go ahead. Yeah. 
Q Cm you recall anybody in your family, you, your 
brother, fol:hcr, that's interrered wilh Kings· use of that 
lane called l<inus· Lane? 
A Between my house and their hcuses? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q Sa ·- and you don't know wllo pays the t.ixe~; nn 1·11i1l 
lane l take it7 
A No, J do not. 
Q You don't7 
A No, sir, 
Q Now, the gates you're talking .:ibout, have you ever· 
looked at those gates? 
A Which gates? 
Q The new gates. 











Q Have you c:ver 0~;11C:?d the new gales? ________ ...! 





A I don't know. I've never seen them locked. 
Q So you haven't gone back there since the 
conversation? 
A Since I went back through there, the gates have 
been -- I've been gone for the last month so I mean he put 
the cattle in there and I assume he opened the gates back 
up and there's not been an issue. 
Q Well, let's make the record clear, Mr. Fuquay. The 
Kings use that lane to graze cattle and to actually corral 
the cattle too, don't they? 
A Yeah. I don't know what they -- yeah, sure. They 
graze it. 
Q Okay. But they use it kind of as a holding pen 
then? 
e 
1 some of these. 
2 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
3 QUESTIONS BY MR. FARRIS: 
4 Q Mr. Fuquay, my name Is Bryce Farris and I represent 
5 the Lows. 
6 A Okay. 
7 Q You've been talking about this roadway that they've 
8 referred to or referred to as Castle Lane and from what I 
9 understand is that lane comes off Oreana Loop up to your 
10 property? If you'd look at probably Exhibit 3 if you have 
11 lt in front of you. 
12 A Okay. 
13 Q You see where there's an arrow that says Castle 
14 Lane? 
as A I don't know what -- I don't know about that but -- 15 A Yeah. 
""6 Q Well, there's cattle In there. 16 Q That Castle Lane originates at Oreana Loop further 
17 A Yep. 17 to the south of the area of your property? 
8 Q There's cattle in there an awful lot of the year, 18 A Correct. 
isn't that correct? 19 Q That's the road you've been talking about and it 
A Sometimes, yeah. 20 comes up, goes through your property? 
Q Okay. And they also -- Kings use that road to get 21 A Correct. 
to their fields, don't they? 22 Q And then goes up to the property that you've --
A Correct. 23 that someone's Identified as Clint Fuquay? 
Q They've used that road ever since you've lived in 24 A Correct. 
125 that property. 25 Q Okay. With respect to that Castle Lane, from what 
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2 Q And never have you tried to kick the Kings off the 2 mailbox is currently'? 
'3 property, have you, off the road? 3 A Currently, yes. 
. 4 A Not that I recall. 4 Q Okay. That's your address? 
I 5 Q Well, you never have, have you? 5 A Yes. 16 A Not that I recall, no. 
~
·. 7: Q So in other words, you've never interfered with the 
Kings using their own property, have you? 
A Other than the gates. 
l·,10 Q Pardon me? l .. 1
2 
A Other than the issue with the gates. 
.. Q Well, they put up gates. Particularly when they 









Q Okay. Now, you can't tell Judge Nye whether it's 
easier to open the metal gate than to put the wire over the 
posts with the loop, can you? 
A I've not opened them metal gates. I haven't been 
f10 through there since. 





COURT: Mr. Farris. 
MR. FARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try not 
25 to be redundant. Let me see if I can put a fine point on 
37 
.i/22/2014 11:13:04 AM 
6 Q That's where Schwann's or other delivery folks 




Q Okay. Currently. As we sit here today. And if 
10 you'd look at Exhibit 1, do you have that In front of you? 
11 A This one? 
12 Q Yes, yeah. 
13 COURT: Oh, I've got It. It's this one here. 
14 Yeah. 
15 WITNESS: Okay. 
16 BY MR. FARRIS: 
17 Q You see where at the top of that it says "map 
18 address" and it says 18907 Castle Lane? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q That's your address? 
21 A Correct. 
22 Q So that's -- If you want to put in your address to 
23 find your property, that's the address you put in, Castle 
24 Lane? 
25 A Correct. 
39 
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1 ,A Sure. 1 Q So It's just a matter of convenience for you -- I 2 Q Coming up Castle Lane, that's a straight shot 2 A Yes. 
3 without stopping for anything, correct? 3 Q -- to go through the Kings'? 
4 A Yes. 4 A Yes. I 5 Q Now, when did you get your driver's license? 5 Q Only convenience. That's the only reason. 
6 A When I was 15. 6 A It's quicker. 
7 Q And so you say you're 27 now. 7 Q Could be? I 
8 A Yes. 8 A It's quicker. 
9 Q So that's twelve years ago? 9 Q It's quicker. Well, that's what I'm calling 
I 10 A Yes. 10 convenience. 
11 Q And six of those twelve years you lived somewhere 11 A It's easier, yes. 
12 else. 12 Q Okay. So you want to use King's Lane just because 
I 13 A Yes. 13 It's convenient. 
14 Q So you've only been on this property for six years. 14 A Because that's what I've always used. 
15 A No. Eight. Since I was 19. 15 Q You don't claim any right to It, do you? I 16 Q Can you give me the years when you were gone, from 16 A What's that? 
17 when to when? 17 Q You don't claim any right to King's Lane, do you? 
18 A I would say from 2001 to 2005. 18 A I've been using it so I just always assumed that I I 19 Q Well, that's five years. 19 could. 
20 A Four. I don't remember when in 2001. Moved back 20 Q Have you ever excluded the Kings from using that 
21 the summer of 2005. 21 lane? I 22 Q When you got your driver's license, you were gone. 22 A No. 
23 You didn't even live on that property. 23 Q Have you ever told them to get off? 
I 24 A I stayed there on the weekends. 24 A No. 
25 Q Other than weekends but you didn't Jive there on a 25 Q Have you ever told them that they couldn't use It 
64 66 
I 1 day-to-day basis. 1 If you're using It? 
2 A Correct. 2 A No. 
3 Q You were not watching the Kings' operation on a 3 Q So in a way, have you interfered with the Kings? I 4 day-to-day basis. 4 A No. 
5 A Correct. 5 Q Have you given them any hassle about when you use 
6 Q In fact, you've never watched Kings on a day-to- 6 the lane? 
7 day -- 7 A No. 
8 A Correct. 8 Q Okay. 
9 Q Is that right? 9 MR. FARRIS: Your Honor, I don't have anything to 
10 A Correct. 10 add. 
11 Q Just occasionally seeing what's going on, right? 11 COURT: Okay. Thank you. Redirect. 
12 A Correct. 12 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
13 Q So when you say that they've never had cattle in 13 QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
14 there, you don't know, do you? 14 Q You indicated that Castle Lane Is what Mr. Rainey 
15 A What are you talking about? 15 calls an all-weather road? 
16 Q Well, there's periods of times you said they never 16 A Yes. 
17 had cattle and never locked gates. You don't know because 17 Q Is that -- who maintains that road? 
18 you're not there on a day-to-day basis, are you? 18 A We do. 
19 A I drive that road on a day-to-day basis but In that 19 Q Do you maintain King Lane? 
20 time, I wasn't there on a day-to-day basis so at that time, 20 A Yes. 
21 I can't say what they did on a day-to-day basis. 21 Q How do you maintain it? 
22 Q Okay. And Is there any reason you don't go down -- 22 A We've bladed it with a road grader and a land 
23 when you're driving, you don't go down to Oreana through 23 plane. 
24 Castle Lane? 24 Q What else? 
25 A It's quicker to get where I'm going going that way. 25 A We've -- a backhoe. FIiied In potholes with a Ill 
65 67 
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COMES NOW the Defendant, HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA., acting by its Tmstee, 
GILBERT KING and ROSE KING, by and through their counsel ofrecord, RONALD P. RAINEY, 
and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56 submits this MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. This motion 
is supported by the accompanying affidavits of Rose King, Gilbert King, and Ronald P. Rainey, and 
the prior affidavits submitted in this action by Rose King and Gilbert King, which are of record, and 
by the supporting memorandum on this motion for summary judgment. 
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I. 
STATUS OF THE CASE 
This action seeking the declaration of a prescriptive easement on King Lane was commenced 
by a complaint filed by the Fuquay Plaintiffs on August 11, 2014. The Heart K Ranch Defendants 
filed an answer denying the requested relief, and counterclaiming for declaratory relief as to the 
scope of pe1missive use on King Lane, requesting permanent injunctive relief, and quiet title. 
On Thursday September 4, 2014 the Fuquay Plaintiffs requested, and on the next day, Friday 
September 5, 2014, this Court granted, a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), as based upon 
uncontested affidavits submitted in support of that motion. The matter went to hearing on September 
18, 2014 on Plaintiffs' request for entry of a preliminary injunction, which the Court denied by an 
order entered on September 29, 2014, with a limited exception for emergency vehicles. 
The Fuquay Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the Low 
Defendants only on October 29, 2014, which motion was withdrawn on December 17, 2014. 
As based upon the testimony provided in open court at the September 18, 2014 hearing on 
the motion for preliminary injunction and the prior affidavits which have been submitted by the 
paiiies in this action, ai1d it now appearing that the Fuquay Plaintiffs caimot sustain the necessary 
evidence to prevail on ai1 essential element of their prescriptive easement claim, the King Defendants 




The maps attached to the Affidavit of Gilbert King previously submitted concerning the 
motion for preliminary injunction clearly illustrate the current conditions on the ground in the area 
of alleged dispute. King Lane is a private road located entirely upon private lai1d that is about one 
half mile in length. It roughly runs in an east-west direction from the Oreana Loop Road until it 
connects with Castle Lane, which itself then proceeds on to the south where it connects to the public 
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Oreana Loop Road. Recent increased use of Kings Lane by the Plaintiffs by large commercial 
trucks, including loaded logging trucks, is rapidly degrading a bridge that was never designed to bear 
such loads. 
Perhaps of even greater significance is the fact that Heart King Ranch conducts its livestock 
operations on, and about King Lane, and actually "grazes-out" King Lane itself, which requires a 
respectful use of that roadway, and the gates at each end of the roadway, which prevents the Heart 
King Ranch livestock from leaving its property, and also restricts livestock owned by others from 
entering the Heart King Ranch property. The state of Idaho - and especially Owyhee county -
remains "open range" country. See e.g., Greer v. Ellsworth, 113 Idaho 979, 751 P.2d 675 
(Ct.App.1988) (discussing "open range" in the area of Oreana in Owyhee County). In Maguire v. 
Yanke, 99 Idaho 829, 590 P.2d 85 (1978) the Idaho Supreme Court briefly explained the history of 
open range in Idaho: 
Western cattle states generally rejected the common law, holding that 
livestock roaming at large connnitted no trespass when they strayed on unenclosed 
private land. [footnote 1 omitted] See Scott, The Range Cattle Industry: Its Effect 
on Western Land Law, 28 Mont.L.Rev. 155 (1967). Idaho, concurring with the 
approach of its neighboring states, also rejected the common law rule. Kelly v. 
Easton, 35 Idaho 340,207 P. 129 (1922); Johnson v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., 7 
Idaho 355, 63 P. 112 (1900). The Idaho rule was stated as follows: "The 
common-law rule that every man must confine his own cattle to his own land does 
not obtain in this state, and in Strong v. Brown, 26 Idaho 1, 140 P. 773, 52 
L.R.A.,N.S., 140, Ann.Cas. 1916E, 482, itis held that under our statute (C.S., c. 82), 
if a landowner fails to fence out cattle lawfullv at large, he may not recover for 
loss caused by such livestock straying upon his unenclosed land." Kelly v. 
Easton, 35 Idaho at 344, 207 P. at 130 (citations omitted). However, one who 
willfully and deliberately drives his stock upon the lands of another, whether 
enclosed or unenclosed and grazes them upon such land without the permission of 
the owner, is liable in damages for the trespass. Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81, 14 
S.Ct. 477, 38 L.Ed. 363 (1894); Swanson v. Groal, 12 Idaho 148, 85 P. 384 (1906). 
99 Idaho at 832, 590 P.2d at 88 (bracketed reference to, "footnote 1 omitted," added; emphasis 
added). See also, I.C. § 25-2118 (""Open range' means all uninclosed lands outside of cities, 
villages and herd districts, upon which cattle by custom, license, lease, or pennit, are grazed or 
permitted to roam."). 
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So long as neighbors located on "open range" remain on good terms, it is possible for that 
open range to be shared on fair terms. But when these friendly and accommodating arrangements 
between neighbors break down, then fences, gates, and even locks become necessary. In this case, 
as already mentioned above, the Heart King Ranch periodically grazes-off the area encompassed 
within King Lane. Reasonable means are therefore required to keep the Heart King Ranch livestock 
on its own property, and the livestock of adjoining landowners off the property of the Heart King 
Ranch. Consequently, gates and fences are necessary, and must be respected to accomplish this 
purpose in an area of open range. 
As the additional affidavits that have been submitted in support of this motion for swnmary 
judgment and the earlier motions filed in this case by Rose King and Gilbert King amply illustrate, 
King Lane itself was in such a state of development that it could not sustain the decree of use that 
the Fuquay Plaintiffs claim at any time prior to 1988-89. Although arguably the Court could 
conclude that there remain genuine issues of material fact that would preclude entry of summary 
judgment as between the parties as to their contested issues of use of the road, there appears to be 
no contested genuine issue of fact in this case, as to any act or conduct by the Fuquay Plaintiffs that 
would have placed any of the named defendants in this action on notice of adverse prescriptive use 
claim made by the Fuquay Plaintiffs to King Lane. Therefore, it appears that this action is ripe for 
summary judgment. 
III. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid useless trials. Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 
3 3 7, 340-41, 563 P.2d 395, 398-99 ( 1977). The party moving for summary judgment initially carries 
the burden to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,404,848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App. 
1992). The court must detennine whether the moving party has shown that there is a lack of any 
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genuine issue of material fact as to each issue raised by the motion for summary judgment. Coghlan 
v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,401,987 P.2d 300,313 (1999). TI1is burden maybe met 
by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to 
prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 31 l, 882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct.App.1994). Such an 
absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing that is accomplished with 
the moving patty's own evidence, or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence in view of 
the contention that such evidence fails to establish a required element of the non-moving party's 
claim. Heath v. Honker's lvfini-Mart, h1c., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App.2000). 
Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the party 
opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discove1y responses or by affidavits, that there 
is indeed a genuine issue for trial, or if the non-moving party is able to offer a valid justification for 
the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). "The nonmoving party cannot rely on mere speculation, and a 
scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of mateiial fact." Bollinger v. Fall River 
Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632,637, 272 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2012). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
The Fuquay Plaintiffs' Claim Of A Prescriptive Easement To King Lane Fails For Lack Of 
Clear And Convincing Evidence Of An Adverse Claim Of Right With The Actual Or Imputed 
Knowledge Of The Servient Landowners For The Required Prescriptive Period Of Time 
Easements by prescription are not favored under Idaho law. Lorangv. Hunt, l 07 Idaho 802, 
803, 693 P .2d 448, 449 ( 1984 ). A plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence each of 
the five required elements necessat)' to establish a prescriptive easement as declared by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 700,963 P.2d 383 (1998): 
To establish an easement by prescription, the claimant must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: ( 1) open 
and notorious; (2) continuous and uninte1TUpted; (3) adverse and under a claim of 
right; ( 4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement 
(5) for the statutory period. See I.C. § 5-203; Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 173, 
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16 P.3d 263, 270 (2000). Each element is essential to the claim, and the trial 
court must make findings relevant to each element in order to sustain a 
judement on appeal. 
139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973 (emphasis added). The 2003 Idaho Civil Jury Instructions define 
the "clear and convincing" standard of proof as follows: 
When I say a pa1iy has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and 
convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that 
such proposition is true. This is a higher burden than the general burden that the 
proposition is more probably true than not true. 
IDJI 1.20.2 (underlined emphasis added). See also, In re Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 
P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006) (Clear and convincing evidence, "is generally understood to require 
' [ e ]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.'"). 
Because the burden of proof at trial to establish a prescriptive easement by clear and 
convincing evidence is placed upon the Fuquay plaintiffs as to each element of their claim, on this 
motion for sunnnary judgment the defendants need only establish that the Fuquay plaintiffs cannot 
establish material facts on any single essential element of their prescriptive easement claim in order 
to prevail on this motion for summary judgment. This standard of proof on summary judgment was 
declared as follows by the Idaho Supreme Court in Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 
(1999): 
Where the non-moving pruiy will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party's 
burden may be satisfied by showing the absence of material fact with regard to any 
essential element of the non-moving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The absence of a genuine issue 
of fact with regard to an essential element of the plaintiffs claim renders any other 
potential issues of fact irrelevant. Once the absence of sufficient evidence on an 
element has been shown, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact. The nonmoving party crurnot merely rely upon its 
pleadings, but must produce affidavits, depositions, or other evidence establishing 
an issue of material fact. R.G. Nelson, A.LA. v. Steer, l l8 ldal10 409,410, 797 P.2d 
117, 118 (1990). The norunoving party need not submit evidence on every element 
upon which it will beru· the burden at trial, but only those elements about which the 
moving party successfully carried its burden. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc. 126 
ldal10 527, 887 P.2d 1034 (1995). 
132 Idaho at 810-11, 979 P.2d at 1168-69. 
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The Fuquay plaintiffs have argued that they have established a prescriptive easement over 
King Lane at various times during the period of time during which the five year prescriptive use 
prevailed prior to the change in the period of time to twenty years in 2006. On this motion for 
summary judgment the King Defendants argue that all times during this time (prior to 2006), any use 
by the Fuquay plaintiffs or their predecessors, was use in common with the Kings and Lows that in 
no way inte1fered with their use of King Lane and therefore under Idaho law was deemed 
permissive and could not be prescriptive. This rebuts elements three and four (adverse use that 
is known to the servient landowner) making any prescriptive claim during this period impossible. 
The fact that the Fuquay plaintiffs may have used King Lane in a manner that has in fact interfered 
with the King and Low Defendants use of the road after 2006 (e.g., use by large trucks commencing 
in 2011) places that use within the twenty year prescriptive period, which use cannot mature into any 
prescriptive right until at least 2026. 
In Chenw. Conway, 116Idaho 901, 781 P.2d 238 (Ct.App.1989), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
provided the following summary of the essential characteristics of prescriptive easements, including 
that conduct which is deemed pennissive use: 
The law in this state regarding prescriptive easements is well settled and was 
thoroughly summarized in Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idal10 40 I, 404, 724 P .2d 13 7, 140 
(Ct.App.1986): 
A claimant, in order to acquire a prescriptive easement in Idaho, must 
present reasonably clear and convincing evidence of open, notorious, 
continuous, uninten-upted use, under a claim of right, with the knowledge of 
the owner of the servient estate for the prescriptive period. State ex rel. 
Hamanv. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 594P.2d 1093 (1979); Westv. Smith, 95 Idaho 
550,511 P.2d 1326 (1973); Kauppv. CityofHailey, 110 Idaho 337, 715 P.2d 
1007 (Ct.App.1986). The prescriptive period in Idaho is five years. I.C. § 5-
203. A prescriptive right cannot be obtained if use of the servient estate is by 
permission of the owner. State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, supra. 
The general rule in Idaho is: 
[P]roof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
claimed right for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to ho-w the use 
began, raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of 
right. The burden is then on the owner of the servient tenement to show that 
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the use was penuissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. 
[Quoting Westv. Smith, 95 Idaho at 557,511 P.2dat 1333; emphasis added.] 
In Melendez, we noted that two exceptions have been recoe9ized to the 
general rule stated in West. One of these exceptions is found in Simmons v. 
Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941). There, the Supreme Court 
said: 
The rule would seem to be that where the owner of real prope1ty 
constructs a way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use 
thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be 
presumed to be by way of license or permission. 
A1elendez goes on to explain this variation in the general rule where a roadway, 
established and maintained by the owner of the servient tenement, is jointly used by 
the owner and others: 
Understanding the basis for the Simmons rule helps to detennine the limits 
of its application. There should be no presumption that the use originated 
adversely to the owner unless the use itself constitutes some invasion or 
infringement upon the rights of an owner. Where one person merely uses 
a roadway in common with his neighbor, without dama1:e to the 
roadway, without interfering with the neighbor's use of the roadway, 
and where the neighbor has established and maintained the roadway on 
his own propertv for his own purposes, only the most minimal intrusion 
is made into the owner's dominion over his property. Logically, a use 
which is not in fact adverse to the owner provides no basis for the 
presumption that the use is adverse. However, where the use made of the 
property for the prescriptive period is shown to constitute some infringement 
or invasion of the owner's rights, it is more appropriate to apply the general 
rule, presuming the use to be adverse, that is, without permission of the 
owner. 
111 Idaho at 405, 724 P.2d at 141. 
116 Idaho at 903, 781 P .2d at 240 ( emphasis added). 
As the Idaho Supreme Court quite recently observed in, HF.LP., LLC v. The City o.fTwin 
Falls, 2014 WL 6865494 at *8, 14.22 ISCR 45, 54 (December 8, 2014) "Moreover, if the 
presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the presumption continues until a hostile 
and adverse use is clearly manifested and 'brought home' to the servient property owner. Backman 
v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,398,210 PJd 75, 83 (2009); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789, 792, 
537 P.2d 631,634 (1975)." The presumption ofpennissive use in common with the Defendant 
Kings and Lows applies in this case, and there is no evidence that any hostile or adverse use contrary 
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to that pemrissive use was ever "brought home" to the Kings, as was testified to by J.C. Fuquay at 
the preliminary injunction hearing in September 2014: 
Q. Do you know that this lane from the bottom of your house around the 
corner from your house to Oreana is Kings' private property? 
A. No, I wasn't aware of that. It's always been an open lane since I've 
been around. 
Q. You didn't know that Kings owned that property? 
A. I knew that they owned the property on the north side of that lane. 
Q. You didn't know that they owned the lane? 
A. No. I did not. I always assumed it was an easement or private road -






Well, have you ever interfered with the Kings' use of that land? 
No, I have not. 
Have you ever told them to get out? It's your lane. You're going to 
No, sir, I have not. 
Q. Have you ever done anything that inte1rupted their use? And they 
being Kings. Have you ever done anything to interrupt the Kings' use of that lane? 
A. No, sir, I have not. 
Q. Do you know if anyone in your family has ever interrupted the Kings 
use of that lane? 
A. Not to my recollection, no. 
Q. And so bottom line is nobody from your family, as far as you know, 
have ever hindered or interfered with the Kings' use of that lane we're - - in the 
pleadings, it's called King's Lane. Do I need to rephrase that again? 
A. Yeah, go ahead. Yeah. 
Q. Can you recall anybody in your family, you, your brother, father, that's 
interfered with Kings' use of that lane called Kings Lane? 
A. Between my house and their houses? 
Q. Yes. 
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A. No. 
Preliminary Injunction Tr., pg. 86, L., 4 to pg. 87, L. 14. (as attached to the Affidavit of Ronald P. 
Rainey). 
John E. Fuquay and Clinton Ward Fuquay have also acknowledged that they did not interfere 
with King's use of the fa.1111 lane known as King Lane. John E. Fuquay's testimony is recorded in 
the Preliminary Injunction Tr., pg. 36, L., 21-25 and pg.37, L., 1-15 and Clinton Ward Fuquay's 
testimony is recorded at pg. 66, L, l 8-25 and pg. 67 L. I -7. 
The fourth element required to establish a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing 
evidence is that the claim is made, "with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the 
servient tenement," it is closely related to the "open and notorious use" third element, and requires 
proof that the servient landowner had actual knowledge of the claimed prescriptive use, or that the 
use was of such a character that upon reasonable inquiry that the servient landowner ought to have 
known that such a prescriptive use existed. See e.g., Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 173, 16 P.3d 
263, 270 (2000) ("The open and notorious use must rise to the level reasonably expected to provide 
notice of the adverse use to the servient landowner maintaining a reasonable degree of supervision 
over his premises.). This fourth requirement was further addressed by the Ida110 Court of Appeals 
in Hall v. Strawn, 108 ldal10 111, 697 P.2d 451 (Ct.App.1985): 
The trial court found that prior to 1981, Hall's use of Strawn's roadway was "not of 
such character as to give defendant notice of any adverse claime [sic] thereto by 
plaintiff." On appeal, Hall asserts that the trial court erred in requiring him to 
affirmatively prove that Strawn had knowledge of his use of the Police Cabin Road 
under a claim of right. He argues that his open and notorious use of the roadway for 
longer than the prescriptive period was sufficient to charge Strawn with knowledge 
of his claim. We recognize that a person is charged with knowledge of the status and 
condition of his or her land, and that, in the usual case, where a claimant succeeds in 
establishing open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted use under a claim of right 
for the statutory period, knowledge of the owner may be presumed. See 2 G. 
Thompson, Commentaries on the Modem Law of Real Property,§ 341, at 194-95 
(1980 Replacement); Sanchez v. Dale Bellamah Homes of New Mexico, h1c., 76 N.M. 
526,417 P.2d 25 (1966); Jurgensen v. Ainscow, 155 Neb. 701, 53 N.W.2d 196 
(1952); 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses§ 61, at 470. However, mere use 
alone is insufficient to establish an easement. The use must also be exclusive in 
the sense that it is proprietary in nature and exercised independently of the 
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rights of all others. Thompson, supra, at 195. 
In the present case, Strawn testified that, with her permission, the Association 
and several of her neighbors used the road in question. Hall, himself, testified that 
he thought he was using a public road. Where, as here, the same degree of use upon 
which the adverse claim is based has been exercised indiscriminately by the general 
public, individual acquisition of a prescriptive easement has generally been held 
impossible. Annot., 11 I A.L.R. 221 (1937). In such a case, the claimant must 
perform some act whereby the adverse nature of the claim is clearly indicated 
to the owner of the servient estate. Id. 
The case at bar is analogous to Cusic v. Givens, 70 Idaho 229,215 P.2d 297 
(1950). In Cusic the plaintiffs sued to establish a prescriptive easement over a road 
crossing the defendant's property. The road had been opened by a Mr. Duffy, the 
defendant's predecessor. In rejecting plaintiff's claim our Supreme Court stated: 
The record shows that the road was laid out and established by Mr. Duffy, for 
his own use, prior to the sale to McMullen. Through the years following 
it was used by the owners and by all who had occasion to go to either of 
the adjacent farms, by the ditch rider, the milk trucker, hay buyers and 
the occupants of the farms in their farming operations. This use was 
entirely permissive. Mr. Duffy made no obiection. There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that any user claimed an adverse right. Mr. Morgan, a 
predecessor of plaintiff's in the ownership and occupation of the west eighty, 
and who fam1ed that land in 193 9, 1940 and 1941, said he used it because he 
thought it was a public road. The plaint("f}.' Cusic himself. testified he thought 
ii ·was a county road and that the county oi1111ed it. A prescriptive right 
cannot be acquired by such use. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.] 
Id. at 231. 215 P .2d at 298. We agree with the trial court that the appellant did not 
demonstrate that his use of the Police Cabin Road was of such character as to give 
respondent notice of his adverse claim. 
108 Idaho at 112-13, 697 P.2d at452-53 (Italicized emphasis in original, underlined-bold emphasis 
added). This requirement was further addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Anderson v. Larsen, 
136 Idaho 402, 34 P.3d 1085 (2001): 
In order to establish a private prescriptive easement, a claimant must present 
reasonably clear and convincing proof of open, notorious, continuous, and 
uninten-upted use under a claim of right and with the knowledge of the owner of the 
servient tenement for the prescriptive period of five years. See I.C. s 5-203; Baxter, 
135 Idaho at 172, 16 P.3d at270; Westv. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,511 P.2d 1326 (1973). 
The purpose of the requirement that prescriptive use be open and notorious is 
to give the owner of the servient tenement knowledge and opportunity to assert 
his rights against the development of an easement by prescription. The open 
and notorious use must rise to the level reasonably expected to provide notice 
of the adverse use to a servient landowner maintaining a reasonable degree of 
supervision over his premises. See Kaupp v. City of Hailey, 110 Idaho 337, 340, 
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715 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Ct.App.1986). 
136 Idaho at 406, 34 P.3d at 1089 (emphasis added). See also, Halvorson v. North Latah County 
Highway Dist., 151 Idaho 196, 204, 254 P .3d 497, 505 (2011) ( citing Anderson on the "open and 
notorious use" issue). 
The affidavits of Rose and Gilbert King, as submitted in support of this motion establishing 
that at no time prior to 2011 did the Fuquay Plaintiffs engage in any use of King Lane that was not 
considered, as described under the standard of lvfelendez and Chen decisions set out above, as not 
simply being in common with the Kings and Lows, and in no way interfering with their use of King 
Lane. It was only when the persistent use of the very large trucks began sometime in 2011, or 
thereafter, that any inte1ference or damage to the road and its bridge began. Any alleged adverse or 
prescriptive use which commenced at that time would be subject to the twenty year prescriptive use 
period which went into effect in 2006, and would not yet have ripened into a prescriptive right. With 
all use prior to that time being by implied permission, no prescriptive use right arose under the 
previous five year statute either. Therefore, in the absence any facts that can establish the required 
adverse use, an essential element of the Fuquay Plaintiffs' prescriptive easement claim fails, 




Under the standard that the absence of a genuine issue of fact with regard to an essential 
element of the plaintiffs claim renders all other potential issues of fact irrelevant. the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their prescriptive easement claim to King Lane due to an absence of any 
evidence in support of ru1 open and notorious adverse claim known to either the Kings or the Lows 
that would have put the Kings or the Lows on notice of that prescriptive use easement claim. In the 
absence of this essential element of the Fuquay plaintiffs' claim, all other issues of fact are rendered 
irrelevant, and entry of summary judgment for the defendant on the Fuquay Plaintiffs' prescriptive 
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easement claim is appropriate. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD Case No. CV-2014-0278 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY; 
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vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. 
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 




RESPONSE TO KINGS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendants, Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Low"), by and through their attorneys of record, Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC, and hereby submits 
this response to the motion for summary judgment submitted by Defendant Heart K Ranch 
(hereinafter "King"). 
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On or about January 29, 2015, King's submitted a Motion for Swnmary Judgment along with 
a supporting memorandum and supporting affidavits which seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims for 
a prescriptive easement because Plaintiffs have failed to establish the requisite elements. Low 
respond to the Kings' motion by supporting it. The Lows previously submitted affidavits and a 
memorandum in response to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, which was subsequently 
withdrawn by Plaintiffs, but the arguments in support of King's motion are similar to those made 
by the Lows. Thus, the Lows support the King's motion and contend that if such a motion is 
granted then Lows reserve the right to bring their own motion dismissing the claims against the Lows 
based upon similar grounds that Plaintiffs cannot establish the necessary elements for a prescriptive 
easement. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs have not established the ownership of the land where the roadway 
(King Lane) is located and thus if summary judgment is granted to King then it should also be 
granted to Low. Moreover, to the extent summary judgment is granted to King and King own any 
portion of the roadway referred to as "King Lane" then Plaintiffs would not have an easement for 
the roadway from Oreana Loop to their property. Put another way, once one link of the chain is 
broken then there is no easement and any easement across the property of Low would be moot or 
useless to Plaintiffs because it does not create an access easement from their property to Oreana 
Loop. Accordingly, Low not only support the King's motion for summary judgment but reserve 
the right to seek summary judgment/dismissal of Plaintiffs' action against the Lows if it grants 
swnmary judgment to the Kings. 
DATED this,l#1ay of February, 2015. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-14-0278 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO HEART K 
RANCH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
I. BACKGROUND 
This is a case where Plaintiffs are seeking judicial confirmation of their prescriptive 
easement rights over the defendants' properties. The defendants have installed gates to 
prevent Plaintiffs from accessing their homes, even though Plaintiffs' prescriptive rights were 
established years ago. 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to their prescriptive easement claims 
against the Lows in in October 2014. In November 2014, the Lows responded to the motion 
and submitted an affidavit from Rose King that clearly created disputed issues of fact. In 
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December 2014, Plaintiffs withdrew their Motion and canceled the hearing because it was 
obvious from the declarations filed with the court that there were disputed issues of material 
fact that would require the Court to deny Plaintiffs' motion. 
Heart K Ranch has now filed its own motion for Summary Judgment, notwithstanding that 
Rose King's testimony created the disputed issues of fact in the first place. None of the facts 
have changed, and the disputed testimony before the Court requires the Court to deny any 
party's motion for summary judgment. 
II. LEGALSTANDARDS 
A. Summary Judgment 
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all facts and inferences from the 
record in favor of the non-moving party and the moving party has the burden of proving the 
absence of genuine issues of material fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 
165, 168 (1997). Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach 
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian 
Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,718,918 P.2d 583,587 (1996). 
B. Prescriptive Easement 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription "must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open 
and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4) 
with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the 
statutory period." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). 
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Once the claimant presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began, he 
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Wood v. Hoglund. 
131 Idaho 700, 702---03, 963 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair. 130 Idaho 675, 680, 
946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to 
show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. 
Wood. 131 Idaho at 703, 963 P.2d at 386; Marshall. 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. The 
nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property." 
Hodgins. 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 975. The state of mind of the users of the alleged 
easement is not controlling; the focus is on the nature of their use. Id at 231-32, 76 P.3d at 
975-76. Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293,303, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005). 
III. DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
A. Testimony Before the Court 
There are numerous declarations and affidavits before the Court. For the court's 
convenience, they are compiled and submitted with this response. They include: 
• Declaration of Raymond Jayo dated August 27, 2014 
• Declaration of John Fuquay dated August 27, 2014 
• Affidavit of Rose King dated September 9, 2014 
• Affidavit of Susie Low dated September 15, 2014 
• Affidavit of Gilbert King dated September 8, 2014 
• Declaration of Denise Collett dated September 9, 2014 
• Declaration of Scott Snyder dated September 17, 2014 
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• Declaration of Seth Thomas dated September 16, 2014 
• Declaration of Schwann Delivery Person dated September 12, 2014 
• Declaration of John Fuquay dated October_, 2014 
• Affidavit of Rose King dated December 4, 2014 
• Affidavit of Samuel Steiner dated November 10, 2014 
• Affidavit of Ron Rainey dated January 29, 2015 
• Affidavit of Rose King dated January_, 2015 (unsigned) 
• Affidavit of Gilbert King dated January_ 2015 
In addition to the testimony, there are numerous exhibits and public records for the court 
to consider. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Disputed Facts Preclude Summary Judgment 
In order for this court to grant Heart K Ranch summary judgment, the Court would have 
to review all of the declarations and affidavits on record and made a determination that there 
are no disputed facts and that Heart K Ranch will prevail as a matter of law. That ruling is 
impossible in this case. As the testimony shows, historical use of the roadway is not only 
disputed, it is hotly disputed. 
Heart K Ranch invites the court to weigh the testimony and find that Rose King and 
Gilbert King's declarations outweigh contrary declarations. Heart K argues that the court 
should weigh whether the evidence is "clear and convincing." Weighing evidence or testing 
credibility of witnesses is impermissible on a motion for summary judgment. For summary 
judgment, the court must find that that there are no disputed issue of material facts and that 
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only legal issues remain. The court must also grant all reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
the facts to the Plaintiffs. When the Court applies the proper standard here, the court cannot 
grant summary judgment. 
The following table shows some of the material facts that are disputed: 
Name Testimony 
Raymond Jayo Used King Lane to access 
Plaintiffs properties for over 5 
years 




Susie Low King Lane has always been 
gated 
John Fuquay 
Gilbert King Fuquay' s use of King Lane has 
been permissive 
John Fuquay 
Gilbert King Fuquays have no right to use 
King Lane 
John Fuquay 
Scott Snyder Fuquays said they would 
refuse to close gates 
John Fuquay 
Seth Thomas Graze cattle on adjacent land 
and need gates closed 
John Fuquay 
Shawn Drew Gates prevented him from 
delivering to Fuquay 
residences 
John Fuquay 
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Disputed Testimony 
Children used King Lane to 
get to school 
Her children used King Lane 
to get to school 
King Lane was never gated 
until the last few years 
Use of King Lane has always 
been without permission 
Fuquays have always used 
King Lane and have 
prescriptive rights 
Fuquays did not close gates 
over the road 
Cattle are only occasionally 
grazed in the area 
Deliveries were made until 
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John Fuquay Plaintiffs began using King 
Lane in 1977 
Rose King 
John Fuquay Fuquay family and guests used 
King Lane since 1977 
Rose King 
John Fuquay James Fuquay used King Lane 
for access for large semi trucks 
and cattle trucks since 1977. 
Rose King 
John Fuquay Operated John Fuquay 
trucking company and used 
King Lane regularly for trucks 
Rose King 
Rose King 
Samuel Steiner Fuquays used King Lane for a 
short cut. 
John Fuquay Used King Lane on a near-
daily basis for residential 
purposes 
Rose King 
John Fuquay Used King Lane without 
permission from Steiners 
Samuel Steiner 
Samuel Steiner Zane Block and Jim Fuquay 
did work on King Lane 
Rose King 
Rose King "I have reviewed the 
Declaration of John Fuquay 
dated October 28, 2014. The 
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the gates were locked at the 
inception of this litigation 
Fuquay did not start to use 
King Lane in 1977 
Fuquay family and guests 
always used Castle Lane but 
not King Lane 
Fuquays did not use King 
Lane for large trucks until 
2011 
Fuquays did not use King 
Lane for large trucks for 
business until 2011 
Fuquays could not use King 
Lane prior to 1988-89 when 
they replaced the culvert. 
Fuquays did not use King 
Lane for residential purposes 
Steiners did not object to 
anyone using King Lane 
Fuquays have never 
maintained King Lane 
* *This statement alone shows 
that there is a disputed issue 
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statements set forth by Mr. of fact 
Fuquay in his declaration are 
inaccurate ... " 
Rose King Between 1979-1982 King Lane 
was impassable 90% of the 
time 
John Fuquay Used King Lane since 1977. 
Rose King The Fuquays have always 
respected the gates 
Rose King The Fuquays have refused to 
close the gates 
Rose King The Fuquays have damaged 
the roadway 
In short, it is clear that there are disputed issues of material fact in this case and summary 
judgment cannot be granted. As the Lows argued in their objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment in November 2014: 
"There are numerous material issues of fact .... More specifically, Plaintiffs' motion is 
based primarily upon the allegations or statements contained in the affidavit of John 
Fuquay concerning use of the road. However, these allegations are unequivocally 
rebutted by Rose King, Samuel Steiner, Plaintiffs' own testimony and others that there 
has not been regular, continuous or adverse use of the road by Plaintiffs." 
The Lows then went on to argue why there are disputed issues of fact that precluded 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary Judgment. Those arguments are just as sound now as they 
were then. Plaintiffs recognized that summary judgment could not be granted and chose to 
withdraw the motion rather than waste everyone's time at a hearing. Those same disputed 
facts still preclude summary judgment for Heart K Ranch. 
B. Heart K Asks the Court to Determine "Reasonableness" - which is a Fact Issue 
Heart K has asked the court to rule that Plaintiffs use of King Lane "did not rise to the 
level reasonably expected to provide notice of the adverse use." The obvious problem is that 
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what is "reasonable" is a fact issue, not a legal issue. The court cannot look at disputed 
evidence on affidavits and make a determination of what was reasonable or what was not 
reasonable. Those are clearly issues of fact that must be deferred to trial. 
Heart K argues that the affidavits of Rose King and Gilbert King show that Plaintiffs did 
not adequately use King Lane prior to 2011 and that the use was permissive. Again, Heart K 
ignores the disputed issues of fact. John Fuquay has testified that he is the owner of a trucking 
company, that his father also owned a trucking company, and that they used King Lane for 
trucks since 1977. Fuquays deny that they ever had permission to use the roadway. The 
evidence is obviously disputed. 
Finally, it appears that Heart K believes that adverse use must mean that Fuquays 
intentionally interfered with the defendants' use of the roadway - that somehow Fuquays 
must have tried to prevent the defendants from using the roadway. That is not the meaning of 
adverse and hostile for prescriptive easement claims. The nature of the use is adverse if "it 
runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property." Hodgins. 139 Idaho at 2~1, 76 
P.3d at 975. No legal standard requires a prescriptive right claimant to force the servient 
owner off of the property. 
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December 2014, Plaintiffs withdrew their Motion and canceled the hearing because it was 
obvious from the declarations filed with the court that there were disputed issues of material 
fact that would require the Court to deny Plaintiffs' motion. 
Heart K Ranch has now filed its own motion for Summary Judgment, notwithstanding that 
Rose King's testimony created the disputed issues of fact in the first place. None of the facts 
have changed, and the disputed testimony before the Court requires the Court to deny any 
party's motion for summary judgment. 
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Summary Judgment 
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all facts and inferences from the 
record in favor of the non-moving party and the moving party has the burden of proving the 
absence of genuine issues of material fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 
165, 168 (1997). Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach 
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian 
Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,718,918 P.2d 583,587 (1996). 
B. Prescriptive Easement 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by prescription "must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open 
and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; ( 4) 
with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the 
statutory period." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). 
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Once the claimant presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began, he 
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. Wood v. Hoglund. 
131 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair. 130 Idaho 675,680, 
946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to 
show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. 
Wood 131 Idaho at 703, 963 P.2d at 386; Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. The 
nature of the use is adverse if"it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property." 
Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 975. The state of mind of the users of the alleged 
easement is not controlling; the focus is on the nature of their use. Id. at 231-32, 76 P.3d at 
975-76. Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293,303, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005). 
III. DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
A. Testimony Before the Court 
There are numerous declarations and affidavits before the Court. For the court's 
convenience, they are compiled and submitted with this response. They include: 
• Declaration of Raymond Jayo dated August 27, 2014 
• Declaration of John Fuquay dated August 27, 2014 
• Affidavit of Rose King dated September 9, 2014 
• Affidavit of Susie Low dated September 15, 2014 
• Affidavit of Gilbert King dated September 8, 2014 
• Declaration of Denise Collett dated September 9, 2014 
• Declaration of Scott Snyder dated September 17, 2014 
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• Declaration of Seth Thomas dated September 16, 2014 
• Declaration of Schwann Delivery Person dated September 12, 2014 
• Declaration of John Fuquay dated October_, 2014 
• Affidavit of Rose King dated December 4, 2014 
• Affidavit of Samuel Steiner dated November 10, 2014 
• Affidavit of Ron Rainey dated January 29, 2015 
• Affidavit of Rose King dated January_, 2015 (unsigned) 
• Affidavit of Gilbert King dated January_ 2015 
In addition to the testimony, there are numerous exhibits and public records for the court 
to consider. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Disputed Facts Preclude Summary Judgment 
In order for this court to grant Heart K Ranch summary judgment, the Court would have 
to review all of the declarations and affidavits on record and made a determination that there 
are no disputed facts and that Heart K Ranch will prevail as a matter of law. That ruling is 
impossible in this case. As the testimony shows, historical use of the roadway is not only 
disputed, it is hotly disputed. 
Heart K Ranch invites the court to weigh the testimony and find that Rose King and 
Gilbert King's declarations outweigh contrary declarations. Heart K argues that the court 
should weigh whether the evidence is "clear and convincing." Weighing evidence or testing 
credibility of witnesses is impermissible on a motion for summary judgment. For summary 
judgment, the court must find that that there are no disputed issue of material facts and that 
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only legal issues remain. The court must also grant all reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
the facts to the Plaintiffs. When the Court applies the proper standard here, the court cannot 
grant summary judgment. 
The following table shows some of the material facts that are disputed: 
Name Testimony 
Raymond Jayo Used King Lane to access 
Plaintiffs properties for over 5 
years 




Susie Low King Lane has always been 
gated 
John Fuquay 
Gilbert King Fuquay's use of King Lane has 
been permissive 
John Fuquay 
Gilbert King Fuquays have no right to use 
King Lane 
John Fuquay 
Scott Snyder Fuquays said they would 
refuse to close gates 
John Fuquay 
Seth Thomas Graze cattle on adjacent land 
and need gates closed 
John Fuquay 
Shawn Drew Gates prevented him from 
delivering to Fuquay 
residences 
John Fuquay 
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Disputed Testimony 
Children used King Lane to 
get to school 
Her children used King Lane 
to get to school 
King Lane was never gated 
until the last few years 
Use of King Lane has always 
been without permission 
Fuquays have always used 
King Lane and have 
prescriptive rights 
Fuquays did not close gates 
over the road 
Cattle are only occasionally 
grazed in the area 
Deliveries were made until 
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John Fuquay Plaintiffs began usmg King 
Lane in 1977 
Rose King 
John Fuquay Fuquay family and guests used 
King Lane since 1977 
Rose King 
John Fuquay James Fuquay used King Lane 
for access for large semi trucks 
and cattle trucks since 1977. 
Rose King 
John Fuquay Operated John Fuquay 
trucking company and used 
King Lane regularly for trucks 
Rose King 
Rose King 
Samuel Steiner Fuquays used King Lane for a 
short cut. 
John Fuquay Used King Lane on a near-
daily basis for residential 
purposes 
Rose King 
John Fuquay Used King Lane without 
permission from Steiners 
Samuel Steiner 
Samuel Steiner Zane Block and Jim Fuquay 
did work on King Lane 
Rose King 
Rose King "I have reviewed the 
Declaration of John Fuquay 
dated October 28, 2014. The 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO HEART K MOTION 
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the gates were locked at the 
inception of this litigation 
Fuquay did not start to use 
King Lane in 1977 
Fuquay family and guests 
always used Castle Lane but 
not King Lane 
Fuquays did not use King 
Lane for large trucks until 
2011 
Fuquays did not use King 
Lane for large trucks for 
business until 2011 
Fuquays could not use King 
Lane prior to 1988-89 when 
they replaced the culvert. 
Fuquays did not use King 
Lane for residential pll!])oses 
Steiners did not object to 
anyone using King Lane 
Fuquays have never 
maintained King Lane 
* *This statement alone shows 
that there is a disputed issue 
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statements set forth by Mr. of fact 
Fuquay in his declaration are 
inaccurate ... " 
Rose King Between 1979-1982 King Lane 
was impassable 90% of the 
time 
John Fuquay Used King Lane since 1977. 
Rose King The Fuquays have always 
respected the gates 
Rose King The Fuquays have refused to 
close the gates 
Rose King The Fuquays have damaged 
the roadway 
In short, it is clear that there are disputed issues of material fact in this case and summary 
judgment cannot be granted. As the Lows argued in their objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment in November 2014: 
"There are numerous material issues of fact .... More specifically, Plaintiffs' motion is 
based primarily upon the allegations or statements contained in the affidavit of John 
Fuquay concerning use of the road. However, these allegations are unequivocally 
rebutted by Rose King, Samuel Steiner, Plaintiffs' own testimony and others that there 
has not been regular, continuous or adverse use of the road by Plaintiffs." 
The Lows then went on to argue why there are disputed issues of fact that precluded 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary Judgment. Those arguments are just as sound now as they 
were then. Plaintiffs recognized that summary judgment could not be granted and chose to 
withdraw the motion rather than waste everyone's time at a hearing. Those same disputed 
facts still preclude summary judgment for Heart K Ranch. 
B. Heart K Asks the Court to Determine "Reasonableness" - which is a Fact Issue 
Heart K has asked the court to rule that Plaintiffs use of King Lane "did not rise to the 
level reasonably expected to provide notice of the adverse use." The obvious problem is that 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO HEART K MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200- 6TH A VENUE, SUITE 620 
SEATILE, WA 98101 
(206) 223-4525 
325
what is "reasonable" is a fact issue, not a legal issue. The court cannot look at disputed 
evidence on affidavits and make a determination of what was reasonable or what was not 
reasonable. Those are clearly issues of fact that must be deferred to trial. 
Heart K argues that the affidavits of Rose King and Gilbert King show that Plaintiffs did 
not adequately use King Lane prior to 2011 and that the use was permissive. Again, Heart K 
ignores the disputed issues of fact. John Fuquay has testified that he is the owner of a trucking 
company, that his father also owned a trucking company, and that they used King Lane for 
trucks since 1977. Fuquays deny that they ever had permission to use the roadway. The 
evidence is obviously disputed. 
Finally, it appears that Heart K believes that adverse use must mean that Fuquays 
intentionally interfered with the defendants' use of the roadway - that somehow Fuquays 
must have tried to prevent the defendants from using the roadway. That is not the meaning of 
adverse and hostile for prescriptive easement claims. The nature of the use is adverse if "it 
runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the property." Hodgins. 139 Idaho at 2~1, 76 
P.3d at 975. No legal standard requires a prescriptive right claimant to force the servient 
owner off of the property. 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO HEART K MOTION 
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Very simply, the court cannot grant summary judgment for any party in this case. The 
parties have submitted enough disputed testimony that it is impossible for this case to be 
decided without a trial. The court must deny Heart K's motion. 
Dated: February 12, 2015 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO HEART K MOTION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the supporting Declarations of Matthew Cleverley and John Fuquay 
on the following individuals in the manner indicated: 
Ronald P. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@gwestoffice.net 
Attorney for Kings 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W, River Street, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83707 
208-629-7447 
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Lows 
Dated: February 12, 2015 
DI U.S.MAIL I 
DI LEGAL MESSENGER I 
001 EMAIL 
DI HAND DELIVERED 
001 EXPRESS DELIVERY 
DI FACSIMILE 
Dlu.s.MAIL I 
DI LEGAL MESSENGER I 
001 EMAIL I 
DI HAND DELIVERED I 
001 EXPRESS DELIVERY I 
DI FACSIMILE I 
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200-6111 Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
_Fl.~~-M. 
FEB 1 j 2015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-14-0278 
COMPILATION OF TESTIMONY 
The attached declarations and affidavits have been previously submitted to the comt. This 
compilation is for the Court's and parties' convenience. 
Dated: February 12, 2015 
COMPILATION - 1 
418 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Plaintifrs Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the supporting Declarations of Matthew Cleverley and John Fuquay 
on the following individuals in the manner indicated: 
Ronald P. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attorney for Kings 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W, River Street, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83707 
208-629-7447 
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Lows 
Dated: February 12, 2015 
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DI U.S.MAIL 
DI LEGAL MESSENGER 
[K)I EMAIL 
DI HAND DELIVERED 
[K)I EXPRESS DELIVERY 
DI FACSIMILE I 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200- 6m A VENUE, SUITE 620 
SEATTLE, WA 98101 
(206) 223-4525 
330
Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200 - 61h Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON 0. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-14-0278 
DECLARATION OF RAYMOND JAYO 
IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE MOTION 
FOR TEMORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER 
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state ofldaho, the undersigned declares: 
1. I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in this action and am not 
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and 
could testify to them in a court proceeding. 
2. I am a friend ofthe Plaintiffs and have used King Lane to get to Plaintiffs houses for more 
than 5 years. 
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3. On or Around August 21, 2014, someone installed a gate across King Lane. Prior to the 
installation of this gate, there had never been any obstruction of the roadway or any 
prohibition of access. 
4. On or around August 22, 2014, I attempted to cross the gated roadway to get to John 
Fuquay's house. Rose King confronted me and told me I was not allowed to use King 
Lane to get to the Fuquay's house. 
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF 
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE 
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY OF PERJURY. 
Dated: August 27, 2014 





Matthew R. Clevel'iey, ISB #5418 
Fid_elity National Law Oroup 
1200-61h Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Clevedey@ftif.com 
Attorney fot· Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICTCOURT OF Tl-IE-STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSEFOQUAY, 
Plaintiffs; 
v. 
SUSlE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMEIUCAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case.No. CV-14-0278 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY IN 
SUPPORT OF EX PARTB MOTION FOR 
TBMORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
Under penalty ofpetji1ry 1mde1'theJaws of the state of Oregon:, the undersigned declares: 
Pronel'tics nud Parties 
1. I atn OJ1e of the Plaintiffs in this action. I am Sl1bit1itting this de.claration in suppol't of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for 't¢mporai·y Restrainh1g Order (the 'iMotion't) preventing a11y o.f the 
. . . . 
Defendants from blockiqgacces;:;to our prope1ty ove1··King-Lane. 
2. A stt·eet ntap-shoWil'lg the geneta_l location of the area is anached as E~hibit "A'' to the 
MQtion. A1t aedal tnap showing the Owyhee County Assess.or~s- lot boundaries is attached 
as Exhibit "B" to the Motion. A Google Bai-th map showing an aedal view and gei1eral 
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road batmdal'ies and identities of the affected parcel owners is attached as Exhibit "C" to 
the Motion. 
3. Clhtto11 Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuqµ~y own the pat·cel (the 11Clinto11 Fuquay 
Parcel'') at the west end of King Lane. It was once palt of the Jolm Fhquay Pai'cel, The 
legal description fc>1'· the Cli11ton F11q\1ay Patcel is shown ot1 the war1'ft1tty deed attached as 
Exhibit 11D1• to the Motion. 
4. l own the pai'cel (the ''John Fuquay Pat"cef,t) which is located south. of the Clinton: Fuquay 
Pa1·cel. The legal descl'iption foi' the John Fuquay Patee! is shown on the Trustee's Deed 
dated October 13, 1989 attached as Exhibit "En to the Motion (less the CJinton F11quay 
Parcel). 
5. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the CILow P~l'cel l ' .. ) located.south of King Lane. 
There are two parcels whlch we1·e conveyed by the same deed. The legal description fOl' 
the Low Pal'cel 1 is shown on the Special Wan'anty Deed attached as Exhibit 11F,, to tile 
Motion. 
6. Avco Financial Sel'vices ofldaho Falls, Ille. may claitn.sometight, title or interest in the 
Low Patcel 1 by vh1t1e of El Real Estate Mortgage in Ure amount <>f $68,000 wllich was 
i-ecorded on or around March 18, 1996 as Owyhee cotmty records no. 218373. The 
Mo1'tgage was executed by Samuel V.C. Steine1· and Ma1;y J. Steiner, htisband and wife 
and enc1uhbers Low Parcel l. It is possible that tl1is inortgl\ge wa$ p&id but was never 
released. A copy of the Mortgage is attached as Exhibit 110'' to the Motfoil. 
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7. Susie Low ai1d Cal Low own the parcel (the ''LowParcel 2")located sQuth of King Lane. 
01-eana Loop Road, ctos~es the no11hwest come1• of Low Parcel 2. The legal descl'iption 
for the. Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed .attached as Exhibit "W' to 
the Motion, 
8. The HeartX Ranch Trust UTA December:28, 2012 owns the pat'Cel to the 1101·th of King 
Lar1e (the "Heart K Ranch Pat-eel''). The legal description got the Heaet-KRanch Pa1·cel is 
shown on the Gift Deed attached as Exhibit c'l" to the Motion. 
9. .Got'don G. Kitig and Rose M. King may claim some right, title or interest in the Henrt K. 
Ranch Pal'Cel by virtue of a Peed of Trn&thl the amou11t of$86,500 in favor of One West 
Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as Owyhee County reool'ds no. 248616 and 
encumbered the Heal't K Ranoh Patcel. A copy of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit 
"J.11 The deed oftmst was assig1,ed to Gotdon 0. King a.11d Rose M. Khtg on Septem~i' 
12,. 2005. A copy of the Assignment of Deed of Trust is attached as Exhibit ''K., to the 
Motion. 
10. Fh·st American Title Insurance Company may olaitn s!'.>me dght, title or interest in the 
Heart K. Ranch Parcel by virtue -of being named as the. trnstee under a Deed of Tmst in the 
amount of $86,500 in favor .of 0•1e West Ba11k which was re_cotded on foly 28, 2Q04 as 
Owyhee County recol'ds no. 2486l6 ·and encunibered the He.a1t K Ranch Parcel. A copy 
of the deed of b:ust is attached as Exhibit ''Jif to the Motto:n. 
COlvlPLAINT-3 
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11. The properties at issue in this Con1plait1t ~re looate.d ln Owyhee. Coumy, Idaho. They cu·e 
located appl'oximately thl'ee miles east of Oreana a1ul are south of Highway 78. The 
closest public roadway to ttie propedies is Oi'eana Loop Road. 
12. Oreatm toop l.'oad t·m1s h1c a geue~ally,west dln~ction.f1'0J11 Highway 78 to a point ttear a 
'location where Low Parcels 1 and 2 and the Heart K Ranch Parcels intersect. Near that 
location, Oi'eana Loop Road tuttis and continues in a so,1thwestel'ly dlt'ection through Low 
Parcel 1. 
13. Kh1g Lane is a private roadway that conthtues westedy from whei·e: Oreana Loop Road 
turns sO\!lbwest Orea1ia Loop Road and provides the access to the Clit1t F\1quay Parcel and 
tbe,Jolm Fuquay Pal'ceJ. 
14. The Plai11tiffs have used :King.Lane to access. the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the Johrt Fuquay 
Putcelsince at least 1989. 
15. King Lane has been an unobstn1cted t'Oadway µsed by Plah1tiffs and the general public 
sh,ce at least 1989. 
Blockage o·f King Laue by.Defend Ants 
16. On 01· Around August 21, 201-4, on~ or .alt of the Oefen~auts installed gates actoss King 
La1ie to p1-eventus fro1n accessing King Lane to oti1· properties. One gate was fostalied at 
the northeast co1·ner of the CUntoti Ft1qJ1ij)' Parcel and a ~·econd gate was installed ne.ar the 
intersection of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
17. Pictili'.es of the gated area al'e attached as Exhibit."K'; to the Motion. 
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18. On or around August 22,.2014, n frl~nd of ours, Raymond Jnyco, attempted to cross- lhe 
gate<l roa<lwuy to get to. om· house:. Roso I<lng confronted the friend and told hlni he. wa$ 
110t allowed to ilSe Kitig Lane to ac'Cess om· properly. 
19. We are in irnmediate need of access to their properties ove1· King l~ne, 
20. The gate.If interfere with normal delivery services used by Plaintlfts s\1Qh as Fedoml 
Express, UPS a11d ScbwaM.1s. 
21. The gates interforo witlt PhdnUffs' .access to e111ergem~y services such.as pollce, fire and 
tunb\llance services; 
22. Defendants' instnllatlon. of the gale aoro.ss Kfog Laite was done ·a.Oer thi$. lawsuit was 
filed, and we were not consulted p1•ior to the i,1stnllntion Qf the gate. No11e of the 
Defend1mtswiil be harmed or damaged by allowing usto continue the same uninterrupted 
access over K.Jng 1$e that we Juwe itsed fur 25 yea.,s. TherefQre; we should not be 
requii'edlo post a: bond fin the issua11ce of the temporary llesh·alningOrdet. 
£.HEREBY DECLARE:THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE:BEST OF 
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND TH.A.TI Ul'IQERSTAND IT IS MAPE FOR USE 
AS EVIDENCE TN COURT AND IS SUBIBCT TO PENALTY OF PE Y. 
Dated-: August271 2014 
Jolin FuqUaY, · 
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RONALD P. RAINEY ISB-#1022 
Attorney at Law 
P;O; Bo~ 26 
110 Notth Ninth Stre_et 
Cnldwell, IdahQ 83606~0026 
Phone (208)459-:3659 
Facl!imiJe Transmission No:459-9067 
Attotney fol· Defendants 
Gilbert. King as Trustee for the 
Heart K Eanch Ti'u&t UTA December 28, 2012. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT Of THE THUID JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN ANb FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN B. FUQUAY; CLINTON WA~D, .) 
FUQUAY ai1d HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, ) 
) Case No. CV;.;2014-0278 
Phihltiffs, ) 
J AFFlDAVIT OF ROSE KING 
VS; ) 
) 
SUSIE LOW; .CAL LOW; HEART K ) 
RANCH TRUST UTA ·DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, iNC.; GORDON G .. KING) 
ROSE NI. I{INO; flIRST AMERICAN ) 




GILBERT KING, as Trnstee; and ) 
ROSE M. l<ING, as Beneficiary of the ~-
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA ) 






JOHN E. FUQUAY: CLlNTON WARD ) 
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FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY ) 
) 
Countel'defendnnts. .) 
.) ______________ ,) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
Coumy of Owyhe¢ ) 
Rose King, being first duly sworn 0~1 oath, depo.ses a11d slate$ as follows: 
1.. I am one of theclefendants\counterclnimants iu the above...:ent.itled m1tttet'
1 
I. am ovet" 
the age of majorityr and I make this Affidavit based upon facts wJthin my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. My deceased husband, Gordon. King. and I put"ohased our ranch which included 
King Lane on September 17, 197_3. At th~ tJn.1e of11ui'chase, Kil1g Ln1\e was olily a path through 
grass and weeds. My husband and I constructed what is now Ring Lane, an all welllher road. 
We use this l'oad several times a day in our fai11ily and ranching operation, 
' 
I Ia.ter 1tained this road King Lnne. 
3. Attached to this ~ffidavit. are Ji'ue aM. cottectcd_pies of photographs that t tece11tly 
took of the ilrea in question concerning King Lanei Castle Lanei the gates on King Lane. and the 
current location of the school bus stop, whe1'e children who attend the local school are picked up 
an,d dt·opped off. E.ach individual photo is captioned as to what it reveals 
DATED '!'his: 9th day of September, 2014. 
Rose King 
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' " 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE M_§._a-Net-a · Public in and fo1· said State, 
this 9th day of September, 2014. ../·' . 
// 
· otai'y Public for Idaho 
Residing l\t: CaldweU, Idnho 
My Com1nisslon Expii'es: 12118/2018 _,,, 
C!ERTIFICATR OF SERVICE 
I1 Ronnld P; Rainey, hereby ce1tify that on this q day of September, 2014, I 
caused a ttue and col'l'ect .copy .of tlte foregoing .inslrnme~Iivered to the adverse parLy, 
via the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
_x__u.s. Mall, Postage Pi·ep(l'id _Facsimile Transmission _Hand Delivery 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200 .6th Avenue, Suite 620 
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Vi¢wt,fthe East Gate toKingLane. 
Looking to .the West 
Vi~w of the East Gate ·to King Lim:e 
Looklng to tJ1e W~st 
341
Cm·rent West Gate. to King ·Lane :Being -Constructed· 
Lookingto 1he West 
Arel\ of the Ciutelit West Oate to King Lane Before Construction 
Which Indicate!Hhe Location of'the Fo1·me1"Wfre Gate 
342
View t1f Castle Lane 
· All We~ther Sui'face Road 
Lookin,g to the Notth 
View ofCastleLarte 
All Weather Sul'face-.Road 
iookingto·the Nol'th fi'oin it$ 
lnterseotiori. with Oi'.eana 
Loop Road 
343
Entry to Castle Lane All-Weathe1· Smface Road from the Oreana Loop Road 
L6okh1g:to the North 
Mail 'Boxes at the Intersection of the Oreana.Loop Road an:d Castle Lane School 13-us· Stop 
Looking to the South 
344
View of the Castle Lane An .. weatherSurface Road 
Looking to the North 
View of the Castle La11.e All..;Weather Surface Road 
Looking loJhe.North 
345
S. BRYCE FARRIS 
[Idaho State Bar No. 56361 
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Golden Eagle Building 
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110 
P. 0. Box 7985 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 629-7447 
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559 
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD Case No. CV-2014-0278 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G, 
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; 
Defendants, 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County or!}/,._ ~ ss. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSIE LOW 
Susie Low being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says that: 
1. I am over the age of 18 and I make this Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge 
and I am competent to testify to the matters contained herein. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSIE LOW - 1 
346
2. I have lived at 21101 Oreana Loop Road in Murphy, Idaho since September of2005 
and I am familiar with the roadway located on or between the property currently owned by Heart 
K Ranch Trust and the property currently owned by myself and my husband which as been 
referenced in this matter as "Kings Lane." 
3. Since I have lived there, and during my observations of the roadway referenced as 
"Kings Lane" there has always been a minimum of two gates across the roadway which have been 
closed to prevent livestock from roamin_g onto and off of the property owned by Heart K Ranch 
Trust. Any person attempting to utilize the madway has had to stop, open and close the gates. 
D-A.TED.·t11·ts· /t#"d·" •. ··r L,. I!.'-• ./ - 2014 n ay; 0 ·~~Ab>", . 
Susie Low 
Sworn to and subscribed befure me this .1£~~. ~014 . 
.......... ,... _...,... ~ , .. a···,, , ~--io .t l',t: ,,,. - . . . 
~~&: •••••·• ••• ~ '"~,., Flotruy Public. for Idaho 
-§- · t\:ta,nc1 \ * \ Residing in~,.V~, Idaho _ ._ ·')~ •' J. i My Commission Expires: ?./?q& 
41' * .. 7 ·-. * . ..t.-\1..,~o .~ I -
... ·:a ._Att,_Jj_ 
••. • .... '""' '!ir" '"",Ii-.•••~•••- ,~·~ttj· .. ,, lhrv t1 ~. i•~-''•••,,.,,nn•' 
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CERTIFICATE_OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the 
following on this ./Jday of September, 2014 by the following method: 
MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200 - 61h Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
Telephone; (206) 224-6003 
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
RONALD P. RAINEY 
RONALD P. RAINING PA 
110 N. 91h Ave. 
P0Box26 
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and Rose 
King 
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LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federa] Express 
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LJ Facsimile 
W Electronic Mail or CM/ECF 
[Kl U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 
LkJ Electronic Mail or CM/ECF 
S. Bryce Farris 
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RONALD P. RAINEY - !SB# 1022 
Attorneys at Law 
l lo North Ninth A venue 
Post Office _Box 26 
Caldwell; Idaho 83606-0026 
Telephonei (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 01· 459-6'147 
Attoi'hey for Defendants 
Gilbel't King 11s Tmstee for the 
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA.December 28, 2012 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE S'I'NfE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 






SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K ) 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28> ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;) 





GILBERT KING, as Trustee,-and ) 
ROSE M. KING, as He1reflci11i'j of the ) 
HEART.le RANCH TRUST OTA ) 




AFFIDAVIT OF G!LBERT KING-PAGE 1 
CASE NO. CV2014-0278 




JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSEFUQUA Y ) 
) 
Cotmterdefendants. j 
STATE OF1DAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
GILBERT KlNG, being first dtlly sworn. upon o~th depose$ and says: 
1. I am a patty in t_he above-eapti(;med-a(.}tion, over the age of111ajo1·ity~ com11ete11uo 
testify, and l make this affidavit upon personal ktlow)edge. 
2. AUached f!S Exlitl)it A to this a,fftdavit is a true apd co1·rect copy ofa umng Map1• as 
obtalned 1md downloaded from the Intemet, whi¢hprovides an accut'ftte-repl'esentation of the Orean~ 
Loop Road. 
3. State Highway 78 is highli'ghted in yellow on Exhibit A with the Oreana Loop Road 
itself highlighted irt green. King Lane is highlighted it1 ~-and another access.from the Oreana 
~oop RQad to King La11e that is known:as Castle LaneJs highlighted in blue. Although.1he size of 
this map does not reveal the actual location of the co1mection, the Oreana Loop road connects with 
State Blghway 78 at both en.ds of tha.t.looJ) ro~d. 
4. Attached as Exhibit D to this affidayitls a true and co1tect copy of the smt1e "Bing 
Map" In a_ closer view~ which reveals t.he actual ntnn:es· of the roadways ht question, but this closer 
view 1)0. longel' l'evea)s the location ·of St~tt hlghway 78 to the 1101th. 
5. Attached as Exhi'blt C to this ·afflcfavit-i.s a true conect copy of art Owyhee CoJUJty 
reference llUlP which shows the same atea .with a fill overlay of sections, quarter sections, atid 
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indications of townships and ranges. 
6. I have indicated the approximate location of the Fuquay Plaintiffs' prnpertles on 
Exhibit B. 
7. As indicated on Exhibit B, the npproxima:te length of Kihg Lane is !-4 mile, wlieref\s 
C.a.stle Lane has i\"length of appi'oxhnately 1 3./4 miles. 
8. As should. be apparent fr~m the· rilaps that have hc::en attach~d to this. a~davit. and 
by the photogtaphs attached to Rose King's affidavit, and by the other declatations that have been 
inade aod submitted by affected parties iii this action, the Fuquay Plaintiffs proper~ is neither 
lat1dlooked, nol'dependent upon the use of King Lane in order to access their property, but instead 
.is readily acc~ssible ior all purposes by the all. w.eatber Castle Lane road. 
9. The l1uqu!:ly·Pl_ainUffs have no legal right to compel the continued-use ofthepl'ivate 
King Lane, which use has at ~11 times has been entirely permissive. 
10. ln the absence of any demonstrated necessity, 'Ol' any manifest adverse claiin, the 
Fuquay Plaintiffs have no right to a11y·coiitinued \1Se of Kii1gLane. 
11. Because KingLane is an entirely pl'ivate roadway, as the owners of that roadway, the 
l!eart l<.Ranch is entirely within its rights tcrplac~,gates across that ~ntries to tluJt l'Qadwayin Otdei· 
to lbnit nn.(l rcstl'ictits l1~e tht oWrttws, their invjtees, and other.given e:xpress per111tssio11. 
r2. I have received nelthet wdttennor or~l notice from tbe.Plaintiff'sattomeyexplaining 
whut tne nahwe and extent of-any "immediate and irrepat·able iajury; lossi or damage"· that will resglt. 
to·ihe F1.1q11ay Plafotiffs ifa Temporary Restrninh1g Order(TRO) is not issued, without fir~t allowing 
om· attorney to be heard in oppositio11 to th,e issuance of tha:trequested.order. 
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Further affiant sayeth not, 
. SUBSCIUBED AND SWORN to before me this ~eptember~ 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY Thaton this -Z_ day :of Septembel', 20 l 4,a true and co1·1-ec.t copy of 
the fol'egoing document: was sel'ved upon tlie following: 
Malfhew R. Clevel'ley 
Fldelity National Law GROUP 
1200 Gth Avem,e,.Sulte 620 
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Sep,09,2014 08:24 AM K~NG ~ATTLE KORRAL 
RONALD P. RAINEY TSB 111022 
Atturnuy nt Luw 
P.O. Box 26 
110 North Nlnlh Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Phone (208)459-3659 
Fncsimlle 'l'rnnsmiluilon No:459-9067 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King aa Trustee for the 
Hen.rt K. Ru.11ch Trust UTA December 281 2012 
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IN THE OlSTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS 
THE ST A'rB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TflE COUNTY OF WYHBE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, ) 






SUSIE LOW: CAL LOWi HBART K. ) 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SBRVICBS OF ) 
IDAHO FA.LLS, INC.; GORDON 0. KING ) 
RpSE M. J<CNG: FIRSr AMERICAN ) 
TITLE lNSURANCE COMPANY) ) 
) 
Defendants, ) 
GILBERT KIN01 t\6 Truetee; and 
ROSB M. KINO, ae DenefioJ111·y oe the, 
HBART K RANCH TRUST UTA 
DECEMBER 28, 20121 
Counterchtim11nt111 
VS, 












DECLARATlON OF DENICE COLLETI ·1 
DECLARATION OF ENlCE · 
COLLE'IT IN SUPPO OPDEPENDANT1S 
OBJECTION TO PLA TIFFS' EX·PARTE 
MOTION FOR TEM RARY 
RESTRAlNINO ORD R 
·"··-····--··-----'------------
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R 20883./12061 PA~E. 2/ 3 
Under pennhy of perjury u1,der the laws of the state of Jduho, the 1ode,·sig11ed declme.,: 
1. J am over the age of 18. I 11m not related to nny of the pnrties in t is action and inn not 
Involved in the lltlgRtion. 1 h1we personul knowledge of the events U1is declaration and 
could testify to them in n court proceeding. 
2. I reside on Colletr Lnne, Or()11nn1 Idnho "nd hnvu be~n II bu11 drlv r for tho Grttndviow 
School DIAtrlot for a.3...Yoo1·s. 
3. I stMt my bu11 route. at my residence by driving down Collett l nc to Oreana Loop, 
driving west on Oreana Loop to the Fuquay mail box where I pick up 
-:,1id~,c-44 ..... _ .. i-__ Puquny1 son of J.C. Fuqmty. 1 proceed west on Orellna Loop through 
t7 
the vii Inge of Orennn up to the west end of Orennl\ Loop and High ny 78 east to tho enin 
of Oreana Loop where I make another stop. J do not mnke a son ol bus stop at Kings 
' Lane. When I return the children home, I reverse the route 011 Orea a Loop and Highway 
78 dropping orr ~ Fuquay at the Fuquay mailbox and thes I go ro my residence 
'L - . ~ .],µ-'#IA,- r; (!. ,J-~ CAMA..t ~ 
on C~llett L."tnts. '1 ~~ ; . .. ~_/ 1- . 
~ ~ ~ ·~ ,_.-,!~, 
I CSRTIFY UNDBR PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO HE LAW OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TR.OE A.N CORRECT. 
011te.d thla 'i' day of September. 2014. 
DECLARATION 0.F·DBNlCE COLLETT •2 
' . ·--·----'-----------
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I, Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certil'y that on this_ day o-f Sept 11bor1 2014, l caused 
a Lrue and conect copy of the foregoing Instrument to be deliverer.I tu tl10 dverfie pnl't)', vin the 
method Indicated below, addressed as follows: 
_U.S. Mo.ii, Postage Prepnid _Facsimile Transmission Delivery 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
Fidelity Nntionul Luw Oroup 
1200 Glh Avenue, Suite 020 
Seattle, W11shlngwn 98101 
TeJephone: 206·224-6003 
Fllcsimllc: •77-6SS .. S281 
Email: Mttttb~Yt,Clqverly@fnf,oom 
Ronald P. Rainey 1 
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GIL 11.Nl)JO KING 
l!Qo:'ALD P. RAINF.t' JSB #l.m.2 
A1*amey at Lr,., 
l'.O. BCD 26 
llO Notlh Nilllh Streor 
Ca1illR1J. lilaho 836'.J6-0026 
l'bcl:lc (D)4S9-36S9 
Jl"aaj]m~ '!iammissloa No~ 
Anorlle.]I b Ddi:lldatu 
Gilbellt Kmg: as. 1i.ml£e :1br 1ml 
Rem K. Rind! TlOlt UTA D=cc:caber 23, 21H2 
~B 
JN 'lUE DISTIUCt COUR'[ OF n1E nmm .JUDIC.AI. J:llSTIUCI' OF 
'IBB STAIB OP JD.ABO. IN Mm FOR. llfE COUN'IY rJe OWY.HBE 
JOHNE FIIQllA.Y; CUNTON WAJtD. ) 
FUQUA:! aad l3AlLEY ROSE RJQUAY, ) 
) Casi:: N11. CV-2'01+o27.8 
~ ) 
p., 
) :te::LARATION OF SCOTT SNrnER 
'V'S. ) 
) 
SUSIE IDW; CAL LOW; HEAJrr K. J 
RANCH TROST VIA OECEMBEll 28. ) 
2012; A\ICO flMANClAL S!itVtCES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, JNC.; GORDON 0. KING ) 
RCI.SE M. KING; FIRST AMBR:ICAN ) 




OLBli1T lrnJG. a., nm,u:; amt ) 
ROOS M. KING. 11S J!lc::udicl.llZ)' CJ! tbc: } 
EEABTK RANCH TRUSf U!A. ) 






JOHN f.. 'fllJQUAY~ ctJNTON WARD ) 
DECLA'.l'UITJON OP SCOTT SNYDER -1 
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B Rcvl!W/Commcnt Worr1mi 
AtlJ>lO TAPl7 gvo B),la 
PHOTOS? Vu Nv 
Make eoi1J011 a.nd Neild tos 
Olhcr: 
B Summ11n1 Osher: 
COJ)let Sent by: 0 -------+----------
§ Countv Pl'O.leculur Jul'enll11 Pll'Clllatlon -----------
OFFICEM REVIEWED av 
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ALLEN, LUCILE MAY 
Al.~~N. LUDt1.e MAY 
Offlc1:rs (0/1 RoporU) 
31 SNYDER.SCOTT 
Duerlptlon 
1t111pork.'CI Da11!11lme 0512812()14 11 :44 
Occur"'d Date: 14 TO S/2M014 
Octnrrtd '1'11111: 1:A4:li1AM TO 11:44:&tAM 
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. SQJi>.12, 2014 08: 03 AM I<lbTG lCA~TLE KORRAL 
owv,.me COUNTY SHfnUli1,''S OFP[Ci 
Rcpon l40l4SO.OOl 
T-549 P004/008 F-712 
a 2088342051 PAGE, 3/ ~ 
N,4.TURE OF COMPLAINT, Civil Dispute of Fences and Oates 
On S/29/2014 l w11.s di11patched to Kins Lone, and 18907 Caatle Lan 0"1im~ Owyhee 
County, Idaho for a neighbor dispute conoernlns feRQee un private property. 
l fir&t made contact with John Edmund Fuquay at his roaidence, l 8S'I07 Cas e Lane. On the 
way to John', residence, from the Klns's property, I h.-d paned through two fenoes with the 
gate, oloiod. I also observed cattle in the area. 1 lllked John if he had any t e of easement for 
the privale road that 11 routed from the Kina property to John's n:&ldence. J hn advised he doea 
have easemen~ that oune from many years past. I advised John, the Kings a vised there was no 
legal easement, but permission was given to Joh.n use the road at any time, a long Q9 if the gates 
were closed, the~ needed to remain alosed due to tattle In the area. 
I advised John oftdaho Code 3S·l 12 BstabHshment of gates ... , in which if any damages 
°"urred to fences or gates, any claims made by the property owner, would o doubled In a court 
of law. Jolut advised if any damages were to occur to any fence or gates, or o any cattle related 
to an open sate. he would take full responslb[Uty. Iohn advised he was not oing 10 cJQsc nny 
gates on the road 1n question, as he felt he had a right of way or cHemant. J hn also adviacd he 
would not close any sates, because he didn't want his older relatives to h11vo to 41:russto with the 
sate1 or step In cattle manure. Jahn ndvisad ht waa involved with multiple a torneye ooncernins 
the property and easements. 
I then left John's l'Osidcinc~, artd returned to the King nuddence, I made co tact with Gilbert 
Gene K.lng1 and advised Gilbert olmy disc:ussion with John, mainly to infor Gilbert of possible 
sntea left open whlle Gilberts• cattle were in the area. I aleo advised Gilbert of Johns intentions 
ofpoHibty oot elosii,g the ptea. Gilbert did have cows in the area that wo d be affected if 
gatell were lefl: open. 





tiep, .LI, ..:U.L(I. U I : G b J;IJlll .l\..l.J)I~ .l\Al::J."J.,Js; .I.\.Vll,.KAJ., 
RONALD P, RAINEY ISB #1022 
Attome)' t\t L11w 
P.O. Box 26 
110 North N1nth Street 
Caldwell, tdaho 83606-0026 
Phone (208)459~3659 
Pncslmlle Trnnsmiludon No:459-9067 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King us Trustee. tor tile 
Heart IC. Uanch Tru!lt UTA December 28. 2012 
T-553 P002/005 F-718 
IN THB DISTRICT COURT OF TRE THIRD JUDICIAL DlS'.rRlCT OF 
THB STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'l'Y OF OWYHBB 
JOHN E. FUQUAY: CLINTON WARD, ) 








STJSTE LOW: CAT .. LOWi HEART K. ) 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OP ) 
IDAHO PALLS, INC.; GORDON 0. KTNO ) 
ROSE M. KlNOi FIRST AMERICAN ) 
TlTLB JNSURANCIS COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) _________ ) 
OlLBERT KING, ae Ttuotee; cmd 
n.os:s M. KlNO, ll8. Be1\efi"il4T)' or the 
Il6AR.T K ll.ANCH TRUST UTA 













JOHN E. FUQUAY: CLINTON WARD ) 
DECLARATlON OF SETH THOMAS .. 1 
Ciuie No. CV-2014-0278 
DECLARATION OF SB'fH rrHOMAS 
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09-18-'14 07:57 FROM-
b~~.i,.~u~q VJ:QO MW A.~~ A~~L~£ Av............._, 




T-553 P003/005 F-718 
Under penulty of perjury under the hlWS of the state of ldnho, the undersigned deolm'eli: 
1. 1 am ov"r the age of 18. I am not related to any of the parties in t:llis a.clion and am not 
involved in the liligatton. I have personal knowledge of the evenrs in this declaration und 
could te&ttfy to them in tl court proceeding. 
2. Please, sec the attllched E.xhibif "A" for my statement. 
l C.&RTIFY UND'lm PENALTY OF PE.R.TURY PURSUAN'f TO-TJIE LAW OF THE 
STATE OF 1DAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECf. 
Dated this 16th day of September, 2(H4. 
DECLARATLON OF SETH THOMAS -2 
371
09-18-'14 07:57 FROM- T-553 P004/005 F-718 
CBRTIP[CATE OF SERVICE 
J.1 Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certify that on this J gi°...,day of September, 2014, 1 cnu11ed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing tnstrument co beTelive1·ed to tho udver&e party, via the 
method Indicated below, addressed as followi;: 
_u.s. Mall 1 Pofit&1ge P1·epaid AFnc.,imlle Tn1nR111hudon _Hond Delive,·y 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
Fidelity National Luw Group 
1200 6th Avent1e. Suite 620 




S, Bryvo Pur1la 
P.O. Box 798S 
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::awp.J..,.~u.a." Ul•t,liU .l:'.U.1 A..L.l.~\ilr ,l,""".L..L..&..1.i.:a .u.'u'.1.,.1.-..n..,w ..... -------"T ... -
September 131 2.014 
it> Whom It May concern: 
Our winter range la adjac-ent to the property of Heart K Ranch Trust. we graze our 
cattle there during the winter months. It It beneficial to us If all landowners that border 









RONALD P. RAINEY ISB #1022 
Attomey at Law 
P.O. Box26 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 . 
Phone (208)4S9-36S9 
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
ll:eart K. Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
T-529 P002/003 F-684 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE TI-IlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHNE. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD. ) 






SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K. ) 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC. i GORDON G. KING ) 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN ) 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ______________ ) 
) 
GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and ) 
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the ) 
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA ) 
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) _______________ ) 
T-529 P003/003 F-684 
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the undersigned declares: 
1. I am over the age of 18. I am not related to any of tho parties in this action and am not 
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and 
could testify to them in a court proceeding. 
2. I have been delivering Schwann products to people in the Oreana area for approximately 
five years. 
3. I have delivered Schwann products to Jolm Fuquay and Clinton and Hailey Fuquay by 
traveling up Oreana Loop Road then Castle Lane to their residences. The road was 
completely passable allowing me to travel it all year round. I was prevented from using 
this road when the gate was locked across Castle Road. I would still use Castle Road 
to make deliveries if the locked gate was not there. 
I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO TIIB LAW OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOlNG rs TRUE AND CORRECT. 
Pated this lt1"1...day of September, 2014. 
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Matthew R. Clevel'ley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law G1·oup 
1200- 6111 Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-14-0278 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Under penalty of pe1jury under the laws of the state of Idaho, the undersigned declares: 
1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this action. I have personal knowledge of the facts in this 
declaration, and I am competent to testify at trial as to the matters herein. 
2. I am submitting this declal'ation in supp01t of Plaintiffs' Motion for Pa1tial Sununary 
Judgment against Defendant Lows. 
3. Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuq\iay 
Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once part of the John Fuquay Parcel before l 
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sold it to CJinton and Hailey Fuquay. The legal description for the Clinton Ft.1quay Parcel 
is shown 011 the war1·anty deed attached as Exhibit "D', to the Motion. 
4. I also own the parcel (the "John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the Clinton 
Fuquay Parcel. The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the 
Trustee's Deed dated October 13. 1989 attached as Exhibit "B,. to the Motion (less the 
Clinton Fuquay Parcel). 
5. I began living on the Joh11 Fuquay Parcel in January 1977 when it was purchased by my 
father. I was about 12 years old when we first moved onto the John Fuquay Parcel. My 
parents bought a mobile home and put on the property and we lived in that for years. 
6. From January 1977 forward, my family continuously used King Lane for access to Oreana 
Loop Road. My parents drove personal vehicles of all types ove1· King Lane. From the 
· time I was 12, we also walked over King Lane to get to the bus stop at Oreana Loop Road 
and to pick up mail from the mail box which is at the comer of King Lane and Oreana 
Loop Road. 
7. Our family's guests regularly and continuously used King Lane to access our house. 
8. My father, James Fuquay, owned large semi-trucks and cattle trucks that he used in his 
farming and ranching operations. He would regularly drive those trucks over King Lane 
to and from Oreana Loop Road. 
9. At about age 14, I began driving large trucks for my father. Those included cattle trucks 
and semi trucks, I would drive them over King Lane to and from Oreana Loop Road. 
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10. At about age 21, I obtained my Idaho chauffeul''s license which is the predecessol' to the 
CDL license. It permitted me to drive commercial tmcks. I started dl'iving large trucks 
commercially at that time and have done so ever since. · I cunently drive commercial 
trucks under the assumed business name of Joh11 Fuquay Trucking. 
11. Since 1977, I have continuously used King Lane to access both the John Fuquay Parcel 
and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel. 
12. I have always believed that I have the right to access the John Fuquay Parcel and the 
Clinton Fuquay Parcel over King Lane and I have always acted in accordance with that 
belief. 
13. At its west end, King Lane connects to Castle Lane. Castle Lane continues south until it 
reached Oreana Loop Road again. There are no othe1· pl'Operties that use King Lane for 
access. 
LOWPARCELl 
14. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the nLow Parcel P') which is located south of 
King Lane and east of the Clinton F1.1quay Parcel. Thel'e are two parcels which were 
conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for the Low Parcel 1 is shown on the 
Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F" to the Motion, 
15. Prior to the Lows ownership of Low Parcel 1, my family openly and continuously used 
King Lane to access the John Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for more than 
5 years. 
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16. Based on the public records. on January 17, 1973, Elme1· 0. Johnston and May M. 
JoJmston conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Charles W. Steiner and Florence W. Steiner. 
17. Based on the public 1-ecords. on Mal'ch 21, 1980, Charles W. Steinel' and Florence W. 
Steiner wel'e divorced and Low Parcel 1 was awarded to Florence W. Steine1·. 
18. Based on the public records, on Septembel' 20, 1987, Samuel Steiner, as personal 
representative of Florence W. Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel Steiner. 
19. Based on the public 1·ecords, on January 23, 1995, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane 
Steiner conveyed Low Parcel 1 to Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner. 
20. Based on the public records, on July 15, 2005, Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner 
conveyed Low Parcel I to :Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC. 
21. Based on the public records, on January 27, 2006, ~ioneer Exchange Accommodation 
Titleholder#69, LLC conveyed Low Parcell to the Lows. 
22. From January 1, 1977 through Mal'ch 21, 1980, I never asked Charles W. Steiner and 
FlOl'ence W. Steiner for permission to use King Lane. Charles W. Steiner and Florence 
W. Steiner never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane. 
23. From Janua1·y 1, 1977 through March 21, 1980, my family used King Lane fol' access to 
the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of pul'poses: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily basis 
for regular 1-esidential purposes such as gofog to and from the store, picking up mail 
from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and from 
personal errands. 
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b. Regulal' use of King Lane for driving large semiwtrucks to and from the John Fuquay 
Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his tmcks and 
continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Tmcking Company. 
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment from 
one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop previously 
located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Laue by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
prope11ies. 
24. From March 21, 1980 thl'Ough September 20, 1987, I never asked Florence W. Steine1· for 
permission to use King Lane. Florence W. Steiner never gave my family, my guests or 
me permission to use King Lane. 
25. From March 21, 1980 through September 20, 1987, we used King Lane for access· to the 
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the followjng types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a neat·-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regula1· use of King Lane for driving large semi-tJ:Ucks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trncks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
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c. Regular fa1·m vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and fi'om the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
prope1ties. 
26. From September 20, 1987 through January 23, 1995, I never asked Samuel V.C. Steiner-
and Mary Jane Steiner for permission to use King Lane. Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mal'y 
Jane Steiner never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane. 
27. From September 20, 1987 thl'o\lgh January 23, 1995, we used King Lane for access to the 
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regulat· personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a nem·Mdaily 
basis for regulal' residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for dl'iving large semi-trncks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestl'ian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
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e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
pl'Operdes. 
28. Fl'Om January 23, 1995 through July 15, 2005, I never asked Samuel V.C. Steinel' and 
Mary Jane Steiner for pet'mission to use King Lane. Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary Jane 
Steine1· never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King Lane. 
29. From January 23, 1995 through July 15, 2005, we used King Lane fol' access to the 
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and fl'om Oreana Loop Road on a neai·-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from pe1·sonal enands. 
b. Regular. use of King Lane for driving large semi-tmcks to and from the John 
Fuquay Pal'cel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
tmcks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trnoking Company. 
c. Regulat· farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
properties. 
30. From July 2, 2005 through January 27, 2006, I never asked Pioneei· Exchange 
Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC for permission to use King Lane. Pioneer 
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Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC never gave my family, my guests 01· me 
permission to use King Lane. 
31. From July 2, 2005 throqgh January 27, 2006, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay 
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regular pe1·sonal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for regulal' residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regula1· use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and ·from the Jolm 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
c. Regula1· farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the cornet· of King Lane and Ol'eana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays• 
pl'operties. 
32. From January 27, 2006 through the pl'esent I never asked the Lows for permission to use 
King Lane. The Lows never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King 
Lane. 
33. From January 27, 2006 to the present, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay Parcel 
and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the foJlowing types of purposes: 
DECLARATION OF JOHN FUQUAY-8 llfl)l!Ll"l'Y NA'l10NAL LAW GROUP 
1200-6'" A vt:NUF., sum: 620 
81'.ATII,I!, WA 98101 
(206) 123·4525 
383
a. Regulat· personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a neat·-daily 
basis for regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking childt-en to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving lat·ge semi-trnoks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
c. Regulai· farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving form equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestdan use of King Lane fo1· children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the come!' of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fnquays' 
prope1ties. 
LOWPARCEL2 
34. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2'') located south of King Lane. 
Oreana Loop Road c1·osses the northwest corneJ' of Low Parcel 2. The legal description 
for the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Wall"anty Deed attached as Exhibit .. H,, to 
the Motion. 
35. Prior to the Lows ownership of Low Parcel 2, my family openly and continuously used 
King Lane to access the John Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for more than 
5 years. 
36. From the pubfic 1·ecords, on May 6, 1942, D. Fred Henderson acquired Low Parcel 2. 
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37. From the public records, between May 6, 1942 and March 18, 1997, the Low Parcel 2 was 
owned by D. Fred Henderson, individually. 
38. From the public records, on March 18, 1997 D. F1·ed Henderson conveyed the Low Parcel 
2 to D. Fred Henderson and Mary F. Henderson as husband and wife. 
39. From the public records, on February 11, 2000, Mary F. Henderson conveyed the Low 
Parcel 2 to Mary F. Henderson, individually. 
40. From the public records, on July 8, 2005, Mary Frances Henderson conveyed the Low 
Parcel 2 to Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC. 
41. On J anua1·y 27, 2006, Pioneer Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC conveyed 
the Low Parcel 2 to the Lows. 
42. Fl'Om January 1, 1977 through March 18, 1997, I never asked D. Fred Henderson for 
permission to use King Lane. D. Fred Henderson never gave my family, my guests or me 
permission to use King Lane. 
43. From January l, 1977 through March 18, 1997, we used King Lane for access to the 
Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types ofpul'poses: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for 1·egular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking childt-en to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trucks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
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c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previoi1sly located at the comer of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays• 
properties. 
44. Ft'Om March 181 1997 tlU'ough July 8, 2005, I never asked D. Fred Henderson or Mary F. 
Henderson for permission to use King Lane. D. Fred Henderson or Mary F. Henderson 
never gave my family, my guests or me pe1mission to use King Lane. 
45. Fl'Om March 18, 1997 through July 8, 2005, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay 
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for the following types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
basis for regulai· residential pul'poses such as going to and from the store, plcking 
1.1p mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from pe1·sonal errands. 
b. Regula1· use of King Lane for driving large semi"trucks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucking Company. 
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane fo1· cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
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e. Use of King Ltme by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuq\.m.ys' 
properties. 
46. From July 2, 2005 through Januat·y 27, 2006, I never asked Pioneer Exchange 
Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC for permission to use King Lane. Pioneer 
ExchangeAcco1nmodation Titleholder #69, LLC never gave my family, my guests or me 
permission to use King Lane. 
47. From July 2, 2005 tlll'ough January 27, 2006, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay 
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel for 1he following types of purposes: 
a. Regular personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road 011 a near-daily 
basis fot· regular residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi.trucks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trncks and continued when I began opel'ating the John Fuquay Tmcking Company. 
c. Regulai· fal'm vehicle use of King Lnne for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestrian use of King Lane for children to· walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop R~ad. 
e. Use of ·King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays• 
properties. 
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48. From Januat·y 27, 2006 through the present I never asked the Lows for permission to use 
King Lane. The Lows never gave my family, my guests or me permission to use King 
Lane. 
49. From Januaty 27, 2006 to the present, we used King Lane for access to the Fuquay Parcel 
and the Clinton Fuquay Pat'Cel fat· the following types of purposes: 
a. Regulal' personal vehicle access to and from Oreana Loop Road on a near-daily 
·basis for regula1· residential purposes such as going to and from the store, picking 
up mail from the mail box, taking children to and from the bus stop, going to and 
from personal errands. 
b. Regular use of King Lane for driving large semi-trncks to and from the John 
Fuquay Parcel. This use has been consistent since 1977 when my father had his 
trucks and continued when I began operating the John Fuquay Trucki11g Company. 
c. Regular farm vehicle use of King Lane for cattle trucks, moving farm equipment 
from one location to another. 
d. Pedestl'ian use of King Lane fOl' children to walk to and from the bus stop 
previously located at the corner of King Lane and Oreana Loop Road. 
e. Use of King Lane by guests of the Fuquays to get to and from the Fuquays' 
properties. 
UTILITIES 
50. The overhead electric lines that service the houses located on the Clint Fuquay Parcel mn 
from Oreana Loop Road along King Lane to the Clint Fuquay Pal'Cel. 
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51. The undergro\md Centurylink telephone linos nm from Oreana Loop Road along King 
Lane to the Clint Fuquay Parcel. It then runs south along Castle Lane to my house on the 
John Fuquay Parcel. 
52. ~:-~tric lines for the house on tl1e John F~quay parcel run norlh through the 
property to the soutll of the John Fuquay Parcel. 
I HBREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF 
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELffiF, AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE 
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO ·PENALTY OF PERJURY. 
Dated: O""ber~2014 u ~;(.,,,(:,u, ?~a~ ~ 
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(Idaho State Bar No. 5636) 
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Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208)629 .. 7447 
Facsimile: (208)629-7559 
E-mail: B1yce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Defendant,; Susie Low and Cal Low 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, ) 






SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K. ) 
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ROSE M. KING: FIRST AMERICAN ) 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
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Defendants. ) 
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Case No. CV .. 2Q14-0278 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING 
Rose King being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and says that: 
1. I am a Defendant in the above-titled action, over the age of 18 and I make this 
affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and I am competent to testify to the matters 
contained herein. I have reviewed the Declaration of John Fuquay dated October 28, 2014. The 




statements set forth by Mr. Fuquay in his declaration are inaccurate for the reasons hereinafter 
set fo11h: 
2. My deceased husband, Gordon King and I purchased our ranch on September 17, 
1973 wllich included a field lane which has been referred to as "King Lane" in this litigation. 
At the time of our purchase, King Lane was only a path through grass and weeds and was wet 
and muddy most· of the year with a culvert constructed of 55 gallon barl'els at the west end. We 
desired to access our fields through the use of this field lane, therefore, we started hauling rocks 
to build a base for this road so that it would be passable for our farm equipment. We did this 
aIUIUally until we decided to sell the ranch in 1982. 
3. My husband and I sold our ranch to Zane Block in 1982 but had to repossess it 
in 1986. During this four year period I was still familiar with the use of King Lane as I 
frequently observed the property and the operations of the ranch. After we repossessed the ranch, 
the lane was in te1Tible condition and we had to construct and improve the road and the crossing 
where the road crosses an il'rigation ditch which. provides water to our ranch. There was a 
culvert 1~ade from 55 gallon baU"els at the west end of the land and these were rusty and leaky. 
We replaced the welded barrel culvert in 1988:.1989 with a concrete culve1t. Prior to that time 
it was impossible for large trucks to cross over the welded banels. This lane still requires annual 
maintenance to make it passable for our ranching operation. 
4. The path/road which has been referred to as "King Lane" was not named King 
Lane until 2002 when emergency 911 came into existence and Gary Aman requested a name for 
the lane to access of emergency vehicles. I informed him that the access would be named "King 
Lane. 
1
' At that time, addresses were provided for the four houses located on the King 




property/ranch with an address of King Lane. Mailing addresses for the four residences on the 
King property/nmch then became King Lane. There was no detel'rnination that the path/road be 
named King Lane would continue any further than the access to our residences. For purposes 
of the rest of thi~ Affidavit I will refer to the roadway at issue as King Lane but this does not 
alter my understanding that King Lane ends at the residences fo1· my rnnch. 
5. What has been referred to as King Lane for purposes of litigation has also been 
used by Cal and Susie Low t who own the property generally to the south of the King 
property/ranch and their predecessors in interest. When my husband and I purchased our ranch 
in 1973, the property now owned by Lows was owned by the Steiner family, and the Steiners 
used the road to access their property to get to and from their fields. This use has continued 
since 1973 to present, including now that the property is owned by Cal and Susie Low. 
6. I am familiar with the property cuITently owned by John Fuquay and Clint and 
Hailey Fuquay which is located generally to the south and west of the King :rancl1. 
7. My son, Greg King, rented the house which ls now occupied by J.C. Fuquay from 
1979 to 1982. During said time my son worked for us and could not use King Lane on a regular 
or frequent basis because the road was wet and impassible approximately ninety percent (90%) 
of the time. Many times when he came to our house or for work he had to walk or drive a 
tractor to do so because the road was not suitable for regular vehicle use. It was not until the 
concrete culve11 mentioned above was installed in the irrigation ditch that allowed more frequent 
use of the roadway. 
8. Our daughter, Karla Love, rented the main house on the Fuquay propel'ty for a 
couple months in the 1980ts. She traveled up and down Castle Lane to Oreana Loop for access 
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even when coming to visit us because King Lane was so impassible. 
9. From 1973 to present the primary access for the properties owned by John and 
Clint Fuquay has bee11 Castle Lane. Any use by the Fuquays of King Lane has been occasional 
use, but not on a daily or regular basis. This use has b~n casual use on occasion as a matter of 
convenience. This is because, among other things, as mentioned above, King Lane is in fact 
impassible during certain times of the year and cannot be used because it becomes too muddy. 
Such occasionaJ/casual use by the Fuquays has been allowed because we wanted to be 
neighborly, their- use did not interfere with our use of the road and it was done so with implied 
permission. The Fuquays use has been so infrequent that is has not bothered us until recently, 
or more specifically within the past five years, when the Fuquays have attempted to increase their 
use by bdnging large trucks through our (King) prope1ty. 
10. There has always been a fence and a gate on the west end of our property along 
what is referred to as King Lane to prevent our livestock from getting to the BLM property to 
' the west. We have also used this fenced area where King Lane is located for our own livestock 
to graze and to pen up for sorting. While the Fuquays have occasionally/casually used the road 
on an infrequent basis they have previously respected the fence and gates across the roadway, 
It was not until recently, within the past year, that John Fuquay asserted they did not have to · 
close the gate. 
11. Prior to this lawsuit, I am not aware of any use by UPS, post office or other 
delivery services of King Lane to provide services to the Fuquay properties. To the contrary the 
mailboxes for th.e Fuquays are located at the end of Castle Lane and I have not observed any 
services using King Lane to provide deliveries to the Fuquay prope1ties. The only mailbox at 
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the end of King Lane is for the Kings. Since this lawsuit has been initiated by the Fuquays, I 
have been asked if Schwaos delivery person can use King Lane to access the Fuquay propedy 
because John Fuquay has locked the gate on Castle Lane directing them to use King Lane. I 
verbally gave permission to the Schwans delivery person to use King Lane that one time which 
was within the past six months. 
12.. I am not aware of any guests of the Fuquays using King Lane to access the Fuquay 
properties. Since my husband and I have owned the King ranch, there has been occasional use 
of King Lane by hunters or othel's who have asked permission. 
13. Any use by Clint Fuquay of the road/King Lane to access the property now owned 
by Clint Fuquay has been in the last 8 years. Again, any use been occasional and not on a 
regular or primary access. 
14. With regard to children catching the school bus at the end of King Lane, my 
children caught the bus there. I do 1·emember that on occasion Megan, John's sister, did come 
down King Lane to catch the bus. I do not recall John Fuquay ever catching the bus at the end 
of King Lane. If he rode the school bus, he caught the bus at the bus stop at the end of Castle 
Lane. Clint Fuquay's children and J.C. Fuquay's cllildren catch the bus at the end of Castle 
Lane. 
15. Until the spring of 2014, I have never seen the Fuquays operate fa1m equipment 
on King Lane. 
16. From 1973 to 1988M1989 there were never any large trucks used on King Lane 
because, among other things, the trucks could not use the lane and pass over the welded ban-els 
mentioned above and King lane was not suitable for said uHe. From 1988M89 to 2011 I have not 
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observed any large trucks or fol' that matter much traffic at· all from the Fuquay properties using 
King Lane. The heavy truck traffic seemed to commence about 2011. 
In summary I have lived on the King Ranch from 1973 to cun-ent except for the four 
years between 1982·1986. I can observe and hear all of the traffic that uses King Lane. I 
dispute Mr. Fuquay's allegations that King Lane has been used since 1977 for regular personal 
vehicles on a nearly daily basis, semi trucks consistently since 1977, regular farm vehicles such 
as cattle tmcks and moving farm equipment, pedestrian traffic to and from the bus stop and 
guests going to and comeing from the Fuquay properties. 
The King family uses King Lane several times a day in our ranching/farming operations. 
Any use if any of King Lane by other people including the Fuquays has never interfered with our 
use of King Lane and in order to be neighborly we have allowed the use by others. Such use 
has been with implied permission. 
yZ_~ 
Rose King r= 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 4th da 
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otary Public for Idaho 
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King . 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROSE KING - Page 7 
[ ~ U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Cel'tified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
L] Hand Delivery 
L] Facsimile 
W Electronic Mail or CM/ECF 
[2Q U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Fedel'al Expl'ess 
LJ Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 




S. BRYCE FARRIS 
[Idaho Slate Bar No. 5636) 
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Golden Eagle Building 
1101 W. River St., Ste. 110 
P. 0. Box 7985 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 629-7447 
Facsimile: (208) 629-7559 
E-mail: bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Susie Low and Cal Low 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR 1HE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD Case No. CV-2014-0278 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC,; GORDON G. 
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
COUNTYOFADA ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL V.C. 
STEINER 
SAMUEL V.C. STEINER being first duly sworn, deposes and states that: 
1. I and my wife Mary are the predecesson; .in title for Cal and Susie Low who purchased 
our properties located adjacent to Oreana Loop Road .in Owyhee County in 2006. 





2. I was born 1957. My parents purchased these properties in 1959. I was two (2) or 
so when we moved onto the parcel in 1959 that is located across Oreana Loop Road from where 
Lows built their residence. Our farm residence was within a half mile of the road everyone is 
referring to as King Lane. 
3. I inherited the properties from my mother in 1984. I had lived on the parcel referred 
to above.until 1975 when I lived in Boise and went to college. I returned to the property in 1980. 
4. There was an old oue-room school building located on what is referred to as Castle 
Road close to the Foreman Reservoir, but classes were not held there. I believe the building was 
moved off sometime in the 1980s. I understood that.it had been an active school site for a number 
of years before being closed down when another school building was built that was more convenient. 
5. I do not know who, if anyone. constructed King Lane. This was an old farm access 
roadway that was used occasionally by a variety of people. My dad always told me that he thought 
the lane belonged to him. Neither my parents nor myselfttied to stop anyone from using the road. 
As long es they did not interfere with our operations, we didn't object to them using 'the lane. 
6. Sometimes hunters used it to go back to the reservoir on the BLM ground. Kings 
used it to go to the geothennal well they had leased on the BLM ground. Renters on the old Munger 
property, now owned by Fuquays and previously owned by Bob Collett used it occasionally as a 
shol't-cutto Grand View. I think that Jim Fuquay used it occasionally when he lived in the mobile 
home located near the rental property now owned by Clint Fuquay. Jim and John Fuquay lived in 
the old Foreman farm residence down by the Foreman Reservoh' for many years and while they 
generally dt'Ove out Castle Road, they also used the lane as a short-cut to Grand View. When Jim 
Fuquay moved on a mobile home at the corner of what would be King Lane and Castle Road, he 
would occasionally use King Lane, probably as a short-cut when he went out to Grand View. 
7. However, the majority of the vehicle use was down Castle Road to Oreana Loop Road 
to the west. This was especially true during wet weather because there is a slough at the common 
west coiner of the Fouquay, Low's and King's properties that was pretty muddy in wet weather. It 
was pretty difficult to get through then. When Zane Blockhad the King property under contract, he 
and Jim Fuquay did some work on the lane one yea1·. 
8. While there was some use of King Lane by passenger vehicles and pickup tmcks, I 
don't believe I ever saw anyone take a large truck out that way, logging trucks or cattle trucks. 
Those kind of vehicles always went out Castle Road. However1 I think that John Fuquay may have 
brought an empty cattle truck in that way a few times. 
DATED this ~y ofNovember1 2014. 




~ . o~ 
runuei;;:~. Steiner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to befo1·e me this /61:;' of November, 2014. 
~~ 
NOTARY PUB~ FO).l THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Residing at DJ, ti · , Idaho 
My Commission expires: t:,,/-:.j/"'17 
i I 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served 
on the following on this 8th day of Sept~, 2014 by the following method: 
J)c~ 
MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW 
GROUP 
1200 - 61h A venue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
Telephone: (206) 224-6003 
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffe 
RONALD P. RAINEY 
RONALD P. RAINING PA 
110 N. 9th Ave. 
P0Box26 
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and 
Rose King 
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RONALD P. RAINEY -ISB # 1022 
Attorneys at Law 
110 No11h Ninth A venue 
Post Office Box 26 
Caldwell, ldaho 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 or 459-6147 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
Rece1veo 
FIDEUTY NAT Till! 
FtB I 1 201~ 
SEATTLE LITJGATIOH 
FILED 
- -A.M. )l~!C_P.M. 
JAN 2 9 2015 
AN~;ti! ~Rhf<,;~0CLERK 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, ) CASE NO. CV 2014-0278 
Plaintiffs, ~ 
) 
vs. ) AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD P. RAINEY 
) 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K ) · 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KINO;) 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMEIUCAN ) 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and 
ROSE M. KJNG, as Beneficia1y of the 
HEART KRANCH TRUST UTA 











JOHNE. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ))) 









STATE OF IDAHO 




RONALD P. RAINEY, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am counsel for the Defendant and Counterclaimant, Heart K. Ranch Tn1st, in the 
above-captioned action, am over the age of majority, competent to testify, and I make this affidavit 
upon personal knowledge. 
2. Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is a copy of the cited testimony of J.C. 
Fuquay, John E. Fuquay and Clinton Ward Fuquay as given in open couit on Sep~mber 18, 2014 
during the preliminary injunction hearing. 
Fui1her affiant sayeth not. 
SUBSCIUBED AND SWORN to before me this..tf!A.. day ofJanuaiy, 2015. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this £. Oday of January, 2015,a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served upon the tbllbwing: 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
Fidelity National Law GROUP 
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620 
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Atlorney for Plalntiffe 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W. River Street, Suite 110 




Attorney for Low Defendants 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Ovemight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Other ______ _ 
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·1 Q The:, c;,n '.:l~l uo :::a!.!:lff La;·~. ::or;·ec.t? 
.2 >-\ They can. 



























A It depar.ds on the '/P.M. 
Q Well, what hapoens In an off year then;• 
A Well, t!'lere·~ the ditch that crln wash out. 
Q Who's locking you out? 
A I said ther-e's a dltc:i that ciin wash out. 
Q Oki1y. And --
A /111d llwt'!l -- lh;1\'1; l'ho onl\• one I can ll1ink 1:,( .ii 
tho moment. 
Q Wilen wa_s the last tlrne the ditch washed out? 
A Two years ago I v,ant to say ond we replaced tile. 
culvert. 
Q Okay. Vou got the culvert all replaced? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And so It's a fine roild now? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q ls that il yes? 
A Yes .. 
Q Okay. So again, the emergency vehicles can go 
right up Castle Lane without nny obstrucllons, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And these delivery people can go up Castle l;ine 
84 
without any obstructions, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q An<I the mall person that delivers your mall right 
4 <lown at the llottom of Castle Lane ilnd Oreana Loop. 














And you do that at least once a day? 




COUlff: Walt until he asks you a question. 
·wmiess: Okc,y. All right. 
1 J COURT: Your attorney can follow up. 
~4 WlTNESS: All right, 
!i LW MR. RAINEY: 
1G Q All Lhese sP.rvices ,u-c ilVallable through Cnstla 
·7 t.mie; Is that correc~? 
O A Yes, yes. 
19 Q Ancl one more time, there's not one obstruction 
1 0 other than maybe a ditch washing out once in a white or a 
' ( culvert? 
) ~~.. A Uh-huh. 
! 3 Q And thal only washes out when you don't dean out 
: ii 'the debris, right? 








Q Ol<ay. ,\nd ~rain hai:p.,ned -mce since .. 
A !t'-5 hilpi:~:-·w ilUfT'ercus times over ~t:e '/ears. 








5 ll<7:..S•! arounc th11 ccrn•?r from ·,our !louse to Orl.lar..l is Kmgs· I 
6 prlV'lt~ proper~/? I 
7 A No, I wasn't aware 'lf tl:-lt. It's alWJ'/S ·le\?n ,u1 j 





Ycu dlC!n't l<no'N that i<ings owned that pr::pert'/:' 
I kne,.., thar they ownad the prope,ty on the north 
11 sidL1 or th.:it lnm.:. 
12 Q You didn't know that they owned the lane? 
13 A No. l did not. I always assumed it was an 
14 casernent or private road -- or an access point to our 
15 property. It's never been disputed up until now. 
16 Q Well, have you ever interfered with the Kings' use 
17 of tlu1t land? 
10 A No, I hnve not. 
19 Q I-lave you ever told thl!m to get out? It's your 





No, sir, I have not. 
Have. you ever done anything thilt Interrupted their 
23 use? And they being Kings. Have you ever done anything to 
24 lntel'rupt the Kings' use or that'lane? 
26 A No, str; I have not. 
06 
1 Q Do you know If anyone in your family has ever 
2 Interrupted the Kings' use ot that lane? 
3 A Not to my recollection, no. 
4 Q And so bottom llno Is nobody from your famlly, as 
G for as you know, hr1v.e ever hindered or Interfered with thlf 
6 l(lngs' use of lhat lm1e we'r~ •• in the pleadings, It's 
7 called King's Lane. Do I need to rephrase that again? 
0 A Yeah, go ahead. Yeah. 
9 Q Can you recnll onybody In your family, you, your 
10 brother, f<1thor, t.hc1t's Interfered with l<ings' use of that 
11 lane called Kings' Lane? 
12 A Between nw house c1nd their houses? 
13 Q Yes. 
14 A No. 
· 15 Q So-· and you don't knpw who pays lhe tilxes on thc1t 
'16 lirn e I take~ It? 
17 A Jllo,ldonot. 
18 Q You don't"/ 
19 A No, sir. 
20 Q Now, the gattis you're talking about, have? you ever 
21 looked at those gates? 
22 A Which gates? 
23 Q The new gntes. 
24 A Not up close, no. 
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A l don't know. I've never seen them locked. 
Q So you haven't gone bacl< there since the' 
conversation 7 
A Since I went back. through there, the gates have 
1 some of these. 
2 CRO?S·e~MINAT[ON 
3 QUESTIONS BY MR. FARRIS: 
4 Q Mr. Fuquay, my name Is Bry<;e Farris and l represen 
6 been •• I've been gooe for the last month so l mean he put 
6 the cattle In there and I assume he opened the gates bacl< 
7 up and there's not been an Issue. 
6 the Lows. 
8 A Okay. 
7 Q You've been talking about this roadway that they've 
8 Q Well, let's make the record clear, Mr. Fuquay. The 8 referred to or referred to as Castle Lane and from what J 
9 Kings use that lane to graze cattle and to actually corral 9 understand is that lane comes off Oreana Loop up to your 
10 property? If you'd look at 1>robably fxhllllt J If you have 
11 It In front of you. 
0 the cattle too, don't they? 
A Yeah. I don't Know what they •• yeah, sure. They 
graze It. 12 A Okay. 






I don't know what -· I don't know about that but -· 
Well, there's cattle In there. 
Yep. 
There's cattle In there an awful lot of the year, 
14 Lane? 
15 A Yeah. 
16 Q That Castle Lane originates at Oreana Loop further 
17 to the south of the area of your property? 
18 A Correct. 
Isn't that correct? 19 Q That's the road you've been talking about and It -
"0 A sometime$, yeah. 20 comes up, goes through your property? 
1 Q Okay. And they also -· Kings use that road to get 21 A Correct . 
• 
2! to their flelds, don't they? 22 Q And then goes up to the property that you've --
A Correct. 23 th~t someone's Identified as Ofnt Fuquay? 
Q They've used that road ever since you've lived In 24 A Correct . 
. j 25 that property. 25 Q Okay. With respect to that Castle-Lane, from what 
.{-_1~~--~~~---3_6~~~~~~--~~----~~~~~~~~3_8~~~~~~~~~~~· 
.... A Correct. 1 I'm understanding your testimony Is, that's where your 
•
2 Q.. And never have you tried to kick the Kings off the 2 mailbox Is currently? 
3 property, have you, off the road? 3 A Currently, yes. 
I 
•
:4 . A Not that I recall. 4 Q Okay. That's your address? 
5 Q Well, you never have, 1,ave you? 6 A Yes. 
8 A Not that I recall, no. 6 Q That's where Schwann's or other delivery folks 
! Kings using their own property, have you? 8 A Currently. 
'
. 7 Q So In other words, you've never Interfered with the 7 deliver to? 
" A Other than tile gates, 9 Q. Okay. Currently. As we sit here today, And If 
*
O Q Pardon me? 10 you'd look at Exhibit 1, do you have that In front of you? 
1 A Other than the Issue with the gates. 11 A This one? 
:2 Q Well, they put up gates. Particularly when they 12 Q Yes, yeah. 
13 had cattle In there, they had gates In there, Isn't that 13 COURT: Oh, I've got It. It's this one here. 
right? · 14 Yeah. 
A Yeah. 16 WITNESS: Okay. 
Q Okay. N~w, you can't tell Judge Nye whether It's 16 BY MR, FARRIS: 
easier to open the metal gate than to put the wire over the 17 Q You see where at the top or that It says "map 
posts with the loop, can you? 18 address" and It says 18907 Castle Lane? 
A I've not opened them metal gates. I haven't been 19 A Correct. 
through there since. 20 Q That's your address? 
MR. RAINEY: 'That's all the cross l have, Your 21 A Correct. 
Honor. 
COURT: Mr. Farris. 
MR. FARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try n1>t 
26 to be redundant. Let me see If I can put a fine point on I 37 
l/22/70!4 11 •f"l-/'ltl AM 
22 Q So that's -- If you want to put In your address to 
23 find your property, that's the address you put In, Castle 
24 · Lane? 
26 A Correct. 
39 
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1· A Sure. 
2 Q Coming up castle Lane, that's a straight shot 
I J without stopping for anything, correct? 
Q So It's Just a matter of convenience tor you --
A Yes. 
4 A Yes. 










Q •• to go through the Kings'? 
A Yes. 
Q Only convenience. That's.the only reason. 
A It's quicker. 
( 
6 A When I was 15. 
7 Q And so you say you're 27 now. 
8 A Yes. 




Q And six of those twelve years you llved somewhere 
12 else. 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q So you've only been on this property for six years. 
Q Could be? 
A It's quicker. 




A It's easier, yes. 
Q Okay. So you want to use King's Lane Just because 
13 It's convenient. 
14 
16 A No. Eight, Since I was 19, 15 
A Because that's what I've always used. 
Q You don't claim any right to It, do you? 
A What's that? 16 Q Can you give me the years when you were gone, from 16 
17 when to when? 
18 A I would say from 2001 to 2005, 
19 Q Well, that's five years. 
20 A Four. I don't remember when In 2001. Moved back 
21 the summer of 2005, 
22 Q When you got your driver's license, you were gone, 
23 You didn't even live on that property. 
24 A I stayed there on the weekends. 
25 Q Other than weekends but you didn't live there on a 
64 
1 day·to·day basis. 
2 A Correct. 
3 Q You were not watching the Kings' operation on· a 
4 day-to-day basis. 
5 A Correct. 
6 Q In fact, you've never watched Klr:igs on a day-to· 
7 day-· 
8 A correct. 
9 Q Is thilt right? 
10 A Correct. 
11 Q Just occasionally seeing what's going on, right? 
12 · A Correct. 
13 Q So when you say that they've never had cattle In 
14 there, you don't know, do you? 
15 A What are you talklng about? 
16 Q Well, there's periods of times you s11ld they never 
17 had cattle 11nd never locked gates. You don't knoY.( because 
18 you're not there on a day-to-day basis, are you? 
19 A I drive that road on a day-to·day basis but In that 
20 time, I wasn't there on a day-to-day basis so at that time, 
17 
18 









I've been using It so 1 Just always assumed that I 
Have_you ever exclu(ted the Kings from using that 
No. 
Have you ever told them to get off? 
No. 
Have you ever told them that they couldn't use It 
66 
1 If you're using lt7 
2 A No. 
3 Q So In a way, have you lnterrered with the Kings? 
4 A No. 
5 Q Have you given them any hassle about when you use 
6 thclane?. 
7 A No. 
8 Q Okay. 
9 MR. FARRIS: Your Honor, l don't have anything to 
10 add. 
11 COURT: Okay, Thank you. Redirect. 
12 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
13 QUESTIONS BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
14 Q You Indicated that Castle Lan·e Is what Mr, Rainey 
1S calls an all-weather road? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Is that -- who maintains that road? 
18 A We do, 
19 Q Do you maintain King Lane? 
20 A Yes. 
( "'1 I can't say what they did on a day-to-day basis. 
,k Q Okay, And Is there any reason you don't go down •• 
21 Q How do you maintain It? 
22 A We've bladed It with a road grader and a land 
23 when you're driving, you don't go down to Oreana through 
24 Castle Lane? 
25 A It's quicker to get.where I'm going going thatway. 
65 
23 plane. 
24 Q What else? 
25 A We've ·- a backhoe. Filled In potholes with a 
67 
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JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FCQUA Y ) 
) 
Counterdefcndants. ) 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
ROSE KING, being fast duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am a party in the above-captioned action, over the age of majority, competent to 
testify, and I make this affidavit upon personal knowledge. 
2. I have previously submitted affidavits in this action in opposition to the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary iajunctio~ (9/9/14 ), and in response and objection to the Fuquay 
. Pl~intiffs request for summary judgment against the Low Defendants (12/9/14), each of those 
affidavits is incorporated by reference herein .. 
3. I have reviewed the Declaration of John Fuquay, as filed with this Court on October 
2912014, and submitted in support of the Fuquay Plaintiffs• motion for summary judgment against 
the Low Defendants, and the claims for prescriptive easement made in that declaration concerni~g 
the Fuquay Plaintiffs use of the roadway that has been identified in this action as "King Lane." 
4, As made and declared within the Declaration of John Fuquay, it appears that the 
Fuquay Plaintiffs are asserting a prescriptive easement claim to the use of King Lane for the period · 
beginning January l, 1977 to the present. 
5. As declal'ed in my affidavit submitted in opposition to the Fuquay Plaintiffs' motion 
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( for summary judgment against the Low Defendants, the King Defenda~ts have owned the property 
alleged to burdened by the alleged prescriptive easement claimed by the Fuquay Plaintiffs since 
1973, except for a four year period between 1982 and 1986. 
( 
( 
6. At all ti.mes prjm· to 2014 tho Fuquay Plaintiffs' any use of King {,ane, whethe1· by 
regular passenger vehicles of the Fuquays and their guests. the infrequent use of semi-trucks in the 
course of the Fuquays' farm and ranch operations, other fm·m and ranch vehicle use, or simple 
pedestrian use, has been in common with, and without interference to or disruption of, the Kings' 
own use of that roadway, or without damage to that roadway or its bridges. As also stated in my 
earlier affidavit, the heavy truck traffic conducted by the Fuquay Plaintiffs on King Lane did not 
commence until about 2011, and until the spring of2014 I had never seen the Fuquays operate fm:m 
equipment on King Lane. 
7. At no time prior to about 2011 did any of the Fuquay Plaintiffs ever overly assert or 
- . 
claim any right or use in respect to King Lane in derogation to the rights of the Kings, or that was 
in any way exclusive or proprietary, such that it wa$ adverse to the rights of the Kings in that" 
roadway. 
8. At no time prior to 2011 did any of the Fuquay Plaintiffs ever perform any act or 
· make any declarat_ion that would constitute a clear, open, and notorious assertion of a claim to a11 
adverse and prescl'iptive right «;laim to the use of King 'Lane. 
9. It was only about in 2011 that the Fuquays did suddenly, and without explanation, 
attempt to drive large semi-trucks for commercial pu1poses which increased use. began to damage 
. 
a bridge at the east side of King Lane. It was at this time that a cement block placed at that location 
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( · · which prevented further use of those trucks, and it was also at this time that the fonner wire gates 
were l'eplaced with metal swing gates. 
(' 
( 
10. As stated in my earlier affidavit, at no time prior to about 1988-89 could any large 
trucks use King Lane because the condition of the road rmcl the welded-barrel culvert simple was not 
allow that use. 
11. Because any claim.by the Fuquay Plaintiffs to a prescriptive easement based upon 
uses that commenced af\er 2006 would be subject to the 20 year statutory period for such easements, 
those uses could not ripen into an actual prescriptive easement claim at any time before 2026. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
Rose King 
SUBSCRIB~D AND SWORN to before me this __ day of January, 2015. 
Notary.Public for Idaho 
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho 
My C~mmission expires: _____ _ 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this __ day of January, 2015,a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served upon the following: 
Mlltlhew R. Cleverley [ ] 
Fidelity National Law GROUP [ ] 
U.S. Mail, 1iostage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
1200 6th A venue, Suite 620 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Seattle, Washington 98101 [ ] 
Telephone: 206-224-6003 [ ] 
Facsimile Tl'ansmission 
Other 
Facsimile: · 877-655-5281 
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf.com 
Altorney for Plaintiffs 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W. River Street, Suite 110 
Boise, Idalto 83707 
Telephone: . 208-629-7447 
. Facsimile: · 208,629-7559 
Email: b1yce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Low Defendants 
--------
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail . 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Other ______ _ 
Ronald P. Rainey 
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JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY ) 
) 
Counterc.lcfondants. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss, 
County of Canyon ) 
OILBERT'IGNG, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am a party in the above-captioned action, over the age of majority, competent to 
testify, and I make this affidavit upon personal knowledge. 
2. I have previously submitted affidavits in this action in oppositi~n to the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs' request for a p~liminary injunction (9/9/14). 
3. It was not unti_l sometime in 2011 that t}:ie Fuquay Plaintiffs began ~ny use of King 
Lane by large semi-trucks. · 
4. This use appeared to be unrelated to uses occurring on the Fuquay properly itself, but 
instead seemed to be for gene1·al commercial trucking purposes unrelated to the prope1ty itself. 
5. On 01· about 1 'Z· f.S "'r.3. (date) I had a large cement block placed at or neat' the 
location of a bridge over°",1££ crt IC (state location) in any attempt eliminate this use of King Lane 
by the Fuquays which was contributing to damage to this bridge. 
6. 01\ or about 'Eh c).d:- l t.( (date) I ha4 two former wfre gates on King Lane 
replaced with metal swing gates, so as to be able to better .control entry onto and through King Lane. 
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Further affiant sayeth not. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this __ day of Janua1y, 2015. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho 
My Commission expires: ____ _ 
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In the opening brief submitted in .support of their motion for summary judgment the Heart 
K Ranch Defendants argued that the Fuquay Plaintiff's alleged prescriptive easement claims, as 
asserted in this action, must necessarily fail because, 
any use [ of King Lane] by the Fuquay plaimiffs ortheir predecessors, [prior to 2006] 
was use in common with the Kings and Lows that in no way interfered with their use 
of King Lane and therefore undea· Idaho law was deemed permissive and could 
not be prescrintive. This rebuts elements three and four (adverse use that is known 
to the servient landowner) making any prescriptive claim during this period 
impossible. 
Heart K Ranch Summary Judgment Memorandum at pg 8 ( emphasis in original/bracketed references 
added). Heart K Ranch's summary judgment motion was premised upon rhe standard that the 
absence of evidence necessary to establish an element that the nonmoving party will be required to 
prove at trial renders any other potential issues of fact irreleyant. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 
807, 810-11, 979 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (1999). 
The Fuquay Plaintiffs have firmly planted their alleged prescriptive easement claims, as made 
in tl1is action, within the five year prescriptive period that existed prior to the change in the 
applicable statute, I.C. § 5-203, to a twenty year prescriptive use period in 2006. See e.g .• Capstar 
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Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 420 n. 2, 283 P.Jd 728, 737 n. 2 (2012). Any 
acrual adverse use that arose after that date would be governed by the cwenty year statute chat is now 
in effect and therefore would not ripen into an actual prescriptive right claim, at the earliest, w1til 
2026, and therefore such claims could not be at issue in this action. Under the controlling Idaho case 
law standards set out in Chen v. Conway, 116 Idaho 90 l, 903, 781 P .2d 23 8, 240 (Ct.App.1989) and 
A,felendezv.Hintz, lll Idaho401,405, 724P.2d 137,141 (Ct.App.1986)theuseofaroadwayin 
common by neighbors is deemed "permissive." 
Where one person merely uses a roadway in common with his neighbor, without 
damage to the roadway, without interfering with the neighbor's use of the roadway, 
and where the neighbor has established and maintained the roadway on his own 
property for his own purposes, only the most minimal intrusion is made into the 
owner's dominion over his property. 
111 Idaho at 405, 724 P.2d at 141, as cited at 116 Idaho at 903, 781 P.2d at 240. 
The various ·affidavits that have been submitted to the Court- and the Fuquays' own hearing 
testimony, as submitted to this Court on September 18, 2014 - remains unrefuted on this critical 
point that the parties to this action used King Lane in common without damage tQ the roadway and 
without interference with each other's use at all times prior to 2011. In other words the use of 
King Lane by the Fuguays was at all times permissive as a n1atter of law under the standards 
of Chen v, Cor,way and Melendez v. Hi11tz. 
The testimony of Rose King, as set forth in her Affidavit submitted in Support of the 
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion for Summary Judgment filed January 29, 2015, on page 3 
paragraph 6 sea.res, ''the Fuquay Plaintiffs' ... use of King Lane ... has been in common with, and 
without interference to or disruption of, the Kings' own use of that roadway, .... " Furthermore 
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Rose King states in paragraph 7, "At no time prior to about 20 l l did any of the Fuquay Plaintiffs 
ever over[t]ly assert or claim any right or use in respect to King Lane in derogation to the rights of 
the Kings, or that was in any way exclusive or proprietary, such that it was adverse to the rights of 
the Kings in that roadway." The Fuquay Plaintiffs have further acknowledged that they never 
interfered with Kings use of the lane as set forth in the excerpts of the trial transcript that were both 
quoted in the Kings' summary judgment memorandum and attached to the Affidavit of Ronald P. 
Rainey filed January 29, 2015. 
Therefore the fact that King Lane was used in common, and without any interference to its 
use by the Kings, remains unreftited, as to the Fuquays' alleged prescriptive use claim, as based upon 
a five year period of adverse use, which allegedly arose at some period of time prior to 2006. The 
only time that any damage to the road (the bridge crossing)1 and any ensuing alleged hostile use 
could have· arose, was after the statutory period had changed to twenty years in 2006. As already 
noted above, no alleged prescriptive right arising out of such a claim could possibly mature and be 
asserted at any time before 2026. 
As to any change from permissive to hostile use as occurring within the earlier five year 
period, prior to the change in the statute in 2006, the Idaho Supreme Court was emphatic in its recent 
decision handed down inH.F.L.P. v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672,339 P.3d 557 (2014): 
Moreover, if the presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the 
presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested and 
"brought home" to the servientproperty owner. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 
390,398,210 P.3d 75, 83 (2009); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789,792,537 P.2d 
631,634 (1975). 
157 Idaho at 681, 339 P.3d at 566. 
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Not to draw too fine a point on this questioa, but note should be taken of the fact that any 
actual change in the initial "permissive" use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs. to an ·'adverse" 
use, within the context of their fiveuyear claim, had to be accomplished no later than June 30, 200 I. 
The reason is that the statutory period of required adverse use changed from five years to twenty 
years effective July 1, 2006. See, Ch. 158, § 1, of the 2006 Idaho Session Laws; LC.§ 67u5 l 0. Any 
effective notice to the defendants in this action of that change in adverse use would have to have 
occurred no later than June 30, 2001 ia order · for the Fuquay Plaintiffs to claim a five year 
prescriptive right under the former five-year adverse use statute. Any change in use from 
"permissive" to i,adverse" which occurred at any time after July I, 2001 would have necessarily 
failed to mature under that five year statute before it changed to a twenty year prescriptive use period 
on July 1, 2006, and thereafter would have required an additional fifteen years to become effective 
under the new twenty year statute that went into effect July l, 2006. 
A review of the chart of alleged disputed material facts, which the Fuquay :Plaintiffs have 
submitted at pp. 5-7 of their summary judgment response brief, only reveals a single allegation which 
touches upon the specific issue that was raised in the motion for summary judgment submitted by 
Heart K Ranch. The very last entry cites the January 2015 affidavit of Rose King for the proposition 
that the Fuquay Plaintiffs' "use" has damaged King Lane. What Rose King actually declared in that 
affidavit was the following: 
9. It was only about in 1.011 thattheFuquays dld suddenly, and without 
explanation, attempt to drive large semi~trucks for commercial purposes which 
inc:reased use began to damage a bridge at the east side of King I,ane. It was at 
this time that a cement block placed at that location which prevented further use of 
those trucks, and it was also at this time that the former wire gates were replaced with 
mental swing gates. 
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Affidavic of Rose King in Support of the DefendantHeartKRanch's Motion for Summary Judgment 
at pp. 3-4 (emphasis added). The above highlighted language certainly implicates the Chen v. 
Conway and Ji,Jelendez v. Hintz standard of permissive use- as cited above- concerning, "use of 
a roadway in common with a neighbor, without damage to the roadway," since the use of those 
trucks in 2011 began to damage the bridge. The problem with any application of that standard to the 
facts ofrhis case is that rhe alleged damaging use in question did Qot arise untH 2011, almost five 
years after the prescriptive period had become twenty years, rather than the five years upon which 
the Fuquay Plaintiffs rely. Even under the applicable summary judgment standard that all facts and 
inferences are viewed in favor of the Fuquays, as the non-moving party. a claim based upon that 
allegation could not mature into a prescriptive right until 2031, at the earliest. 
In addition, the Fuquay Plaintiffs refuse to acknowledge the established fact thatunderldaho 
law even if they did have an established prescriptive easement over King Lane, the Kings, as the 
servient landowners, are entitled to maintain gates over such an easement. See e.g., Beckstead v. 
Price, 146 ldaho 57, 67,190 P.3d 876,886 (2008), by citation to Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 
633, 570 P.2d 870 (1977) and Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 78 P.3d 389 (2003). The 
remaining alleged "disputed facts" as outlined in their chart do not raise any issues that go to the 
"adverse use" element that has been actually raised and put at issue by Heart K Ranch's motion for 
summary judgment (i.e., children walking to school, deliveries, use by friends and guests, daily or 
infrequent use, express or implied permission, maintenance of the roadway). 
On a motion for summary judgment once the absence of evidence in support of an essential 
element of the non-moving party's claim has been demonstrated, the burden then shifts to opposing 
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party to show, via further depositions, discovery responses, or affidavits that there is indeed a 
genuine issue for trial. Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874, 876 P.2d l 54, 156 
(Ct.App.1994 ). ((The non moving party cannot rely on mere speculation, and a sch1tilla of evidence 
is insufficient to create a genuine issue of mate.rial fact." Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., 
Inc., 152 Idaho 632,637,272 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2012). On the facts of this case that have been 
submitted to this Court for decision on this motion for summary judgment the Fuquay Plaintiffs have 
simply failed to submit even a scintilla of evidence in opposition to the "adverse use" element that 
Heart K Ranch challenged and raised on its motion for summary judgment. 
As declared by the Idaho Supreme Court in Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 406, 34 P .3d 
1085, 1089 (2001) the purpose for imposing the requirement that a prescriptive use be open and 
notorious is to give the owner of the servient estate an opportunity to assert his rights against the 
development of an easement by prescription. In that same vein, this is also why "mere use" in 
common with the servient owner is deemed to be permissive, and is also deemed insufficient to 
establish hostile and adverse use. Instead, such an adverse use claim must be in some sense 
exclusive, proprietary in nature, and exercised independently of the rights of all others. See, Hall 
v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111,112,697 P.2d 451,452 (Ct.App.1985). 
As based upon the burden-shifting standard that is implicated on a motion for summary 
judgment when there is an absence of evidence in support of an essential element of the non-movmg 
party's case, the Fuquay Plaintiffs' in their response have failed to come forward and meet that 
burden rhrough the submission of further required evidence in order to avoid the entry of summary 
judgment. Throughout this case the Fuquay Plaintiffs have based their alleged prescriptive easement 
REPLY l'tfEMORANDUJl,f IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT 
HEART K RANCH,.S !YIOTJON FOR SUJt,fMARY JUDGMENT-PA GE 7 
421
l!IL.-1::1-· l:.J 1.:s: li::i l:'.tiUl'J- e T-:-:S4~ Pl!ll1~/ld10 F-229 
claim on a five year prescriptive period, which necessarily must have commenced at some time prior 
to June 30, 2001. The only evidence before this Court that in any way "brings home" an end of the 
presumptive permissive use of King Lane by the FuquayPlainriffs is that use which arose in 2011, 
at a time well within the twenty year prescriptive use period that under no circumstances has 
matured, and that has not even been claimed by the Fuquays in this action. Beyond that single 
incident, there is not even a scintilla of evidence before this Court that otherwise supports the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs' burden to establish an open, hostile, and adverse use claim in existence for the requisite 
five year period of which the Kings ever had any notice sufficient to establish their alleged right to 
a prescriptive easement in King Lane. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the standard that the absence of a genuine issue of fact with regard to an essenrial 
element of the plaintiff's claim renders all other potential issues of fact i.m.material, the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their alleged prescriptive easement claim to King Lane due to an absence 
of any evidence in support of an open and notorious adverse claim known to either the Kings or the 
Lows that would have put the Kings or the Lows on notice of that alleged prescriptive use easement 
claim. In the absence of this essential element of the Fuquay plaintiffs' claim, all other issues off act 
are rendered immaterial, and entry of summary judgment for the defendants on the Fuquay Plaintiffs' 
alleged prescriptive easement claim is therefore appropriate in this case. 
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Respectfully submitted this ~ay of February, 2015. 
_Ronald P. Rainey 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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This matter came on for hearing on February 27, 2015 upon defendants Heart K Ranch 
Trust UTA., acting by its Trustee, Gilbert King; the Estate of Gordon G. King and Rose M. King's 
(hereinafter the "King defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment. Appearing on behalf of the 
King defendants was attorney Ronald Rainey. Appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs was attorney 
Matthew Cleverley, of the law firm Fidelity National Law Group. Appearing on behalf of 
defendants Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter the "Low defendants") was attorney Bryce Farris, 
of the law firm Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC. The Court has considered the briefing, affidavits, 
pleadings and argument submitted and sets forth its decision below. 
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment is proper when ''the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any,-show-that there is no genuine-issue as to any material fact.and. 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In a motion for summary 
judgment, this Court should liberally construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draw 
all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Summary judgment 
must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence presented. West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord 141 Idaho 75, 86-
87, 106 P.3d 401, 412 - 413 (2005), citing Iron Eagle Dev., L.L.C. v. Quality Design Sys., Inc., 
138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003) (citations omitted); see also Willie v. Bd of 
Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133, 59 P.3d 302, 304 (2002). 
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden is always upon the moving party to prove 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. If, however, the basis for a properly supported 
motion is that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an element of the non-
moving party's case, it is incumbent upon the non-moving party to establish an issue of fact 
regarding that element. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 (1996). 
The burden on the moving party may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on 
an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 
Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Summary judgment should be granted with caution. If the record contains conflicting 
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inferences or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be 
denied. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1991). Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 
Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991). 
Where the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be 
the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those 
inferences. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,650 P.2d 657 (1982). 
"While the court was permitted to draw probable inferences from the uncontradicted 
evidence because it would serve as the trier of fact, it was not permitted to make conclusive 
findings with regard to issues upon which the parties submitted conflicting evidence." Banner 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 127, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). Citing 
Williams v. Computer Res., Inc., 123 Idaho 671, 673, 851 P.2d 967, 969 (1993); Ashley v. 
Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 70, 593 P.2d 402,405 (1979); Argyle v. S/emaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670-
71, 691 P.2d 1283, 1285-86 (Ct.App. 1984). 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs seek a declaration of a prescriptive easement over King Lane in Owyhee County. 
King Lane is a private, all-weather road about one-half mile in length. It runs in an east-west 
direction from the public Oreana Loop Road until it connects with Castle Lane, which then runs 
south until it connects with Oreana Loop Road. The King defendants own the parcel of land to the 
north of King Lane, the Low defendants own the parcel of land to the south of King Lane and the 
plaintiffs own parcels of land to the west of King Lane where it ends and connects with Castle 
Lane. 
According to the Affidavit of Rose King filed on December 9, 2014, the Kings purchased 
their property on September 17, 1973. From 1973 to 1989, King Lane was just a path through their 
property and at certain times of the season, it was impossible to use.1 However, the Kings assert 
that by 1989, they replaced the barrel welded culvert with a concrete culvert and improved the road 
making it possible to access year-round. 
1 Ms. King states that King Lane was unnamed until 2002 when The Owyhee County Sheriff's Office requested that 
the Kings name the lane for identification by emergency vehicles. 
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According to the Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014, the plaintiffs state 
that since 1977, they have continuously used large semi-trucks, cattle trucks, farm vehicles and 
personal vehicles to cross King Lane. 
At various times throughout the year, the Kings graze their cattle over King Lane on both 
the King property and the Low property. Prior to 2014, the Kings had barbed wire gates erected on 
both the east and west ends of King Lane to keep the livestock contained. Anyone attempting to 
use King Lane had to stop, open and close the gates. They also had to dodge the Kings' cattle. (See 
Affidavit of Susie Low filed on 9/16/2014 and 9/18/2014 Preliminary Injunction Hearing transcript 
pg. 17). 
During the summer of 2014, a dispute arose between Gilbert King and John Fuquay 
regarding the installation of large iron gates that the defendants recently placed at each end of King 
Lane. (See Affidavit of Scott Snyder filed on 9/18/2014). According to the police report, the King 
defendants told Deputy Snyder that they gave the plaintiffs permission to use King Lane so long as 
the gates remained closed. At the time, the Kings had cattle grazing over King Lane that would be 
affected if the gates were left open. However, John Fuquay stated that he did not have to close the 
defendants' gates because he had an easement over King Lane. On August 11, 2014, the plaintiffs 
filed this suit seeking a declaration of a prescriptive easement over King Lane. 
According to the affidavits and declarations submitted by both the plaintiffs and the 
defendants, King Lane was used by the general public. The plaintiffs assert that they have used 
King Lane as a shortcut to access their property from Oreana Loop Road since 1977. (See 
Declaration of John Fuquay in Support of Ex Parte Motion for TRO and Declaration of John 
Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014). The King defendants assert that they use King Lane several 
times a day to access their pastures and operate their cattle business. (See Affidavit of Rose King 
9/9/2014). 
ARGUMENTSOFTHEPARTIES 
In their motion for summary judgment, the King defendants argue that the plaintiffs claim 
of prescriptive easement is not supported by the necessary evidence to prevail on an essential 
element of a prescriptive easement claim. Specifically, the King defendants argue that the record 
before the Court shows that the plaintiffs' use of King Lane was entirely permissive and there is 
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nothing in the record to show that their use was adverse and under a claim ofright.2 
The plaintiffs contend that there remain genuine issues of fact regarding the required 
elements of their prescriptive easement claim and therefore, summary judgment should be denied. 
LAW & ANALYSIS 
A. Requirements for establishing a prescriptive easement 
The requirements for a prescriptive easement have been clearly established in Idaho: 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by 
prescription "must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the 
subject property, which is characterized as: (1) open and notorious; 
(2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of 
right; ( 4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the 
servient tenement (5) for the statutory period." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 
Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003). A claimant may rely on his 
own use, or he ''may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's 
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine 
such predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the 
requisite five continuous years of adverse use." Hodgins, 139 Idaho 
at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. Once the claimant presents proof of open, 
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the claimed right for the 
prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the use began. he 
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of 
right. Woodv. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383, 385-
86 (1998); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 
(1997). The burden then shifts to the owner of the servient tenement 
to show that the claimant's use was permissive, or by virtue of a 
license, contract, or agreement. Wood, 131 Idaho at 703, 963 P.2d at 
386; Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. The nature of the 
use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the 
property." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 231, 76 P.3d at 975. The state of 
mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling; the 
focus is on the nature of their use. Id at 231-32, 76 P.3d at 975-76. 
Becksteadv. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 62, 190 P.3d 876,881 (2008); citing Akers v. D.L. White Constr., 
Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005). 
"A prescriptive right cannot be obtained if the use of the servient estate is by permission of 
the landowner." Brown v. Miller, 140 Idaho 439, 443, 95 P.3d 57, 61 (2004); (quoting Wood, 131 
2 The Low defendants support the Kings' Motion for Summary Judgment and reserve the opportunity to file their 
own motion for swnmaryjudgment based on the same facts and argwnent. 
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Idaho at 702, 963 P .2d at 385). 
A determination that a claimant has established a prescriptive easement involves entwined 
questions of law and fact. Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61, 190 P .3d 876, 880 (2008). "Each 
element is essential to the claim, and the trial court must make findings relevant to each element in 
order to sustain a judgment on appeal." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 
(2003). It is the province of the trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs presented ''reasonably 
clear and convincing evidence" of each of the five elements. Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 12-13, 
784 P.2d 339, 342-43 (Ct.App.1989). In addition, the creation of a private easement by 
prescription is not favored under Idaho law. Elder v. Nw. Timber Co., 101 Idaho 356, 358, 613 P.2d 
367,369 (1980). 
The King defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claim of prescriptive easement fails as a 
matter of law because there is no evidence in the record to show that prior to 2011, the plaintiffs' 
use of King Lane was "adverse or under a claim of right" for the statutory period.3 Hodgins, 139 
Idaho at 229. Rather, the record reflects that the plaintiffs' use of King Lane was permissive and in 
common with the Kings, the Lows and the general public. 
B. Adverse and under a claim of right 
The Idaho Supreme Court has provided explanation for the prescriptive easement 
requirement that use be adverse and under a claim of right: 
A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient 
tenement was by permission of its owner, because the use, by 
definition, was not adverse to the rights of the owner. Indeed, the 
rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or 
ripen into a prescriptive right unless it constitutes an actual 
invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner. 
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006) (citations omitted). 
The nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the 
property." Akers, 142 Idaho at 303 (quoting Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,231, 76 P.3d 969, 
975 (2003)). "The state of mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling; instead, 
3 In 2006, I.C. § 5-203 was amended to extend the statutory period from five years to twenty years. However, the twenty 
year period does not apply to a prescriptive easement prior to 2006. The plaintiffs claim that they established the 
required elements for prescriptive easement prior to 2006. 
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the focus is on the nature of their use." Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 397-98, 210 P.3d 
75, 82-83 (2009). 
If a use has commenced as permissive, a user must make some new and independent act 
that would put the owner of the servient property on notice that the use was no longer permissive. 
Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326,327, 563 P.2d 50, 51 (1977). However, "mere inaction and 
passive acquiescence is not a sufficient basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was 
with the permission of the owner of the servient tenement." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 
511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973). 
There is nothing in the record to show how plaintiffs' use began but it is undisputed and the 
record establishes that the plaintiffs' use of King Lane was (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous 
and uninterrupted; (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the defendants. Proof of these 
elements, without evidence as to how the use began, raises the presumption that such use was 
adverse and the burden is then on the defendants to show that such use was permissive. 
The King defendants claim that beginning in 2011, the Fuquays use of King Lane became 
adverse use and interfered with their ownership rights when an increased amount of commercial 
and heavy truck traffic was causing excessive damage to the road surface. However, John Fuquay 
claims that his use of King Lane has always been the same, which has always included moving 
heavy trucks and equipment across King Lane. 
According to the Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014, the plaintiffs have 
used King Lane to access the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel since 1977. John 
Fuquay asserts that his father, James Fuquay, owned large semi-trucks and cattle trucks that he 
regularly drove across King Lane from the time they moved onto their property in January 1977. 
John Fuquay also states that as a teenager, he drove large trucks across King Lane while working 
for his father. (See Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014). Once he obtained his 
commercial truck license, John Fuquay stated that he started driving large trucks commercially. 
Currently, John Fuquay asserts that he operates under the business name John Fuquay Trucking 
Company and continues to drive commercial trucks across King Lane. In addition to the 
commercial semi-truck use, John Fuquay asserts that since 1977, the plaintiffs have used King Lane 
to access their parcels with the use of personal vehicles, regular farm vehicles, cattle trucks, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON KING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page7 
430
pedestrian use, and use by the Fuquay's guests. (See Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 
29, 2014). 
As stated above, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must make all 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. While the evidence in the record does not meet the 
clear and convincing standard required to prove the creation of a prescriptive easement that is not 
the standard for summary judgment. The material question of fact that remains to be decided is 
when adverse use began, (whether it was in 2011 as alleged by the Kings or in 1977 as alleged by 
John Fuquay). 
Therefore, summary judgment must be denied. 
Dated this 2-~fl,. day ofMarch, 2015. 
Thomas J. Ryan 
District Judge 
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NATURE OF THIS PROCEEDING 
1. This is an action for a declaratory judgment to establish an easement to the real properties 
owned by 1) John E. Fuquay and 2) Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay. The 
Properties are accessed via a private roadway commonly known as King Lane. Plaintiffs 
seek a declaratory judgment confirming their rights of access over all of the Defendants' 
properties. 
2. The Low and King defendants may own or have an interest in the parcels of property over 
which King Lane runs. 
3. The properties at issue are located east of the city of Oreana, Idaho in Owyhee County. 
4. A street map showing the general location of the area is attached as Exhibit "A." An aerial 
map showing the Owyhee County Assessor's lot boundaries is attached as Exhibit "B." A 
Google Earth map showing an aerial view and general road boundaries and identities of 
the affected parcel owners is attached as Exhibit "C." 
Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay 
5. Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay own the parcel (the "Clinton Fuquay 
Parcel") at the west end of King Lane. It was once part of the John Fuquay Parcel. The 
legal description for the Clinton Fuquay Parcel is shown on the warranty deed attached as 
Exhibit "D." 
John Fuquay 
6. John Fuquay owns the parcel (the "John Fuquay Parcel") which is located south of the 
Clinton Fuquay Parcel. The legal description for the John Fuquay Parcel is shown on the 
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Trustee's Deed dated October 13, 1989 attached as Exhibit "E," (less the Clinton Fuquay 
Parcel). 
Susie Low and Cal Low Parcel 1 
7. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 1") located south of King Lane. 
There are two parcels which were conveyed by the same deed. The legal description for 
the Low Parcel 1 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "F." 
Avco Financial Services of Idaho Falls, Inc. 
8. Avco Financial Services ofldaho Falls, Inc. may claim some right, title or interest in the 
Low Parcel I by virtue of a Real Estate Mortgage in the amount of $68,000 which was 
recorded on or around March 18, 1996 as Owyhee County Records No. 218373. The 
Mortgage was executed by Samuel V.C. Steiner and Mary J. Steiner, husband and wife 
and encumbers Low Parcel 1. It is possible that this mortgage was paid but was never 
released. A copy of the Mortgage is attached as Exhibit "G." 
Susie Low and Cal Low Parcel 2 
9. Susie Low and Cal Low own the parcel (the "Low Parcel 2") located south of King Lane. 
Oreana Loop Road crosses the northwest comer of Low Parcel 2. The legal description 
for the Low Parcel 2 is shown on the Special Warranty Deed attached as Exhibit "H." 
Heart K Ranch Trust 
10. The Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 owns the parcel to the north of King 
Lane (the "Heart K Ranch Parcel"). The legal description got the Heart K Ranch Parcel is 
shown on the Gift Deed attached as Exhibit "I." 
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Estate of Gordon G. King and Rose M. King 
11. The Estate of Gordon G. King and Rose M. King may claim some right, title or interest in 
the Heart K. Ranch Parcel by virtue of a Deed of Trust in the amount of $86,500 in favor 
of One West Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as Owyhee County Records No. 
248616 and encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy of the deed of trust is attached 
as Exhibit "J." The deed of trust was assigned to Gordon G. King and Rose M. King on 
September 12, 2005. A copy of the Assignment of Deed of Trust is attached as Exhibit 
"K." 
First American Title Insurance Company 
12. First American Title Insurance Company may claim some right, title or interest in the 
Heart K. Ranch Parcel by virtue of being named as the trustee under a Deed of Trust in the 
amount of $86,500 in favor of One West Bank which was recorded on July 28, 2004 as 
Owyhee County Records No. 248616 and encumbered the Heart K Ranch Parcel. A copy 
of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit "J." 
PROPERTIES AND ROADWAYS 
13. The properties at issue in this Complaint are located in Owyhee County, Idaho. They are 
located approximately three miles east of Oreana and are south of Highway 78. The 
closest public roadway to the properties is Oreana Loop Road. 
14. Oreana Loop road runs in a generally west direction from Highway 78 to a point near a 
location where Low Parcels 1 and 2 and the Heart K Ranch Parcels intersect. Near that 
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location, Oreana Loop Road turns and continues in a southwesterly direction through Low 
Parcel 1. 
15. King Lane is a private roadway that continues westerly from where Oreana Loop Road 
turns southwest Oreana Loop Road and provides the access to the Clint Fuquay Parcel and 
the John Fuquay Parcel. 
16. The Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay 
Parcel since at least 1989. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
{PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT) 
17. The use of King Lane for access by owners of the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John 
Fuquay Parcel has been open and continuous over the same route for more than 5 years, 1 
and was without permission from adverse land owners. 
18. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment declaring that they have established a prescriptive 
easement for access and utilities over King Lane for access to the Clint Fuquay Parcel and 
the John Fuquay Parcel. 
1 LC. 5-203 was amended from 5 years to 20 years in 2006, but the 5 year time frame still 
applies to prescriptive claims before 2006. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Id 212,222. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
{INJUNCTION} 
19. The Low and King defendants have installed gates that block Plaintiffs' access to King 
Lane and the Low and King defendants continue to block Plaintiffs' rightful access. 
20. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Judgment enjoining the Low and King defendants or any person 
who takes by, through or under them, from blocking or impeding Plaintiffs' access over 
King Lane. 
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS PRAYS AS FOLLOWS 
1. For a Judgment declaring that Plaintiffs have an easement for ingress, egress and 
utilities to over King Lane for access to Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay 
Parcel. 
2. For a Judgment Declaring that each of the Defendants rights in their parcels are 
subject to and servient to the easement for access to Clint Fuquay Parcel and the John 
Fuquay Parcel. 
3. For a Judgment declaring that the easement runs with the land and is binding and 
inures to the benefit of all subsequent owners, transferees, and assigns of the Clint 
Fuquay Parcel and the John Fuquay Parcel. 
4. For a Judgment declaring that the easement runs with the land and is binding and that 
all subsequent owners, transferees, and assigns of Defendants shall be subject to the 
easement. 
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5. For a Judgment enjoining any defendant from impeding or interfering with Plaintiffs' 
access rights over King Lane. 
Dated: March 30, 2015 
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Instrument # 284171 
MURPHY OWYHEE IDAHO 
2014-06-~6 04: 12:27 No. of Pages: 1 
Recorded for: ALLIANCE TITLE - BOISE PROOUCTIC 
ANGELA BARKELL Fee: $10.00 
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy: map 
.,_Tc,.DEEOWARRANTY 
Electronically Recorded by Simplifile 
WARRANTY DEED 
Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. Order No.:217172 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED 
John E Fuquay, a divorced man 
the grantor(s), do(es) hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto 
Clinton Ward Fuquay and Hailey Rose Fuquay, Husband and Wife 
whose cu.rrent address is 
18907 Castle Lane 
Oreana, ID 83650 
the grantee(s), the following described premises, in Owyhee County, Idaho, TO WIT: 
In Township 4 South, Range l East, Bobe Meridian, Owyhee County, ldaho. 
Section 34: The Southwest Quarter or the Northeast Quarter and the Northwest 
Quarter or the Southeast Quarter 
EXCEPT any mobile home or house trailer located thereon 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said 
Grantee, heirs and assigns forever. And the said Orantor does hereby covenant to and with the 
said Grantee(s), that (s)he is/are the owner(s) in fee simple of said premise.,; that they are free 
from all encumbrances Except: Cunent Year Taxes, conditions, covenants, restrictions, 
reservations, easements, rights and rights of way, apparent or of record. 
And that (s)he will wamnt and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
Dated: June 241 2014 
Jµ_~~ 
JohnEFuw /  
S1a1c of Tdtth'0 I ss 
eoun1y or __ Mc,_"'~u::'------- l 
JANANNE KEATING 
NOTAAY PUBLIC 
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Recording Requested By and 
When Recorded Return to: 
SUSIE LOW 
CALLOW 
21220 Oreana Loop Road 
Oreana, ID 33650 
Instrument# 254987 
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO 
2006--01,27 04:35:41 No. of Pages: 4 
Recorded for: PIONEER TITLE COMPANY 
CHARLOTTE SHE. RBURN Q. ~ JU..i'faa: 12.00 
Ex-Offlclo Recorder Daputy-"'-""""-'-'l-'~ilt='-'-----
lndox1,.: DEEO, WARRAHN 
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED (this .. Deed"). made as of the 61h day of January, 2006, is between 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"), 
whose legal address is: 21220 Oreana Loop Road, Oreana, ID 83650. 
WlTNESSETH, That Grantor, for and in consideration of One Dollar and No/I 00 ($1.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, 
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and 
confirm, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever, all the real property, together with 
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State of Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
See legal description described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
Futher Granted Water Rights as Defined in Attachment "Water Rights" 
TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in 
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and 
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in 
law or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of 
way and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water, 
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which arc 
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the 
property (collectively, the "Property"). 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the 
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors 
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors and assigns, 
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises 
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in law, in fee 
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in 
manner and form as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants, 
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature 
whatsoever, as of July IS, 2005 . 
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above·bargained premises in the quiet 
and peaceable possession of Grantee, its successors and assigns, against all and every person or persons 
claiming the whole or any part thereor BY, THROUGH OR UNDER Grantor. 
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IN WJTNESS WHEREOF, Granter has executed this Special Warranty Deed as of the date set 
forth above. 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, 
an ldaho limited liability company 
By: Pioneer 1031 Company, Member 
By: 
STATE OF IDAHO 




The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 61hday of January, 2006, by Alicia 
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer I 031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer 
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
My commission expires: 9.9.09. 
Notary Public 
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... . . . 
EXHIBIT-A 
P07036 
In Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho. 
Section 34: E112 SE1/41 SE1/4 NE 1/4 
Section 35: W1/2 SW1/4, SW1/4 NW14 
EXCEPTING 1-1/2 acres In the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35, 
Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as 
follows: 
COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
of said Section, running thence In a Westerly direction 630 feet; thence In a Southerly 
direction 104 feet; thence in an Easterly direction 630 feet; thence in a Northerly direction 
104 feet to the PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
In Township 5 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho. 
Section 2: Lot 4 
Section 3: Lot 1 




~ .• . . . _.. 
-~---·-····---·--
• \\ .. EXHIBIT~ 
WATER RlGHTS 
1. No. 57-89. 4-1-)874 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation and Stock Water. 0.240 CFS. 
2. No. 57-95. 4-1-1885 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation. 0.360 CFS. 
3. No. 57-I04. 4-1-1887 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.200 CFS 
4. No . .57-116. 4-1-1895 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.100 CFS 
5. No. 57-120. 4-1-1896 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.300 CFS 
6. No. 57-127. 4-1-1899 Priority. Castle Creek Irrigation. 0.400 CFS 
7. No. 57-149. 4-1-1906 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. 0.200 CFS 
8. No. 57-2104. 10-5-1920 Priority. Castle Creek. Irrigation. l.280 CFS 
Total 3.080 CFS 
Total Acres: 145. 
c..:D L... 
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Recording Requested By and 
When Recorded Return to: 
SUSJELOW 
CALLOW 
21220 Oreana Loop Road 
Oreana, ID 836SO 
Instrument # 2549B8 
NURPHY,OWYHE~IDAHO 
2006.01-27 04:38:59 No. of Pages: 2 
Recorded for : PIONEER TITLE COMPANY 
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN ~ ~_Jjee: 6.00 
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy_!,.!!,.._..~"-*'-"'"L'-----
lndn lo: OEEO, WARRANlY 
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE ONLY 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
THIS SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED {this "Deed"), made as of the 61h day of January, 2006, is between 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER #69, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company ("Grantor"), and SUSIE LOW AND CAL LOW, HUSBAND AND WIFE ("Grantee"), 
whose legal address is: 21220 Orenna Loop Road, Oreana, ID 83650. 
WITNESSETH, That Grantor, for and in consideration of One Dollar and No/100 ($1.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, 
has granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and 
confirm, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever, all the real property, together with 
improvements, located in the County of Owyhee, State of Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
Township 4 South, Range I East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; Section 35: Northeast Quarter 
Southwest Quaner; Southwest Quarter Northeast Quarter; Southeast Quarter Northwest Quarter; Northwest 
Quarter Southeast Quarter; Including Water Right #57-10045 and #57-10046 
TOGETHER with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, or in 
anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and 
profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of Grantor, either in 
law or equity, of in and to the above bargained premises, with the hereditaments, easements, rights of 
way and appurtenances, and with all of Grantor's interest, if any, in and to any and all minerals, water, 
ditches, wells, reservoirs and drains, and all water, ditch, well, reservoir and drainage rights which arc 
appurtenant to, located on, now or hereafter acquired under or above or used in connection with the 
property ( collectively, the "Property"). 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises above bargained and described with the 
appurtenances, unto Grantee, its successors and assigns forever. Grantor, for itself, and its successors 
and assigns, does covenant, grant, bargain and agree to and with the Grantee, its successors and assigns, 
that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents, Grantor is well seized of the premises 
above conveyed, has good, sure, perfect, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance, in law, in fee 
simple, and has good right, full power and lawful authority to grant, bargain, sell and convey the same in 
manner and form as aforesaid, and that the same are free and clear from all former and other grants, 
bargains, sales, liens, taxes, assessments, encumbrances and restrictions of whatever kind or nature 
whatsoever, as of July 15, 2005 . 
The Grantor shall and will WARRANT AND FOREVER DEFEND the above-bargained premises in the quiet 
and peaceable possession of Grantee, its successors and assigns, against all and every person or persons 
claiming the whole or any part thereof BY, THROUGH OR UNDER Grantor. 
459
,• 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Grantor has executed this Special Warranty Deed as of the date set 
forth above. 
PIONEER EXCHANGE ACCOMMODATION TITLEHOLDER#69, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company 
By: Pioneer 1031 Company, Member 
ST A TE OF IDAHO 




The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 6thday of January, 2006, by Alicia 
Reinhard, as Assistant Secretary of Pioneer I 031 Company, an Idaho corporation, Member of Pioneer 
Exchange Accommodation Titleholder #69, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
My commission expires: 9.9.09. 
(NOTARIAL SEAL) 
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Intending a gift, ROSE M. KING, a single person, Grantor; does hereby grant, bargain, 
sell and convey to GILBERT GENE KING, AS TRUSTEE (or any successor Trustee 
thereof) OF THE HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012, Grantee, whose 
current address is Post Office Box 36, Murphy, Idaho 83650, the following real property located 
in Owyhee County, Idaho, as described on Exhibit A, attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
SUBJECT TO current taxes and assessments and all subsequent years, together with any 
and all existing easements, rights-of-way, reservations, restrictions and encwnbrances of record, 
to any existing tenancies, to all zoning laws and ordinances, and to any state of facts an accurate 
survey or inspection of the premises would show. 
This conveyance shall include any and all appurtenances, tenements, hereclitaments, 
reversions, remainders, easements, rights-of-way and water rights in anywise appertaining to the 
property herein described. 
I 
All income and gain derived from such property shall be the sole and separate property of 
said Grantee. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has hereunto subscribed her name to this 
instrument this 28th day of December, 2012. 
GIFT DEED - 1 00433804.000 
Instrument # 279640 
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO 
12.31.2012 10:09:48 No. of Pages: 5 
Recorded for: ROSE KING 
CHARLOTTE SHERBURN • 22.00 
Ex-Officio Reeorder DeputY, C::t:;;;:OY'. 
lnduto:OEED,PERSON4LREPAlill :,; '" 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
On this 28th day of December, 2012, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in and for 
said State, personally appeared ROSE M. KING, known or aeknowledged to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed 
the same. 
IN WTINESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year first 
above written. 




Jn Townsblp4 South. Range 1 Emf, Bois~ Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho 
Sccflon 26: Soutbwoat Quarter,. South Half of tho Northwest Quarter, North Half of the Southeast 
Quarter; Southwest Quarter Qfthe Southeast Quarter, South Half of th'? Northeast Quarter, Nortlteut 
Querier of the Northeast Qwutor 
Section 27~ Southeast Quarter of the Southoast Quarter 
Seotlon 94: Northeast Quarter of the Northoast Quarter 
Section 3S: North Half of tho Northwest Quarter. and a parcel In the Southwest ~ of the 
Northwest Quarter desoribed as follows: BegiMlng at tho Northeast comer of the Southwost Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter, Sec. 3S, T4S, RlB, B.M.; thence In a Woatorl)' dfreotion630 feet; thence Ina 
Southerly dlraction 104 feet; thence In an Basterly dlm:tion 630 feet; thenoe In a Northerly dlreotfon 104 
feet to the PLACB OP BBOINNINO. 
BXCBPTINO THEREFROM: 
A ·portton of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35 In Township 4 South, Range l 
Bast, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County. Idaho. described as follows! 
COMMBNCJNO at tho Section comer common to Seotlons 26, 27, 34 and 3S ofTownahlp 4 South,. 
Range 1 East, Boise Merlcllen, Owyhee·County, Idaho; thence · 
· South 1320 feet along tho Section line common to Seotions 34 and 35 a distance of 1320 feet to 
the Southwest comer ·otthe Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section. 3S;thenco 
Bast along tho South line of said Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a dtstanoe of 558 
feet to the. TRUB ~OINT OF BBOJNNINO; thence 
North parallel with the We.1t line or said Section 35 a dtstance of 16S feet; thence 
Bast and parallel with tho South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a dlstanoe 
of 175 feet; thence 
South and pamllel with tho West line of said Section 35 a distance of 16S feet to a point on tho 
South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Qumter of said Section 35 that la Bast a distance of 
17S feet ftom the POINT OF BBOINNINO; thence 
West along said South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a distance of 17S 
feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEOJNNJNO. 
Tractll: . 
A portion of the Nordlwest Quarter of tho Northwest Quarter of Section 35 In Township 4 South, Range l 
Bast, Boise Meridian. Owyhee County, Idaho, dGSmlbed as follows: 
COMMBNC~O at the Scotton comer common to Seotions 26. 27, 34 and 35 of Township 4 South. 
Range 1 Bast, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; thence 
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South 1320 feet along the Seotlon line common to Sections 34 and 35 a distance of 1320 feet to 
the Southwest comer of the Northwest Quam,r of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 3Si thence 
Bast along the South lino of said Northwest Quarter oftbe Northwest Quarter a diatance of S58 · 
feet to the TR.UB POINT OP BBOINNJNG; thence 
Norlb parallel with the West line of said Section 3S a dJstance of 16S feet; 1hence 
Bast and parallel wJth tho South line of 1ho Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a d.latancc 
of 17S feet; 1henee 
South and parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet to a point on the 
South Jim, of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of SBid Seetlon 3S that is Bast a distance of 
175 feet ftom tho POINT OF BBOINNINO; thence 
West along said South Una of 1he Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a dls1ance of 175 
feet to the TRUB POINT OF BEOlNNINO. 
Tract Ill: 
In ToW11Ship 7 South. Range 1 Bast, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho 
Section 9: BestHelfoftlm Northeast Quarter 
Tract IV: 
In Township 7 South. Range 2 East. Boise Moridi1111, Owyhee County, Idauo 
Section 30: WestHa1fof1he Northeast Quarter 
TrlWt V: 
In Township 8 Sou1h, Range 1 :&st, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho 
Seetion 6: Oovemment Lot 7, Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter, Southwest Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter 
Scotlon 7: Government Lot I, Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter" North Half of the 
Northeast Quarter 
Section 18: Government Lots 2, 3, S, 6 md 7, Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
Section 19: Government Lots 1, 2 and 3, East Half of the Northwest Quarter, Northeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter, North Half of 1hc Southeast Quarmr 
TraotVI: 
In Township 8 South, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Owyhee CoUlllY, Idaho 
Scotton 1: East Half of the Southeast Quarter 
Section 12: Bast Half of the Northeast Quarter, Bast Half of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast . 
Quam,r 
Section 13: South Half of the North H~ North Half of the South Hatt Oovomment Lots 1, 2, 3 and 
4 
Sectipn 18: Southeast Quarter. East Half of the Southwest Quarter, Oovemment Lots 3 and 4 
Section 19; North Half of the Northeast Quarter, Southeast Quarter of the Northcast Quarter, 
Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter, Government Lot 1, East Half of the Southeast Quarter 
Section 20: Southwest Quarter of tho Northwest Quarter, Northwest Quarter of 1he Southwest Quarter 





Northwest Quarter, North Half of tho Southwest Quarter 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
Northeast Quarter of1he Northeast Quarter 
TOGBTHBR wrm a grant of Easement for a well, ditch and cooling pond loeat.ed in tho NWNE, Sec. 
34. T4S, RlE. BM, as granted by the· United States, Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, on 





After recording please return to: 
Bank of the West, a 
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DEED OF TRUST 
DEFINITIONS 
Words used in multiple sections of this document are defined below and other words are defined in Sections 3, ii, 
13, 18, 20 and 21. Certain rules regaming the usage of words used in this document are also provided in Section 16. 
(A) "Security Instrument,, means this document, whlchis dated July 19, 2004 
together with all Riders to this document 
(Jl) "Borrower" is Karla Kay KinJ rove, an umarried \o.OtBil 
. Borrower is the trustor under this Security Instrument 
(C) "Lender"is Bank of the West, a california Corporation 
Lender is organized and existing mtder the laws of 
California . Lender's address is 1977 Saturn street 
(bene) , Monterey Park, Cl\ 91755 
Lender is the beneficiary under this Security Instrument. 
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(D) "Trustee" is First J.\nerican Title Insuranc:e carpany, a coq,oration 
(E) "Note11 means the promissory note signed by Borrower and dated July 19, 2004 
The Note states that Borrower owes Lender Eighty Six. Thousand Five Hurrlred and 
00/lOOths Dollars (U.S. $ 86,500.00 ) 
plus interest. Borrower has promised to pay this debt in regular Periodic Payments and to pay the debt in full not 
laterthan August 1, 2024 -
(F) "Property" means the property that is described below under the heading "Transfer of Rights in the 
Property." 
(G) "Loan" means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest. any prepayment charges and late charges due 
under the Note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest 
(H) "Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instrument that are executed by Borrower. The following 
Riders are to be executed by Borrower {check box as app6cable): 
D Adjustable Rate Rider 
D Balloon Rider 
D 1-4 Family Rider 
D Other(s) [specify] 
D Condominium Rider 
D Planned Unit Development Rider 
D Revocable Trust Rider 
D Second Home Rider 
0 Biweekly Payment Rider 
(I) "Applicable Law" means all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes. regulations, ordinances 
and administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable final, non-appealable 
judicial opinions. , 
{J) "Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments~ means all dues, fees. assessments and other 
charges that are imposed on Borrower or the Property by a condominium association, homeowners association or 
similar organization. 
(K) "Electronic Funds Transfer" means any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check, 
draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through. an electronic tenninal, telephonic instrument, computer, 
or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an account. Such term 
includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale transfers, automated teller machine transactions, transfers initiated by 
telephone, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse transfers. 
(L) "Escrow Items" means 1hose items that are described in Section 3. 
(M) "Miscellaneous Proceeds" means any compensation, settlement, award of damages, or proceeds paid by 
any third party (other than insurance proceeds paid under the coverages descn'bed in Section 5) for: (i) damage to, 
or destruction ot: the Property; (ii) condemnation or other taldng of all or any part of the Property; (iii) conveyance 
in lieu of condemnation~ or (iv) misrepresentations of, or omissions as to, the value and/or condition af 1he Property. 
(N) "Mortgage Insurance" means insmance protecting Lender against the nonpayment of. or default on, the 
Loan. 
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(0) "Periodic Payment" means the regularly scheduled amount due for (i) principal and interest under the 
Note, plus (ii) any amounts llllder Section 3 of this Security Instrument. 
(P) "RE.SPA" means the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Aa (12 U.S.C. §2601 el seq.) and its 
implementing regulation, Regulation X (24 C.F .R. Part 3500), as they might be amended from time to time, or any 
additional or successor legislation or regulation that governs the same subject matter. As used in this Security 
Instmm~ "RESP A" refers to all requirements and restrictions that m imposed in regard to a "fedexa1ly related 
mortgage loan" even if the Loan does not qualify as a "federally related mortgage loan'' under RESP A. 
(Q) "Successor in Interest of Borrower" means any party that has taken title to the Property, whether or not 
that party bas assumed Borrower's obligations under the Note and/or this Security Instrument 
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY 
This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and 
modifications of the Note; and (ii) the performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security 
Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust. with power 
of sale, the following descn"bed property located in the a:unty 
{rype of Rr,c;ording Jurisdicfion] 
of 
{Nam& of Recording JurisdicUonJ 
SE!!: ATmrnED HEREl'O AND MADE A PARl' HERIDF 
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A portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 35 In Township 
4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho, described as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Section corner common to Sections 26, 27, 34 and 35 of Township 
4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho; thence 
South 1320 feet along the Section line common to Sections 34 and 35 a distance 
of 1320 feet to the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
of said Section 35; thence 
East along the South line of said Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a 
distance of 558 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
North parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet; thence 
East and parallel with the South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter a distance of 175 feet; thence 
South and parallel with the West line of said Section 35 a distance of 165 feet to 
a point on the South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said 
Section 35 that Is East a distance of 175 feet from the POINT OF BEGINNING; thence 
· West along said South line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter a 
distance of 175 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 11: 
An easement for Ingress and egress over a parcel of land located in the Northwest Quarter 
of Sectlon 35, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Boise Meridian, Owyhee County, Idaho. 
Being further described as follows: 
"BEGINNING at a point on the Northerly right-of-way of Oreana Loop Road from which the 
East Quarter corner of said Section 35 bears South 68° 05'05"' East a distance of 3,483.22 
feet; 
thence along said right•of-way on a curve to the left with a radius of 456. 77 feet 
and a central angle of 13° 02'31 ", an arc length of 103.97 feet (with a chord bearing of 
South 74° 35'55" West, and a chord distance of 103.75 feet); 
thence leaving said right-of-way North 89° 44'39 .. West a distance of 34.65 feet; 
thence South 86° 52' 41 11 West a distance of 101.22 feet; 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 956.00 feet and a central. angle 
of 08° 09'05", an arc length of 136.01 feet (with a chord bearing of South 82° 48'09" West, 
and a chord distance of 135.89 feet); 
thence South 78° 43'37" West a distance of 16.97 feet; . 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 190.00 feet and a central angle 
of 34° 08'57", an arc length of 113.24 feet (with a chord bearing of North 84° 11'54" West, . 
and a chord distance of 111.57 feet); 
thence North 67° 07'26" West a distance of 132.56 feet; 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 162.00 feet and a central angle 
of 57° 53'42", an arc length of 163.69 feet (with a chord bearing of South 83° 55'43" West 
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and a chord distance of 156.82 feet); 
thence Into a tangent reverse curve to the right having, radius of 139.00 feet and 
a central angle of 16° 00'01" attd a length of 38.82 feet. {with a chord bearing of South 62° 
58'5211 West, and a chord distance of 38.69 feet); 
thence along a cure to the right having a radius of 474.00 feet and a central angle 
of 18° 35'17"; 
thence westerly along the arc, a distance of 153.78 feet (with a chord bearing of 
South 80° 16'32" West, and a chord distance of 153.10 feet); 
thence South 89° 34'10" West a distance of 364.49 feet; 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 60.45 feet and a central angle of 
80° 02'33", an arc length of 84.45 feet (with a chord bearing of North 51 ° 23' 44" West, and 
a chotd distance of 77.75 feet); 
thence South 85° 29'29" East a distance of 30.23 feet; 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 32.45 feet and a central angle of 
65° 16'28", an arc length of 36.97feet (with a chord bearing of South 58° 46'46" East, and 
a chord distance of 35.00 feet); 
thence North 89° 34'1 O" East a distance of 364.49 feet; 
thence along a curve to the right with a radius of 446.00 feet and a cental angle of 
18° 35'17", an arc length of 144.69 feet (with a chord bearing of North 80° 16'31" East, and 
a chord distance of 144.06 feet); 
thence along a curve to the left having a radius of 111.00 feet and a central angle 
of 16° 00'01"', an arc length of 31.00 feet (with a chord bearing of North 62° 58'52" East, 
and a chord distance of 30.90 feet); . 
thence along a curve to the right having a radius of 190.00 feet and a central angle 
of 57° 53'42" and a.length of 191.99 feet, (with a chord bearing of North 83° 55'43" East, 
and a chord distance of 183.92 feet}; 
thence South 67° 07'26" East a distance of 132.56 feet; 
thence along a circular curve to the right with a radius of 162.00 feet and a central 
angle of 34° 08'57", an arc length of 96.55 feet {with a chord bearing of South 84° 11'55" 
East. and a chord distance of 95.13 feet); 
thence North 781> 43'37" East a distance of 16.97 feet; 
thence along a circular curve to the right with a radius of 984.00 feet and a central 
angJe of 08° 09'05'1 , an arc length of 139.99 feet {with a chord bearing of North 82° 48"09" 
East, and a chord distance of 139.87 feet); 
thence North 86° 52'41" East a distance of 102.04 feet; 
thence Sc,uth 89° 44'39" East a distance of135.37 feet to the .eotNT OF EGINNING. 
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TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, 
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property. All replacements and additions shall also be 
covered by this Security Instmment All of the foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as the "Property." 
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of 1he estate hereby conveyed and has the 
right to grant and convey the Property and that the Property is unencumbered. except for encumbrances of record. 
Bom>wec warnmts and will defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to any 
encumbrances of record. 
TillS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform 
covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a uniform security instrument covering real property. 
UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows: 
1. Payment of Principal, Interest, Ellcrow Items, Prepayment Charges, and Late Charges. 
BOIIower shall pay when due the principal of, and interest on. the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment 
charges and late charges due under the Note. Borrower shall also pay funds for ES'Clow Items pursuant to Section 3. 
Payments due under the Note and this Security Insttument shall be made in U.S. currency. However, if any check or 
other instrument :received by Lender as payment under the Note or this Security Instrument is retmned to Lender 
unpaid, Lender may require that any or all subsequent payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument be 
made in one or more of the following fonns, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order, (c) certified check, 
bank check, trcasmer's check or cashier's check, provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose 
deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Tmnsfer. 
Payments are deemed received by Lender when received at the location designated in the Note or at such 
other location as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15. Lender may 
retum any payment or partial payment if the, payment or partial payments are insufficient to bring 1he Loan current. 
· Lender may accept any payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan current, without waiver of any 
rights hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or partial payments in the future, but Lender is not 
obligated to apply such payments at the time such payments are accepted. If each Periodic Payment is applied as of 
its scheduled due date, then Lender need not pay interest on ·unapplied funds. Lender may hold such unappJied 
funds until Borrower makes payment to bring the Loan cum:nt. If Borrower docs not do so within a reasonable 
period of time, Lender shall either apply such funds or return them to Borrower. If not applied earlier, such funds 
will be applied to the outstanding principal balance under the Note immediately prior to foreclosure. No offset or 
claim which Borrower might have now or in the future against Lender shall relieve Borrower from making payments 
due under the Note and this Security Instrument or performing the covenants and agreements secured by this 
Security Instrument. 
2. Application of Payments or Proceeds. Except as otherwise described in this Section 2, all payments 
accepted and applied by Lender shall be applied in the following order of priority: (a) interest due under the Note; 
(b) principal due under the Note; (c) amounts due under Section 3. Such payments shall be applied to each Periodic 
Payment in the order in which it became due. Any remaining amo1111ts shall be applied fust to late charges. second 
to any other amounts due under this Security Instrument. and then to reduce the principal balaru:e of the Note. 
If Lender receives a payment from Borrower for a delinquent Periodic Payment which includes a sufficient 
amount to pay any late charge due, the payment may be applied to the delinquent payment and the late charge. If 
more than one Periodic Payment is outstanding, Lender may apply any payment received from Bonower to the 
repayment of 1:he Periodic Payments if, and to the extent that, each payment can be paid in full To the extent that 
any excess exists after the payment is applied to the full payment of one or more Periodic Payments, such excess 
may be applied 10 any late charges due. Voluntary prepayments shall be applied first to any prepayment charges and 
then as descnoed in the Note. 
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Any application of payments, insurance proceeds, or Miscellaneous Proceeds to principal due under the 
Note shall not extend or postpone the due date, or change the amount, of the Periodic Payments. 
3. Funds for Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day Periodic Payments are due 
under the Note, until the Note is paid in full, a sum (the "Funds'') to provide for payment of amounts dne for: 
(a) taus and assessments and other items which can attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien or 
encumbrance on the Property; (b) leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if anJ; (c) premiums 
for any and an imnrance required by Lender and (d) Mortgage Jnsurance premiums, if any, or my sums 
payable by Borrower to Lender in lieu of the payment of Mortgage Insurance premiums in accordance with 
the prcmsions of Section 10. These items are called "Escrow Jtems." At origlnation or at any time during the 
term of the Loan, Lender may reqoire that Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any, be 
escrowed by Borrower, and such dues, fees and assessments shall be an Escrow Item. BorroweT shall 
promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under this Section. Borrower shall pay Lender 
the Fonds for Escrow Items unless Lender waives Borrowers obllgatum to pay the Funds for any or all 
Escrow ltems. · Lender may waive Borrower's obligation to pay to Lender Funds for any or all Escrow Items 
at any time. Any such waiver may only be in writing. 1n the event of mch waiver, Borrower shall pay 
directly, when and where payable, the amounts due for any Escrow Items for which payment af Funds has 
been waived by Lender and, if Lender requires, shall furnish to Lender receipts evidencing soch payment 
within such time period as Lender may require. Borrowers obligation to make such payments and to 
provide receipts shall for all purposes be deemed to be a covenant and agreement contained in the Security 
Instrnment. If Borrower is obligated to pay Escrow Items directly, pursuant to a waiver, and Borrower fails 
to pay the amount due for an Escrow Item, Lender may exercise its rights under Section 9 and pay such 
amount and Borrower shall then be obligated to repay to Lender ury such amount. Lender may revoke the 
waiver as to any or all Escrow Items at any time by notice and, upon such revocation, Borrower shall pay to 
Lender all Funds. and in such amounts, that are then required. 
Lender may, at any time, collect and hoW Funds in an amount (a) sufficient to permit Lender to • apply the Funds at the time specified under RESP A, and (b) not to exceed the maximum amount a lender can 
require under RESP A. Lender shall estimate the amount of Funds due on the basis of current data and 
reasonable ~mates of expenditures of futurl: Escrow Items or othenvise in accordance with ApplicabJe Law. 
The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, 
instrumentality, or entity {including Lender, if Lender is an institution whose deposits are so insured) or in 
aDY Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the Escrow Items no later 1han the time 
specified under RESP A. Lender shall not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funw, annually 
analyzing the escrow account, or verifying the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the 
Funds and Applicable Law permits I.ender to make such a charge. Unless an agreement is made in writing 
. or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on the Funds, I.ender shall not be required to pay Borrower 
any interest or earnings on the Funds. -Borrower and Lender can agree in writing, however, that interest 
shall be paid on the Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the 
Funds as required by RESP A. 
1f there is a surplus of .Funds held in escrow, as def med under RESP A, Lender shall account to 
Borrower foT the excess funds in accordance with RESPA. If there is a shortage of Funds held in escrow, as 
defined lUlder RESP A, Lender shall notify Borrower as required by RESP A, and Borrower shall pay to 
Lender the amount necessary to make up the shortage in accor!lanc.e with RESPA, but in no more than 12 
monthly payments. If there is a deficiency of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESP A. Lender sball 
notify Borrower as required by RESP A, and Borrower shall pay to Lender the amount necessary to make up 
the deficiency in accordance with RESP~ but in no more than 1l monthly payments. · 
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Len.der shall promptly refund 
to Borrower any Funds held by Lender. 
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4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments. charges, fines, and impositions 
attnbutable to the Property which can attain priority over this Security Instrument. leasehold payments or ground 
rents on the Property, if any, and Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any. To the extent that 
these items are Escrow Items, BorrO\ver shall pay them :in the manner provided in Section 3. 
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instmment lDlless 
Borrower; (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable to 
Lender, but only so long as Bouower is pei:forming such agreement; (b) contests the lien in good faith by, or 
defends against enforcement of the lien in. legal proceedings which in Lender's opinion operate to prevent the 
enforcement of the lien while those proo:edings are pending, but only until such procccdings are concluded; or (c) 
secures from the holder of the lien ao agn:emcnt satisfactory to Lender subordinating the lien to this Security 
Instnunent. lfLe:oder determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien which can attain priority over this 
Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying the lien. Wtthin 10 days of the date on which 
that notice is given. Borrower shall satisfy the lien or take one or more of the actions set forth above in this 
Section 4. 
Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for a real estate tax verification and/or reporting 
service med by Lender in connection with this Loan. 
5. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing OT hereafter erected on the 
Property .insured against loss by fire, hazards .included within the tcnn ••extended coverage," and any other hazards 
including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance. This insmance shall. be 
maintained in the amounts (including deductll>le levels) and for the periods that Lender requires. · What Lender 
requires pursuant to the preceding sentcnccs can change during the term of the Loan. The insmance carrier 
providing the .i.nsnrance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's right to disapprove Borrower's choice, 
which right shall not be exercised unreasonably. Lender may require Borrower to pay, .in connection with this Loan, 
either: (a) a one•time charge for ftood zone detemlinat:icm, certification and tracking services; or (b) a one-rime 
charge for flood wne detennination and certification services and subsequent charges each time reJ\18PP.i.ngs or 
similar changes occur which reasonably might affect such detemrination or certification. Borrower shall also be 
respollSlllle for the payment of any fees imposed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in eotmection with 
the review of any flood zone determination resulting from an objection by Borrower. 
If Borrower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above, Lender may obtain .insurance coverage, 
at Lender's option and Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any particular type or amount 
of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might not protect Bom>wer, Bonower's 
equity in the Property, or the contents of the Property, against any risk, hazard or liability and might provide greater 
or lesser coverage than was previously .in effect Borrower acknowledges that the cost of the .i.nsmance coverage so 
obtained might significantly exceed the cost of insmance that Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts 
disbursed by Lender under this Section 5 shall become additional debt of Bonower secured by this Security 
Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note xate from the date of disbursement and sball be payable, 
with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment 
All insurance policies required by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lender's right to 
disapprove such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as mortgilgee and/or as an 
additional loss payee. Lender shall have the right to bold the policies and renewal certificates. 1f Lender requires, 
Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and renewal notices. If Borrower obtains any 
form of insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, for damage to, or destruction ot: the Propeny, such 
policy shall include a standard mortgage clause and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional loss 
payee. 
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may 
make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in. writing. any 
insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall be applied to restoration 




or repair of the Property, jf the restmation or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. 
During such repair and ~oration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such insurance proceeds until Lender 
has had an opportnnity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, 
provided that such inspection shall be imdertaken promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and 
restoration in a single pll)'lilent or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is 
made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such insumnce proceeds, Lender shall not be 
required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such proceeds. Fees for public adjusters, or other third parties, 
retained by ;Borrower shall not be paid out of the insurance proceeds and shall be the sole obligation of Borrower. If 
the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's secwity would be lessened, the insuiance proceeds 
shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument; whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, 
paid to Borrower. Such. insmance proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2. 
JfBorrower abandons the Property, Lender may file, negotiate and settle any available insurance claim and 
related matters. If Borrower does not respond within 30 days to a notice from Lender that the insurance carrier has 
offered to settle a claim, then Lender may negotiate and settle 'the claim. The 30-day period will begin whm the 
notice is given. In either event. or if Lender acquires the Property-under Section 22 or otherwise, Borrower hereby 
assigns to Lender (a) Borrower's rights to any .insurance proceeds in an amount not to exceed the amounts wpaid 
under the Note ortbis Security Instrument, and (b) any other ofBorrower's rights {other than the right to any refund 
of unearned premiums paid by Borrower) under all insurance policies covering the Property, insofar as such rights 
are applicable to the coverage of the Property. Lender may use the insurance proceeds either to repair or restore the 
Property or to pay amOllltfs llllpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. 
6. Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal residence 
within 60 days after the execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as 
Borrower's principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender otherwise agrees in 
writing, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, or umess extenuating circumstances exist which. are 
beyond Borrower's control. • 7. Preservation, Main1enance and Protection of the Property; Inspections. Bonower shall not 
destroy, damage or impair1he Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the Property. Whether 
or not Borrower is residing in the Property, Borrower shall maintain the Property in order to prevent the Property 
from deteriorating or decreasing in value due to its condition. Unless it is determined pursuant to Section 5 that 
repair or restoration is not economically feasible, Bonower shall promptly repair the Property if damaged to avoid 
further deterioration or damage. 1f insurance or condemnation proceeds are paid in connection with damage to, or 
the taking of, the Property, Borrower shall be respons1"ble for repairing or JeStoring the Property only if Lender has 
released proceeds for such purposes. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single 
payment or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. If the insurance or condemnation proceeds 
are not sufficient to repair or restore the Property, Borrower is not relieved of Borrower's obligation for the 
completion of such repair or restoration. 
Lender or its agenl may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. If it has reasonable 
cause, Lender may inspect the interior of the improvements on the Property. Lender shall give Borrower notice at 
the time of or prior to such an interior inspection specifying such reasonable cause. 
8. Borrower's Loan Application. Borrower shall be in default if, during the Loan application process. 
Borrower or any persons or entities acting at the direction of Botrower or with Borrower's knowledge or consent 
gave materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements to Lender ( or failed to provide Lender 
with material information) in connection with the Loan. Material. representations include, but are not limited to, 
representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of the Property as Borrower's principal residence. 
9. Protection of Lender's Interest in the Property and Rights Under this Security Instrument. If 
(a) Borrower fails to petform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instmment,-(b) there is a legal 
proceeding that might significantly affect Lender's interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security 
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Instrument (such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate. for condemnation or forfeiture, for enfon:emcnt of a lien 
which may attain priority over this Security Insnument or to enforce laws or regulations). or (c) Borrower has 
abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is .reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's 
interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument, including protecting and/or assessing 1he value of 
the Property, and securing and/or repairing the Property. Lender's actions can include, .but are .not limited to: 
(a) paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument~ (b) appearing in court~ and 
(c). paying reasonable attorneys' fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or righls under this Sccmity 
Instrument, including its secured position in a bankruptcy proceeding. Securing the Property includes, but is not 
limited to> entering 1he Property to make repairs, change locks, ieplace or board up doors and windows, drain water 
from pipes. eliminate building or other code violations or dangerous conditions, and have utilities 1urned on or off. 
Although Lender may take action under tbi& Section 9, Lender does not have to do so and is not wider any duty or 
obligation to do so. It is agreed that Lender incurs no liability for not taking any or all actions authorized 1Ulder this 
Section 9. 
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Bonower secured 
by this Security Instrument.. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and 
shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment 
If this Security lllstrument is on a leasehold, Barrower shall comply with all the provisions of the lease. If 
Borrower acquires fee title to 1he Property, the leasehold and the fee title shall n.ot merge unless Lender agrees to the 
merger in writing. 
IO. Mortgage IDsur.mce. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan, 
Borrower shall pay the premiums required to main1ain the Mortgage Insurance in effect. If, for any ieason, 1he 
Mortgage Insurance coverage required by Lender ceases to be avallable from the mortgage insurer lhat previously 
provided such insurance and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments toward the premiums 
for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage substantially equivalent to the 
Mortgage Insurance previously .in effect, at a cost. substantially equivalent to the cost to Borrower of the Mortgage 
Insmance previansly in effect. from an alternate mortgage insurer selected by Lenden If substantially eqllivalent 
Mortgage Insurance coverage is not available, Bouower shall continue to pay to Lender the amount of the separately 
designated payments that were due when the insurance coverage ceased to be in effect Lender will accept. use and 
retain these payments as a non-refundable loss reserve in lieu of Mortgage Insurance. Such loss reserve shall be 
non-refundable, notwithstanding the fact that the Loan. is ultimately paid in full. and Lender shall not be required to 
pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such loss reserve. Lender can no longer require loss reserve payments if 
Mortgage lnsutance coverage (in 1he amount and for the period that Lender requires) pro'1ided by an insurer selected 
by Lender again becomes available, is obtained, and Lender requires separately designated paymems toward the 
premiums for Mottgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan and 
Borrower was ICqUired to make sepamtely designated payments toward the premimns for Mortgage Insurance, 
Borrower shall pay the premiwns required to maintain Mortgage Insurance in effect, or to provide a non-refundable 
loss reserve, until Lender's 1equiremcnt for Mortgage Insurance ends in accordance with any· written agycement 
between Borrower and Lender providing for such termination or until termination is required by Applicable Law. 
Nothing in this Section 10 affects Borrower's obligation to pay interest at the rate provided in the Nole. 
Mortgage Insurance :reimburses Lender (or any entity that pun:hascs the Note) for certain losses it may 
incur ifBorrower does not repay the Loan as agreed. Borrower is not a patty to the Mortgage Jnsurance. 
Mortgage insurers evaluate their total risk on all such insurance in force from time to time, and may enter 
:into agreements with other parties that share or modify their risk, or reduce losses. These agreements are on teans 
and conditions that are satisfactory to the mortgage insurer and the other party (or parties) to these agreements. 
These agreements may require the mortgage insurer to make payments using any source of funds that the mortgage 
insurer may have available (which may include timds obtained from Mortgage Insurance premiums). 
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~ a result of these agreements, Lender, any purchaser of the Note, another insurer, any minsurer, any other 
entity, or any affiliate of any of the foregoing, may receive (directly or indirectly) amounts that derive from (or 
might be cllaracterized as) a podion of Bonower's payments for Mortgage Insurance, in exchange for sharing or 
modifying the mortgage insmer's risk, or reducing losses. If such agreement provides that an affiliate of Lender 
takes a share of the .insurer's risk in exchange for a share of the premiums paid to the insurer, the ammgement is 
often tenned "captive.reinsurance." Further: 
(a) Any such agreements will not affect the amounts that Borrower has agreed to pay for :Mortgage 
Insurance, or any other terms of the Loan. Such agreements will not increase the amount Borrower will owe 
for Mortgage Insunnce, and they will not entitle Bol"i'ower to any refund, 
(b) Any such agreements will not affect the rights Borrower has - if any - with respect to the 
Mortgage Insurance under the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 or any other lalV. These rlghta may 
include the right to receive certain diJclosurest to request and obtain cancellation of the Mortgage Insurance. 
to have the Mortgage Insurance terminated automatically, and/or to receive a refund of any Mortgage 
Imurance premiums that were unearned at the time of such cancellation or termination. 
11. Assignment of MiJcellaneous Proceeds; Forleiture. All Miscellaneous Proceeds are hereby 
assigned to and shall be paid to Lender. 
If the Property is damaged, such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of the 
Property, if the restoration or repair is ecOllOJJl.ically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. During such 
repair and ICS1oration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such Miscellaneous Proceeds until Lender .has bad 
an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work bas been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided 
that such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may pay for the repairs and restoration in a single 
disbursement or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing 
or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such Miscellaneous Proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay 
Borrower any interest or earnings on such Miscellaneous Proceeds. If the restoration or repair is not economically 
,feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by 
this Security Instrument, whetba or not then dne, with the excess. if any, paid to BOITOWer. Such Miscellaneous 
Proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2. 
In the event of a total taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall 
be applied to the sums secutcd by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid to 
Bonower. 
In the event of a partial t.aJcing, destruction, or loss in value of the Property in which the fair market value of 
the Property immediately before the partial taking. destruction, or loss in value is equal to or greater than the amount 
of the sums secured by this Security Instrument mnnediately before the partial taking. destruction, or loss in value, 
unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the sums secured by this Security Instrument shall be 
reduced by the amount of the Miscellaneous Proceeds multiplied by the following fraction: (a) the total amount of 
the sums secirred immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value divided by (b) the fair market 
value of the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value. Any balance shall be paid 
to Borrower. 
In the event of a partial taking, destruction, ox loss in value of the Property in which the fair market value of 
the Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is less than the amount of the sums 
secured immediately before the partial talcing. destruction, or loss in value, unless Borrower and Lender otherwise 
agree in writing, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security I:nstrumcnt 
whether or not ¢.e sums are then due. 
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower. or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the Opposing Party 
(as defined in the next sentence) offers to make an award to settle a claim for damages, Borrower fails to respond to 
Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender is authorized to collect and apply the Miscellaneous 
Proceeds either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or 
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not then due. "Opposing Party" means the third party that owes Borrower Miscellaneous Proceeds or the party 
against whom Borrower has a right of action in regard to Miscellaneous Proceeds. 
Borrower shall be in default if any action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is begun !hat. in 
Lender's judgment, could result in forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment ofLender's interest in the 
Property or rights under this Security Instrument Borrower can cure such a default and, if acceleration bas 
occuned. reinstate as provided in Section 19, by causing the action or proceeding to be dismissed with a ruling that, 
in Lender's judgment, precludes forfeiture of the Property or other material impairment of Lender's interest. in the 
Property or rights under this Security Instrument. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages that are 
attnllutable to the impainnent of Lender's interest in the Property are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender. 
All Miscellaneous Proceeds that are not applied to restoration or repair of the Property shall be applied in 
the order provided for in Section 2. 
11. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waivu. Extension of the time for payment 
or modification of amortization of the swns secured by this Security Instrmnent granted by Lender to Borrower or 
any Successor in Interest of Borrower shall not operate to release the liability of Borrower or any Successors in 
Interest of Borrower. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against any Successor in Interest of 
Borrower or to refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of the sums secured by this 
Security instrument by reason of all)' demand made by the original Borrower or any Successors in Interest of 
Borrower. Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy including, without limitation, Lender's 
acceptance of payments from third persons, entities or Successors in Interest of Borrower or in amounts less than the 
amount then due, shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy. 
13. Joint and Several Liability; Co-signers; Successon and Assigns Bound. Borrower covenants and 
agiees that Borrower's obligations and liability shall be joint and several. However, any Borrower who co-signs this 
Security hlstrument but does not execute the Note (a "co-signer''): (a) is co-signing this Security Instrument only to 
mortgage, grant and convey the co-signer's interest in the Property under the tenns of this Security Instmment; (b) is 
not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lender and any 
other Borrower can agree to extend, modify, forbear or ~e any accommodations with regard to the terms of this 
Security Instrument or the Note without the co-signer's consent 
Subject to the provisions of Section l&, any Successor in Interest of Borrower who assumes Bouower's 
obligations under this Security Instrument in writing. and is approved by Lender, shall obtain all of Bonower's 
rights and benefits under this Security Instnnnent. Borrower shall not be released from Borrower's obligations and 
liability under this Secnrity Instrument unless Lender agrees to such release in writing. Toe covenants and 
agreements of this Security Instrument shall bind (except as provided in Section 20) and benefit the successors and 
assigns of Lender. 
14. Loan Charges. Lender may charge Borrower fees for services perfonned in connection witll 
Borrower's default, for the pmpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights under this Security 
Instrument, including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees. In regard to any 
other fees, the absence of express authority in this Security Instrument to charge a specific fee to Borrower shall not 
be consuued as a prohibition on the charging of such fee. Lender may not charge fees that are expressly prohibited 
by this Security Instrument or by Applicable Law. 
H the Loan is subject to a Jaw which. sets maximum. loan charges, and that law .is finally intei:pretcd so that 
the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the Loan exceed the permitted 
limits, then: (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the ammmt necessary to reduce the charge to the 
permitted limit, and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded 
to Borrower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal owed under the Note or by making a 
direct payment to Borrower. If a refund reduces principa). the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment 
without any prepayment charge (whether or not a prepayment charge is provided for under the Note). Bonower's 
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acceptance of any such refund made by direct payment to Borrower will consitnte a waiver of any right of action 
Borrower might have arising out of such overcharge. 
1S. Notices. All notices given by Borrower or Lender in connection with this Security Instrument must be 
in writing. Any notice to Borrower in connection with this Security Instmment shall be deemed to have been given 
to Bonowerwhen.mailed by first class mail or when.actually delivered to Borrower's notice address if sent by other 
means. Notice to any one Borrower shall constitute notice to all Boaowers unless Applicable Law expressly 
requin:s otherwise. The notice address shall be the Property Address unless Borrower has designated a substitute 
notice address by notice to Lender. Boaower shall promptly notify Lender of Borrower's cliange of address. If 
Lender specifies a procedure for ICpOrt:ing Borrower's change of address, ~ Bonower shall only report a change 
of a<idres through that specified procedure. There may be only one designated notice address unde:r this Seem.icy 
Instrument at any one time. Any notice to Lender shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail 
to Lender's address stated herein unless Lender has designated another address by notice to Borrower. Any notice 
in connection with this Secupty Instrument shall not be deemed to have been given to Lender until actually received 
by Lender. If any notice required by this Security Instroment is also required under Applicable Law, the Applicable 
Law requirement will satisfy the corresponding requirement. under this Security Instrument 
16. Governing Law; Severability; Roles of Conltmction. This Security Instrument shall be governed 
by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. All rights and obligations contained 
in this Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and limitations of Applicable Law. Applicable Law 
might explicitly or implicitly allow the parties to agree by contract or it might be silent, but such silence shall not be 
construed as a prohibition against agreement by contract. In the event that any provision or clause of this Security 
Instrument or the Note conflicts with Applicable Law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security 
Instrument or the Note which can be given effect without the conflicting provision. 
As used in this Security Instrmru:nt: (a) words of the masculine gender shall mean . and include 
conesponding neuter words or words of the feminine gender; (b) words in the singular shall mean and inclnde the 
plural and vice versa; and (c) the word "may" gives sole discretion without any obligation to take any action. 
17. Borrower's Copy. • Borrower shall be given one copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument 
18. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 18, "Interest 
in the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not limited to, those beneficial 
interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or escrow agreement, the intent 
of which is the transfer of title by Bouo.wer at a future date to a purchaser. 
If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or jf Bonower is not a 
natural person and a beneficial interest in BOIIOwer is sold or tramferred) without Lender's prior written consent, 
Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secnn:d by this Security Instrument. However, this 
option shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prolu"bited by Applicable Law. 
If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide 
a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15 within which 
Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Bonower fails to pay these sums prior to the 
expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies pennitted by this Secnrity Instrument without further 
notice or demand on Borrower. 
19. Borrower's Right 1o Reinstate After Acceleration. If Borrower meets certain conditions, Borrower 
shall have the right to have enforcement of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time prior to the earliest of. 
(a) five days before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in this Security lDstrument; (b) such 
other period as AP,plicable Law might specify for the termination ofBonower's right to reinstate; or (c) entty of a 
judgment enforcing this Security Instrument. Those conditions are that Borrower: (a) pays Lender all sums which 
then would be due under this Security Instrument and the Note as if no aa:eleration had occurred; (b) cures any 
default of any other covenants or agreements; {c) pays all expenses incurred .in enforcing this Security Instrument, 
including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees. and other fees 
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incurred for the purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Property and rights llllder this Security Instrument; and 
(d) takes such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure that Lender's interest in 1he Property and rights 
under this Security Instrument, and Borrower's obligation to pay 1he sums secured by this Security lnstnnnent, shall 
continue unchanged. Lender may require that Borrower pay such reinstarement sums and expenses in one or more 
of the following forms, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check, bank check, treasurer's 
check or cashier's check. provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured by a 
federal agency, instmmentality or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Tr.uisfer. Upon reinstatement by BOIIOwer, this 
Security Instrument and obligations secured hereby shall remain fully effective as if no acceleratipn had occmred. 
However~ this right to reinstate shall not apply in the case of acceleration un<ler Secti.on 18. 
20. Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer; Notice of Grievance. The Note or a partial interest in the 
Note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times without prior notice to Bonower. A 
sale might result in a change in the entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that collects Periodic Payments due llilder 
the Note and this Security Instrument and performs other mortgage loan servicing obligations lJJldcr the Note, this 
Security Instrument, and Applicable Law. There also might be one or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated 
to a sale of the Note. If there is a change of the Loan Servicer, Borrower will be given written notice of the change 
which will state the name and address of the new Loan Servicer, the address to which payments should be made· and· 
any other information RESP A requires in connection with a notice of transfer of servicing. If the Note is sold and 
thereafter the Loan is serviced by a Loan Servicer other than the purchaser of the Note. the mortgage loan servicing 
obligations to Borrower will remain with the Loan Servicer or be transferred to a successor Loan Servicer and are 
not assumed by the Note purchaser unless otherwise provided by the Note purchaser. 
Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence, join. or be joined to any judicial action (as either an 
individual litigant or the member of a class) that arises from the other party's actions pursuant to this Security 
Instrument or that alleges that the other party has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by reason of, this 
Security Instrument. until such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party (with such notice given in 
compliance with the requiremans of Section 15) of such alleged breach and afforded the other party hereto a 
reasonable' period after the giving of such notice to take corrective action. If Applicable Law provides a time period 
which must elapse before ce~ action can be taken, that time period will be deemed to be reasonable for purposes 
of this paragraph. The notice of acceleration and opportunity 1d cure given to Borrower pursuant to Section 22 and 
the notice of acceleration given to Borrower pursuant to Section 18 shall be deemed to satisfy the notice and 
opportuni1y to take cOIIective action provisions of this Section 20. 
21. Hazardous Substances. As used in this Section 21: (a) "Hazardous Substances" are those substances 
defined as toxic or haz.aidous substances, pollutants, or wastes by Environmental Law and the following substances: 
gasoline, kerosene,- other fJammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides and herbicides, volatile solvents, 
materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials; (b) "Environmental Law" means federal 
laws and laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that relate to health, safety or enviromnental 
protection; (c) "Environmental Cleanup" includes any response action, remedial action. or removal action, as 
defined in Environmental Law; and (d) an "Environmental Condition" means a condition that can cause. contribute 
to, or otherwise trigger anEnvironmental OeaIIUp. 
Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any Hazardous 
Substances, or1hreaten to release any Hazardous Substances, on or in the Property. Borrower shall not do, nor allow 
anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property (a) that is in violation of any Environmental Law, (b) which 
creates an Environmental Condition, or (c} which, due to the presence, use, or release of a Hazardous Substance, 
creates a condition that adversely affects the value of the Property. The preceding two sentences shall not apply to 
the presence, use, or storage on the Property of small quantities of Hazardous Substances that are generally 
recognized to be appropriate to normal residential uses and to maintenance of the Property (including, but not 
limited to, hazardous substances in conswner products). 
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.. 
Bouowc:r shall promptly give Lender written notice of (a) any investigation. claim, demand. lawsuit or 
other action by any govenunental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any Haz.ardous 
Substance or Enviromncntal Law of which Borrower has actual knowledge, (b) any Environmental Condition, 
including but not limited to, any spilling, leaking, discharge, release or threat of release of any Hazardous Substance, 
and·(c) any condition caused by the presence, use or release of a Haz.ardous Substance which adveisely affects the 
value of the P.roperty. If Bmrower learns, or is notified by any governmental or Tegulatory authoricy, or any private 
party, that any removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Property is necessary, 
Borrower shall promptly take all necessary remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law. Nothing 
hetein shall create any obligation on Lender for an Environmental Cleanup. 
NON-UNIFORM COVENANI'S. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 
22. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following 
Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument (but not prior to acceleration 
under Section 18 unless Applicable Law provides othernise). The notice shall specify: (a) the default; (b) the 
action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to 
Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or before the date 
specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument and sale of 
the Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the 
right to bring a court action to assert the non~xistence of a default or any other defense of Borrower to 
acceleration and sale. If the default is not cured on or before the date specified in the notice, Lender at its 
option may require immediate payment in fnll of all sums secured by this Security Instrument without 
further demand and may invol,e the power of sale and any other remedies permitted by Applicable Law. 
Lender shall be entitled to collect aD expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22, 
including. but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence. 
If Lender invokes the power of sale, Lender shall e:s:ecute or cause Trustee to execute written notice 
of the occurrence of an event of default and of Lender's election to caJse the Property to be sold, and shall 
cause such notice to be recorded in each county in which any part of the Property is located. Lender or 
Trustee shall mail copies of the notice as prescn"bed by Applicable Law to Borrower and to other persons 
prescribed by Applicable Law. Trustee shall give public notice of sale to the persons and in the manner 
prescribed by Applicable Law. After the time required by Applicable Law, Trustee, without demand on 
Borrower, shall sell the Property at public auction to the highest bidder at the time and place and under the 
terms designated in the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in any order Trustee determines. Trustee 
may postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public announcement at the time and place of any 
previously scheduled sale. Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale. 
Tmstee shall deliver to the purchuer Trustee's deed conveying tlie Property without any covenant 
or warranty, expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the 
truth of the statements made therein. Trustee shall apply 1he proceeds of the sale in the following order: 
(a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable Trustee's and attorneys' fees; (b) to all 
sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the person or persons legally entitled to it. 
23. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall request 
Trustee 10 reconvey the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured 
by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property without wammty to the person or 
persons legally entitled to it. Such person or persons shall pay any recordation costs. Lender may charge sucl:! 
person or persons a fee for reconveying the Property, but only if the fee is paid to a third party (such as the Trustee) 
for seivices rendered and the charging of the fee is pernritted under Applicable Law. 
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24. Substitute Trustee. Lender may. for any .reason or cause, from time to time remove Trustee and 
appoint a successor trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor 
1rustee shall succeed to all the title, power and duties confem:d upon Trustee herein and by Applicable Law. 
25. Area and 1.-0cation of Property. Either the Property is not more than forty aaes in area or the 
Property is located wi1hin an :incorporated city or village. 
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and ag{CCS to the terms and covenants contained in this Security 














----------- (Space Below Th/SLJne For Acknowledgment/------------
State of~ 




Before me the undersigned authority, on tllis day personally appeared 
tcLv~ ~ Uvy Leue 
known to me (or proved to me through an identity card or other document) 
to be the person(s) whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he/she/they 
executed the same forihe pmposes~flderation therein expressed. -· f 
Givenundermy~~I~,,.#,~3,9-aa of QU-LG\ 2)C)V'-1 , 
~f/i ,.,,~~.,.,,. ~ (\ CA - . • 
(Seal) l ~ ~ _ .. a y' \ LA,.A):y'.\ 4...41\.A-<tC' 
: .Q:)\Z o-tP\ 1_.,. \ NotuyPublic 5 ~ ~ ,•"' t, : My Commission Expires: 
: ~ 0 ! Ho euaia. 1c,ano 
\ • p\l4ltv t1; $ Residing In m 31261'0 
-~ L"',_ "If:' .. ~ MY eon,mlnlOO 0q>1ras 
•• n••••••• '""" ".,, u'J> <l • ., 'it. ~ A r:a o~ ~., .. 
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RECORDING REQUESTED BY: 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: 
Jones • Gledhill • Hess • Fuhrman 
& Eiden, P.A. 
225 N. 9lh Street, Suite 820 
Boise, ID 83701 
ATIN: Kimbell D. Gourley, Esq. 
Instrument # 263646 
MURPHY, OWYHEE, IDAHO 
2005-09-28 _ 12:58:43 No. of Pagos: 2 
Recorded for: JONES-GLEDHILL ET Al 
CHARLOTTE SHERBUR~ ~:6.00 
Ex-Offlcfo Recorder DelNIIY , · 1 lndt1 ~; ASSlliNMENT. OEEO OF 
(Space above this line for Recorder's use) 
ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST 
Bank of the West , a California corporation ("Bank of the West"), the 
beneficiary under that certain deed of trust executed by Karla Kay King Love, a 
single individual, as grantor/trustor, in favor of Bank of the West, as beneficiary, 
securing a promissory note in the original principal sum of $86,500.00, recorded 
July 28, 2004, as instrument no. 248616, in the records of Owyhee County, Idaho 
(the "Deed of Trust"), does hereby assign and transfer unto Gordon G. King and 
Rose M. King, husband and wife, whose address is 1912.f King Lane, Murphy, 
Idaho 83650, all right, title, and interest in and to the Deed of Trust, without Bank 
of the West's warranties, express or implied, as to the priority of the Deed of 
Trust, but with Bank of the West's warranty that it is the legal and lawful owner 
and holder of the Deed of Trust and the promissory note and other loan 
documents associated therewith. 
DA TED this (2 lti day of September, 2005. 






STATE OF HAWAII ) 
: ss. 
City &County of Honolulu ) 
On the fttn day of September, 2005, before me, the undersigned notary 
public in and for said state, personally appeared GARY Y. KAWAHtOrO , 
known or identified to me to be the 14ffiTANI m Pffl!DENJ of First 
Hawaiian Bank. the company that executed the within instrument or the person who 
executed the same on behalf of said company, and acknowledged to me that said 
company executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day 
and year first above written. 
ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST - 2 
No ry blic for Hawaii 
Residing at 1-\o nolu h..1 HI 
Commission expires: NOV l 4 2005 
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Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 26 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Phone (208)459-3659 
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K. Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
_r:1~~B P.M. 
APR - 7 2015 
~~'~ ~~-
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JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, ) 
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GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and 
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JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 





STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Owyhee ) 
Rose M. King, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the defendants in the above-entitled matter, I am over the age of 
majority, and I make this Affidavit based upon facts within my own personal knowledge. 
2. The area in which we live in Owyhee county is cattle country and my deceased 
husband, Gordon, and I always owned and used trucks in our ranching operation. Many of our 
neighbors also owned trucks and it would not have been out of character for the area for these 
trucks to have used King Lane although I did not see them. 
3. It should be noted that the size of trucks used today are much larger than the 
trucks used in the 1970's and 1980's. 
4. If other people drove large trucks on King Lane it would not have been out of 
character for where we live, and such use did not interfere with our use of the lane and the use 
did not damage the lane or bridges. Therefore we permitted other people to use the lane in an 
attempt to be neighborly. 
5. It was not until J.C. Fuquay and Clint Fuquay got married and started their own 
trucking business on or about 2011 that the damage to the lane and bridges started occurring. 
There is still not intereference with others use of King Lane and our ranching operation.&2 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 11(2)(b) 
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DATED This 7th day of April, 2015. 
Rose M. King 
. SUBSCRIB~D AND SWORN TO BEFORE M~.--~~blic in and for sai~ State, 
this 7th day of Apnl, 2015. "' / ./ 
1 
\~ 
. / I I l ) 
1Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: Caldwell, Idaho 
. I 
My Commission Expires: 12/18/2018 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 11 (2)(b) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ronald P. Rainey, hereby certify that on this ,Z_ day of April, 2015, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be delivered to the adverse party, via the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid _X_Facsimile Transmission _Hand Delivery 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200 6th A venue, Suite 620 




S. Bryce Farris 
P.O. Box 7985 
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RONALD P. RAINEY - ISB # 1022 
Attorneys at Law 
110 North Ninth Avenue 
Post Office Box 26 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 or 459-6147 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K Ranch Trust UT A December 28, 2012 
--~~~~-M. 
APR - 7 2015 
~-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 






SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K ) 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING;) 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN ) 




GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ) 
ROSE M. KING, as Beneficiary of the ) 
HEARTKRANCHTRUSTUTA ) 
DECEMBER 28, 2012, ) 
) 
Counterclaim.ants, ) 
CASE NO. CV 2014-0278 
KING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 
ll(a)(l)(B) OF DECISION DENYING 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
KING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 






JOHNE. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA., acting by its Trustee, 
GILBERT KING (Hereinafter, "King Defendants''), by and through its counsel of record, RONALD 
P. RAINEY, and submits this MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION pursuant to I.RC.P. 
U (a)(2){B) of the Court's March 25, 2015 Memorandum Decision Upon King Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. This motion is supported by the accompanying affidavits, and by a 
supporting memorandum to be filed with the Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of thls 
motion as provided by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(C). 
Respectfully submitted tbis1' day of April, 2015. 
·~ ~:, ~< 
~ 7,,- ~..-:----
~~'.c:--~C:-L--~- --------- , :-;', _-t,,:..--- 0 ~ c -,p ~ 
Ronald P. Rainey ===--------
Attorney for the King Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this L day of April, 2015,a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served upon the folJowing: 
Matthew R. Cleverley [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Fidelity NationaJ Law GROUP [ ] Hand Delivered 
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620 [ J Overnight Mail 
Seattle, Washington 98101 jx1 Facsimile Transmission 
Telephone: 206-224-6003 [ ] Other _______ _ 
Facsimile: 877-655-5281 
Email: Matthew.Cleverly@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs · 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W. River Street, Suite 110 




Attorney for Low Defendants 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
,M Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] Other---------
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Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
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. ' .. 
I. 
ISSUES RAISED ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
The King Defendants were extremely "surprised," not only by the Court's decision on their 
motion for summary judgment, but by the Court's complete failure to either directly address the 
single issue raised on that motion, or to address the specific arguments raised and presented by the 
Kings in support of their summary judgment motion on the single issue presented to the Court. This 
surprise was further fueled by what could only be the Court's inadvertent mischaracterization of the 
Kings' motion as apparently being a "concession" as to the other elements of the Fuquays' case. 
On summary judgment when a single element of a case is challenged, this only means that 
the moving party is only challenging the failure of proof on that single element of the case, which 
if successful, will necessarily render all other elements of the case "immaterial." This does not mean 
that the moving party is conceding those remaining elements of the case. Somehow that 
characterization crept into this case, when at page 7 ofits Memorandum Decision the Court declared: 
There is nothing in the record to show how plaintiffs' use began but it is 
undisputed and the record establishes that the plaintiffs' use of King Lane was 
(1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; and (4) with the 
actual or imputed knowledge of the defendants. Proof of these elements, without 
evidence as to how the use began, raises the presumption that such use was adverse 
and the burden is then on the defendants to show that such use was permissive. 
Memorandum Decision at pg. 7 (emphasis added). 
As simply as can be stated, the King Defendants were only arguing that if, under the 
controlling rule ofldaho law, the Fuquay Plaintiffs use of King Lane was at all times deemed to be 
permissive, then there can be no prescriptive easement, which is dependent upon "adverseness" in 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF KING DEFENDANTS' 
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order to be established. If that single element can be shown not to exist - as a matter of law - then 
all other elements - and all other alleged genuine issues of material of fact - thereafter become 
immaterial, and the entire claim fails, for lack of the required proof as to that single element -
adverseness. 
Therefore, as just noted, the King Defendants' summary judgment motion was premised upon 
that standard which provides that proof of the absence of evidence that is necessary to establish an 
essential element of the claim that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial renders all 
otherpotentialissues of fact irrelevant. Bromleyv. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 810-11, 979 P.2d 1165, 
1168-69 ( 1999). In respect to the five elements that are required to prove a claim for a prescriptive 
easement, the King Defendants had placed at issue on their motion for summary judgment the fact 
that all use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs during the claimed five year prescriptive use period 
had been deemed permissive - as a matter of law - under Idaho's long-recognized joint-use-in-
common rule. Consequently, there never had been any adverse use of King Lane by the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs, whatsoever, during any claimed five year adverse use period - as a matter of law -
therefore rendering all other potential issues of facts irrelevant. Instead, as the Court stated on page 
7 of its opinion, the King Defendants were characterized to have conceded those elements. 
In addition to this point, there were several other significant factual elements, which although 
they were in fact noted by the Court in its decision, their full weight and significance to this summary 
judgment motion apparently were not completely appreciated by the Court. These include the 
following: 
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( 1) The Fuquay Plaintiffs' claimed prescriptive use of King Lane is only being 
asserted during the existence ofldaho's five year statutory prescriptive use 
period prior that existed prior to 2006, and only upon their use made after 
1989, as specifically pled by the Fuquays in paragraph 17 of their original 
complaint and in paragraph 16 of their amended complaint. 
(2) The mere use of large commercial trucks in common on King Lane for 
normal ranching purposes - both by the King Defendants and by the Fuquays 
- does not create any notice of an adverse or prescriptive use by the Fuquays. 
(3) The Court failed to address in any fashion Idaho's long-standing "Joint-use-
in-common-rule," and its associated and derivative rules, as establishing only 
a permissive use of a common roadway, such as King Lane. 
Each of these specific points will be addressed in tum in the King Defendants' argument that is 
presented in support of their motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial of their motion for 
summary judgment. 
II. 
RESTATEMENT OF THE QUESTION 
PRESENTED ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On their motion for summary judgment the King Defendants had presented a single narrow 
issue for the District Court's consideration under the standard that if the Fuquay Plaintiffs failed in 
the proof of a single element of their prescriptive easement claim, then that entire claim would 
necessarily fail. The King Defendants had argued that the Fuquay Plaintiffs' alleged prescriptive 
easement claim, as asserted in this action, must necessarily fail because, 
any use [ of King Lane] by the Fuquay plaintiffs or their predecessors, [prior to 2006] 
was use in common with the Kings and Lows that in no way interfered with their use 
of King Lane and therefore under Idaho law was deemed permissive and could 
not be prescriptive. This rebuts elements three and four (adverse use that is known 
to the servient landowner) making any prescriptive claim during this period 
impossible. 
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Heart K Ranch Summary Judgment Memorandum at pg 8 ( emphasis in original/bracketed references 
added). Heart K Ranch's summary judgment motion was premised upon the standard that the 
absence of evidence necessary to establish an element that the nonmoving party will be required to 
prove at trial renders any other potential issues of fact irrelevant. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 
807, 810-11, 979 P.2d 1165, 1168-69 (1999). 
The King Defendants argued that under the primary controlling principles ofldaho law when 
a neighbor (the Fuquays) is allowed to merely use a roadway (King Lane) in common with his 
neighbor (the Kings), without either damaging the roadway itself, and without interfering with 
the neighbor's use of the roadway, then that use of the roadway is deemed to be permissive, as a 
matter of law. This is sometimes known as the "joint-use-in-common rule," and the King 
Defendants had cited to, and provided an extensive quotations from, Chen v. Conway, 116 Idaho 
901,903, 781 P.2d 238,240 (Ct.App.1989) and Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,404, 724 P.2d 
137, 140 (Ct.App. 1986). This particular rule ofldaho law was first stated by the Idaho Supreme 
Court almost 75 years ago in Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (1941), and was 
reaffirmed by Idaho's high court as recently as, Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 503, 236 P .3 
1257, 1263 (2010) ('"[W]here the owner of real property constructs a way over it for his use and 
convenience, the mere use thereofby others which in no way interferes with his use will be presumed 
to be by way of license or permission.' Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 1000, 1005, 829 P.2d 1349, 
1354 (1992) (quoting Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941))."). 
The Court denied the King Defendants' motion for summary judgment without directly 
addressing, or even acknowledging, the single issue that the King Defendants had raised on their 
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motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the King Defendants' request reconsideration, at least 
to obtain clarification in moving towards trial, as to the Court's position on this essential question. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE ll(A)(2)(B) 
In Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99,107,294 P.3d 1111, 
1119 (2013) the Court declared that, "This Court has repeatedly held that I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) 
provides a district court with authority to reconsider and vacate interlocutory orders so long as final 
judgment has not been entered." [ citations omitted]. Denial of a motion for summary judgment is 
such an interlocutory order that can be reconsidered under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B). See e.g., Wandering 
Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586,589,329 P.3d 368,371 (2014). 
When considering a motion for reconsideration under Rule l l(a)(2)(B) the Court may 
consider any new evidence that may be presented that bears upon the correctness of the interlocutory 
order that is being challenged. International Real Estate Solutions, Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 
819, 340 P.3d 465,468 (2014). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Existence Of Commercial Trucking On King Lane, At Times Other Than When 
The Five Year Prescriptive Use Period Applied, Is Irrelevant To The Fuquay Plaintiffs' 
Claims 
As the Fuquay Plaintiffs have unequivocally acknowledged in both of the complaints that 
they have filed with this Court, their alleged prescriptive easement claims are only based during that 
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time when Idaho had a five year prescriptive easement period prior to July 1, 2006. See, Ch. 158, 
§ 1, pg. 474 of the 2006 Idaho Session Laws. In paragraph 18 of the original complaint and in 
paragraph 17 of the First Amended Complaint, the Fuquays alleged: 
18. The use of King Lane for access by owners of the Clint Fuquay parcel and the 
John Fuquay Parcel has been open and continuous over the same route for 
more than 5 years, [ footnote 1, noting changing in statutory period to 20 years 
omitted] and was without permission from adverse land owners. 
Original complaint at pg. 5; First Amended Complaint pg. 5. (bracketed referenced added). 
This particular fact is significant because virtually all of the alleged "commercial" truck 
traffic activity that the Fuquays have engaged in on King Lane has occurred after 2006 when the 
prescriptive use period increased to 20 years. The Fuquays have made no claims in this action under 
that 20 years prescriptive use period. Therefore, that particular "commercial" truck traffic, which 
is all the trucking activity that has been engaged in by both Clint and J.C. Fuquay on King Lane, is 
simply irrelevant to the five year prescriptive easement claims made in this action. Both Clint and 
J.C. Fuquay testified at the September 18, 2014 preliminary injunction hearing that all of the 
commercial trucking that they have personally engaged in on King Lane has occurred within the last 
eight years - 2015 minus eight equals 2007. The following is the extracted testimony of Clint and 
J.C. Fuquay from the preliminary injunction hearing: 
Both Clint and J.C. Fuquay previously have testified that their alleged use oflarge trucks on 
King Lane for commercial trucking purposes, in alleged adverse use to the King Defendants, arose 
after the change in the statute to a twenty year prescriptive use period:' 
The entire transcript of the September 18, 2014 preliminary injunction hearing has 
previously been submitted to the court, as attached to the affidavit of Bryce Farris. 
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So you've only been on this property for six years. 
No. Eight. Since I was 19. 
Can you give me the years when you were gone, from when to when? 
I would say from 2001 to 2005. 
Well, that's five years. 
Four. I don't remember when in 200 I. Moved back the summer of 
Q. When you got your driver's license, you were gone. You didn't even 
live on that property. 
A. I stayed there on the weekends. 
Testimony of Clint Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of J.C. Fuquay, September 18, 2014 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 65, LL. 5-24. 
Q. Where do you reside? 
A. 18902 Castle Lane. 
Q. And where is that in proximity to Clint Fuquay's house? 
A. It is probably a quarter of a mile east of my brother's house. 
Q. Is that on property that Clint owns? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you lived there? 
A. I've lived there since Clint owned it since June. Prior to that, I've 
lived there almost eight years. 
Q. And prior to that, where did you live? 
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A. I was in college in Twin Falls. 
Testimony of J.C. Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 73, LL. 6-18. 
A. I've lived there for eight years and I've had no dispute up until 
recently about going that direction. 
Q. So eight years ago would have been about - -
A. When I got married - - when I was married and moved - - officially 
moved into the house that I live in. 
Q. You got married in 2007, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So from 2007 till now, you're saying you use King Lane? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then before that, you were gone with your brother and mother 
somewhere else? 
A. Yeah. Well, I moved- - when I was 15, as I said earlier, I moved from 
my father's house to where my mother resides now. And then after that, after I 
graduated high school I moved to Grand View and then I went to - I lived and 
worked in Grand View and went to college in Twin Falls and then in 2007, I guess 
you'd say, is when I moved back. 
Q. Okay. So this continuous use has only been since 2007. 
A. My continuous use, yeah. 
Testimony of J.C. Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 89, LL. 4-24. 
A. We've always drove trucks up and down that lane. 
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Q. I mean these cattle trucks. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And that's just been in the last five years, hasn't it? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. So in the last five years, you and your brother have started driving 
cattle trucks up and down King Lane. 
A. Yes. 
Testimony of J.C. Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 91, L. 20 to pg. 92, L. 3. 
Q. You've only been doing it for the last five years. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Your brother's only been doing it for less than five years. 
A. Yes. 
Q. So since '06 is when you - - at least '06 and past is when you started 
using the big trucks. 
A. Yeah. Of my own, yeah. 
Q. And you would agree that those big trucks are hard on the road and 
hard on the bridge? 
A. They are extra weight than a typical vehicle, yes, but we also help to 
maintain the road. 
Q. My question is are those big trucks hard on the bridge and hard on the 
road? 
A. They're hard on everything, yes. 
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Q. Okay. And that's an increase in use that you've been doing just in the 
last six years, five years? 
A. I wasn't aware that the bridge was under question. I thought it was 
the lane. 
Q. But you've just increased your use by driving the big trucks there? 
A. Yeah, I did. 
Q. Your brother did too? 
A. That is how I make my living. 
Q. And your brother also? 
A. And that's how he makes his living. 
Q. And you and your brother could go up and down Castle Creek - -
Castle Lane with your big trucks? 
A. We could. 
Testimony of J.C. Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 92, L. 21, to pg. 93, L. 24. 
Q. Now you and your brother are both driving trucks up and down this 
King's Lane. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Before, it was just your dad? 
A. It was. 
Q. Okay. So you've increased the use by at least two different drivers by 
two different trucks? 
A. Yes. yes. 
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Q. That's been in the last five years? 
A. Yes. 
Testimony of J.C. Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 101, L. 22 to pg. 102, L. 6.2 
In sum, the only significant point that the Court seemed to make in its March 25, 2015 
Memorandum Decision concerning the existence of genuine issues of material fact that would 
preclude entry of summary judgment, was the use of King Lane by large commercial cattle trucks. 
See, Memorandum Decision at pp. 7-8. Based upon the evidence presented, the use of such large 
trucks for "commercial" purposes falls outside of "any" claim made by the Fuquay Plaintiffs in this 
action, since that use has arisen after the prescriptive use period changed from five to twenty years, 
and the Fuquays' claim in this action is only being made within the five year prescriptive period that 
existed before 2006. 
Another point that arises as to the time of use by the Fuquay Plaintiffs also goes to the claims 
made on the face of their complaint. As recently stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in, Mickelsen 
Construction, Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396,299 P.3d 203(2013): 
"' (T)he only issues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the 
pleadings.' A cause of action not raised in the pleadings may not be raised on 
appeal, even if the trial court considered the issue." Nelson v. Big Lost River 
Irrigation Dist., 148 Idaho 157, 160, 219 P .3d 804, 807 (2009) ( quoting Vanvooren 
v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440,444, 111 P.3d 125, 129 (2005)) (citation omitted); Nava v. 
Rivas-Del Toro, 151 Idaho 853, 860-61, 264 P.3d 960, 967-68 (2011); accord 
2 If you go further back in time than 2007, then you will find that neither Clint (age 27, 
- Tr., pg. 64, L. 7), nor J.C. ( age 29, - Tr., pg. 55, LL. 20-21; Tr., pg. 89, L. 16) would have been 
then old enough to have held a commercial license to drive such commercial trucks at that earlier 
date, as within the five year period of their prescriptive easement claim (1989-2006). 
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O'Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 139 Idaho 9, 15, 72 P.3d 849,855 (2003). 
154 Idaho at 405,299 P.3d at 212 (emphasis added). In both the Fuquay's original complaint, and 
also in the now pending, First Amended Complaint, they have only pied and placed at issue their use 
of King Lane since 1989: 
17. The Plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Clint Fuquay Parcel and the 
John Fuquay Parcel since at least 1989. 
Original Complaint at pg. 5; See also, First Amended Complaint, ,i 16 at pg. 5. ( emphasis added). 
As already noted above, as pied, the Fuquay Plaintiffs' claim to a prescriptive easement over 
King Lane requires proof of five years of continuous adverse use. As based upon the face of their 
own pleading this adverse use would have had to have commenced at some time between 1989 and 
mid-200 I. Arguably, any adverse use that commenced after July I, 200 I could not have ripened into 
a full prescriptive easement before the required five year adverse use period changed to twenty years 
on July I, 2006. See, Ch. 158, § I, pg. 474 of the 2006 Idaho Session Laws. 
Again, the Court in going the other direction has simply stated that, "There is nothing in the 
record to show how plaintiffs' use began ... " Memorandum Decision at pg. 7, but the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs themselves allege that the use began in 1989, and at least for summary judgment purposes 
under the Mickelsen Construction case that is the basis upon which the case is to be submitted to the 
Court for decision. 
B. The Normal Course Of Development Allows For The Use Of Large Commercial Trucks 
As A Regular Part Of Common Ranching Operations 
It seems that a key element of the Court's March 25, 2015 summary judgment decision was 
that the use of large commercial trucks on King Lane was one of the primary grounds upon which 
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the Court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed that precluded a grant of summary 
judgment to the King Defendants. The Court's conclusion is encapsulated in the following two 
paragraphs of its summary judgment Memorandum Decision. 
The King defendants claim that beginning in 2011, the Fuquays use of King 
Lane became adverse use and interfered with their ownership rights when an 
increased amount of commercial and heavy truck traffic was causing excessive 
damage to the road surface. However, John Fuquay claims that his use of King 
Lane has always been the same, which has always included moving heavy trucks 
and equipment across King Lane. 
According to the Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014, the 
plaintiffs have used King Lane to access the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay 
parcel since 1977. John Fuquay asserts that his father, James Fuquay, owned large 
semi-trucks and cattle trucks that the regularly drive across King Lane from the time 
they moved onto their property in January 1977. John Fuquay also states that as a 
teenager, he drove large trucks across King Lane while working for his father. (See 
Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014). Once he obtained his 
commercial truck license, John Fuquay stated that he started driving large 
trucks commercially. Currently, John Fuquay asserts that he operates under the 
business name John Fuquay Trucking Company and continues to drive commercial 
trucks across King Lane. In addition to the commercial semi-truck use, John Fuquay 
asserts that since 1977, the plaintiffs have used King Lane to access their parcels 
with the use of personal vehicles, regular farm vehicles, cattle trucks, pedestrian 
use, and use by the Fuguay's guests. (See Declaration of John Fuquay filed on 
October 29, 2014). 
Memorandum Decision at pp. 7-8 (emphasis added). 
The King Defendants continue to adhere to their original argument that it was not until 201 1 
that any use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs became adverse to them, such to trigger any 
adverse or prescriptive claim. Nonetheless, there are certain intervening issues that have emerged 
from the Court's analysis on this summary judgment motion, as set out above, which deserve further 
consideration on this motion for reconsideration. First, is the alleged continuing and on-going use 
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of King Lane by the Fuquays' large cattle trucks- prior to their increased damaging and interfering 
use that began in 20 l l. This use of large cattle trucks by the Fuquays does not in any fashion rebut 
the King Defendants' primary argument on summary judgment of the existence of an "in-common" 
and permissive use of King Lane between the Kings and Fuquays. The use of such large trucks is 
not at all uncommon in the general ranching community and in the cattle business, and therefore 
should be considered an "in common" use of King Lane in the same fashion as any other non-
interfering use. See. April 7, 2015 Affidavit of Rose King. 
While the applicable rule itself is stated in the context of an existing easement, which 
easement the King Defendants do not in this case concede, for purposes of addressing this issue, this 
discussion of Idaho easement law provides a useful benchmark. When an easement has been 
recognized, some change in use of that easement is permissible over time to accommodate normal 
development. McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 924, 88 P.3d 704, 743 (2004); and Elder v. 
Northwest Timber Co., IOI Idaho 356,613 P.2d 367 (1980). Uses made by servient and dominant 
owners may be adjusted consistent with normal development over their respective lands. Boydstun 
Beach Ass 'n v. Allen, l l 1 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.1986). The degree of change that will 
be allowed in use of an easement differs with the manner in which the easement was conveyed, 
language of conveyance, and use of servient estate before and after conveyance. Abbott v. Nampa 
School Dist. No. I 3 I, l l 9 Idaho 544, 808 P .2d 1289 ( l 99 l ). The question of whether a dominant 
tenants' increased use of an easement over a roadway amounts to an expansion of original easement 
or merely an, increase in the degree ofuse is a question oflaw. Gibbons v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 
570 P.2d 870 {l 977) (Where prescriptive easement was established for access to single family 
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residence and movement necessitated by cattle and farming operations, additional use of easement 
for commercial business and additional four residents amounted to an expansion of the original 
easement). 
Therefore, under the Idaho's "joint-use-in-common" rule, the mere use oflarge cattle trucks 
has in fact become a normal part of normal ranching operations, such that their use on King Lane 
should be treated no differently for purposes of "in common use" than the other uses the Court 
observed concerning, "the use of personal vehicles, regular farm vehicles, cattle trucks, pedestrian 
use, and use by the Fuquay's guests." Consequently, the use of large cattle trucks by the Fuquays 
was just as much a non-interfering use "in common" with the Kings as was any other use of personal 
vehicles, farm vehicles, or other vehicle that was typical to a farming or ranching operation. The key 
element, was that there was no evidence of either "interference," or "dama~" to the Kings. 
C. The Court Failed To Address The Primary Legal Question Raised By The King 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, The Application Of The "Joint-Use-In-
Common Rule" 
Finally, as based upon two Idaho Court of Appeal's decisions- Chen v. Conway, 116 Idaho 
901, 903, 781 P.2d 238, 240 (Ct.App.1989) and Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,405, 724 P.2d 
137, 141 (Ct.App.1986)- the King Defendants had presented to the District Court the "joint use-in-
common rule" upon which they had based their argument that there was simply no evidence of 
adverse use upon which the Fuquay Plaintiffs' could proceed on their prescriptive easement claim 
to King Lane. The foundation of the "joint use-in-common rule" is an almost 75 year old decision 
of the Idaho Supreme Court in Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (1941), in which the 
Court set out authority from a number of sister states in support of that rule, which decision since 
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that time has been consistently followed in this jurisdiction, having been most recently cited and 
followed by the Idaho Supreme Court in, Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497,503, 236P.3 1257, 
1263 (20 I 0). As originally stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in 1941, the "joint use-in-common 
rule" as stated in Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P .2d 740 (1941) was declared as follows: 
The rule would seem to be that where the owner of real property constructs 
a way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by others which 
in no way interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of license or 
permission. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291; Howard v. Wright, 
38 Nev. 25, 143 P. 1184; Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W. 925; Burk v. 
Diers, 102Neb. 721, l69N.W.263;Longv.Mayberry, 96Tenn.378,36S.W.1040; 
Parish v. Kaspare, 109 Ind. 586, 10 N.E. 109; Null v. Williamson, 166 Ind. 537, 78 
N.E. 76; Gascho v. Lennert, 176 Ind. 677, 97 N.E. 6;Kilburn v. Adams, 48 Mass. 33, 
7 Met. 33, 39 Am. Dec. 754; 18 C. J., sec. 120, p. 105. 
The use of a driveway in common with the owner and the general public, 
in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part indicating a separate and 
exclusive use on his part negatives any presumption ofindividual right therein 
in his favor. Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 631, 66 P. 10; Heenan v. Bevans, 51 
Cal.App. 277, 196 P. 802; Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W. 925; Pirman 
v. Confer, 273 N.Y. 357, 7 N.E.2d 262,264. 
An individual using land as a road in common with the public cannot 
acquire a prescriptive right of way against the owner. Thornley Land & Livestock 
Co. v. Morgan Bros., 81 Utah 317, 17 P.2d 826; Pirman v. Confer, 273 N.Y. 357, 7 
N.E.2d 262; 111 A. L. R., Extended Annotation, p. 221. 
The rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or ripen 
into a right by prescription unless it constitutes some actual invasion or 
infringement of the rights of the owner. Thomas v. England, 71 Cal. 456, 12 P. 
491 ;Monarch Real Estate Co. v. Frye, 77 Ind.App. 119,133 N.E. 156; 19 C. J. 887, 
sec. 52, Citations, Note 74. 
63 Idaho at 144, 118 P.2d at 744 (emphasis added). See also, Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 
497,503,236 P.3 1257, 1263 (2010); Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851,861,230 P.3d 743, 753 (201 O); 
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 64, 190 P.3d 876, 883 (2008); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 684, 
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691,946 P.2d 984,991 (Ct.App.1996); Burns v. Alderman, 122 Idaho 749, 754-55, 838 P.2d 878, 
883-84 (Ct.App.1992); Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 13, 784 P.2d 339,343 (Ct.App.1989); and 
Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,404, 724 P.2d 137, 140 (Ct.App.1986). 
In its March 25, 2015 Memorandum Decision the Court had several times noted that King 
Lane had also been used by, "the public," which also under the Simmons decision creates a strong 
presumption against the establishment of a prescriptive easement. The rule that use by the "public" 
can never ripen into a prescriptive right is derived from the broader rule to the same effect 
concerning use of a "public road." French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950, 958, 751 P.2d 98, 106 
(1988). 
The requirement of such "independent decisive acts, serves to reemphasizes that "mere use," 
in common with the owner, can never establish a prescriptive easement. State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 
662,666 n.4, 8 P.3d 657,661 n.4 (Ct.App.2000); Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, 114, Idaho 79, 83, 753 
P.2d 290,294 (Ct.App.1988). As pointed out on the summary judgment motion, the Idaho Supreme 
Court in one its most recent decisions, H.F.L.P. v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672,339 P.3d 557 
(2014) had declared: 
Moreover, if the presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the 
presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested and 
"brought home" to the servient property owner. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 
390,398,210 P.3d 75, 83 (2009); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789,792,537 P.2d 
631,634 (1975). 
157 Idaho at 681,339 P.3d at 566. 
With all due respect to this Court, no acknowledgment of these arguments, much less any 
consideration of them, was provided in the Court's March 25, 2015 Memorandum Decision. It was 
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the primary question that had been advanced by the King Defendants' in support of their argument 
that if the Fuquays were unable to prove that they had established an adverse claim, then all other 
elements of their alleged prescriptive easement claim were simply rendered immaterial - not as the 
Court somehow had characterized those elements, as having been conceded by the King 
Defendants. 
While the King Defendants had presented the preliminary injunction testimony of J.C. 
Fuquay as being fairly representative of all the Fuquay Plaintiffs to the effect that they had in fact 
never interfered with the Kings' use of King Lane, all of the Fuquays did so-testified at that 
September 18, 2014 hearing, as set forth in the following excerpts from that testimony: 
Q. And never have you tried to kick the Kings off the property, have you, 
off the road? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. Well, you never have, have you? 
A. Not that I recall, no. 
Q. So in other words, you've never interfered with the Kings using their 
own property, have you? 
A. Other than the gates. 
Q. Pardon me? 
A. Other than the issue with the gates. 
Q. Well, they put up gates. Particularly when they had cattle in there, 
they had gates in there. Isn't that right. 
A. Yeah. 
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Q. Okay. Now, you can't tell Judge Nye whether it's easier to open the 
metal gate than to put the wire over the posts with the loop, can you? 
A. I've not opened them metal gates. I haven't been through there since. 
Testimony of John Fuquay, the father of Clint and J.C. Fuquay, September 18, 2014 Preliminary 
Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 37, LL. 2-20. 
Q. Have you ever excluded the Kings from using that lane? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever told them to get off? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever told them that they couldn't use it if you're using it? 
A. No. 
Q. So in a[ny] way, have you interfered with the Kings? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you given them any hassle about when you use the lane? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. 
Testimony of Clint Fuquay, son of John Fuquay and brother of J.C. Fuquay, September 18, 2014 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, pg. 66, L. 20 to pg. 67, L. 8 (bracketed reference added). 
Q. Do you know that this lane from the bottom of your house around the 
corner from your house to Oreana is Kings' private property? 
A. No, I wasn't aware of that. It's always been an open lane since I've 
been around. 
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Q. You didn't know that Kings owned that property? 
A. I knew that they owned the property on the north side of that lane. 
Q. You didn't know that they owned the lane? 
A. No. I did not. I always assumed it was an easement or private road -
- or an access point to our property. It's never been disputed up until now. 
Q. Well, have you ever interfered with the Kings' use of that land? 
A. No, I have not. 
Q. Have you ever told them to get out? It's your lane. You're going to 
use it? 
A. No, sir, I have not. 
Q. Have you ever done anything that interrupted their use? And they 
being Kings. Have you ever done anything to interrupt the Kings' use of that lane? 
A. No, sir, I have not. 
Q. Do you know if anyone in your family has ever interrupted the Kings 
use of that lane? 
A. Not to my recollection, no. 
Q. And so bottom line is nobody from your family, as far as you know, 
have ever hindered or interfered with the Kings' use of that lane we're - - in the 
pleadings, it's called King's Lane. Do I need to rephrase that again? 
A. Yeah, go ahead. Yeah. 
Q. Can you recall anybody in your family, you, your brother, father, that's 
interfered with Kings' use of that lane called Kings Lane? 
A. Between my house and their houses? 
Q. Yes. 
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Testimony J.C. Fuquay, Son of John Fuquay and brother of Clint Fuquay, September 18, 2014 
Preliminary Injunction Tr., pg. 86, L., 4 to pg. 87, L. 14. 
In sum, the Fuquays all testified that they had not interfered with the Kings' use of King 
Lane. Clint and J.C. Fuquays' use of large cattle trucks for "commercial" uses did not arise until 
after 2006, which is beyond the time at which the claims are being made in this lawsuit. The 
remaining uses of large cattle trucks on King Lane, within the five-year prescriptive-use period has 
been non-interfering and non-injurious, and therefore in common with the Kings - as a matter of 
law. 
Under the Simmons v. Perkins standard, and the decisions in Chen w. Conway and Melendez 
v. Hintz, within that Simmons standard, which were cited and relied upon in the Kings' summary 
judgment memorandum, the Fuguays' use of King Lane has been at all times permissive as a 
matter of law. 
Prescriptive easements are disfavored under Idaho law. Lorangv. Hunt, 107 Idaho 802,803, 
693 P.2d 448, 449 (1984). Trials are expensive. This case is set for trial beginning June 15, 2015. 
Both the facts and the law upon which this case will be tried appear to be fairly well settled at this 
time. The King Defendants respectively request that the Court reconsider its summary judgment 
decision and directly and specifically address the factual issues and legal questions raised concerning 
the application of the rule in Simmons v. Perkins to this case. 
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For all the reasons set out above, the King Defendants respectfully request that their motion 
for reconsideration be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this ~~day of April, 2015. 
onal P. Rainey 
Attorney for the King Defendants 
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The Kings request for the Comt to reconsider its denial of the King's Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be denied. The cou1t's ruling shouldn't have come as a "smprise" 
to anyone, The Court cannot grant summary judgment to any party in this case because there 
are disputed issues of material fact. 
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In its March 25, 20 l S ruling, the trial court pointed out that ''the material question of fact 
that remains to be decided is when adverse use began, (whether it was in 2011 as alleged by 
the Kings or in 1977 as alleged by John Fuquay.)" Very simply, Plaintiffs' arguments for 
reconsideration are irrelevant because the Court has already determined that there are disputed 
issues of fact. Whether the Court considered all of the Kings nuanced legal arguments really 
doesn't matter because the disputed issues of fact preclude summary judgment. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l l(a)(2)(B) permits parties to move the court to 1·econside1· 
an interlocutory order until fourteen days after a final judgment has been entered. The court 
must consider new evidence bearing on the correctness of a summary judgment order if the 
motion to reconsider is filed within fouiteen days after a final judgment issues. Kepler-
Fleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho 207,210,268 P.3d l 159, 1162 (2012). 
The district couit has no discretion on whethel' to entertain a motion for reconsideration 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B). On a motion for reconsideration, the 
comt must consider any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an 
interlocutory order. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 473, 147 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct. 
App. 2006). 
When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same 
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being 
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reconsidered. In other words, if the original order was a matter within the trial comt's 
discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the 
original order was governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to the motion 
for reconsideration. On the other hand, when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for 
reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, the Court must determine whether 
the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment. 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
ARGUMENT 
A. There are Disputed Issues of Fact that Preclude Summitry Judgment 
The Kings ask the court to reverse itself but offer no basis for the court to suddenly find 
that the material facts are undisputed. On that point alone, the court cannot grant Kings' 
motion. 
The Kings complain that the Court ignored their "sole argument" in their motion -- that 
Fuquay's use falls under the ''use in common" rule, and was therefore permissive. The Kings 
actually make two arguments which can be succinctly distilled as: l) The Fuquay's use of 
King Lane was permissive and was not adverse until 201 t and 2) the use was not adverse 
because it was uin common." 
Kings attempt to prove this by using the testimony of JC Fuquay and Clint Fuquay 
because they didn't have trucks until 2011. However, Kings totally ignore John Fuquay's 
testimony that he and his father used trucks over the roadway starting in 1977. 
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The Kings continue to ignore the disputed issues of fact. As the court noted, "the King 
defendants claim that beginning in 2011 1 the Fuquays use of King Lane became adverse .... 
According to the Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014, the plaintiffs have 
used King Lane to access the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel since 1977.0 The 
Kings are asking the Court to simply ignore the disputed issues of fact and accept their 
conclusory "use in common'' argument. As the court has recognized, adverse use, and when 
it began, is at the heart of the dispute. There is no reason to reconsider Kings' arguments 
because the facts are disputed. The court must decide based on the evidence at trial, not at 
summary judgment. 
B. "Adverse and Under a Claim of Right" docs not mc1m confrontational 
The Kings also argue that because the Fuquays never interfered or tried to kick the Kings 
off the roadway that their use wasn't adverse enough. The Kings seem to argue that some sort 
of physical confrontation is required to show adversity. That isn't the case. "Under a claim 
of right" means that the claimant has used the property without recognition of the rights of the 
setvient landowner. Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 541, 989 P.2d 276, 283 (1999). It 
would be ludicrous to think that the Fuquays - or any other easement claimant -· would have 
to engage in a physical confrontation or prevent the servient landowner from using the 
roadway. The Kings' argument that confrontation is required would not make good public 
policy. 
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C. The Kings Misrepresent Fuguay's Pleadings and the Testimony 
The Kings also argue that the Fuquays cannot prove any use of the roadway prior to 1989 
because "they have only pled and placed at issue their use of King Lane since 1989." (King's 
Memorandum at 13). The Kings misrepresent the Complaint. The Complaint alleges that 
John Fuquay acquired the property in 1989 from his father and that the use was adverse ''since 
at least 1989. " John Fuquay' s declaration states that adverse use commenced in 1977. Kings 
representations and arguments that the Plaintiffs allegations are limited to 1989 forward are 
simply untenable and without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The court correctly recognized that there are disputed issues of fact. King's Motion for 
Reconsideration should be denied. 
Dated: April 28, 2015 
Matthew R. Cleverley, I B #5418 
Fidelity National L r up 
1200 -61'1 Avenu , Suite 20 
Seattle, WA 981 
(206) 223-4525, ex . 3 
Matthew. Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO KING'S MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION - S 
FIDELITY N.\T10NAL LAW Gll01JP 
t 100 - 6'" A VENUE, SUITE 620 
St:.\'ITLE, WA 98101 
(206) 123-4515 
522
Aor.28. 2015 2:54PM No.1629 P. 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing document on the 
following individuals in the manner indicated: 
Ronald P. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attorney for Kings 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W, River Street, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83707 
208-629-7447 
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Lows 
Dated: April 28, 2015 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO KING'S MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION - 6 
I]][ U.S. MAIL 
DI LEGAL MESSENGER 
[K}I EMAIL 
DI HAND DELIVERED 
DI EXPRESS DELIVERY 
Dl FACSIMILE I 
[K)I U.S. MAIL I 
DI LEGAL MESSENGER I 
[K)[ EMAIL I 
DI HAND DELIVERED I 
DI EXPRESS DELIVERY I 
DI FACSIMILE I 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW Gl\OUP 
1200 - (ila A VENUE, Sum 620 
SEA.TTL!, WA !)8101 
(206) 223 -4S2S 
523
05-11-'15 09:25 FROM-
RONALD P. RAINEY -ISB # 1022 
Attorneys at Law 
110 North Ninth Avenue 
Post Office Box 26 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 or 459-614 7 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee for the 
Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
T-047 P002/023 F-578 
lflli&~&ED P.M. 
MAY 11 2015 
~ ep Cl 
(. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 






SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING) 
as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH ) 
TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28, 2012; ) 
AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; THE ESTATE OF ) 
GORDON G. KING; ROSE M. KING; ) 




CASE NO. CV 2014-0278 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF KING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 
11(a)(2)(B) OF DECISION DENYING 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF KING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE ll(a)(2)(B) 
OF DECISION DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 1 
524
05-11-'15 09:25 FROM- T-047 P003/023 F-578 
I. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
This Court concluded its Memorandum decision on the King Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment with the following sentence: 
The material question of fact that remains to be decided is when adverse use began, 
(whether it was in 2011 as alleged by the Kings or in 1977 as alleged by John 
Fuquay).[?] 
Memorandum Decision at pg. 8. The essential question that the King Defendants have raised on this 
Motion for Reconsideration is: 
Whether there is any evidence before this Court of"any" adverse use of King Lane 
by the Fuquay Plaintiffs that arose before 2011 under the applicable legal standards 
for determining such "adverse use," as established by Simmons v. Perkins, and its 
progeny? 
In response to the King Defendants' arguments made in support of its Motion for 
Reconsideration the Fuquay Plaintiffs have argued: ( 1) That the Kings have ignored other essential 
genuine issues of material fact in the case upon which summary judgment should be denied; (2) That 
the Kings have raised and asserted an incorrect standard of "adverseness" in respect to the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs' prescriptive easement claim, and (3) That the Kings have mis-read the extent of claims 
presented by the Fuquays on the face of their complaint. The King Defendants will respond to each 
of these argwnents in this Reply Brief on its Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's denial of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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A. The Standard Of "Interference" Or "Injury" Necessary To Establish The Existence 
Of The Reguired "Adverseness" Of An Alle2ed Prescriptive Easement On Summary 
Jud2ment Is Well Established Under Idaho Law 
The King Defendants have argued on their Motion for Reconsideration that this Court erred 
in failing to fully and completely consider the single issue that was raised by the Kings on their 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which is that the Fuquay Plaintiffs have failed to establish the 
required "adverseness" of their alleged prescriptive easement claim within any five year period 
necessary to claim a prescriptive easement in King Lane. The essence of the Kings' argwnent, is that 
in the absence of the required "adverseness," all other elements of the Fuquays' alleged prescriptive 
easement claim are therefore rendered irrelevant, and as a consequence, cease to be genuine material 
facts in the case. See e.g., O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 13, 72 P.3d 849, 853 (2003) 
("A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the case may be different. Rife v. Long, 127 
Idaho 841,849,908 P.2d 143. 151 (1995)"). 
In support of their motion for swnmary judgment, the King Defendants primarily relied upon 
the testimonial evidence of the Fuquay Plaintiffs themselves, which testimony established that the 
Fuquays had neither: (a) interfered with the Kings' own use of King Lane, nor, (b) that by their use 
of King Lane had the Fuquays injured that roadway, at any time within any claimed five year 
prescriptive use period, thus eliminating any basis upon which the Fuquays could allege their 
prescriptive easement claim to King Lane. 
In response to this argument, the Fuquay Plaintiffs have essentially ignored the Kings' 
argument that all of their alleged use of King Lane prior to 2011 was permissive - as a matter oflaw 
- under Idaho's long-recognized joint-use-in-common rule. The Fuquays have instead responded 
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that, "The Kings seem to argue that some sort of physical confrontation is required to show 
adversity." See, Fuquays' Reconsideration Response, at pg. 4. The Kings have never made any such 
argument that any "physical confrontation" is required to establish the required adverseness to 
establish a prescriptive easement. The Kings have consistently, and repeatedly, relied upon the long-
established rules, as laid down by the Idaho Supreme Court. In this instance, the applicable standard 
was most recently summarized by the Court in, Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 76 P .3d 969 (2003): 
Proof of independent, decisive acts, such as maintenance of the way, tearing down 
barriers, and other indications of separate and exclusive use is sufficient to rebut a 
presumption of pennissive use. Marshall v, Blair, 130 Idaho at 680-681, 946 P .2d 
at 980-981; Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 140, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941). 
139 Idaho at 232, 76 P.3d at 976. This requirement of the existence of evidence consisting of 
independent decisive acts, such as the maintenance of the road, or tearing down of barriers, or other 
indications of separate and exclusive use, of such an extent sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
permissive use is required to emphasize the corollary rule that "mere use" can never establish a 
prescriptive easement to the use of a roadway in common with a neighbor. State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 
662,666 n.4, 8 P.3d 657,661 n.4 (Ct.App.2000); Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, 114, Idaho 79, 83, 753 
P.2d 290,294 (Ct.App.1988). 
In the King Defendants original memorandum that was submitted in support of their motion 
for summary judgment the Kings had cited a recent decision from the Idaho Supreme Court, 
HF.LP., LLC v. The City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672, 339 P.3d 557 (2014), in which the Court 
had declared that a change from permissive use to adverse use must be of such an extent that the 
change in use is, "'brought home," to the servient landowner (the Kings) before that permissive use 
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can be held to have changed to an adverse use: 
--------~--~-- --
Moreover, if the presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the 
presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested and 
"brought home" to the servient property owner. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 
390,398, 210 P.3d 75, 83 (2009); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789,792,537 P.2d 
631,634 (1975). 
157 Idaho at 681,339 P.3d at 566. 
Throughout the course of this action the Fuquay Plaintiffs have alleged nothing more than 
their mere use of King Lane. They have utterly failed to allege any "adverse" use of King Lane, 
which was at the heart of the claim raised on the King Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
It has been the very absence any ''interfering use," or any ''damaging use," at any time during a 
claimed five year claimed period of adverse use which would serve the purpose of the required 
adverse use. That required, "adverse use," is simply absent from the Fuquay Plaintiffs' prescriptive 
easement claim in this action. The only evidence of any maintenance by the Fuquay's in this action 
was conduct that occurred after the prescriptive period changed to twenty years in 2012 and 2013 
and therefore would not be relevant to five year claim that has made by the Fuquays in this action. 
See, Preliminary Testimony of Clint Fuquay at pg. 67, L. 21 to pg. 68, L. 1; pg. 69, LL. 4-21; and 
pg. 70, LL. 11-15. 
In conjunction with the fact that the Fuquays have offered no evidence whatsoever of any 
"independent or decisive acts that demonstrate their "adverse" claims to King Lane at any time 
during their use of that roadway within their alleged five year prescriptive use claims, they also 
allege that, "Kings totally ignore John Fuquay' s testimony that he and his father used trucks over the 
roadway starting in 1977 ." See, Fuquay Response to Motion to Reconsideration at pg. 3. The King 
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Defendants have not ignored this evidence. Instead, it is merely the fact that all of this evidence, 
when considered by the Court, does not meet the required threshold standard of either: (1) having 
interfered with the Kings' own use of King Lane, or (2) in any way having injured King Lane, at any 
time prior to 2011, as that rule of adverse use was first announced in Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 
136, 118 P .2d 740 (1941 ), and was most recentfy applied in Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 
503, 236 P .3 1257, 1263 (2010). There is simply is no evidence of required adverse use by the 
Fuguay Plaintiffs in this action. 
As apparently emphasized by this Court at pp. 7-8 of its summary judgment decision, it was 
the use of "commercial trucks, both for the Fuquay Plaintiffs' own use, and for other use in 
commercial true kin&, that apparently swayed this Court to deny the King Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. But as demonstrated by the affidavit submitted in support of the King 
Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, the mere use of commercial trucks, standing alone, does 
not create an adverse use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs, since the Kings themselves use such 
commercial size trucks in their own use of that roadway, and the commercial trucking use for others 
by the Fuquays did not begin until the prescriptive use period changed to twenty years in 2006, and 
is therefore outside the scope of the prescriptive easement claims that have been made by the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs in this action. 
Consequently, none of the "permissive use" of King Lane by the Fuquays, under thejoint-
use-in-common rule established by Simmons v. Perkins, has ever been rebutted by any evidence 
presented by the Fuquay Plaintiffs, much less for any continuous five-year period of claimed 
prescriptive use. There simply has been no adverse use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs as is 
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required to establish such a prescriptive easement. 
In sum, in the absence of any alleged "adverse use," of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs, 
they simply have no colorable claim to a prescriptive easement at any time prior to 2006 when the 
statute changed to 20 years. As such, summary judgment for the King Defendants is appropriate on 
that basis. 
B. The Kina Defendants Have Not Misrepresented The Fuquay Plaintiffs Pleadin& Under 
The Standards Applicable To Summary .ludament Motions 
The United States Supreme Court's precedent in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477U.S. 317, 106 
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), as that standard has been adopted and followed in Idaho, is often 
cited by Idaho Courts in support of summary judgment procedure. (The United State Supreme Court 
noting that summary judgment upon a proper showing of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of 
material fact, is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the civil rules 
as a whole, which rules are designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action."). 477 U.S. at 327 106 S.Ct. at 2555. 
In Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 882 P.2d 475 (Ct.App. 1994), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals cited the summary judgment rule that has been cited, invoked, and relied upon by the King 
Defendants in this case:: 
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(c), which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R.C.P. S6(c), stated: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of 
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 
against a party who fails to make a showin& sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be 
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"no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof 
concernine an essential element of the nonmovin& party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is 
"entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw,, because the norunoving party has 
failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with 
respect to which she has the burden of proof. "[The) standard [for granting 
sununary judgment) mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) .... " 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 
265 (1986) (citations omitted). 
The language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted by the appellate 
courts ofldaho. See, e.g., G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 
P.2d 851 (1991); Barab v. Plumleigh, 123 Idaho 890, 892, 853 P.2d 635, 637 
(Ct.App.1993); Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 93 7, 941, 854 
P.2d 280,284 (Ct.App.1993); Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 44-45;844 P.2d 24, 
26-27 (Ct.App.1992). 
126 Idaho at 311-12, 882 P.2d 478-79 (emphasis added). This conclusion of the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, as to the adoption of Celotex by the Idaho Courts, was affirmed by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 770 n. 2,215 P.3d 485,490 n. 2 (2009) ("Our court 
of appeals has correctly recognized that ''(t)he language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted 
by the appellate courts of Idaho." Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 312, 882 P.2d 475, 479 
(Ct.App.1994) (citing, interalia, G& M Farms v. Funklrl"igarion Co., 119 Idaho 514,808 P.2d 851 
(1991 )).") 
Celotex was included within the cited authority that was relied upon in the King Defendants' 
opening brief on this motion for summary judgment. The King Defendants' have also raised and 
cited to this Court the principle that the only issues that are before the Court on a motion for 
summary judgment are those that are presented on the face of the pleadings that are before the court 
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in the case. Mickelsen Construction, Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 405, 299 P.3d 203, 2012 
(2013 ). This point is raised again here because the Fuquay Plaintiffs have made the argwnent in 
opposition to the King Defendants Motion for Reconsideration that the Kings have misinterpreted 
the Fuquays complaint, as unfairly limiting their claims on summary judgment concerning both the 
Fuquays' use of King Lane after 1989 and prior to 2006 under the former five year prescriptive use 
statute. These are simply the facts that have been pled on the face of the Fuquay Plaintiffs' own 
complaint in this action for an alleged prescriptive easement in King Lane. 
Although Idaho is clearly a "notice pleading" state, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently 
stated that within this notice pleading standard that, "The key issue in determining the validity of a 
complaint is whether the adverse party is put on notice of the claims brou1ht a1ainst it.'' Brown 
v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 164, 335 P.3d 1, 9 (2014) (emphasis added). Critical to the five 
elements necessary to prove a prescriptive easement is the actual prescriptive period that applies to 
that claimed easement. The Fuquay Plaintiffs have made it quite clear in footnote 1 to their 
complaint in this action that they intend to proceed under the former statute that provided for a five 
year prescriptive period.1 The Machado case, as cited in that footnote to their complaint, indicates 
this is permissible. ("We held that 'the twenty year time period does not apply to an easement by 
prescription acquired prior to the amendment."'). 
In contrast to the Machado rule, as applied only to the facts of this case, a civil action is 
generally controlled by the law that is in force at the time the complaint is filed. See e.g., Woodland 
The text of that footnote to the Fuquays' complaint declares that: "I.e. 5-203 was 
amended from 5 years to 20 years in 2006, but the 5 year time frame still applies to prescriptive 
claims before 2006. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Id 212, 222.,, 
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Furniture, LLC v. Larsen, 142 Idaho 140, 146, 124 P.3d 1016, 1022 (2005) ("We agree with 
Woodland that the version of LC.§ 48-104 in effect when Woodland filed its complaint in March 
2000 governs this suit."), citing to, Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 503-04, 
445 P.2d 720, 724-25 (1968) (A lawsuit is governed by the statutes in effect at the time the 
complaint is filed). Under I. C. § 73-101 statutes are not to be applied retroactively, "unless expressly 
so declared." But see, Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 938, 318 P.3d 918, 928 (2014) (The 
Legislature's intent to apply a statute retroactively is sufficient if that intention to make that law 
retroactive is clear and if the language clearly refers to the past as well as to the future, then the intent 
to make the law retroactive is expressly declared.). 
When I.C. § 5-203 was amended from five to twenty years effective July 1, 2006, see, Ch. 
158, § 1, pg. 474 of the 2006 Idaho Session Laws, that new twenty year prescriptive period was to 
operate prospectively only, such that no new claim to adverse rights under that amended statute 
could ripen into an actual prescriptive right- at the soonest - until July 1, 2026. 
The Fuquays' have pointed out in response to the King Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration that on the face of their complaint that they state their alleged use has been adverse 
"since at least 1989," which allows them to also provide proof of use prior to 1989. As noted above, 
the questions that are placed at issue on a motion for summary judgment are those that are stated on 
the face of the complaint, as supported by the Mickelsen Construction decision. In addition, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has also declared that the standards of Rule 1 S(b) do not apply to motions for 
summary judgment in Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 967 P.2d 284 (1998): 
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Rule l S(b) applies only to unpled theories that are litigated through the submission 
of evidence at a trial of the cause on the merits, and not to factual issues raised in a 
motion for summary judgment. 
132 Idaho at 86,967 P.2d at 288. See also, 0 'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 15, 72 P.3d 
849,855 (2003). Consequently, on summary judgment the rules seems faidy well established that 
it is only what is stated on the face of the complaint that is placed at issue, and not what might be 
established at a subsequent trial by consent of the parties. This is a risk that a party must bear, that 
chooses to plead its claims differently than what it might subsequently attempt to prove at trial, if 
it is successful in reaching trial. 
A number of the specific evidentiary questions raised by the Fuquays' response are more 
appropriately addressed in response to the Kings' motion in limine and therefore have been reserved 
for the Reply to the King Defendants' motion in Ii mine. Nonetheless, at some point, the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs must confine their alleged prescriptive easement claim to a specific declared discrete five 
year period, even if that five year period is tacked with a predecessor's alleged adverse use. But, as 
consistent with the purposes of swnmary judgment, as stated above, the Fuquay Plaintiff's should 
not be allowed to avoid summary judgment by merely speculating as to the existence of their alleged 
prescriptive easement claim, hoping that the required evidence will eventually appear at trial. 
Although that evidence at this point would be highly contradictory to the evidence that has already 
been presented in court under oath by the Fuquays themselves. As the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
Heather v. Honkers' Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 8 P.3d 1254 (Ct.App.2000) summarized: 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) governs the defense of a motion for 
summary judgment, and states, in relevant part: 
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of that party's pleadings. but the party's response. by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. 
(Emphasis added.). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is identical to its federal counterpart and, 
thus, we find federal law instructive to this Court's analysis of the issue at hand. It 
is not the intent ofF .R.C.P. 56 "to preserve purely speculative issues of fact for trial." 
Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm 'n, 663 F.2d 120, 128 (D.C.Cir.1980). [8 P.3d 
1257] A party opposin2 summan judiment cannot demand a trial simply 
because of the "speculative possibility that a material issue of fact may appear 
at that time." 1 OB CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY 
KANE, WRIGHT MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDUREE § 2739 at 388-89 (3d ed.1998). See Childers v. High Society 
Magazine, Inc., 557 F.Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (an unsupported statement 
that "it might not be so" was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment). 
134 Idaho at 713-14, 8 P.3d at 1256-57 (emphasis added). 
In sum, there simply appears to be no evidence within any specific five year period - as 
claimed by the Fuquay Plaintiffs - that supports their claim of an adverse prescriptive easement to 
King Lane. It was the Fuquay Plaintiffs' burden in response to the King Defendants• motion for 
summary judgment, not just to allege the existence of genuine issues of material fact, of disputed 
genuine issues of material fact on the motion for summary judgment - whether the Fuquays use of 
King Lane had ever interfered with of Kings's use of King Lane or injured King Lane during the 
period of alleged adverse five period of alleged prescriptive use claimed under the Fuquays' 
complaint? This alleged use necessarily had to occur at some time prior to 2006, and as pied on the 
face of that complaint - sometime after 1989. That evidence - other than mere pennissive use in 
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05-11-'15 09:27 FROM- T-047 P014/023 F-578 
common with the Kings- in fact has not been presented to this Court. The Fuquays do nothing more 
than merely speculate that a genuine issue of fact may appear at the time of trial. Something more 
is required to avoid the entry of swrunary judgment. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the Simmons v. Perkins standard, raised on the King Defendants original motion for 
summary judgment, the Fuquay Plaintiffs have not established an adverse claim to King Lang. The 
King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration should be granted, and summary judgment should be 
entered for the King Defendants on the Fuquays alleged claim to a prescriptive easement in King 
Lane. 
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CASE NO. CV 2014-0278 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON 
KING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
This matter came on for hearing on May 14, 2015 upon the King defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration of this Court's ruling on their Motion for Summary Judgment. Appearing on 
behalf of the plaintiffs was attorney Matthew Cleverley, of the law firm Fidelity National Law 
Group. Appearing on behalf of the King defendants was attorney Ronald Rainey. Appearing on 
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behalf of the Low defendants was attorney Bryce Farris, of the law firm Sawtooth Law Offices, 
PLLC. The Court has considered the briefing, affidavits, pleadings and argument submitted and 
sets forth its decision below. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STANDARD 
IRCP ll(a) (2) (B) allows a party to seek reconsideration of any interlocutory order 
before the entry of judgment. Final judgment has not been entered in this case therefore, 
Defendants' motion is timely. On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new 
admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. See PHH 
Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P .3d 1180, 1184 (2009) ( citing Coeur 
d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 
(1990)). 
"When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same 
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being 
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012), reh'g 
denied (Aug. 1, 2012). In this case, the King defendants seek reconsideration of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision upon King defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on March 
25, 2015. Thus, this Court must apply the summary judgment standard that it applied to its 
earlier decision. 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In a motion for summary 
judgment, this Court should liberally construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draw 
all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Summary judgment 
must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence presented. West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord 141 Idaho 75, 86-
87, 106 P.3d 401, 412 - 413 (2005), citing Iron Eagle Dev., L.L.C. v. Quality Design Sys., Inc., 
138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003) (citations omitted); see also Willie v. Bd. of 
Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133, 59 P.3d 302,304 (2002). 
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On a motion for summary judgment, the burden is always upon the moving party to prove 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. u: however, the basis for a properly supported 
motion is that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an element of the non-
moving party's case, it is incumbent upon the non-moving party to establish an issue of fact 
regarding that element. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,923 P.2d 416 (1996). 
The burden on the moving party may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on 
an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 
Idaho 308,311,882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1994). 
A trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or 
resolve controverted factual issues. American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 671 P.2d 
1063 (1983). 
Summary judgment should be granted with caution. If the record contains conflicting 
inferences or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be 
denied. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,808 P.2d 876 (1991). Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 
Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991). 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs seek a declaration of a prescriptive easement over King Lane in Owyhee County. 
King Lane is a private, all-weather road about one-half mile in length. It runs in an east-west 
direction from the public Oreana Loop Road until it connects with Castle Lane, which then runs 
south until it connects with Oreana Loop Road. The King defendants own the parcel of land to the 
north of King Lane, the Low defendants own the parcel of land to the south of King Lane and the 
plaintiffs own parcels of land to the west of King Lane where it ends and connects with Castle 
Lane. 
The Court went into greater background detail in its Memorandum Decision Upon King 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on March 25, 2015. That background 
information is incorporated herein. 
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Argument Supporting Motion to Reconsider 
Quoting from King Defendants' Memorandum in Support, beginning on page 2: 
As simply as can be stated, the King Defendants were only arguing 
that if, under the controlling rule of Idaho law, the Fuquay Plaintiffs 
use of King Lane was at all times deemed to be permissive, then 
there can be no prescriptive easement, which is dependent upon 
"adverseness" in order to be established. If that single element can 
be shown not to exist - as a matter of law - then all other elements -
and all other alleged issues of material fact - thereafter become 
immaterial, and the entire claim fails, for lack of the required proof 
as to that single element - adverseness. 
The Court denied the King Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment without directly addressing, or even acknowledging, the 
single issue that the King Defendants had raised on their motion for 
summary judgment. Therefore, the King Defendants' request 
reconsideration, at least to obtain clarification in moving towards 
trial; as to the Court's position on this essential question. 
The King Defendants' argue that: (I) the five year prescriptive period had to begin 
sometime between 1989 and 200 I since it had have been completed before the law changed in 
2006; therefore, use of commercial truck traffic is not relevant since it only occurred after 2007 
when Clint and J.C. Fuquay started to run their commercial trucks over that road (2) John Fuquay's 
claimed use beginning as far back as 1977 of large cattle trucks was not adverse as it simply was the 
same sort of general cattle ranching operation that the King Defendants' were involved in and thus 
not adverse - but rather consistent with the ''joint use in common rule" established in Idaho; (3) and 
it is this "joint use in common rule" that the King Defendants' are asking the Court to apply to grant 
summary judgment. 
In their response to the King Defendants' motion to reconsider, the Fuquays state: 
The Kings continue to ignore the disputed issues of fact. As the 
court noted, "the King defendants claim that beginning in 2011, the 
Fuquays use of King Lane became adverse . . . According to the 
Declaration of John Fuquay filed on October 29, 2014, the plaintiffs 
have used King Lane to access the Fuquay Parcel and the Clinton 
Fuquay Parcel since 1977." The Kings are asking the Court to 
simply ignore the disputed issues of fact and accept their conclusory 
"use in common" argument. As the court has recognized, adverse 
use, and when it began. is at the heart of the dispute. There is no 
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reason to reconsider Kings' arguments because the facts are 
disputed. The court must decide based on the evidence at trial, not at 
summary judgment. 
The argument that the King Defendants want the Court to revisit is that pursuant to the law 
set forth in HE.L.P .. LLC v. The City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672,339 P.3d 557 (2014) a change 
from permissive use to adverse use must be of such an extent that the change in use is "brought 
home" to the servient landowner before that permissive use can be held to have changed to an 
adverse use. Citing Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,398,210 P.3d 75, 83 (2009): 
Moreover, if the preswnption of permissiveness applied when the 
use began, the presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use 
is clearly manifested and "brought home" to the servient property 
owner. 
The King Defendants argue that although John Fuquay, in his affidavit, claimed that he and 
his father used to run their commercial or cattle trucks through and over King Lane as far back as 
possibly 1977, there is nothing in Fuquay's claim that describes the use as interfering with or 
damaging the use of the lane for the Kings. It is upon that basis that the King Defendants seek 
summary judgment. That is, there is no evidence in the record before the Court that can establish 
adverse use for any five year period leading up to 2006. Thus, summary judgment should be 
granted as there is no issue of fact on the element of adverse use. 
Adverse and under a claim of ript 
The Idaho Supreme Court has provided explanation for the prescriptive easement 
requirement that use be adverse and under a claim of right: 
A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient 
tenement was by permission of its owner, because the use, by 
definition, was not adverse to the rights of the owner. Indeed, the 
rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or 
ripen into a prescriptive right unless it constitutes an actual 
invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner. 
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006) (citations omitted). 
The nature of the use is adverse if "it runs contrary to the servient owner's claims to the 
property." Akers, 142 Idaho at 303 (quoting Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,231, 76 P.3d 969, 
975 (2003)). "The state of mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling; 
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instead, the focus is on the nature of their use." Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 397-98, 
210 P.3d 75, 82-83 (2009). Emphasis added. 
If a use has commenced as permissive, a user must make some new and independent act 
that would put the owner of the servient property on notice that the use was no longer permissive. 
Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326, 327, 563 P.2d 50, 51 (1977). However, "mere inaction and 
passive acquiescence is not a sufficient basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was 
with the permission of the owner of the servient tenement." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 
511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973). 
It is undisputed and the record establishes that the plaintiffs' have used King Lane as far 
back as 1977, and the use was with the actual knowledge of the defendants. It can be argued that 
plaintiffs use has been open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted. Proof of these elements, 
without evidence as to how the use began, raises the presumption that such use was adverse and the 
burden is then on the defendants to show that such use was permissive. Marshall v. Blair, 130 
Idaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975 (1997). However, the Idaho Supreme Court has articulated 
exceptions to the preswnption of adverse use in the case of roadways and driveways like King 
Lane. 
'use of a driveway in common with the owner and the general 
public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part 
indicating a separate and exclusive use on his part negatives any 
presumption of individual right therein in his favor.' Simmons v. 
Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (1941) (emphasis added). 
This Court further explained in Simmons that use of a roadway 
must invade or infringe on the owner's rights in order for the use to 
be considered adverse and, thus, to ripen into a prescriptive right of 
way. 
Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680. 
On summary judgment, the King defendants argue that there is nothing in the record to 
show a decisive act on the part of the plaintiffs that would have interfered with their use. The 
burden is on the plaintiffs to present some evidence to show a decisive act or incident to create a 
genuine issue of material fact that defendant's use of King Lane was adverse and under a claim 
of right. Since plaintiffs have not done so, the King defendants believe that summary judgment 
is appropriate. 
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According to the Affidavit of Rose King filed on September 9, 2014, the King defendants 
began making improvements to King Lane in 1973 when they purchased their property. By I 988-
89, the defendants had turned King Lane into an all-weather road. The record before the Court 
shows that the Kings were the only parties to maintain or make improvements to King Lane m1til 
2013 when the plaintiffs assert that they graded or added gravel to the lane. (See Transcript of 
Preliminary Injunction Hearing, pgs. 67 - 69 attached to Affidavit of Bryce Farris filed December 
9, 2014 ). The evidence also shows that the Kings use King Lane on a day-to-day basis to conduct 
their cattle operation, and at various times throughout the year, graze their cattle over King Lane 
between two gates at either end of the lane. 
There is also evidence in the record to show that King Lane was used by the general public. 
According to Samuel Steiner, a predecessor in title to the Low property, King Lane ''was an old 
farm access roadway that was used occasionally by a variety of people." (See Affidavit of Samuel 
Steiner filed on December 9, 2014) Steiner stated that his family did not try to stop anyone from 
using the road so long as they did not interfere with his family's operations. He stated that hunters 
used King Lane to access the reservoir on BLM land, that the Kings used it to access a geothermal 
well, and that the predecessors to the Fuquay property used it as a shortcut to Grandview. Steiner 
also stated that the majority of vehicle use was down Castle Road, especially during the wet 
weather because King Lane was difficult to cross when muddy. Furthermore, there is evidence in 
the record of other specific public use by the mail carrier, the Schwann Truck driver and the school 
bus driver. See Declarations of Krivanec, Drew and Collett filed September 9, 2014. 
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe all facts in favor of the 
nonmoving party. However, it is incumbent upon the nonmoving party to "make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). 
In this case, the plaintiffs have simply stated that there was adverse use prior to 2006 and 
that a genuine issue of fact exists. However, there is nothing in the record to show a decisive act 
of interference that could be construed as a separate and exclusive use. According to the 
Declaration of John Fuquay in Support of the Ex Parte Motion for TRO, the plaintiffs began using 
King Lane in 1989. The Fuquays also state that the general public has also used King Lane since 
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1989. This only supports the defendants' argument that there was no decisive act or incident of 
exclusive use because the use was in common. At the preliminary injunction hearing, there was 
disputed testimony that the plaintiffs actually began using King Lane in 1977. However, even when 
this Court views those facts in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no evidence to show that the 
plaintiff's use was ever adverse to or ran contrary to the Kings' claims to the property. 
Rather, the evidence shows that prior to 2011, the plaintiffs never interfered with the 
defendants' use of King Lane and their use was in common with the Kings, the Lows and the 
general public. The only evidence of an adverse use and decisive act occurred in 2011 when the 
plaintiffs increased large commercial truck traffic over King Lane. However, that adverse use 
places the prescriptive easement claim within the twenty year statutory period. 
Not only do the plaintiffs state that the general public used King Lane, they admit that their 
own use of King Lane never interfered with the defendants. According to the transcript from the 
September 18, 2014 hearing on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiff Clint Fuquay, 
the son of John Fuquay, testified to the following: 
Mr. Rainey: You don't claim any right to King's Lane, do you? 
Clint Fuquay: I've been using it so I just always assumed that I 
could. 
Mr. Rainey: Have you ever excJuded the Kings from using that 
lane? 
Clint Fuquay: No. 
Mr. Rainey: Have you never told them to get off? 
Clint Fuquay: No. 
Mr. Rainey: Have you ever told them that they couldn't use it if 
you 're using it? 
Clint Fuquay: No. 
Mr. Rainey: So in a way, have you interfered with the Kings? 
Clint Fuquay: No. 
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Mr. Rainey: Have you given them any hassle about when you use 
the lane? 
Clint Fuquay: No. 
(Transcript of Preliminaty Injunction hearing on September 18, 2014, pgs. 66-67). 
Plaintiff John Fuquay also testified at the September 18, 2014 hearing. According to the 
transcript, John Fuquay stated that whenever the Kings' cattle were grazing over King Lane, there 
was barbed wire gates placed on both the east and west ends of the road. John Fuquay also testified 
as to the physical description of the gates as well as how he would unlatch, open and close the gates 
each time he passed through. He also testified that before the "last four or five years/' King Lane 
has always been open. (See Transcript, pgs. 16-17). 
J.C. Fuquay (not a party to this case), the son of plaintiff John Fuquay, also testified at the 
hearing and stated the following: 
Mr. Rainey: Do you know that this lane from the bottom of your 
house around the corner from your house to Oreana is 
Kings' private property? 
J.C.: No, I wasn't aware ofthat. It's always been an open 
lane since I've been around. 
Mr. Rainey: You didn't know that Kings owned that property 
J.C.: I knew that they owned the property on the north side 
of that lane. 
Mr. Rainey: You didn't know that they owned the lane? 
J.C.: No. I did not. I always assumed it was an easement or 
private road-or an access point to our property. It's 
never been disputed up witil now. 
Mr. Rainey: Well, have you ever interfered with the Kings' use of 
that land? 
J.C.: No, I have not. 
Mr. Rainey: Have you ever told them to get out? It's your lane. 
You're going to use it? 
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J.C.: No, sir, I have not. 
Mr. Rainey: Have you ever done anything that interrupted their 
use? And they being Kings. Have you ever done 
anything to interrupt the Kings' use of that lane? 
J.C.: No, sir, I have not. 
Mr. Rainey: Do you know if anyone in your family has ever 
interrupted the Kings' use of that lane? 
J.C.: Not to my recollection, no. 
(Transcript, pgs. 86-87). 
Based on the record before this Court the plaintiff has failed to make any showing on the 
essential element that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was adverse and under claim of right. Even 
when this Court makes all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, there is nothing in the record to 
indicate a decisive act or incident of separate and exclusive use from 1977 until 2011. While the 
use of King Lane may not have started with express or even implied permission, the record and 
testimony of the plaintiffs shows that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was in "common with the owner 
and the general public." Marsha/1130 Idaho at 680; (quoting Simmons, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 
740 (1941 ). A prescriptive easement cannot be granted unless there is evidence of a decisive act 
or incident showing adverse use that could be considered an "actual invasion of or infringement 
on the rights of the owner." Hughes, 142 ldaho at 480. 
Because there is no proof or evidence concerning this essential element of the plaintiffs' 
case, that the Fuquays' use was adverse and contrary to the ownership rights of the Kings, the 
King defendants have met their burden of sho-wing there is no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the element of adverse use. 
Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden 
shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further 
depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a 
genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure 
to do so under I.R.C.P. 56 (f). Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 
392, 179 P.3d 352,355 (Ct.App. 2008). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON KING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Page 10 
546
This court has reviewed the record thoroughly and cannot find that plaintiffs have met 
this burden. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate. This is especially so given the plaintiffs 
burden of proof at trial (clear and convincing evidence). 
Therefore, counsel for the King defendants is directed to prepare a judgment consistent 
with this Memorandum Decision and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. 
Dated this /t:t-"' day of June, 2015. 
Th,£ .. q &-
District Judge 
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COURT'S JUNE 19, 2015 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
KING'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REQUEST FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
I. MOTION AND BACKGROUND 
Pursuant to IRCP 11 (a)(2)(B), Plaintiffs move the court for reconsideration of its June 
19, 2015 Memorandum Decision Upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. The 
Kings sought reconsideration of the Court's original March 25, 2015 Memorandum Decision 
Upon King Defendants' Motion/or Summary Judgment which had denied the Kings' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
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The Court's original March 25, 2015 decision denied the Kings' Motion for Summary 
Judgment because the court found that there were disputed issues of material facts as to when 
adverse use began. In its decision, the Court concluded: 
As stated above, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must make 
all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. While the evidence in the record does 
not meet the clear and convincing standard required to prove the creation for a 
prescriptive easement that is not the standard for summary judgment. The material 
question of fact that remains to be decided is when adverse use began, (whether it was 
in 2011 as alleged by the Kings or in 1977 as alleged by John Fuquay). 
Despite finding that there were material issues of fact regarding when adverse use 
began, the Court reversed itself and granted the Kings' motion for summary judgment. In its 
June 19, 2015 decision, the Court stated: 
Based on the record before this Court the plaintiff has failed to make any showing on 
the essential element that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was adverse and under a claim 
of right. Even when this Court makes all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, there is 
nothing in the record to indicate a decisive act or incident of separate and exclusive 
use from 1977 until 2011. While the use of King Lane may not have started with 
express or even implied permission, the record and testimony of the plaintiffs show 
that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was in "common with the owner and the general 
public." Marshall 130 Idaho at 680; (quoting Simmons, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 
( 1941 ). A prescriptive easement cannot be granted unless there is evidence of a 
decisive act or incident showing adverse use that could be considered an "actual 
invasion or infringement on the rights of the owner." Hughes, 142 Idaho at 480. 
Because there is no proof or evidence concerning this essential element of the 
plaintiffs' case, that the Fuquays' use was adverse and contrary to the ownership rights 
of the Kings, the King defendants have met their burden of showing there is no 
genuine issue of material fact regarding the element of adverse use. 
June 19 Memorandum Decision at p. 10. 
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Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reconsider its reversal because its original 
decision was correct. There are disputed issues of material facts that make summary judgment 
inappropriate. 
In addition, the Court used the incorrect legal standard in reconsidering its decision 
and based its decision on an incorrect application of the law. When the correct legal standard 
is applied, the court should have denied the Kings' request for reconsideration and concluded 
that the Kings are not entitled to summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs are also submitting pages from the deposition of Rose King and Gilbert King 
which were taken on May 11, 2015 and which were not available to be submitted in response 
to the prior motions. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B) permits parties to move the court to reconsider 
an interlocutory order until fourteen days after a final judgment has been entered. The court 
must consider new evidence bearing on the correctness of a summary judgment order if the 
motion to reconsider is filed within fourteen days after a final judgment issues. Kepler-
Fleenor v. Fremont Cnty., 152 Idaho 207,210,268 P.3d 1159, 1162 (2012). 
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for reconsideration 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B). On a motion for reconsideration, the 
court must consider any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an 
interlocutory order. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound 
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discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 473, 147 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct. 
App. 2006). 
When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same 
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being 
reconsidered. In other words, if the original order was a matter within the trial court's 
discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the 
original order was governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to the motion 
for reconsideration. On the other hand, when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for 
reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, the Court must determine whether 
the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment. 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
III. ARGUMENTS 
Respectfully, there are several problems with the court's rulings: 
1. The Court applied the wrong presumption of adverse use. There is no evidence of how 
the road was created, and there is a presumption of adverse use which should have 
been construed in favor of the Fuquays. 
2. "Use in common" is a factual determination and there is conflicting evidence as to the 
use of the roadway. The court construed inferences from the conflicting evidence in 
favor of the Kings instead of in favor of the Fuquays. 
3. Even if there was "use in common" the evidence showed that Jim Fuquay had 
committed a distinct act of placing a new mobile home on his property in 1977 and 
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using the roadway for access to that mobile home. The placement of the mobile home 
was a separate distinctive act that created an adverse use. The court ignored the 
evidence of the adverse use commencing in 1977 and focused only on the use in 2011. 
A. The Prescriptive Easement Requires a Three-Step Analysis 
Presumptions for prescriptive easements use a three-step analysis: 1) Does the general 
rule presuming adverse use apply? 2) Is there evidence of permission by the landowner that 
negates the presumption of adverse use? and 3) If there is evidence of permission, is there 
evidence of an infringement of right by the easement claimant that reinstates the presumption 
of adverse use? 
1. General Presumption 
The first prong is a presumption that use of a roadway, without evidence of how that 
use began, is presumed to be adverse to the servient owner. 
Although clear and convincing proof of each of the elements necessary to establish a 
prescriptive easement is generally essential to a claim, there is a shortcut in terms of 
proving adverse use. Without evidence of how the use of the property began, proof of 
open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted use for the prescriptive period raises a 
presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right." 
Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 232, 76 P.3d 969, 976 (2003). 
Once the presumption of adverse use is established, the servient landowner has the 
burden of proving that the use was permissive: 
The general rule is that proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
claimed right for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use began, 
raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. The burden 
is then on the owner of the servient tenement to show that the use was permissive, or 
by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF THE COURT'S JUNE 19, 2015 
MEMORANDUM DECISION - 5 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 




W. v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973). See also Marshall v. 
Blair, 130 Id. 675,680; Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 62, 190 P.3d 876, 881 (2008). 
2. "In Common" Exception to General Presumption 
The second prong, the exception to the adverse presumption rule is: if the servient 
landowner presents evidence of a use "in common," then the use may be deemed permissive. 
However, for the "use in common" exception to apply, there must be an "absence of evidence 
as to whether the use began adversely or with permission of the servient owner." Melendez v. 
Hintz, 111 Idaho 401, 404, 724 P.2d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 1986). Mere acquiescence by the 
servient owner, however, is not evidence of permission: "As we have noted, mere proof that 
the owner "acquiesced" in the use is not proof that the use was with the owner's consent or 
permission." Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,405, 724 P.2d 137, 141 (Ct. App. 1986). This 
puts the burden on the servient owner to produce affirmative evidence that the use was 
permissive. Simply "doing nothing" is not evidence of permission or of a "use in common." 
3. The General Presumption Overrules the Exception 
The third step is: even if there is some evidence of permission or use in common from 
the servient owner, if there is some evidence that the easement claimants' use infringed on or 
invaded of the owners' rights, the general rule presuming adverse use, rather than the 
exception, still applies: 
Understanding the basis for the Simmons rule helps to determine the limits of its 
application. There should be no presumption that the use originated adversely to the 
owner unless the use itself constitutes some invasion or infringement upon the rights 
of an owner. Where one person merely uses a roadway in common with his neighbor, 
without damage to the roadway, without interfering with the neighbor's use of the 
roadway, and where the neighbor has established and maintained the roadway on his 
own property for his own purposes, only the most minimal intrusion is made into the 
owner's dominion over his property. Logically, a use which is not in fact adverse to 
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the owner provides no basis for the presumption that the use is adverse. However, 
where the use made of the property for the prescriptive period is shown to constitute 
some infringement or invasion of the owner's rights, it is more appropriate to apply 
the general rule, presuming the use to be adverse, that is, without permission of the 
owner. 
Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,405, 724 P.2d 137, 141 (Ct. App. 1986)(emphasis added). 
B. The Facts in this Case Support the General Presumption of Adverse Use 
In this case, the general rule applies. First, the roadway was in existence long before 
any of the parties in this case owned their properties. Second, the Kings did not show 
evidence of permission (as opposed to mere acquiescence). And third, even if the Kings 
showed some evidence of permission or use in common, the Plaintiffs presented evidence of 
an infringement of right that re-instated the presumption of adverse use. 
The court applied the presumptions incorrectly. There is no evidence as to how the 
original use began. Therefore, the court must apply the general rule in favor of the Plaintiffs. 
The Kings then have the burden of presenting evidence that the use was permissive. The 
Kings may not merely rest on acquiescence. However, even if there is some evidence as to 
use in common, if there is any evidence to show an infringement or invasion of the owners' 
rights, then the general presumption of adverse use must apply. Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 
401, 405, 724 P.2d 137, 141 (Ct. App. 1986). Here, the court simply looked at the evidence 
of increased truck use in 2011 but ignored the evidence as to the adverse use that began in 
1977. 
The court was initially correct in its analysis when it applied the general rule that when 
there is no evidence as to how use of a road began, the use is presumed adverse to the 
landowners. However, as to the second step, the Kings did not present evidence that the use 
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of the roadway commenced as permissive or that there was use in common in 1977. The 
Kings merely argued that they had a similar use of the roadway for farm trucks in 2011, and 
since Plaintiffs did not cause any damage to the roadway until then, the similar use was "in 
common." The Court accepted Kings' arguments that because Plaintiffs did not cause any 
damage to the roadway until 2011, the use was "in common" with the Kings. 
First, it is illogical that the law would require an easement claimant to damage a 
roadway in order to show adverse use. Common sense dictates that one who regularly uses a 
roadway would take care to prevent, not cause, damage to the roadway. After all, why would 
someone intentionally cause damage to a roadway that they would then need to repair? The 
reliance on arguments that there was no damage to the roadway is illogical and contrary to 
public policy. 
Second, the Court did not address the fact that the Kings sold their property to Zane 
Block in 1982 and repossessed it some 4 years later, in 1986. Affidavit of Rose King Dated 
December 4, 201413. There was no evidence of use in common during the year before or the 
year after Block's ownership of the property. The Kings also presented no evidence that the 
use of the roadway between March 1982 and September 1986 - when the Kings did not own 
the property-- was permissive. Therefore, the Fuquays' continued use of the roadway during 
that time is presumed to be adverse. 
In her deposition, Rose King acknowledged that she did not know if the use of the 
roadway from 1982-1986 was permissive or adverse. 
13 Q. All right. We're talking about 
14 King Lane when Zane Block was buying it. 
15 A. If I drive down and you drive down 
16 tomorrow, am I supposed to see your tracks? 
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17 Q. Well, my question was could you tell 
18 whether or not anybody had been using the road? 
19 Did it look like it was in use? 
20 A. Well, somebody had been using it. 
21 Q. Okay. But if there's a -- you don't 
22 know who was using the road during that time? 
23 A. No, I do not know. 
24 Q. Okay. It could have been the Fuquays, 
25 right? 
1 A. I don't know who was using the road, 
2 sir. 
3 Q. When Mr. Block was buying the property, 
4 did you believe that you still had the right to 
5 control who could or could not use King Lane? 
6 A. We didn't try to do that. 
7 Q. Okay. Was it your belief that you 
8 still had that right to? 
9 A. No. But I had the right to observe 
10 what was going on. 
11 Q. Okay. So when Mr. Block was there, you 
12 couldn't have come in and put gates up and said, 
13 "Well, you're just buying the property. We're 
14 going to put gates up and control who comes 
15 through"? 
16 A. No, I could not have done that. 
Rose King Deposition at 39-40 
At the time the Kings re-acquired the property in 1986, the use by Plaintiffs was 
presumptively adverse to the Kings because there is no evidence that the Plaintiffs' use during 
the time of Blocks' ownership was permissive. The Kings did not present any evidence of a 
change from adverse use to permissive use in 1986 when they re-acquired the property. In 
fact, the Kings did not live on the property immediately after re-acquiring it in 1986 and took 
no steps to determine whether the Fuquays' use of the roadway was adverse at that time. 
12 Q. Now, between 1986 and 1988 when you 
13 moved back up, did any of your -- did you have any 
14 indication during that two-year period that the 
15 Fuquays or anyone on their property were using 
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16 King Lane? 
17 A. I would assume they were, but I can't 
18 tell you. 
19 Q. At any point, did you ask any of your 
20 children to prevent anybody from using King Lane? 
21 A. No, we did not. 
Rose King Deposition at 42. 
There is at least an issue of fact as to whether the Plaintiffs' use of the roadway during 
Blocks' ownership, and the year before or after Blocks ownership - a period totaling more 
than 5 years--was adverse. 
C. There is No Evidence of Use in Common in 1977 
The court's analysis of "use in common" relied exclusively on the evidence of 
increased truck use in 2011. Again, that issue is largely irrelevant. While the increased use is 
relevant to the scope of the easement, the prescriptive easement had vested long before 2011. 
The evidence in the record showed that Jim Fuquay purchased the property in 1977 
and began using the roadway at that time. (Declaration of John Fuquay dated October_ 
2014). In his deposition, Gilbert King acknowledged that Fuquays began using the roadway 
for access after Jim Fuquay put in the mobile home: 
23 A. Okay. We're probably not clear. When 
24 they lived in this house here where John lives, 
25 they went in and out Castle Lane. When they put 
Page 86 
1 the double-wide in over here -- so I suppose it 
2 would be closer to like '79 -- then, you know, 
3 their use was once in a while. 
4 Q. Okay. Once in a while is what? 
5 A. A time or two a week, I would say. 
6 Q. Okay. A time or two a week with cars 
7 or a pickup? 
8 A. Cars or pickups. 
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Gilbert King Deposition at 85-86. 
There is no evidence that Jim Fuquay's use of the roadway began as permissive in 
1977. Since there was no evidence that the use began as permissive in 1977, the presumption 
is that the use was adverse. The Kings had an obligation to show evidence of a change in use 
from hostile to permissive by 1982 (5 years after Jim Fuquays purchase in 1977). The Kings 
presented no evidence of "use in common" between 1982 and 1986. Based on the 
presumption of adverse use commencing in 1977, Plaintiffs' prescriptive rights vested in 
1982. No amount of permissive or in-common use after that time nullifies the fact that the 
easement rights had already vested. 
The evidence is that the Kings never enforced any right to exclude Jim Fuquay from 
using King Lane. They merely acquiesced: 
Q. Did you ever tell Jim and Wanda that 
22 they were not allowed to use King Lane? 
23 A. No, I did not. 
24 Q. Did you believe at the time that you 
25 had -- would have had the right to tell them that 
Page 23 
I they couldn't use King Lane? 
2 A. Yes, I do. 
Deposition of Rose King at 22-23. 
D. The Public Use Exception Does Not Apply 
The "public use" exception requires indiscriminate public use equal to the use of the 
easement claimant. Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111, 112-13, 697 P.2d 451, 452-53 (Idaho App., 
1985) ("Where, as here, the same degree of use upon which the adverse claim is based has 
been exercised indiscriminately by the general public, individual acquisition of a prescriptive 
easement has generally been held impossible.") The Court relied on Huges v. Fischer for 
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support that use in common with the public requires a separate distinct act of adversity. 
However, the facts in Huges show the road at issue in that case was actually open to the 
general public. "All of the plaintiffs themselves corroborated the public use of the Path by 
testifying that use of the Path was "common knowledge," that "everybody did it." Hughes v. 
Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 481, 129 P.3d 1223, 1230 (Idaho,2006). So, in Hughes, the public use 
was to the same degree as the adverse use. 
That is not the same in this case. In this case, the Court stated that "there is evidence 
in the record of other specific public use by the mail carrier, the Schwann Truck driver and 
the school bus driver." Memorandum Decision at 7. The first issue is there is no evidence that 
that use would be "to the same degree" as the adverse use. The second issue is those 
declarations, which were submitted by the Kings, say that those drivers did NOT use King 
Lane. 
In addition, Rose King testified that there was never any public use of the roadway: 
Prior to this lawsuit, I am not aware of any use by UPS, post office or other delivery 
services of King Lane to provide services to Fuquay properties. To the contrary, the 
mailboxes for the Fuquays are located at the end of Castle Lane and I have not 
observed any services using King Lane to provide deliveries to the Fuquay 
properties ... .I am not aware of any guests of the Fuquays using King Lane to access 
the Fuquay properties. 
Affidavit of Rose King dated December 4, 2014. 
In her deposition, Rose King reaffirmed her testimony that the roadway was never 
used for deliveries: 
1 Q. You've never seen any delivery drivers 
2 using King Lane, FedEx, UPS, Post Office dropping 
3 off any mail packages to anybody that lived in 
4 Clint or JC's houses? 
5 A. No. The only time that I ever saw, the 
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6 Schwan's asked me one day, he said, "The gate is 
7 locked. I can't go up." I said, "You can go this 
8 time, but don't go anymore. They'll have to 
9 unlock their gate if they want it." 
10 So, no, they didn't come our way. The 
11 FedEx man did stop several times and ask how we 
12 got there, and we directed them to go around the 
13 way they were supposed to. And I believe you 
14 have some affidavits showing that from those 
15 people. 
Deposition of Rose King at 58. 
In her deposition, Rose King indicated that if the general public tried to go down the 
roadway, she would stop them in her driveway: 
A. Let me tell you one thing before you go 
20 too far. If you're looking at the picture, if 
21 you're going to drive across our bridge and you 
22 don't know that there's a lane that goes to the 
23 left, you're going to come directly into my yard. 
24 We had that. We told people where they wanted to 
25 go. They turned around and went back. So most of 
1 the people that I would have came or if there was 
2 a hunter, as you have asked before, then they 
3 would ask. 
4 Q. Okay. So if somebody didn't know that 
5 the road took the left tum after the bridge to go 
6 out there, they would have usually ended up in 
7 your driveway? 
8 A. That's correct. 
9 Q. And then they would have either said, 
10 "Oops, sorry," turned around and left, or if they 
11 were looking for somebody they might have stopped 
12 and asked? Is that a fair statement? 
13 A. Yes. And we would have told them how 
14 they went to get there 
Rose King Deposition at 25-26. 
There is no evidence of any public use that was equal to or greater than the use by the 
Plaintiffs. In addition, Rose King specifically denied any public use of the roadway. At the 
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very least, that testimony creates an issue of material fact. Was King Lane used by UPS, 
Schwanns, and other delivery services as the Court decided? Or did they never use King 
Lane, as Rose King testified? To what extent was there use by the general public versus 
invitees of the Fuquays? While the court can certainly make those factual findings at trial, the 
question of whether there was public use is clearly a disputed issue of material fact. In 
addition, the Court made the reasonable inferences of public use against the Plaintiffs instead 
of against the Kings as the moving party. The court should not have construed any facts or 
inferences against the Plaintiffs. 
E. There is Evidence of Distinct Adverse Use 
As noted, the Plaintiffs are entitled to rely on the presumption of adverse use because 
there is no evidence that the use of the roadway began as permissive. According to Rose 
King, the roadway has existed in the same location since at least 1894: 
A. It goes right where it is today. It is 
the same spot. It hasn't moved. That lane goes 
to where the fence -- the gate is because those 
fences are all the borderlines. When we bought 
the property, nobody resurveyed any land. Where 
we live, it was surveyed in 1894. So when they 
took us around to show us the borderline, and if 
you will look, the fence goes all the way across 
what's between Cal and Susie's and then it comes 
right here in front of Clint and JC's house. That 
same fence. And then it turns and goes south. 
Deposition of Rose King at 15-16. 
Samuel Steiner also testified that King Lane was in existence since at least 1959 when 
he was born and lived on it: "I do not know who, if anyone, constructed King Lane. This was 
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an old farm access roadway that was used occasionally by a variety of people." Declaration 
of Samuel V.C. Steiner at, 5. 
The Kings first acquired the property in 1973. Affidavit of Rose King dated 
December 4, 2014 at 12. According to Rose King, the roadway was in existence for nearly a 
hundred years before they bought he property. There is no evidence as to how the road was 
created or when the use began. Therefore, under the first prong of the analysis, the 
presumption is that the use of the roadway was adverse to the owners. Marshall v. Blair, 130 
Id. 675, 680. 
There is also ample evidence in the record to show the Fuquays' use of the roadway 
was adverse to the owners. The record first shows a distinctly adverse act when Jim Fuquay 
purchased his property in 1977 and began using the roadway for access. After purchasing the 
property, Jim Fuquay put a new mobile home on his property and began using King Lane to 
access that new home. As John Fuquay testified: 
I was about 12 years old when we first moved onto the John Fuquay Parcel. My 
parents bought a mobile home and put on the property and we lived in that for years. 
From January 1977 forward, my family continuously used King Lane for access to 
Oreana Loop Road. My parents drove personal vehicles of all types over King Lane .... 
Since 1977, I have continuously used King Lane to access both the John Fuquay 
Parcel and the Clinton Fuquay Parcel. 
Declaration of John Fuquay dated October_, 2014. 
John Fuquay is not the only one to testify as to the Fuquays' use of the roadway after 
the placement of the mobile home in 1977. Samuel Steiner testified in his declaration that: 
"When Jim Fuquay moved on a mobile home at the comer of what would be King Lane and 
Castle Road, he would occasionally use King Lane, probably as a short cut when he went out 
to Grand View." Steiner also testified that "Renters on the old Munger property, now owned 
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. . . 
by Fuquays and previously owned by Bob Collette used [King Lane] occasionally as a short-
cut to Grandview. I think that Jim Fuquay used it occasionally when he lived in the mobile 
home located near the rental property now owned by Clint Fuquay." Declaration of Samuel 
V.C. Steiner dated November 10, 2014 at if6. 
The testimony is significant because it provides evidence of a distinct and decisive act 
that put the Kings on notice as to Jim Fuquay's adverse use of the roadway. At the time the 
Kings purchased their property in 1973, the mobile home on the Fuquay property did not 
exist. Once Jim Fuquay placed the mobile home on his property in 1977, he began using 
King Lane for access to that home. From that testimony, the court must make the reasonable 
inference that the Fuquays' use of the roadway after placement of the new mobile home was a 
distinct and decisive act that showed adverse use of the roadway by the Fuquays. At the very 
least, it is a material issue of fact as to when the adverse use began that precludes summary 
judgment. 
In addition to the Fuquays' use for access to the mobile home, the Fuquays had 
numerous renters on their property who would use the roadway for access to the rental 
property. Dennis Jayo, Nate Moore and Tanna Gilbert are some of the renters. The Kings 
were aware that all of these people were using the roadway. 
12 Q. How about when Tanna Gilbert was there? 
13 Do you recall her living there? 
14 A. I recall her living there. 
15 Q. Do you recall how she would get to and 
16 from that house? 
17 A. She came down the lane part of the 
18 time. She worked for other people. She wasn't 
19 always around. 
20 Q. So she would use King Lane to get to 
21 and from her house? 
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22 A. I don't know if that was her primary, 
23 sir. 
24 Q. I'm not saying whether or not it is her 
25 primary. I'm asking if she used it. 
A. I saw her very seldom on the road 
2 because she was seldom ever around. 
3 Q. Did you ever tell her not to use 
4 King Lane? 
5 A. No, I did not. 
6 Q. Is it your understanding and belief 
7 that you could have told her not to use that lane 
8 and that would have been within your rights? 
9 A. Yes, I feel that. 
Deposition of Rose King at 18-25. 
Rose King acknowledged that during the time that Nate Moore was a renter and lived 
on Fuquays' property, he used the roadway for access: 
6 Q. And when Nate lived in that house, how 
7 did he get to and from that house? 
8 A. He would have probably went down our 
9 lane. 
10 Q. And you were aware that he was going up 
11 and down? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And how often would he go up and down? 
14 A. He went to work in the morning, and he 
15 came home in the evening. That was the extent. 
16 He didn't run up and down back and forth. 
17 Q. Do you remember how many years that 
18 would have been? 
19 A. Oh, maybe a couple of months. 
20 Q. And again, same thing, is that you 
21 never told Nate that he wasn't able to use that, 
22 the road to get up and back from the house? 
23 A. No, I did not. 
24 Q. But, again, you understood that you 
25 could have if you had wanted to? 
Page 31 
I A. Yes, I do. Yes, I do. 
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t .. . ' . 
Gilbert King acknowledged that starting in at least 1980, renters on the Fuquay 
property would use the roadway for access: 
21 Q. Okay. What was -- I don't know if 
22 you're old enough to remember what it was like 
23 then. Was it --
24 A. It was -- well, I remember in the 
25 wintertime, it would get pretty sloppy. My 
Page 19 
1 brother lived in the house where JC lives, and he 
2 had a two-wheel-drive pickup. And it was bad 
3 enough that he couldn't get back and forth at 
4 times in the winter because of the ruts where it 
5 is alkali, you know. That was the reason for 
6 gravelling it there in '80 in the summertime. 
7 Q. Which brother was that? 
8 A. Greg. 
9 Q. How long did he live in that house? 
10 A. It was from the time he got married 
11 until -- like three years, I think. '79 to '82 or 
12 so. Something like that. 
13 Q. Okay. And when he lived there, how 
14 would he get back and forth to his house or to 
15 where he was living? 
16 A. Oh, just, you know, on the dirt road 
17 there in the lane. 
18 Q. He would go up and down King Lane to 
19 get to the house? 
20 A. Um-hum. 
21 Q. Do you know who else lived in that 
22 house over the years? 
23 A. Some people by the name of Laws lived 
24 there. Tanna Gilbert lived there. Nate Moore. 
25 Somebody else. 
Page 20 
1 Q. Dennis Trayo? 
2 A. I don't remember. He was before my 
3 time. But I know John lived there for a period of 
4 time when they got divorced. 
5 Q. John Fuquay? 
6A. Um-hum. 
7 Q. Okay. And when those people lived in 
8 that house, how would they get back and forth to 
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9 the house? 
10 A. Down the lane there part of the time. 
11 Q. So they would go -- this Exhibit 5 
12 doesn't show it, but let me see it. All right. 
13 So Exhibit 3, you had marked where the gate is. 
14 JC's house is just west of where the gate is 
15 now? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. There? So the -- whoever lived in 
18 the house would come out King Lane past the --
19 down the lane past the houses out to Oreana Loop 
20Road? 
21 A. Yes. 
Gilbert King Deposition at 18-20. 
The use of the roadway by renters for access to the rental property is not in common 
with the Kings. Use by renters is a distinct act that put the Kings on notice of Plaintiffs 
adverse use. 
Since there is evidence of a distinct and decisive act that put the Kings on notice of 
Plaintiffs adverse use in 1977, the presumption of adverse use has continued uninterrupted. 
The Kings offered no evidence to interrupt the adverse use of the roadway or to change the 
adverse use to permissive. Since the Kings were aware of the adverse use, they lost any right 
to object in 1982. 
The law will presume that the land belongs to the owner of the paper title, and that the 
use was by permission or silent acquiescence. If this presumption is overcome by 
evidence showing the use to have been hostile, and that the owner knew of such 
hostile claim and took no steps to protect his property for a period of five years, then 
the presumption changes. No injustice is done to the owner, if he knows the claim to 
be hostile, and that title is being asserted against him, but neglects for five years to 
avail himself of the right which the law gives him. He is in the position of any other 
owner of property who negligently allows the statute of limitations to run against him. 
Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 667, 670-71, 66 P. 10, 11-12 (1901). 
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Since there is no evidence to contradict the presumed adverse use of the roadway 
beginning in 1977, Fuquays' prescriptive rights would have ripened and vested in 1982-
either 5 years from Jim Fuquays' purchase of the property in January 1977 or 5 years from the 
placement of the mobile home. 
The Kings argued that Plaintiffs' adverse use did not occur until 2011, and therefore did 
not occur within the 20-year statute of limitations period. The court accepted this premise but 
ignored the evidence of adverse use that began in 1977 when Jim Fuquay placed the mobile 
home on his property and began using the roadway for access. The Kings showed no evidence 
of use "in common" between 1977 and 1982. Again, this is significant because the 
presumption is that Jim Fuquay's use beginning in January 1977 was presumptively adverse. 
And, at the very least, the Fuquay' s placement of the mobile home in 1977 was a separate and 
distinct act that brought home to the Kings that Fuquays intended to use King Lane for access. 
Because it is apparent that there are disputed issues as to when the adverse use began, 
summary judgment was inappropriate: 
This case is highly complex and presents multiple issues of material fact which the 
lower court should address at trial. The testimony of several material witnesses 
presented conflicting information and the parties should be cross-examined to 
determine their credibility. Thus, the district court erred in granting Capstar summary 
judgment because the case presents multiple issues of material fact that preclude the 
court from deciding on a motion for summary judgment whether an easement exists. 
Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 421, 283 P.3d 728, 738 
(2012). 
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The Court's original determination that there are disputed issues of material fact that 
preclude summary judgment was correct. As has been noted, summary judgment is 
inappropriate when the evidence and inferences are in dispute: 
Summary judgment was not a proper method to dispose of a case with so much 
conflicting evidence ... Although the court, as the trier of fact, may draw the 
most probable inferences from the undisputed evidence, there are enough 
genuine issues of material fact to warrant deciding the merits of the case at 
trial. There is a fine line between drawing the most probable inferences and 
weighing the evidence, and this Court holds the belief that the district court 
should have allowed the case to go to trial in order to weigh the conflicting 
evidence and test the credibility of the witnesses. 
Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 416, 283 P.3d 728, 733 
(2012). 
The Court's determination on reconsideration that there was no evidence of adverse use or 
distinctive acts is incorrect. The record has heavy evidence that the adverse use began in 
1977, and of distinct acts that put the Kings on notice of Plaintiffs' adverse use of the 
roadway after that time. 
Plaintiffs are not required to put forth their entire case or to present clear and convincing 
evidence to defend against a summary judgment motion. They need only show material issues 
of fact. It was erroneous for the court to suggest that it was considering the weight of the 
evidence at this point in the case. The only way for the court to hear and weigh all of the 
evidence is for it to be presented at trial. 
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Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reconsider its reconsidered order, 
acknowledge that there are disputed issued of material fact, deny the Kings' motion for 
summary judgment, and continue the matter for trial. 
Dated: July 2, 2015 
Matthew R. Cleverley, IS 18 
Fidelity National Law roup 
1200 - 6th A venue, Sui e 62 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 223-4525, ext. 10 
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration and the pages from Depositions of Gilbert King and Rose King on the 
following individuals in the manner indicated: 
Ronald P. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@qwestoffice.net 
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S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
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208-629-7447 
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Attorney for Lows 
Dated: July 2, 2015 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - I 
CKJI U.S. MAIL I 
DI LEGAL MESSENGER I 
[XJI EMAIL I 
DI HAND DELIVERED I 
DI EXPRESS DELIVERY I 
DI FACSIMILE I 
[XJI U.S. MAIL I 
DI LEGAL MESSENGER 
[XJI EMAIL 
DI HAND DELIVERED 
DI EXPRESS DELIVERY 
DI FACSIMILE I 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200 - 6'" A VENUE, SUITE 620 








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X 
4 
5 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD FUQUAY 
and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
6 Plaintiffs, 
7 vs. 
8 SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K RANCH 
TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO 
9 FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO FALLS, 
INC.; GORDON G. KING; ROSE M. KING; 





- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X 
13 
14 
15 DEPOSITION OF ROSE KING 
16 May 11, 2015 
17 
18 VOLUME 1 
Pages 1 - 80 
19 
2 0 Reported by 
Brooke R. Bohr 




25 Job No. CS2066702 
L__ -------
800-567-8658 
Veritext Legal Solutions 
Case No. CV-14-0278 I 
I 
_ FILED! 
11 .~O A.M. ____ Jt.M. 
JUL O 6 2015 
973-410-4040 
572
----- - --Page2 / - -- -- -- - - -
I DEPOSITION OF ROSE KING, taken at the ,
1
 1 NAMPA, IDAHO 
Page4 
2 instance of the Plaintiffs, at the Holiday Inn 
3 Express,4104E.FlamingoAvenue,ConferenceRoom, I 2 May 11,2015, 11:57 a.m. 
4 in the City of Nampa, State of Idaho, commencing 
1
1 3 
5 at 11:57 a.m., on May 11, 2015, before Brooke R. 4 ROSE KING, 
, 6 Bohr, CSR, RPR, a Notary Public in and for the 
5 7 State of!daho, pursuant to notice, and in produced as a witness at the instance of the 
8 accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil 6 Plaintiffs, having been first duly sworn, was 
9 Procedure. 7 examined and testified as follows: 
IO 
II APPEARANCES 8 
12 9 EXAMINATION 
13 FOR PLAINTIFFS 10 BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 














FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200- 6th Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
matthew.cleverley@fuf.com 
FOR SUSIE LOW and CAL LOW 
S. Bryce Farris, Esq. 
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1101 W.RiverStreet,Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83707 
(208) 629-7447 
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
FOR HEART K RANCH TRUST and ROSE M. KING: 
Ronald P. Rainey, Esq. 
RAINEY LAW OFFICES 
110 N. 9th Avenue 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
(208) 459-3659 
erainey@questoflice.net 
11 Q. Ms. King, as you know, I'm 
12 Matt Cleverley. I represent the Fuquays. 
13 You've observed several of the 
14 depositions. So you kind of know how this is 
15 going to work. So if you have any -- if you're 
i 16 not understanding any questions, let me know. 
'1 17 A. Okay. 
/ 1 s Q. Can you state your name, please. 
f 19 A. Rosemary King. 
i 20 Q. And where do you live? 
I
, 21 A. I live at 19124 King Lane. 
22 Q. How long have you lived there? 
'i 23 A. Total years, probably 40. 
24 Q. Total years? 
/ 25 A. Um-hum. , -- --------------~---- ------------ - -----r--------------------~-~--------::j 




W I TN E S S : I Q. When did you first move into the 
1 
2 property? 







Examination by Mr. Cleverley 
Examination by Mr. Rainey 
* * * * * 
EXHIBITS 
' 10 Page: 
: 11 


















4 Q. You and your husband bought it? 
5 A Yes, we did. 
6 Q. And did you buy the entire property 
7 that is now also known as the Heart K Ranch 
8 property, as well? 
9 A. It is all one piece of property. 
10 Q. It is all one piece? And you have your 
11 house now that has a separate property? 
12 A. I just have my home, yes. Due to the 
13 trust, I have my home. 
14 Q. Okay. So I just want to make sure I'm 
15 clarifying. You're the one that's been around the 
16 longest on this one? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. All of the property at one time 
19 belonged to you and your Mr. King? 
20 A Yes . 
21 Q. Okay. And then at some point you sold 
22 all of the property to Zane Block? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Do you recall when that was? 
25 A We sold it in March of'82 is when we 
- -------------- . -----··------ ---- ------- -·" ------ -- -------~-·--- i 
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Q. And then he owned all of the property, 
including your house, all of the houses? 
A. No. There was no houses there. There 
5 was only one house. 
6 MR. RAINEY: He asked you ifhe owned the 
7 house. Explain to Mr. Cleverly the mechanism of 




THE WITNESS: Okay. We sold it to him, 
but we retained -- we had a Quitclaim Deed we 
retained because we weren't sure of the man's 
12 abilities. So everything, the State leases, the 
BLM, the water rights, everything retained in our 13 
14 name. He was more or less a tenant. 
15 Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: So explain --
i 16 explain that to me. He was -- did he put money 
17 down as a down payment? 
18 A. He did. 
• 19 Q. How much? 
• 20 A. I don't remember. 
21 Q. Does $650,000 sound right? 
22 A. Truthfully, I do not remember. 
23 Q. What was he supposed to pay monthly? 
24 A. He didn't pay monthly. It was supposed 
25 to be yearly. 
' Page 8 i 
that? 
2 A. He had a payment January 3rd, 1984, and 
3 that was the last payment that he made. 
4 Q. All right. So what happened -- he made 
5 his second payment. 1985 comes around, and you 
6 don't get a payment? Or had there been any 
7 conversations before then that he wasn't going to 
8 be able to make the payment? 
9 
JO 
A. There was no conversation from him. 
Q. So what happened after he didn't make 
II the third payment or he made a second payment 
12 and didn't make anything else? Tell me what 
13 happened. 
14 A. We went to the bank to give us our 
15 papers, and then he filed a lawsuit against the 












Q. And what happened as part of everything 
that was going on? 
A. What do you mean what happened? 
Q. Well, was he -- was he filing 
bankruptcy to try and make payments? 
A. No, not to us. He was just filing 
bankruptcy because he wanted the property. 
Q. So he wanted to keep the property? Was 
f--- ---··----- --·--·-·--· -t---· ------- -----~~--------~ 
Page 7 ! Page9 
he going to try and make payments through the I Q. How much was he supposed to pay each 
2 year? 
3 A. The figure, if! can recall correctly, 
4 should have been about $96,000. 
5 Q. And for how many years was he supposed 





A. I don't know. 
Q. Was he --
A. Until it was paid for. 
Q. Okay. Do you know what the total 







A. $1,860,000, I believe. 
Q. All right. And so he put a down 
payment down, and you were carrying the balance of 
the contract? 
A. Wedid. 
Q. Okay. So he would then pay you 
18 payments, and he was supposed to make one payment 
19 a year? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And was that -- when was this first 
22 payment due? 
23 A. The first payment was due January 3rd, 
24 1983. He made that payment. 
25 Q. And then did he make payments after 





A. I truly don't know how that all 
operated, sir. 
Q. So you said you went down to the bank 
7 to get your papers. What do you mean you went to 
the bank to get your papers? ! 8 
9 A. Because they held it in escrow for us. 







Q. So you had a purchase contract for the 
property he was buying. He would get the title to 
the property --
A. When it was paid for. 
Q. -- when it was paid for? 
A. Yes. 
• 17 Q. When did you end up getting the 
18 property back? 
19 
120 





A. We had to evict him because he would 
not leave the premises after the judge gave it 
back to us, and it was in September of '86. 
Q. So you had to evict him? Did the 
sheriff come out and move him out? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Did you have a separate lawsuit that 
3 (Pages 6 - 9) 
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took us around to show us the borderline, and if I 
2 
A. Where JC lives was there. 
Q. Okay. Did somebody live in that one? 
3 A. The Foreman -- the Foreman we purchased 
4 from, his hired hand lived there. 
5 Q. Was the? 
6 A. The house where Clint lives, no. There 
7 was no house there. The Fuquays bought that and 
8 moved it in. 
9 Q. That was in about 1979? 
10 A. I think so. 
11 Q. It would have been at least -- so we're 
12 getting time references -- after you bought the 
13 property, but before you had sold to Steiner --
14 I'm sorry. Not Steiner -- Zane Block, sometime 
15 between then and when you sold is when the Fuquays 
16 put that additional house in -- Clint's house 
17 where Clint currently lives on the comer; is that 
18 right? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Okay. So tell me how -- what about 
21 what we're calling King Lane? What was it called 
22 when you bought your property? 
A. When we bought the property, it was --
! I 
2 you will look, the fence goes all the way across 
3 what's between Cal and Susie's and then it comes 
4 right here in front of Clint and JC's house. That 
same fence. And then it turns and goes south. ! 5 
6 Q. Okay. So the fence was there when you 
7 bought the property? 
8 A. The fence was there when we bought the 
9 property, and we were told that was the property 
10 line. 
i 11 Q. Were there two fences, one on either 
• 12 side of the road? 
113 A. There was a fence. So they had -- the 
1
1 
14 fence was there so the movement of the cattle, if 
i 15 you wanted to bring your cattle out of the field, 
1 
16 you moved them in. And ifby chance that's what 
I 17 the reason for all of those fences are. 
i 18 Q. So maybe I -- I probably didn't ask 
: 19 this clearly. When you moved in, was there a 
! 20 fence on both sides of King Lane? 
I 
21 A. Both sides. But the south fence, which 
22 is against the Lows', is what they called the 
23 section fence, the border fence. 
24 Q. Okay. So was it your understanding 
25 
it is a road so we could get to and from our 
fields. The only King Lane is from Oreana Loop • 25 that the roadway was entirely on your property? i 
·-+-------------~-~---------- j 
Page 15 ! Page 17 \ 
into our premises. This is just a field road to A. Yes, we were under that understanding. ' 
2 get to and from our properties. It is not a lane. 2 But we were also told that they had -- because of 
3 It doesn't have a name. But everybody is calling 3 the bridge to get to and from, that they were 
4 it King Lane. For the premiss of this lawsuit, we ' 4 allowed to come around and come in. They have 
5 call it King Lane. But the 9-1-1 only comes into , 5 three gates in their fence so they can get into 
6 our property. 
7 Q. Okay. So tell me about -- so that 
8 we're referencing the same thing for what we're 
9 talking about, tell me what King Lane looked like 
i IO when you bought your property. 
, 11 A. What it looked like? 
I 
! 12 Q. Um-hum. 
i 13 A. It was a little narrow two-wheel track 
i 14 to go to and from because we have to go that way 
! 15 to get into our fields, and that's all it was used 
16 for. 
17 Q. Okay. So how far down did those tracks 
18 go? I mean, did they go all the way down to where 
19 Clint's house is now? 
20 A. It goes right where it is today. It is 
21 the same spot. It hasn't moved. That lane goes 
I 22 to where the fence -- the gate is because those 
I 23 fences are all the borderlines. When we bought 
i 24 the property, nobody resurveyed any land. Where 
i 25 we live, it was surveyed in 1894. So when they 
l------~-------··--- -----~------------------ ------
6 their property. So they used it in common. 
7 Nobody else. 
8 Q. And who is "they"? 
9 A. Well, at that time, it was the 
IO Steiners. 
II Q. Okay. 
. 12 A. They came in and used it. But they 
'1 13 had three gates. And if they wanted to move 
! 14 their cows out, then they could move them up and 
15 go out, and they didn't get into our fields and 
16 intermingle with our cows. Ifwe needed to move 









Q. Did the Steiners own their property 
before you bought the property? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. Did you ever talk with the Steiners 
about who owned the road? 
A. I had no reason to. 
Q. As far as where that road went, you 
were calling it a path, a two-Jane path that went 
5 (Pages 14 - 17) 




1 between the fences. How far west did that path 
2 go? Did it stop at the gate or did it -- at the 
3 comer of where your property was or did it 
4 continue on past the Fuquays? 
5 A. Well, I'm sure at one time when they 
6 had a school there, I'm sure that they probably 
7 used the wagons to go that way for the school. 
8 But that didn't make it a road, sir. And I know 
9 on one of these pictures that you have, you can 
10 even see the grass in between the tire -- where 
the wheel tracks go. 11 
, 12 Q. So if you were to go down King Lane 
through your property and out, would you 
eventually be able to connect back up with 




16 A. You could or you could go straight 











Q. So what was the -- did you ever see 
where the Fuquays lived, Clint and JC have their 
houses at the end, if you follow the road out, you 
get to their houses. Did they use that road --
sorry. Did anybody that lived there at the time 
use that road to -- King Lane to get to Oreana 
Loop? 
A. Run that by me again. 
I understood when you bought the property from 
2 DI Foreman --
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. -- that you owned that lane and that 
5 nobody else had the right to use it? 
6 A. I didn't say they had a right to use 
7 it. I said the neighbors, they had an agreement 
8 at the time we moved there. And at the time we 
9 moved there it was the Steiners. 
JO Q. Did you ever have an agreement with the 
11 Steiners? 
12 A. No, we did not. You know, there was a 
13 thing that was called an honor. Mr. Foreman told 
14 us that those people that owned that ranch had 
15 that right. So when they sold it to the Lows, it 
16 went to the Lows. 
17 Q. When was the first time that you were 
I 8 aware that the Fuquays were using -- going up and 
Page 20 
! 19 down King Lane? When is the first time you became 
', 20 aware of that? 
; 21 A. Which Fuquays? 
22 Q. Well, it would have either been Jim, 
23 because he was the one that ended up buying the 
; 24 property, or any -- John eventually bought the 
• 25 property. Let's start with Jim Fuquay. When he 
+------~-~----··-·----------- --------------r-------.. --- ------··-- ··--------~---~ 
Page 19 1 Page21 
I Q. Sure. Well, let's narrow that down. 
2 The Foreman owned the property that now 
3 belongs to the Fuquays? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And they lived in the house where 
6 John Fuquay lived? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. The house where JC lives, which is up 
: 9 there along King Lane --
! IO A. Yes. 
I 
'. II Q. -- you said somebody -- the Foreman 
i 12 hired hand lived in that house when you bought the 
J 13 property? 
I 14 A. Yes. That was Mr. Foreman that lived I 
!, 15 where we do. 
: 16 Q. What do you mean he lives where you 
. 17 do? 
18 A. We bought from DI Foreman. Fuquays 
19 bought from Kirby Foreman. Two different segments 
20 of properties. 
21 Q. Okay. All right. 
22 A. They separated out their properties, 
23 and Mr. Foreman says, "This is your lane. You own 
24 it. Nobody else has it." 




























bought the property, did he ever go up and down 
King Lane? 
A Very, very seldom. 
Q. When you say "very seldom," what does 
that mean? 
A. Maybe once a week. Maybe not that 
often. It was closer for them. They lived where 
John lives. It would be closer for them to go 
south. That's only three-quarters of a mile. And 
their children caught the bus there, John, when he 
went to school, John and Megan. 
Q. Okay. So let's -- hang on with me so 
we can track. When Jim Fuquay bought the 
property, they bought it from Kirby Foreman in 
19 -- it was 1977 when Jim bought the property? 
A. Okay. 
Q. And they moved into -- which house did 
they move into? 
A. Where John lives. 
Q. Where John lives? And then they 
brought in a couple of years later, the doublewide 
mobile and put that at the property where Clint 
now lives, right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. When they put that mobile home in 
6 (Pages 18 - 21) 




I there, who lived in that mobile home? 
2 A. Well, eventually, Jim and Wanda moved 
I 3 into it. 
4 Q. Okay. And when Jim and Wanda moved 
5 into that home, did they use King Lane to get to 



















A. From which house? 
Q. From the house that they put in the 
doublewide that Jim and Wanda put in that they 
moved into, did they use King Lane to get to and 
from that house, the one that they put in and 
moved into? 
A. How did they use it? 
Q. No. Did they use King Lane to get to 
and from their house? 
A. Very seldom. They went south. 
Q. So you're saying maybe once a week that 
they would use it, and otherwise they would go 
south? 
A. They went south. 
Q. Did you ever tell Jim and Wanda that 
they were not allowed to use King Lane? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you believe at the time that you 
had -- would have had the right to tell them that 
A. I saw her very seldom on the road 
2 because she was seldom ever around. 
3 Q. Did you ever tell her not to use 
4 KingLane? 
5 A. No, I did not. 
6 Q. Is it your understanding and belief 
Page 24 1 
7 that you could have told her not to use that lane 
8 and that would have been within your rights? 
9 A. Yes, I feel that. 
10 Q. Do you recall who lived in the house 
11 after Tanna Gilbert? 
12 A. No. Truthfully, I can't tell you who 
13 all lived because I had things I had to do. So 
14 that wasn't my primary concern to watch who lived 
15 where. 
16 Q. Well, you knew that there were some 
! 17 people living there, regardless of who it was? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Okay. And were you aware of how they 
20 were getting to and from that house? 
21 A. Well, they had both ways to go. 






A. I don't know. 
Q. I understand that they could have gone 





they were using King Lane? they couldn't use King Lane? 
, 2 A. Yes, 1 do. 
3 Q. Now, at some point, there were other 
4 people that lived in the house that we call JC's 
5 house, which is the one that fronts on King Lane? 








Q. And there have been a number of people 
that had lived in that house. And tell me who I 
might be missing. Dennis Jayo, Tanna Gilbert. 
A. Dennis Jayo would have been long before 
my time. I don't know about him. 
Q. How about when Tanna Gilbert was there? 
Do you recall her living there? 
i 14 A. I recall her living there. 
! 15 Q. Do you recall how she would get to and 








A. She came down the lane part of the 
time. She worked for other people. She wasn't 
always around. 
Q. So she would use King Lane to get to 
and from her house? 
A. I don't know if that was her primary, 
sir. 
2 A. I was aware. Periodically I saw 
3 people, yes. 
4 Q. Did you always know who they were or 
5 did you not know who they were that were living 
6 there? 
7 A. I knew who the Lows were or the --
8 shoot. Who the Laws were. I knew Tanna; the 
9 young boy that worked at the garage. Those, I 
10 remember. 
11 Q. Was there ever anybody that lived there 
12 that you didn't know or you don't --
13 A. Sir, I don't know. 
14 Q. Did you ever stop anybody along those 





Where are you going"? 
A. I have. 
Q. What--
I 
1 19 A. Let me tell you one thing before you go 
i 20 too far. If you're looking at the picture, if 
21 you're going to drive across our bridge and you 
22 don't know that there's a lane that goes to the 
23 left, you're going to come directly into my yard. 
24 
: 25 
Q. I'm not saying whether or not it is her , 24 We had that. We told people where they wanted to 
primary. I'm asking if she used it. 1 25 go. They turned around and went back. So most of, 
- - ---- - --- -- ---~------------------- _____ ____i_= ____________________________ ---- --- - ------- ---- ---
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the people that I would have came or if there was ; 
2 a hunter, as you have asked before, then they 2 
3 would ask. 3 
4 Q. Okay. So if somebody didn't know that 4 
5 the road took the left tum after the bridge to go 5 
6 out there, they would have usually ended up in 6 
7 your driveway? 7 
8 
9 Q. And then they would have either said, 9 
'10 
A. That's correct. I 8 
"Oops, sorry," turned around and left, or if they 10 
were looking for somebody they might have stoppe~ 11 
and asked? Is that a fair statement? i 12 
j I I 
12 
I 
13 A. Yes. And we would have told them how I 13 
14 they went to get there. i 14 
Q. Did you ever have anybody stopped that ! 15 
I 
16 were looking for the Fuquays? i I 6 
A. Yes. i 11 
15 
17 
18 Q. How would you tell them to go to the ! 18 
19 Fuquays? ! 19 
20 A. We told them to go back to the highway, i 20 
Oreana Road South, and that was their road. I 21 
I 22 
21 
22 Q. I was using the term Fuquays broadly. 
23 Were they looking for John Fuquay at that time? 





I 25 Q. Did you ever have anybody stop that was r----·----------------- ---·-------- ---
Page 27 ! 
I looking for Tanna Gilbert? 
2 A. No. 2 
i 3 Q. Or anyone else? 3 
4 A. No. 4 
5 Q. Do you recall -- just to make it clear, ' 5 
6 do you recall anybody stopping and asking for 6 
7 directions to anyone other than John Fuquay's 7 
8 house that would come in and stop? 8 
9 A. No, I do not. I 9 
i 
10 Q. Was there a gate at the west end of : 10 
11 your property where the Fuquay's property is and i 11 
12 the Lows and then yours is on the other side where 12 
13 the new gates have been put up. Was there a gate 13 
14 down at that end of the property? 14 
15 A. When we bought it, yes, there was. 15 
16 Q. Was that left open or was that closed? ' 16 
17 A. It was closed most of the time. 17 
18 Q. So if people were going through along i 18 
19 that road, would they open and close the gate? i 19 
20 A. They had to open and close the gate. 20 
21 That's common courtesy. i 21 
22 Q. When Tanna Gilbert lived there, did you 22 
23 ever see her stop and open the gate? 23 
24 A. If it was closed, I'm sure she did, and ,24 
I 25 she would have closed it if they went through. 25 
L__ ____ , ________ --···---------·,-·-- -----------------
Page 28 : 
Q. How about the Laws? 
A. They would have did the same. 
Q. So when we're talking King Lane, you 
said that it was mostly a path, a two-wheel 
path --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- that went out that way. Who 
improved it and made it into the type of gravel 
road it is now? 
A. My husband and I did, our boys. 
Q. Tell me about when that was. 
A. Well, when we first moved there, we had 
to do different things to it. It is alkali 
ground. When alkali gets wet, you sink. And it 
had to be very firm. So we hauled big rocks and 
put on it. I can't tell you all of the years that 
we did what we did, but we made the road to what 
it is today. And that was so we could take our 
feed in to feed the cattle, so we could irrigate, 
so we could take our equipment back and forth. 
All of our individual fields are individually 
fenced, and they've all got gates. 
Q. Did anyone else assist in the road 
improvements that you were doing? You and your 
husband and your children. Did anybody else 
Page 29 ! 
help? 
A. No. 
Q. When do you recall the -- let me back 
up. Do you recall when Jim Fuquay moved into the 
house that Clint now lives in, the doublewide? 
A. Um-hum. 
Q. Do you recall when he moved in there? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Do you know when -- and, again, going 
back. Do you recall if when he moved into that 
house, John lived in the other house where John 
currently lives? I'm just trying to get a gauge 
on how people moved around. 
A. You know, sir, John didn't always live 
on that property. And when -- I don't know when 
he moved into that house to live there for his 
own. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember when Nate Moore. 
lived out there? 
A. I know he lived there, but I can't tell 
you when he lived there. 
Q. Do you remember which house he lived 
in? 
A. The little tiny one where JC lives. 
Q. Where JC lives now? 
8 (Pages 26 - 29) 




A. That was the only house that anybody trucks or cattle trucks or things like that -- up 
2 Jived in that was not Fuquay. 2 and down King Lane? 
3 Q. That would have been used more like a 3 A. Maybe once or twice. I don't recall 
4 rental house? 4 him very seldom on our Jane. And I know that 
5 A. It sat vacant a great deal of the time. 5 until Block moved there, we got it back, I know 
6 Q. And when Nate lived in that house, how 6 that they didn't. 
7 did he get to and from that house? 7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. He would have probably went down our 8 A. Or if they did, I don't know how they 
9 lane. 9 maneuvered it. 
IO Q. And you were aware that he was going up IO Q. When Zane Block owned the property and 
11 and down? ! 11 lived there, did he make any improvements to the 
12 A. Yes. ' 12 road, to King Lane? 
13 Q. And how often would he go up and down? i 13 A. Not that was visible. 
14 A. He went to work in the morning, and he 14 Q. So would you say that King Lane then 
15 came home in the evening. That was the extent. 15 has been in its current state since you -- since 
16 He didn't run up and down back and forth. 16 before Zane Block, as far as the condition that it 
17 Q. Do you remember how many years that 17 is in now? 
18 would have been? 18 A. Yes. 
19 A. Oh, maybe a couple of months. , 19 Q. Do you recall when Clint Fuquay moved 
20 Q. And again, same thing, is that you i 20 into his house? 
21 never told Nate that he wasn't able to use that, i 21 A. About the time he and Haley got 
22 the road to get up and back from the house? J 22 married, I would say. 
23 A. No, I did not. 123 Q. Do you know how Jong ago that was? 
• 24 Q. But, again, you understood that you / 24 A. Maybe 2008, '9. I don't know. 
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A. Yes, I do. Yes, I do. 
Q. When was the first time that you 
remember seeing John -- let me back up. 
Do you ever remember seeing John Fuquay 
using King Lane to get to and from any of the 
properties? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall when you first would have 
seen him doing that? 
A. No, sir, I do not. 
Q. Was he -- did you ever stop him and 
say, "You've got to go use your other road"? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. But it is your understanding and belief 
that you could have if you had wanted to at that 
time? 
A. Ifwe hadn't have been neighbors -- if 
we hadn't have been nice neighbors to them, we 
could have, yes. 
Q. Did you ever give him any permission, 
say, "Hey, you're supposed to use the other road, 
but it is okay if you use this one"? 
A. Never said anything to him. 
Q. Did John Fuquay ever drive big trucks 
that you recall -- and I'm talking either semi 
1 Q. Did Clint and Haley use King Lane to 
2 access and get to and from their property? 
3 A. Some. 
4 Q. Okay. When you say "some," tell me 
5 what that means. 
1 6 A. Well, I'm sure they went the other way, 
7 too, or they should have. I don't know. They 
8 went sometimes. 
9 Q. Okay. So, again, I'm not really --
: 10 whether they could have gone the other way is --
I 1 A. Is irrelevant to you. 
1 12 Q. Right. My question is did they go 
I 
1 13 through and use King Lane from the time that 
, 14 they moved in -- Clint and Haley moved into that 
: 
' 15 house? 
: I 6 A. I can't answer that. 
· I 7 Q. Do you recall ever stopping them or 
. 18 saying, "Hey, stop coming up and down the road"? 
19 A. No. 
: 20 Q. Is it fair to say that you never did 
21 that to any of the Fuquays or anybody that was 
22 living on those properties? 
23 A. I think that would be a fair 
! 24 assessment. 
· 25 Q. I don't want to have to keep asking 
9 (Pages 30 - 33) 
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I specifically like that. If that's a fair --
2 A. That's a fair statement. 
3 Q. Okay. And it is also a fair statement 
i 4 that you believed that you could have told anybody 
5 at any time to stop using that road if you had 























A. Probably. I don't know. I don't 
know. I think so. We were trying to be neighbors 
to the Fuquays. 
Q. How long did it take for you to put the 
gravel and rock down on the road on King Lane as 
it is now? 
A. It took years. 
Q. So was it -- if you -- was it a gradual 
improvement? 
A. It is alkali soil. When alkali gets 
wet, it eats. So those rocks and things 
disappear. Now then, we have put big rocks in the 
road, so we have built a base now that we are 
pretty firm. But we still have to keep 
maintaining it every year when there's a wet spot. 
If the neighbor's ditch runs over on us or if the 
sub gets out, it gets wet and it goes down. You 
have to keep doing it. It is a never-ending job. 
/ 25 But we have to use it daily, so we have to 
f---- -----------···-~- -----
Page 35 
maintain it so we can get to and from our fields. 
2 Q. If you had known that the road was 
3 actually on the Steiners' property, would you have 
4 actually done anything differently? 
5 MR. RAINEY: Objection to the form of the 
i 6 question because it calls for pure speculation, 
7 first of all. And, secondly, we don't know who 
8 owns the road at this point. We don't agree with 
9 your survey. 





then. You believed that you owned the property 
over which the road run? 
A. Correct. 
14 Q. Was it your belief you owned all of the 
15 road and all of the property from Oreana Loop all 
16 the way to the west of your property? 
A. Yes. 17 
, 18 Q. And was it your belief that that was 
19 entirely -- that the road was entirely on your 
20 property? 
21 A. Yes. 
Q. Did -- were there ever any 
conversations between you and the Steiners about 
the Steiners believing the road was on their 
property? 
, I A. No. 
2 Q. If you had discovered that the road was 
3 on the Steiners property instead of your property, 
4 would you have still done all of the improvements 
5 that you did to the road for your own maintenance 
6 and access? 
7 MR. RAINEY: Counsel, your question still 
8 calls for pure speculation. I don't know that the 
9 witness can answer that. 
IO Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: Well, if she can 
11 answer it. You either would have or wouldn't 
12 have, I'm guessing? 
13 A. I cannot answer that for you. 
14 Q. Okay. You indicated that you believed 
15 that the section fence was the fence on the south 
16 side of the road, and that you owned up to that 
17 section fence. Was there a map or something that 
18 you saw that made you believe that that was the 
19 section fence? 
20 A. No. That was just what the Foremans 
21 had bought when they bought it in 1894. That's 
22 where the fence was, and that's what their old 




Q. Did you ever see that? 
A. No, I did not see that, sir. i 
_ __j 
Page 37 \ 
Q. Okay. Then how -- I'm wondering how ! 
2 
1 3 
you came to the belief that that was where the 
section fence was? 
4 A. The Foremans told us, sir. That's how 
5 I came to that belief. When they sold it us to, 
6 that's where they sold it to. 
7 Q. So it was your belief that you were 
8 buying -- when you bought that, you were buying 
9 the road, as well as both fences on -- the fences 
', IO 
I 
i l l 
f 12 
i 13 
on both sides of the road? 
A. Correct, sir. 
Q. When you moved to California after 
Mr. Block bought the property, how often did you , 
14 come back to Idaho and go over to see the 
15 property? 
16 A. We were probably back to Idaho, 
17 probably, monthly. At least, every two months. 
18 Q. Okay. And did you go over to see 
19 Block? 
i 20 A. No, we did not go see Mr. Block, but we 
' 21 went to observe. 
: 22 Q. When you say you went to "observe," 
23 what does that mean? 
24 A. We drove around so we could see what 
25 was happening on the premises. 
--- - ---------~·-··-----···---~----···-··--------- ----- --
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Q. You drove around-- tell me where you 
2 would drive. Just drive in through the barn or 
3 you'd go down the lane? 
4 
5 
A. We would go down the lane and look. 
Q. So would you go all the way back out 
6 Castle Lane, as well? 
7 A. No, we didn't go back out Castle Lane. 
8 We came out through the ranch. 
9 Q. What did you observe when you were 
IO observing to see how things were being handled or 
what he was doing to the property? ' 11 
• 12 
i 13 
A. It wasn't good. 
Q. Okay. Tell me what you saw or why you 
14 think it wasn't good. 
15 A. Well, when you have weeds that are 
16 3 feet tall and you don't see things that are 
, 18 
17 going like they should, they are tearing up 
things, taking out -- it just wasn't -- he was not 






Q. You were, I guess, concerned because 
you were concerned that you might end up getting 
it back in worse condition or he was not going to 
maintain it? 
A. Yes, we were concerned he was not 
i 25 maintaining it. 
i-----------------~-~-
Page 40 j 
A. I don't know who was using the road, 
2 sir. 
3 Q. When Mr. Block was buying the property, 
4 did you believe that you still had the right to 
5 control who could or could not use King Lane? 
6 A. We didn't try to do that. 
7 Q. Okay. Was it your belief that you 
8 still had that right to? 
9 A. No. But I had the right to observe 
IO what was going on. 
11 Q. Okay. So when Mr. Block was there, you 
12 couldn't have come in and put gates up and said, 
13 "Well, you're just buying the property. We're 
14 going to put gates up and control who comes 
15 through"? 
16 A. No, I could not have done that. 
17 Q. When you moved back onto the property 
18 after evicting Mr. Block and after getting the 







Q. All right. Did you make any 
improvements to King Lane after that point, other 
than -- let me -- from 1986 forward, did you make 
any improvements to the King Lane road? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Page 391 
Q. Did you ever talk with him about 
125 
Page 41 I 
Q. Okay. What were those improvements 
2 that? 
3 A. No, we did not. 
! 4 
5 
Q. Could -- when you were driving down the 
road, could you tell that anybody else had been up 
6 and down the road, on King Lane? 
7 A. Well, that's hard to say, sir. 
8 Q. Was it -- was there any track marks or 
, 9 anything like that that would show people had been 
! IO up and down the road? 
' 11 A. I don't -- I don't understand your 
12 phrasing of that. 
, 13 Q. All right. We're talking about 
1 14 King Lane when Zane Block was buying it. 
1 15 A. If I drive down and you drive down 
! 16 tomorrow, am I supposed to see your tracks? 
17 Q. Well, my question was could you tell 
18 whether or not anybody had been using the road? 
• 19 Did it look like it was in use? 
20 A. Well, somebody had been using it. 
21 Q. Okay. But if there's a -- you don't 
, 22 know who was using the road during that time? 
; 23 A. No, I do not know. 
. 24 Q. Okay. It could have been the Fuquays, 
, 25 right? 
I 
i 2 that you made? 
1. 3 A. That's when we put in the new culvert 
4 across the ditch, across the lane, as you're 
, 5 calling it. And that's when we hauled in more 
6 rocks, made it a harder surface. 
7 Q. Okay. And after you had done those 
8 improvements, did you ever see the Fuquays using 
9 the road after you had done those other 
IO improvements? Did you see anybody to and from the 
11 Fuquay property over King Lane after you had --
12 between '86 and 1987, in that first year you were 
13 back? 
I 
i 14 A. I don't know how to put that first year 
j 15 we were back. We got the property back. Mr. King 
' 16 and I sent Gil and our daughter and husband to 
; 17 stay up on that ranch. We continued on the other 
; 18 ranch coming back monthly. Mr. King and I did not 
! 19 move back until '88, our personal self, but we had 
: 20 our home that we came up and stayed there and we 
: 21 did things while we were there. 
22 Q. So you moved back permanently in 1988? 
23 A. Yes. But our children came before us . 
: 24 We sent them on up. 
: 25 Q. Okay. So they would have lived there 
11 (Pages 38 - 41) 
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1 Q. You've never seen any delivery drivers i I 
2 using King Lane, FedEx, UPS, Post Office dropping! 2 
3 off any mail packages to anybody that lived in I 3 
4 Clint or JC's houses? I 4 
5 A. No. The only time that I ever saw, the 5 
6 Schwan's asked me one day, he said, "The gate is 6 
Page60 I 
and it took a number of days -- or coming down the : 
road. It took a number of days before it dried ' 
out enough it was good again. 
Q. Other than that time, when was it 
impassable? 
A. Periodically during the year. Like I 
7 locked. I can't go up." I said, "You can go this 
8 time, but don't go anymore. They'll have to 
9 unlock their gate if they want it." 
7 was telling you, when the water is in -- the Lows 
8 now have put in pivots. So they don't have that 
9 ditch. So that ditch is no longer there. So that 
10 So, no, they didn't come our way. The 10 
/ 11 FedEx man did stop several times and ask how we 111 
: 12 got there, and we directed them to go around the 112 
i 13 way they were supposed to. And I believe you . 13 
[ 14 have some affidavits showing that from those I 14 
I 15 people. [ 15 
i 16 Q. Do you have any agreements with the 116 
I 11 Lows about the use of the King Lane? I 11 
1
/ 18 A. No, we do not. We just honored what ! 18 
19 Mr. Foreman told us. ! 19 
water isn't there 24 hours a day. 
(Cell phone ringing.) 
MR. CLEVERLEY: We'll take a pause while 
your attorney steps out. 
(Recess taken.) 
Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: Before our break, 
you were telling me -- we were talking about when 
the road is impassable. And you told me there was 
a time when the neighbor's ditch had overflowed 





Q. Is King Lane impassable certain times 
of the year? 
I 20 and then you were going to tell me when else the 
i 21 King Lane has been impassable. 
A. The lane was impassable until we fixed I 22 A. Well, if -- it doesn't happen very 
, often. But if we get a downpour of rain, then it j 23 it. 
124 
i 
Q. In 19 -- in the 1970s or I 980s? 
A. Yes. 1989. 






___ _t a_I_l_s1_·n_k_s_d_o_w_n_. ____________ j 
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Q. So the statement -- I'm looking in your I 
affidavit that says, "This use has been casual use I 2 
on occasion as a matter of convenience. This is I 3 




5 King Lane is, in fact, impassable during certain I 5 
6 times of the year and cannot be used because it I 6 
i 7 becomes too muddy." Is that true? 7 
8 A. That is very true. The ditches -- we 8 
9 now have a cement ditch. Our well runs 24 hours a 9 
10 day, 365 days a year. And when you have a dirt 10 
' I I 1 I 
Q. How long does it take to dry out? 
A. Well, it depends on how wet it gets. 
Q. A day? 
A. Oh, no. It will take several days. 
And we have -- like I say, we have alkali. So if 
you look, at times, you'll look at it and you 
think it's snowed and it looks like there's salt 
out there because that's what alkali is. 
Q. If there was a bad downpour, maybe a 
few days for it to dry out that it would become 
impassable? ditch, water is always subbing. I don't know if 
I 2 you're familiar with things like that. But the 12 A. Yes. It would take a few days to a 
13 Steiners, the Lows also had irrigation ditches 
14 that are dirt. There's times in our yard the 
I 3 week. But as long as we stay right on the road, 
14 we can keep the base. But it is a work in 
15 water would get so high, and we would ask them if 15 progress. 
I 6 they would turn off their water if they weren't 16 Q. How often does that happen where it 
17 irrigating so it would go down. 
18 So that road is that way. It is so 
17 becomes impassable like that that you wouldn't be 
18 able to use it for a few days or a week? 
I 9 wet. It mires down. So we keep building up that 19 A. Well, there again, it is going to be 
determined by the weather and if the ditch 20 base, and we have to do that. That's the only way 20 
21 we can get back and forth. 
22 Q. When was the last time that the road 
23 was impassable? 
24 
25 
A. Well, I think the neighbors water got 
out of control and came running down the ditch, 
21 overflows or something. I can't tell you. I 
22 can't be specific like you want. 
23 Q. Okay. Well, can you tell me when in 
24 the last year it was impassable? 
25 A. I don't think we've had a problem this 
----------------------------- ---- --- --------- ---~-----------------
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May 11, 2015, 9:07 a.m. 
GILBERT KING, 
produced as a witness at the instance of the 
Plaintiffs, having been first duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
(Exhibit Nos. 3 through 8 marked.) 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CLEVERLEY: 
Q. Could you please state and spell your 
full name. 
A. Gilbert Gene King. 
Q. And what's your address, please. 
A. 19100KingLane. 
Q. In Oreana? 
A. Oreana. 
Q. And you are here as the trustee of the , 
Heart K Ranch Trust; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. How long have you been the 
trustee for that trust? 
A. Two years. 
Page 5 l 
I Q. Do you have any ownership in any of the 
2 properties that we're talking about and have been 
3 involved in litigation as an individual or are you 
4 just through the trust? 
5 A. Just through the trust. 
6 (Exhibit No. 20 marked.) 
, 7 Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: I'll hand you 
! 8 
9 
what's we've marked as Exhibit 20. From that, can 
you tell me or show which property is owned by 
10 Heart K Ranch? 
11 A. Okay. I can show you right here. 
12 Q. You can go ahead and draw on that, if 
: 13 that helps. I just want to make sure we know 
• 14 exactly which ones are which. 
15 A. Just outline it for you? 
: 16 Q. Sure. That's fine. 
1 
17 A. (Indicating.) 
• 18 Can you see that? It is this in here, 
'. 19 and it continues on. 
· 20 Q. It continues to the north? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. So the -- there are a couple of 
, 23 small squares of property inside there. Does the 
24 trust own those or is that Rose's property and 
25 someone else's property? 
2 (Pages 2 - 5) 




Page 18 i Page 20 
Q. Dennis Trayo? 1 
2 
3 
Q. Do you know when this road became 1 
called King Lane? , 2 A. I don't remember. He was before my 
time. But I know John lived there for a period of A. Ever since I was a little boy. I don't ' 3 
4 know. That's just what we referred to it as 
5 there, King Lane. 
6 Q. Did it ever have a -- was it always 
7 called King Lane or was it part of Castle Lane or 










A. It was never part of Castle Lane that I 
knew of. 
Q. So let's talk about King Lane. And 
we'll just talk about the road there that you're 
considering King Lane. How long has that been 
there? 
A. It was there when we moved there in 
16 '74, as far as I know. It was a lane, you know, 
17 which -- it was a lane, not necessarily that there 
18 was a road in the lane, but there was a fence on 
i 19 each side and a way up the middle. And then my 
! 20 folks gravelled it in, probably, '80. 
: 21 Q. Okay. What was -- I don't know if 
I 22 you're old enough to remember what it was like 
' 23 then. Was it --
; 24 A. It was -- well, I remember in the 
i 25 wintertime, it would get pretty sloppy. My f--- --- ·---- -- -- --- ------------------·----------- --- --




brother lived in the house where JC lives, and he 
had a two-wheel-drive pickup. And it was bad 
enough that he couldn't get back and forth at 
i 4 times in the winter because of the ruts where it 
5 is alkali, you know. That was the reason for 
, 6 gravelling it there in '80 in the summertime. 
7 Q. Which brother was that? 
8 A. Greg. 
9 Q. How long did he live in that house? 
i 10 A. It was from the time he got married 
i 11 until -- like three years, I think. '79 to '82 or 
















Q. Okay. And when he lived there, how 
would he get back and forth to his house or to 
where he was living? 
A. Oh, just, you know, on the dirt road 
there in the lane. 
Q. He would go up and down King Lane to 
get to the house? 
A. Um-hum. 
Q. Do you know who else lived in that 
house over the years? 
A. Some people by the name of Laws lived 
there. Tanna Gilbert lived there. Nate Moore. 
Somebody else. 
4 time when they got divorced. 
5 Q. John Fuquay? 
6 A. Um-hum. 
7 Q. Okay. And when those people lived in 
8 that house, how would they get back and forth to 
9 the house? 
, 10 A. Down the lane there part of the time. 
' 11 Q. So they would go -- this Exhibit 5 
12 doesn't show it, but let me see it. All right. 
13 So Exhibit 3, you had marked where the gate is. 





Q. There? So the -- whoever lived in 
18 the house would come out King Lane past the --
19 down the lane past the houses out to Oreana Loop 
20 Road? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Are there utility lines that run along 
23 King Lane? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Do you know where they go? 
Page 21 . 
A. Well, somewhere in here, right about 
2 where this white dirt is, one takes off through 
3 the field. 
4 Q. North? 
5 A. North, yeah. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. And the rest ofit continues up here. 
8 {Indicating.) I don't know ifit stops at Clint's 
9 house or if it -- I don't know where it goes from 
10 Clint's. 
11 Q. Okay. What's the condition of 
12 King Lane now? What's its road surface? Can 
13 you describe how wide it is and what it is like 
14 now? 
i 15 A. Oh, it is probably JO-, 12-foot wide of 
: 16 gravel. 
1 
17 Q. Has it had more than just gravel? Has 
• 18 it had a road base put down under it and gravel on 





A. No. It is just pit run. 





Q. Has anybody else ever helped maintain 
that road? 
A. JC brought a road grader down once that 
--- ------ -- -·-- -··----------- - - ---·------------- - I ___________________________ --
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I know of. 
2 Q. Do you know why he would do that? 
3 A. No. To make it hard for us to mow the 
4 weeds along there. I don't know why he brought 
5 it. 
6 Q. Did it help improve the road or did it 
7 make the road --
8 A. No. 
9 Q. It didn't help improve the road at 
IO all? 
11 A. Not from my point of view. 
12 Q. Okay. What about any other gravel or 
13 things like that? Anybody else contribute to 
14 gravel or anything else along the road? 
15 A. JC got from hay from me once. And 
16 instead of reimbursing me for the hay, I had him 
17 bring me a load of gravel. It would have been on 
18 the east end of the lane between the bridge and 
19 the highway. 
20 
21 
Q. Did anybody else ever add gravel or do 
anything else besides that? 
A. No. 
I Q. How long does that take to have the 
2 cattle eat the grass off? 
3 A. It depends on what kind of season it 
4 is, how wet the season it is, and how many cattle 
5 are put on it for the given time, you know. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. So it could be from two weeks to two 
8 months. And then part of the year the lane is 
• IO I 
9 used for a water gap to water cattle out of 
Lows' property because the last several years 
the creek hasn't had any water in it for the cows 
12 to drink, and the artesian well runs down the 
' 11 
13 ditch that parallels the lane. So the cattle had 
14 to come off their property into the lane to get a 










few years, it's been, you know, up to six months 
at a time it's been closed up. 
Q. If someone were to go down the road, 
were those gates able to be open and passed 
through? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. Okay. Now, is it your understanding 22 
23 Q. Now, down at the east end of King f 23 that the King Lane is on Heart K Ranch property or • 
24 Lane -- I'm going to show you Exhibit 4. And i 24 is on the Lows' property? 
I 
• 25 these numbers are the same ones that we had. On : 25 A. It could be on both up through there. ------ --- --t-------- ----- - ----------------------· ----------- ----------' 
Page 23 , Page 25 • 
Exhibit 4, were there any other gates or any other · I I don't know. It is on one or the other. 
2 fences that would have crossed the road anywhere 1 2 Q. Is it anything that's ever been --





A. Yeah. There's a gate right here. 
(Indicating.) Do you want me to draw on this? 
Q. Sure. Go ahead. 
A. (Indicating.) 
9 Q. Okay. So you put an X on the roadway 







type of a gate is that? 
A. That's a wire gate. 
Q. What's the purpose of that wire gate? 
A. To keep the cows from coming down by 
the creek when I didn't -- because there's another 






Q. Everybody has just used it? 
A. Yeah. Well, rephrase that. How 
i 9 everybody has just used it? 
: IO Q. Well, I guess -- Jet me be a little 
I 
' 11 bit, just kind of an offhand comment. Has 
12 anybody, to your knowledge, ever had a survey or 
13 investigation to determine whose property the road 
14 actually goes on? 
15 A. To my knowledge, no. 
I 16 
I 
fence right here. You can't quite -- your picture 16 Q. So I guess when it was -- when it's 
: 17 doesn't go far enough. There's another gate here, 17 
18 and we fenced this off. And if we'd ate this off ! 18 
19 already, and we don't want the cows coming down : 19 
here. So this just closed it off. So they are i 20 
I 
I 20 
21 just locked in this portion of the lane. 
22 (Indicating.) 





been built and maintained, you haven't been 
concerned about whose property that it's been on, 
as long as it has just been maintained and you've 
had it available for access; is that fair? 
A. It is either on -- it was either 
Steiners' or Kings' property or Lows' or Kings' 
property, one or the other, and we both use it in 
24 A. Every year we do it. We eat it off. 
25 We keep the grass and the weeds ate down. 
24 common. So ... 
25 Q. Were there ever any -- to your 
~----·-- -•-s-• --- ------•--·---·------· 
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and the Steiners or anybody that owned the 
property prior to the Steiners? 1 guess the 
Steiners have owned the property for a Jong time. 
Ever any discussion about whose property the road 
was on or anything like that? Ever any 
discussions that you're aware of? 
A. No. 
Q. So what's at the west end of -- if 
you're going to be -- let me back up. 
What types of things do you use, 
say, you in general, the Kings, use that roadway 
for? Where do you go if you're going down that 
road? 
A. To the irrigation well. What do we 
use? ls that your question? Tractors, hay 
trailers, trucks, any field equipment. 
Q. Do you have any reason to go past the 
gate that is on the west end of King Lane now? 
A. Yeah. Our well water comes from right 
here, from this pond. 
Q. Okay. 
A. So we go up there, and we check it. 
Q. ls that well on your property or is it 

























up forever, you know. 
Q. Do you drive cattle trucks with cattle 
in over there? Do you take the cattle trucks out 
over to that well? 
A. No loaded trucks. We go up there and 
wash out periodically. 
Q. So who else -- we were talking about 
people that have lived in the house that JC lives 
in now that have used that road. You mentioned 
the Laws and Tanna Gilbert and Nate Moore and 
John Fuquay. Would anybody else go up there 
besides those people? Would you have, I don't / 
know, hunters? Would you have BLM people goin~ 
through over there? Was it pretty much just who 
lives there that would be going out there? 
A. Pretty much just the people that live 
there, as far as I can remember. 
Q. And there's nowhere else that this --
that the roads go to, other than the houses and 
the BLM property? There's no businesses or 
destinations out there that anybody would go to? 
A. No. 
Q. Again, that's not a trick question? 
A. No. I 




A. It is on BLM. 
2 Q. Take a look at Exhibit 6, which shows 




Q. And then the fence would be -- the gate 







Q. Where would you go once you came down 
around this way? 
A. Right -- that well is right here. 
i 12 Right here is where I go to. There's a number of 
' 13 ways you can go. You can go up the road here. 
' 14 You can go up the ditch, in the upper ditch here. 
15 (Indicating.) 
, 16 Q. What's the primary route that you would 
17 take? 
18 A. On my motorcycle, probably right up the 
2 
I 3 
Q. If there was something out --
A. No, there's nothing out there. 
Q. I saw you kind of getting worried about 
4 it. It is not a trick question. I just want to I 
, 5 know if there's any other reason why anybody woulq 
6 come down the roads, other than, assumably, they 
1 
7 would be the people that live there. There's no 
grocery store, you know, anything else that anyone i 









A. (Witness shakes head.) 
Q. You're shaking your head no? 
A. No. 
Q. What about UPS or FedEx? Have you ever 
seen them go down the road? 
A. No. 
Q. Down King Lane? 
A. (Witness shakes head.) 
Q. No? Do you recall the Fuquays ever 
1 19 
20 
ditch. In a vehicle, right up this lane, this ' 19 having a mailbox at the end of King Lane near 
road here. (Indicating.) 20 Oreana Loop Road? 
21 Q. I'm looking at the overhead. It looks 21 A. Yeah. 
: 22 like there's some well-used roads coming north off 
1 
22 (Exhibit No. 21 marked.) 
'23 of Castle Lane at the comer of the Fuquay 23 Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: I'll show you 
i 24 property. 24 Exhibit 21 which is an aerial view of where Oreana i 
1 25 A. Yeah. There's no vegetation at all 25 Loop curves off into King Lane. Can you indicate ! 
L-----------------·-------------~--· ------- -- ----------'-
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I Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: So you previously 
2 submitted an affidavit in this case, a couple of 
3 them. You said that it was not until sometime in 
4 2011 that the Fuquay plaintiffs began any use of 
5 King Lane by large semi trucks. Is that true? 
6 A. Yeah. Any use that was, you know, 
7 noticeable. Like I told you earlier, when John 
8 lived where JC does, you know, he took his truck 
9 up there periodically. And then he moved back to 
IO the other house, and there was no use to speak of. 
' I I Q. So I don't want to put too fine of a 
12 point on it. But there was use, it was just not 
13 as noticeable as what you're saying in 201 I? 
14 A. Well, it was just -- the only time I 
· 15 remember is when he lived in that little house 
16 where JC does. And then when Karen moved off and 
17 he moved back to the other house, I don't remember 
18 anymore truck use until those kids started doing a 
, 19 little trucking around here and there. 
t 20 Q. How much use are you seeing Clint and 
· 21 JC use? Do they have a lot of trucks? 
22 A. They each had a truck for a period 
23 there. It is just seasonal use, you know. It 
: 24 was. 
25 Q. Would they be going up and down all the 
Page 55 
time or was it just out and then you might see 
2 them come back in a week or two later? What was 
3 the type of --
4 A. Yeah. It would be out, do their work 
5 and then back. They didn't truck up and down the 
6 Jane, you know. It was seasonal work, it seemed 
7 like. 
8 Q. When you say "semi truck," what type of 
9 trucks were they? What type of trucks do you see 










A. They have a ten-wheeler truck, and then 
the trailer is -- they borrow different trailers 
around from people. I seen them go by with a 
belly dump. That was pretty much it. Dirt 
trailers that I remember. 
Q. Do you recall whether or not you would 
see them trucking their cattle in and out? 
A. No. 
Q. You don't recall or, no, you didn't see 
! 20 them? 
·21 A. No. 
: 22 Q. What about the cement block that you 
23 placed by the bridge? 
24 A. It is right here in this picture. 
' 25 It was just to keep people from running off the 
Page 56 : 
edge of the bridge. They were getting careless 
coming around there, and it was keeping -- so they 
got straight before they tried to cross the 
bridge, to prevent from breaking the comers off 
the bridge. 
Q. Did that block impede anybody's use of 
the bridge or did it make your corner wider so you 
hit straight before you hit the bridge? 
9 A. Make sure you're correct before you go 
10 across. 
11 Q. So in your declaration you said, "I 
12 had a large cement block placed at or near the 
13 location of the bridge over Castle Creek in any 
14 attempt eliminate this use of King Lane by the 
15 Fuquays which was contributing to the damage to 
16 the bridge." Were they contributing damage to the 
17 bridge? 
18 A. They -- it hadn't, but it would. If 
19 the use continued, it would. 
20 Q. Okay. So up until then, there hadn't 
21 been any damage to the bridge? 
22 A. I guess it is preventative. 
23 Q. Okay. So you put the block there to --
24 A. There's no broken boards on the bridge 
25 yet. 
Page 57 ' 
Q. Okay. All right. And at the time that 
2 you put that there, there wasn't any damage? You 
3 were doing it as preventative? 
4 A. There was tire tracks, you know. 
5 could see what was going to happen. 
6 Q. Did you ever have to make any repairs 
7 to the bridge because of truck use or anything 
8 else? 
9 A. No. I put out some -- a cement wall on 
IO this other side to keep the bank from eroding 
11 away. 
12 Q. Did you ever see anybody bring any 
13 loaded trucks in that way over the bridge? 
14 A. I did not. But to my understanding, 
15 there were -- somebody brought a loaded log truck 
16 over there, but I wasn't home at the time. 
17 Q. Was that one of the Fuquays that did 
18 that? 
19 A. I think one of them -- one of the 
20 Fuquays was a passenger in the truck, I believe. 
21 I don't know. I wasn't home. 
' 22 Q. Any other -- was there any damage that 
23 the Fuquays ever caused to the bridge that you 
24 recall, aside from your preventative wanting to be 
' 25 sure? Did they ever cause any damage to the 
15 (Pages 54 - 57) 




it during the week and drive home in a car on the 
2 weekends or time off, you know. So it varied. 
, 3 From time to time, it would be daily, you know. 
4 And then if they went somewhere else and worked, 
5 it wouldn't be. 
6 Q. All right. That helps me understand. 
7 Oh, let me have just a minute here. 
8 Let me ask you about this one. Take a look at 
I 9 that exhibit. Do you recognize what that is? 







Q. What is that? 
A. It is the west end of King Lane. 
Q. Okay. Is that the gate that you put at 
the west end? 
A. Yeah, the gate and the new fence. 
16 Q. Okay. And there's a chain that goes 







Q. Is that a fence to lock the gate? 





Q. BY MR. CLEVERLEY: I'm sorry. The 
chain. 
A. Yeah. I believe it is not locked on 
the gate right there. It is just a chain laying 
' 
Page 83 
I around the pipe. 
2 Q. Okay. Is that chain currently used to 
3 lock that gate and prevent it from being opened? 
4 A. There's a chain around it. I assume it 
5 is probably that one. 
6 That looks nice, that white fence metal 
7 gate. I wish they would have got a picture more 
8 to the south. 
9 MR. CLEVERLEY: Let's go off the record. 
Page 84 
A. Okay. 
2 Q. So you were talking earlier about when 
3 Jim Fuquay owned the property in 1977. 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And what piece of property, if you look 
6 at Exhibit 3, did you understand he owned at that 
7 time? 
8 A. Okay. It would be this and this here. 
9 (Indicating.) 
IO Q. Okay. 
11 A. So it would be west of the Lows' 
12 property and next to the Lewis' property would be 
13 the boundary on the south side. 
14 Q. And on Exhibit 3 you marked what has 
15 been labeled by someone as Clint Fuquay and 
I 16 John Fuquay? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Okay. 





Q. Where did you understand Jim Fuquay to 
have lived in 1977? 
A. Where Clint lives currently at the 
comer of -- the northwest comer of the property. 
: 24 
( 25 
Q. Did anyone occupy the house where 
John Fuquay currently resides? 
I A. Ask me that again. 
2 Q. At that time, in 1977, did anybody 
Page 85 
' 3 occupy the house where John Fuquay currently 
1 4 resides? 
5 A. Okay. 1 could have told you wrong to 
6 begin with. Maybe when they first moved there, 
7 they might have lived in the house where John 
8 lives. 
9 Q. Where he currently lives? 
! II 
'12 
(Off the record.) IO 
MR. CLEVERLEY: All right. I don't have any 11 
other questions, unless Mr. Farris or Mr. Rainey 12 
A. Yes. And then maybe it was a couple of 
years later they moved in the double-wide. 
Q. Okay. And you mentioned in 1977 there 
was use by Jim Fuquay with a car or pickup 
occasionally? 














MR. FARRIS: I do. I have a few questions. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FARRIS: 
Q. Mr. King, you know me. My name is 
Bryce Farris, and I represent Cal and Susie Low, 
for the record. 
A. Yes. 
Q. I have a few follow-up questions I want 
to make sure I'm understanding. 
Do you have Exhibit 3 in front of you? 
It is this one right here. 
13 
i 14 
; 15 A. That's what I recall. 
Q. Can you explain what you mean by 1 16 






! 25 I 
A. Probably, about a couple times a week. 
Q. Okay. And so we're clear, we're 
talking about the house that John currently 
resides in. 
A. Okay. We're probably not clear. When 
they lived in this house here where John lives, 
they went in and out Castle Lane. When they put 
___ ._l _______________ . __ • ----- -~---- ·-
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1 the double-wide in over here -- so I suppose it 

















their use was once in a while. 
Q. Okay. Once in a while is what? 
A. A time or two a week, I would say. 
Q. Okay. A time or two a week with cars 
or a pickup? 
A. Cars or pickups. 
Q. It wouldn't have been with larger 
trucks? 
A. No. 
Q. The house where John currently resides, 
you said they went --
A. Out Castle Lane to the south. 
Q. Have you ever seen anybody residing at 
that house use what we've been calling King Lane 
for purposes of your deposition today? 
A. No. Their use was primarily Castle 
19 Lane. 
20 Q. Okay. Now, you were talking about that 
21 it was physically impossible to use what we've 
22 been calling King Lane because of some corrals 
23 that were built? 
i 24 A. Yes. 
i 25 Q. Do you know when those corrals were 
Page 87 
I removed? 
2 A. Sometime during the period when Zane 
3 Block was on the King property. 
4 Q. Was that, I think you said, between '83 
5 and '86? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. So prior to '83, at least, it was 
Page 88 , 
I east -- no, the west end, where there's been a 
2 gate that's been installed? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Is there a culvert that you would have 
5 to drive over? 
6 A. At the west end? 

















Q. How wide is that culvert? Do you know? 
A. It is 10 -- 8-, 10-foot wide. 
Q. Do you know what that culvert is made 
of? 
A. Concrete . 
Q. A concrete culvert? Do you know how 
deep it is? 
A. It has got maybe a foot of dirt on it. 
Prior to that concrete culvert being put in there, 
there was just a couple old tin barrels that were 
welded together. 
Q. Do you know when the concrete culvert 
was installed? 
! 22 A. It was when we poured the cement 
' 23 ditches so the trucks could come in that way. 
' 24 would say '89-ish or so. 
' 25 Q. Okay. Because I thought -- yeah, 
Page 89: 
I'm trying to track the timeframe. So you had 
2 mentioned that Zane Block when he was occupying 
1 3 the property removed all of the ditches? 
4 A. The ditches -- excuse me. The dirt 
5 ditches in the field, he had tore out the ditches, 
6 plowed them out and taken the fences out. We have' 
7 it fenced up to where you can control the cows in 
8 physically impossible for any truck use down what ' 
9 has been called King Lane? 
8 smaller bunches. On the section of property, 
9 there's ten or a dozen fields. 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And then sometime during that period of 
12 '83-'86, the corrals were removed by Zane Block 




Q. Did -- are there any other impediments 
that would prevent the use of King Lane by large 
trucks since 1986? Let me ask it a different 
: 18 way. Prior to '83 or '86, there was the corrals 
i 19 that prevented it from physically happening. 
20 After that time and current, today, are there 
21 any physical impediments that would prevent use 
22 of large trucks on what is now referred to as 
23 King Lane? 
24 A. Not that I'm thinking of. 
25 Q. Okay. Is there a -- I guess it is the 




Q. So you weren't referring to the 
concrete ditches along the roadway? 
A. No. 
, 13 Q. But, nevertheless, the barrels that you 
: 14 were talking about got replaced sometime after --
15 A. After. 
16 Q. --you took possession of the property 
1 
17 back in, roughly, '89? 
' 18 A. That's when we poured some ditch and 
19 the barrels had a hole in it, I remember, and it 
20 had to be replaced because we had to bring the 
! 21 cement trucks in that way to get in the field 
, 22 because you couldn't cross the bridge with a 
: 23 loaded truck. 
. 24 Q. Okay. You had discussed this concept 
__ i 25 -~f_o~~11!~~e ~n-~~~~~-~<>.ll_~<>.u!~-~~-v~_t_o put a 
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herewith and is supported by the Affidavits already on file with the Court, the Court's prior decisions 
in this matter, along with the record and pleadings already on file with the Court. 
Low reserve the right to submit additional affidavits in support of this Motion. 
Oral argument on this Motion is respectfully requested. 
DATED thisj!/."t;y of July, 2015. 
:J'H LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
by""'·,;.L---------~_-__ -i..--_____ _ 
S. Bryce Farris 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the 
following on this /1- day of July, 2015 by the following method: 
MATTHEW R. CLEVERLEY 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200 - 6th Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
Telephone: (206) 224-6003 
E-Mail: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
~ U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 
LJ Electronic Mail or CM/ECF 
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RONALD P. RAINEY 
RONALD P. RAINEYPA 
110 N. 9th Ave. 
PO Box 26 
Caldwell, ID 83606-0026 
Telephone: (208) 459-3659 
Facsimile: (208) 459-9067 
E-Mail: erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attorneys for Defendants Gordon and Rose 
King 
Ll(1 U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[_] Federal Express 
LJ Hand Delivery 
LJ Facsimile 
LJ Electronic Mail or CM/ECF 
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COMES NOW Defendants, Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Low"), by and through their attorneys of record, Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC, and hereby submits 
this Memorandum in Support of the Low' s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed concurrently 
herewith. Low's Motion and Memorandum are supported by the Affidavits already on file with the 
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Court, including, but not limited to the Affidavits of Rose King, Samuel Steiner, and S. Bryce Farris 
, as well as the record already before this Court, including, but not limited to, the Declarations of 
Rose King, Gilbert King, the Mailperson and Denice Collett previously filed with the Court on or 
about September 9, 2014. The Low's Motion and Memorandum are also supported by this Court's 
prior Decision regarding the Kings' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Judgment entered in 
favor of Kings in this matter. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As this Court is well aware, Plaintiffs claim an easement by prescription for use of King Lane 
across the property of Low and Defendants Heart K Ranch, Gordon King and Rose King (hereinafter 
collectively "King"). It is not known at this time to what extent the road crosses the Low and King 
properties but there is no dispute that the road crosses a portion of each. King filed a motion for 
summary judgment contending that Plaintiffs had not met the necessary elements to establish a 
prescriptive easement for King Lane and thus summary judgment was appropriate. This Court 
issued a Memorandum Decision Upon King Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on March 
25, 2015 denying King's motion. Low participated in the oral argument for said motion and advised 
the Court that should summary judgment be granted to King it would apply equally to Low and that 
Low anticipated they would file their own motion for summary judgment. King subsequently filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration and on June 19, 2015 this Court issued a Memorandum Decision Upon 
King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration which again analyzed whether Plaintiffs had met the 
necessary elements to establish a prescriptive easement. Again, Low participated in support of 
King's motion. The Court granted King's Motion for Reconsideration and concluded that "[t]his 
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court has reviewed the record thoroughly and cannot find that plaintiffs have met this burden. 
Summary judgment is appropriate. This is especially so given plaintiffs burden of proof at trial 
(clear and convincing evidence)." Memorandum Decision Re: Reconsideration, pg. 11. The Court 
then issued a Judgment in favor of Kings on July 8, 2015 .1 
Now that the Court has granted judgment in favor of King, the same basis, reasoning, facts 
and law support granting summary judgment in favor of Low. In fact, the facts relied upon by this 
Court includes the Affidavit of Samuel Steiner, a predecessor in title to the Low property. 
Memorandum Decision Re: Reconsideration, pg. 7, Thus, Low now seek summary judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs' claims to a prescriptive easement across any portion of King Lane which is 
owned by Low and thus dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Low. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment must be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c); Friel v. Boise 
City Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). The court liberally construes 
the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable 
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Friel, 126 Idaho at 485,887 P.2d at 30 (citing Farm 
Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994); Harris v. 
Dept. of Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992)). Ifreasonable people 
Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's June 19, 2015 Decision but no 
hearing has been scheduled. 
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could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, a summary 
judgment motion is typically denied. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho at 272, 
869 P.2d at 1367. 
However, these standards differ where cases, such as this one, are tried to courts in the 
absence of a jury. See, e.g., State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008) 
( citations omitted) (""[W]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a 
jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those 
inferences. When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained 
to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial 
judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary 
facts."). 
III. ARGUMENT 
The facts, law and arguments supporting the Low' s motion for partial summary judgment are 
already part of the record before this Court. In fact, this Court has decided the very issue that Low 
now seek to address with respect to the claims against Low. Thus, in order to avoid redundancy and 
for judicial economy Low will not repeat said facts and law and instead incorporate by reference the 
existing record which specifically includes the Court's Memorandum Decision Upon King 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 25, 2015 and the Court's Memorandum 
Decision Upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration dated June 19, 2015. 
After thoroughly reviewing the affidavits in the record, including those of the Kings, Samuel 
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Steiner, the predecessor to the Low property and the testimony of Plaintiffs themselves, the Court 
concluded the following: 
Based on the record before this Court the plaintiff has failed to make any 
showing on the essential element that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was adverse under 
claim of right. Even when this Court makes all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, 
there is nothing in the record to indicate a decisive act or incident of separate or 
exclusive use from 1977 to 2011. While the use of King Lane may not have started 
with express or even implied permission, the recorded and the testimony of the 
plaintiffs shows that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was in "'common with the owner 
and general public." Marshall 130 Idaho at 680; ( quoting Simmons, 63 Idaho 136, 
118 P .2d 7 40 (1941 ). A prescriptive easement cannot be granted unless there is 
evidence of a decisive act or incident showing adverse use that could be considered 
an '"actual invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner." Hughes, 142 
Idaho at 480. 
Because there is no proof or evidence concerning this essential element of 
plaintiffs' case, that the Fuquays' use was adverse and contrary to the ownership 
rights of the Kings, the King defendants have met their burden of showing there is 
no genuine issue of material fact regarding the element of adverse use. 
Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden shifts to 
the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses 
or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid 
justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56 (f). Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 
389, 392, 179 P.3d 352, 355 (Ct.App. 2008). 
Memorandum Decision Re: Motion/or Reconsideration, pg. 10. 
The law, facts and reasoning of the Court applies equally to the Lows. This is not a situation 
where Low is asking the Court to apply Idaho Supreme Court precedent or decision from some other 
judge, court or jurisdiction, but rather Low is seeking to have the Court apply the same law and facts 
it has already applied to another defendant, i.e. Low. Evidence concerning the use of the roadway 
in common with Low is provided in the Affidavit of Samuel Steiner, was examined, considered and 
relied upon by this Court, and the lack of evidence or showing by Plaintiffs as to the elements of 
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their claim equally applies to those claims against Low. For these reasons, and the reasons already 
specified in the Court's decision, summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiffs cannot meet 
their burden of showing that any use of King Lane as it applies to Low was "adverse and contrary 
to the ownership rights to the" Lows. 
Given the Court has granted summary judgment to King based upon the same facts, law and 
analysis applicable to the claims against Low, the Court could possible enter conflicting decisions 
if it did not grant summary judgment to Low. Under the rule of stare decisis, when the Court states 
a rule of law necessary to resolve and issue, the rule of law becomes the law of the case and must 
be adhered to through the case's subsequent history. Suitts v. First Bank of Idaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 
15, 21-22, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380-81 (1985). The rule oflaw or decision becomes precedent and 
controls future decisions under the rule of stare decisis. 
Finally, Plaintiffs claims against Low are rendered moot by the Court's decision granting 
summary judgment to King. If Plaintiffs cannot establish an easement over the property of King, 
which there is no dispute that the roadway crosses a portion of the King property, then Plaintiffs 
cannot have a presecriptive easement across any portion of the roadway which crosses the property 
of Low. In other words, now that the Court has granted judgment in favor of King, there can be no 
easement across the property of Low because there is no continuous easement for Plaintiffs' access 
from their property to Oreana Loop Road. Thus, whether mootness, stare decisis, issue preclusion 
or some other basis, summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Low just as the Court has granted 
judgment in favor of King as to the prescriptive easement claims by Plaintiffs. 
II 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the same reasons this Court has granted summary judgment to the Kings, this Court 
should also grant the Low's motion for partial summary judgment and dismiss all causes of action 
of the Plaintiffs against Low. 
DATED thisLf /a; of July, 2015. 
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
by:~~ 
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I. 
QUESTION PRESENTED ON THE FUQUAY 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
T-252 P003/024 F-917 
The Fuquay Plaintiffs' July 6. 2015 Motion for Reconsideration essentially presents only a 
single question for this Court's determination: 
Whether the undisputed facts in the record before this Court support the 
application of the "Use in Common" rule, upon which summary judgment has been 
granted to the King Defendants, or whether, in the alternative, a presumption of 
adverse use should be applied to the facts of this case? 
IL 
THE APPLICABLE IDAHO LEGAL STANDARD 
Beginning with the first memorandum that was submitted to the Court by the King 
Defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment they have consistently- and correctly 
- cited the controlling Idaho legal standard on the question presented on this motion for 
reconsideration, as initialing supported by their citation to the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in 
Chen w. Conway, 116 Idaho 901. 781 P.2d 238 (Ct.App.1989): 
The general rule in Idaho is: 
[P]roof of open, notorious, continuous. uninterrupted use of the 
claimed right for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use 
began. raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of 
right. The burden is then on the owner of the servient tenement to show that 
the use was permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. 
[Quoting Westv. Smith, 95 Idaho at 557,511 P.2dat 1333; emphasis added.) 
In Melendez, we noted that two exceptions have been recognized to the 
2:eneral rule stated in West. One of these exceptions is found in Simmons v. 
Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941). There, the Supreme Court 
said: 
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The rule would seem to be that where the owner of real property 
constructs a way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use 
thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be 
presul!!_ed tQ be by way of license or permission. 
116 Idaho at 903, 781 P .2d at 240 (italicized emphasis in original; bold/underlined emphasis added), 
as originally cited at pg. 9 of the King Defendants, Opening Briefin Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
In this case, the King Defendants have submitted facts to this Court which have established 
the existence of the "joint use-in-co1J1II1on" exception, as described above, that created a presumption 
of pennissive use by the Fuquays concerning King Lane from the time that use began. There has 
been no question presented in this case as to any uncertainty as when the Fuquay Plaintiffs' ''use" 
of King Lane began, and as further argued below, if anything, their arguments submitted in support 
of their motion for reconsideration only further solidify the fact that their "use·' of King Lane is well 
established as to how and when it began. such that the presumption of adverseness does not apply, 
to the facts of this case, and instead, the "joint-use-in-common" rule does apply to the 
circumstances concerning the Fuquay Plaintiffs' use of King Lane. 
The above-stated rule, as to ~e application of the ''presumption of adverse use" that is based 
upon the absence of any evidence of how the claimed "use" be~an, has remained unchanged as 
applied in Idaho. See e.g., HFL.P., LLC v. The City of 'fwin Falls, 157 Idaho 672,681,339 P.3d 
557, 566 (2014); and Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 232, 76 P.3d 969,976 (2003) ("Without 
evidence of how the use of the property began. proof of open. notorious, continuous and 
uninterrupted use for the prescriptive period raises a presumption that the use was adverse and under 
a claim of right.") ( emphasis added). Here we have evidence of how the Fuquays "use" began. 
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III. 
THE FUQUAY PLAINTIFFS HA VE MISSTATED THE APPLICABLE 
IDAHO LEGAL RULES IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THE ARGUMENT 
PRESENTED IS SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATiON 
The Fuquay Plaintiffs have summarized the three points that they have raised in support of 
their argument in support of their motion for reconsideration on pages 4-5 of their supporting 
memorandum. All three points are founded upon material misstatements of Idaho law, or the 
application of the facts to Idaho law. The first point contains the following misstatement ofldaho 
law: 
l. The Court applied the wrong presumption of adverse use. There is no 
evidence of how the road was created, and there is a presumption of 
adverse use which should have been construed in favor of the Fuquays. 
(Emphasis added). As already stated and emphasized above. the presumption of adverse use under 
Idaho law, only arises when there is no evidence as to how the ''use,, that is at issue began - not how 
the road itself was created. Here, the evidence before the Court - as presented by the Fuquays 
themselves - establishes that their use of King Lane began in 1977. 
The Fuquays simply misstate the law when they predicate their entire argument on their 
motion for reconsideration on the premise that a presumption of adverse use under Idaho law can 
arise upon an absence of evidence as to how the road was created, instead of an absence of evidence 
of how their own "use" of the road began, which is the proper question. HF.LP .. LLC v. The 
City of Twin Falls, 151 Idaho 672,681,339 P.3d557, 566 (2014); Hodginsv. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 
232, 76P.3d969,976(2003);andChenw. Conway, 116Idaho901, 903,781 P.2d238,240(Ct.App. 
1989). 
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The second point that the Fuquays have attempted to argue on their motion for 
reconsideration is that application of the "use in common .. rule is to be determined as a ''factual 
detem1ination," rather than as a "presumption," which they are required to rebut. Under Rule 
of Evidence 301, Idaho follows the "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions, Sraie v. Hagerman 
Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 736,745.947 P.2d 409,418 (1997), which in simple parlance 
means that by its operation a presumption relieves the party in whose favor it operates form 
presenting further evidence of the existence of the presumed fact until the opposing party has 
introduced substantial evidence of the nonexistence of that presUmed fact. 130 Idaho at 7 45-46, 94 7 
P.2d at 418-19. 
Here, under the applicable Simmons standard - as declared almost 7 5 years ago in 1941 and 
that is still followed - and which was clearly stated in the Kings' Motion for Reconsideration, the 
applicable controlling presumption is: 
where the owner of real property constructs a way over it for his own use and 
convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use 
will be presumed to be by way of license or permission. 
63 Idaho at 144, 118 P.2d at 744 (emphasis added). See also, Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 
497,503,236 P.3 1257, 1263 (2010); Weitzv. Green, 148 Idaho 851,861,230 P.3d 743,753 (2010); 
Beckstead v. Price. 146 Idaho 57. 64, 190 P .3d 876, 883 (2008); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 684, 
691,946 P.2d 984,991 (Ct.App.1996); Burnsv. Alderman, 122 Idaho 749, 754-55, 838 P.2d 878, 
883-84 (Ct.App.1992); Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 13, 784 P.2d 339,343 (Ct.App.1989); and 
Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,404, 724 P.2d 137, 140 (Ct.App.1986). 
The Fuquay Plaintiffs in their argument on their Motion for Reconsideration now attempt to 
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ignore this long-standing presumption, and instead argue as follows: 
2. '·Use in common" is a factual determination and there is conflicting 
evidence as to the use of the roadway. The court construed inferences from 
the conflicting evidence in favor of the Kings instead of in favor of the 
Fuquays. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration at pg. 4 (emphasis added). In one of the Idaho Supreme 
Court· s most recent decisions on this specific question concerning rebuttal of a presumed permissive 
use, HFL.P., LLC v. The City of Twin Falls, 151 Idaho 672, 339 P.3d 557 (2014), the Court 
emphasized that the burden is on the party claiming a prescriptive right to present evidence to rebut 
the existence of such a presumed "permissive use:" 
Moreover. if the presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the 
presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested and 
"brought home" to the servient property owner. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 
390,398,210 P.3d 75, 83 (2009); Gameson v. Remer, 96 Idaho 789,792,537 P.2d 
631, 634 (1975). 
157 Idaho at 681,339 P.3d at 566. 
The question of what constitutes sufficient rebuttal of this permissive use presumption leads 
directly into the Fuquays' third argument presented in support of their motion for reconsideration 
alleging that they had provided evidence in rebuttal of the King Defendants' presumption of the 
Fuquays' permissive "use-in-common" of King Lane: 
3. Even if there was "use in common" the evidence showed the Jim Fuquay had 
committed a distinct act of placing a new mobile home on his property in 
1977 and using the roadway for access to that mobile home. The placement 
of the mobile home was a ~l!~l"ateJLnd distinctive act that created an 
adverse use. The court ignored the evidence of the adverse use commencing 
in 1977 and focused only on the use in 2011. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration at pp. 4-5 ( emphasis added). 
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Nothing that Jim Fuquay did, or for that matter, that any of the other Fuquays did or 
undertook on their own land would have any effect whatsoever as to their alleged rights to the "'use" 
of King Lane as that roadway crossed over property owned by the Kings. Only the Fuquays' actions 
as taken in respect to King Lane as that roadway passed over King property would affect any 
potential easement claim that they could ever potentially assert in this action. The general principles 
that apply on this particular question were recently summarized in, Capstar Radio Operating Co. 
v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411,283 P.3d 728 (2012): 
"An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not 
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner." Hughes, 142 Idaho 
at 480. 129 P.3d at 1229 (citing Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3dat 973). In other 
words," 'an easement is defined as a ri2ht in the lands of another, and therefore 
one cannot have an easement in his own lands.,,, Zingiber Inv., L.L. C., v. 
Hagerman Highway Dist .• 150 Idaho 675,681,249 P.3d 868, 874 (2011) (quoting 
Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767,771,450 P.2d 990, 994 (1969)). 
153 Idaho at 420,283 P.3d at 737 (emphasis added). 
What the Fuquays have argued on their Motion for Reconsideration is nothing more than 
actions constituting an alleged "distinct act" for purposes of rebutting the "use-in-common" rule that 
only affected their own land, rather than land owned that was by the King Defendants. These so-
called "distinct acts," as allegedly only undertaken by the Fuquays on their own property, cannot 
create an adverse use, much less an easement, in respect to King Lane as that roadway crosses the 
King Defendants' property. In direct contrast, the adverse conduct that did arise in 2011 consisted 
of distinct acts undertaken by the Fuquays that occurred on the King Defendants' property, which 
as argued in the Kings' Motion for Reconsideration, placed the Kings on notice for the first time of 
the Fuquays' adverse right claim to the "use" of King Lane. 
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This alleged damage to King Lane, as allegedly caused by the Fuquay Plaintiffs in 2011, 
occurred on the King Defendants' property. Such damage, as arising on King property, as opposed 
to actions only taken on the Fuquays' own property would be sufficient to constitute, '~independent 
decisive acts," under the standard of Hodgins v. Sales. 139 Idaho 225, 76 P .3d 969 (2003), as cited 
in the King Defendants' Reconsideration Reply Memorandum: 
Proof of independent, decisive acts, such as maintenance of the way, tearing down 
barriers, and other indications of separate and exclusive use is sufficient to rebut a 
presumption of permissive use. Marshall v, Blair, 130 Idaho at 680-681, 946 P.2d 
at 980-981; Simmons v. Perkins. 63 Idaho 136, 140, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941). 
139 Idaho at 232, 76 P.3d at 976. See, King Defendants• Reconsideration Reply Memorandum at 
pg. 4. But actions taken by the Fuquays that only affect their own property do not satisfy this 
standard, inasmuch as those actions cannot in any manner establish any right to an easement over 
the King Defendants' property. 
Finally, although not put at issue by the Fuquays' motion for reconsideration, the Court 
shonld be reminded that throughout this matter it has been undisputed by any of the parties that King 
Lane has been used by the general public. Use by the general public also rebuts any claim to a 
presumption of adverse use as summarized in Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 129 P.3d 1223 
(2006), as also incorporating the 1941 Simmons decision in its overall analysis, as summarized in 
the following excerpts from the Hughes v. Fisher decision: 
However, there are special considerations relating to notice to the owner when the 
claimant's use of the subject property is shared with the 2eneral public: 
Where, as here, the same degree of use upon which the adverse claim is based 
has been exercised indiscriminately by the general public, individual 
acquisition of a prescriptive easement has generally been held 
impossible. In such a case, the claimant must perform some act whereby the 
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adverse nature of the claim is clearly indicated to the owner of the servient 
estate. 
Hall, 108 Idaho at 112-13, 697 P.2d at 452-53. 
In such situations, mere use of property alone is insufficient to establish a 
private prescriptive easement; rather, the claimant must perform some independent 
act signifying to the owner the adverse user's claim. Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, 114 
Idaho 79, 753 P.2d 290 (Ct.App.1988), vacated by 116 Idaho 739, 779 P.2d 414 
(1989); Hall, 108 Idaho at 112, 697 P.2d at 452. This independent act requirement 
is merely a common sense way of ensuring the prescriptive easement elements have 
been satisfied. By definition. a use must be open and notorious, continuous and 
Wlinterrupted, and adverse and under a claim of right with the actual or imputed 
knowledge of the landowner for five years before it can ripen into a prescriptive 
easement. When the claimant is usin~ the land along with members of the 
genera) public, it would simply be unfair to impute knowledge to the landowner 
that the claimant is makini: an adverse claim. The law in Idaho is clear that the 
general public may not obtain a private prescriptive easement. See Stare ex rel. 
Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 145, 594 P .2d 1093, 1098 (1979) ("[T)his court is of 
the opinion that the 'general public' or 'the people of the state of Idaho' as 
distinguished from specific individuals cannot, absent specific statutory 
authorization, acquire prescriptive rights to private property."). Fairness demands 
the landowner receive some type of ··special notice" so the landowner can 
differentiate between an adverse claimant-who can seek a private prescriptive 
easement-and a member of the general public-who cannot-and take action to protect 
the landowner's property rights. 
Once such use by the public is established, the claimant is obligated to 
identify some independent act si2nifying the adver-se claim to the landowner. 
There is simply nothing in the record indicating acts were committed that would have 
put Fisher on notice that Hughes' use was adverse. In fact, the district court found, 
"Plaintiffs each admitted that there was nothing about their respective uses of the 
Path that would have imparted to Fisher or his predecessors that they were claiming 
a right to use the Path.,, Hughes has not shown this factual finding was clearly 
erroneous. In the absence of some independent act, Fisher cannot be deemed to have 
been on notice that the plaintiffs were each claiming an adverse right. Accordingly, 
Hughes has failed to establish all elements of a prescriptive easement and the district 
court's decision on this matter is affirmed. 
142 Idaho at 481-82, 129 P.3d at 1230-31 (emphasis added). 
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In sum, no act undertaken by the Fuquays in respect to King Lane, as that roadway crossed 
the King property, prior to 2011, ever put the Kings on notice of any adverse or prescriptive claim 
made by the Fuquays to a prescriptive right claim to an easement in King Lane. On this motion for 
reconsideration, the only independent act that the Fuquays have alleged is an action in respect to their 
own property, which is insufficient - as a matter of law- to create any adverse claim to King Lane 
as it crosses the Kings' property. 
IV. 
THE FUQUAYS, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
THEREFORE FAILS ON ALL ARGUMENTS RAISED 
Ultimately, the Fuquays' adverse use argument is simply self-rebutting, since they have 
provided the Court with ample evidence as to how their alleged ''use" of King Lane began in 1977 
at the time of the placement of Jim Fuquay's mobile home> followed by his commencement of the 
use of King Lane for ordinary access to and from that mobile home at that time. Under the Simmons 
decision, and its progeny, the Fuquays' use of King Lane could only be presumed to be adverse if 
there was no evidence as how the Fuquays' use of King Lane had begun_ On this Motion for 
Reconsideration the Fuquays themselves have offered precise and exact evidence of just how and 
when their alleged use of King Lane first began, thus rebutting any possibility of a presumption of 
adverse use under that specific adverse use rule. Therefore, the use-in-conunon rule, upon which 
this Court granted summary judgment to the King Defendants, does in fact apply here, where all the 
evidence before this Court points to the fa.ct that no use of King Lane by the Fuquay Plaintiffs as that 
roadway crosses over the King property had been anything other than permissive until 2011. 
Because the "use-in-common" rule is in the nature of a presumption, the Fuquays can only 
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rebut that presumption by proof ofindependent decisive acts taken to establish an adverse claim to 
King Lane for purposes of establishing a prescriptive easement across the King Defendants' 
property. Such acts undertaken upon the Fuquays' ov.n property have no rebuttal effect for this 
purpose because: (1) the Fuquays cannot establish any claim to an easement in their own lands, and 
(2) such actions are wholly ineffective as to any claim to an easement as made against the King 
Defendants' land. 
Finally, the Fuquays' use of King Lane was at all times also in common with members of the 
general public. 
In sum, none of the grounds alleged in the Fuquay Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration 
state a valid basis upon which to overturn the Court's grant of summary judgment to the King 
Defendants. Therefore, the Fuquay Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this __ day of August, 2015. 
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IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
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Case No. CV-14-0278 
DECLARATION OF MATTHEW 
CLEVERLEY 
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho. the undersigned declares; 
1. I am the attorney for Plaintiffs in this matter. 
2. I am over the age of 18. l am not related to any of the parties in this action and am not 
involved in the litigation. I have personal knowledge of the events in this declaration and 
could testify to them in a court proceeding. 
3. Relevant pages of Gilbert King's deposition dated May 11, 2015 and Rose King dated 
May 11, 2015 were submitted concurrently with Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration 
which was dated July 2, 2015. 
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4. Those deposition pages are true and correct pages from the deposition transcl'jpts. 
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF 
MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND THAT I UNDERSTAND IT IS MADE FOR USE 
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY OF PERJURY. 
Dated: August I 1, 2015 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
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V. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
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Case No. CV-14-0278 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
THE COURrs JUNE 19, 2015 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON KING'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND REQUEST FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit this Reply in support of their motion for reconsideration. 
There are three key issues raised in Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration: 
1, Did the Court apply the correct presumptions? 
2. ls there conflicting evidence as to ''use in common?" 
3. Is there evidence of a "distinct act of adverse use?" 
While the answers to the questions not dispose of the case at this time, they show enough 
disputed issues of fact that the Court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of 
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the Kings. Because there are disputed issues of material fact, the court must, as a matter of 
law, reverse itself and vacate the Kings' summary judgment order and the Judgment. 
It is important to note that the original Motion for Summary Judgment was brought by the 
Kings. Therefore, the Coi1rt was required to construe all facts and all reasonable inferences 
from the facts in favor of the Plaintiffs. Originally, the Couit ruled (correctly) that there are 
disputed issues of matel'ial fact and denied the Kings' motion, The Court then el'red on 
reconsideration when it construed the facts and inferences in favor of the Kings as the moving 
pal'ty instead of in favor of the Plaintiffs as the non-moving party. 
It was not the Plaintiffs' bw·den to prove their entire case in opposing the Kings' motion. 
The Plaintiffs needed only show that there are factual disputes that cannot be resolved on 
summary judgment. The arguments and evidence before the court show that there are disputed 
issues of fact as to when the roadway was constructed, when the adverse use began, and 
whether the nature of the use was adverse to the Kings. Those facts are clearly disputed in the 
evidence before the court1 and summary judgment should not have been granted. 
1. The Court Applied the Presumptions Incorrectly 
The presumption is that when there is no evidence of how the use of a roadway began, the 
use is presumed adverse to the owner. The Kings are arguing that the evidence of initial use 
of the roadway is limited to the Plaintiffs, and therefore the presumption does not apply. That 
is not conect. Idaho law allows dominant easement holders to "tack" their adverse use onto 
prior owners, and any vesting of prescriptive rights of prior owners is conveyed with the land 
to subsequent owners. Thus> the presumption of adverse use relates back to the initial use of 
the roadway. It is not is not limited to just Plaintiffs' use of the roadway. 
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In this case, the evidence shows that the roadway has been in existence for nearly 100 
years and was used by the propetty owners prior to the Plaintiffs. There is no evidence that 
the initial use of the roadway was ever permissive. Therefore the use of the roadway from its 
inception, including the time through Plaintiffs predecessors, is presumed to be adverse to the 
Kings. The Kings have the burden of showing permissive use at the time the roadway was 
built and use began, not just from the Fuquays' first use in 1977. The Kings have not shown 
any evidence that the initial use nearly 100 years ago was permissive; therefore, the 
presumption is that the use has been adverse. 
Since the initial use is presumed to be adverse, then the Kings cannot prevail on summary 
judgment. 
2. There ls Conflicting Evidence as to "Use in Common" 
The Kings rely on Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941) to 
support their claim of"use in common.'' However, Simmons was later discussed in Melendez 
v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,405, 724 P.2d 137, 141 (Ct. App. 1986) where the cotui said if there 
is "some infringement or invasion of rights" that the general rule (presuming adverse use) 
instead of the exception (pl'esuming permission) applies. 
The Plaintiffs presented evidence that their use was adverse to the Kings. The Kings argue 
that evidence is insufficient and that the use was "in common.,, The court should not weigh 
the conflicting evidence in a stunmary judgment motion. Since there is conflicting evidence as 
to what the "use in common" is, and whether that use "infringed» or "invaded0 the Kings 
rights, the inference must be construed in favor of Plaintiffs, and summary judgment was 
inappropriate. Once the court hears testimony of all of the evidence and considers the 
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credibility of the witnesses, the court can weigh it and decide whether the Plaintiffs have met 
the clear and convincing standard. However, the court should not have made any inferences 
against the Plaintiffs on summary judgment because they were the non•moving parties. The 
court was required to make all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs and against the 
Kings, meaning that the court was required to infer that all of the Plaintiffs' use was adverse. 
3. There is Evidence of a Distinctive Event Creating Adverse Use 
As the evidence shows, Jim Fuquay purchased his property and then placed a mobile 
home on his prope1ty in 1977. It is not the act of placing a new home on one's own prope1ty 
that creates adverse use, it is placing a new home on one's own property and rhen using 
someone else's roadway ro access it that creates the distinct adverse use. Once the mobile 
home was placed in 1977 and Jim Fuquay started using the roadway to access it, the Kings 
were on notice that Fuquay's use was adverse to theirs and under a claim of right. That notice 
continued as the homes on the Fuquay property were rented to others and the renters used the 
roadway for access. 
Finally, the Kings continue to argue that any public use of the roadway requires separate 
and distinct adverse use. That is not the standard. The standard is: indiscriminate use by the 
general public equal to that of the claimants. Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111. Here, there is no 
evidence ·of ''indiscriminate public use." In fact, Rose King repeatedly testified that the 
roadway was never used by the general public. The Kings argument that the roadway was 
open to the general public is directly contradicted by Rose King's own testimony. The Kings 
can't have it both ways - either Rose King's testimony must be discounted entirely, or their 
argument must be ignored. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respectfully, the court erred when it granted the Kings' Motion after originally denying it 
The presumption of adverse use applies because there is no evidence as to how the original 
use of the roadway began, and thus the originating use is deemed adverse. The Kings never 
presented any evidence that the use began as permissive. Without permissive use, the Kings 
cannot prevail. 
Even if the court were to agree with Kings that Jim Fuquay's use began as permissive, Jim 
Fuquay1s separate and distinct act of placing a new home on his property and then using ~e 
roadway to access the new home is sufficient to show adverse use, The continued use by 
renters to access the home is also a distinct event evidencing adverse use, 
The Plaintiffs simply want to have their day in court where they can present all of the 
evidence in this case. At that time, the court can weigh the evidence and the credibility of the 
witnesses and make a decision based on all of the facts. 
Dated: August 12, 2015 
Matthew R. Cleverley, I B 5418 
Fidelity National Law ·ou 
1200-6tl' Avenue, Suit 62 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 223A525, ext. 103 
Matthew.Clever1ey@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD Case No. CV-2014-0278 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. 
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY; 
Defendants. 
SUSIE AND CAL LOW'S REPLY IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendants, Susie Low and Cal Low (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"'Low"), by and through their attorneys of record, Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC, and hereby submits 
this Reply in Support of the Low's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
II 





As indicated in the Low' s initial Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment, this 
Court has granted summary judgment to Defendants Heart K Ranch, Gordon King and Rose King 
(hereinafter collectively "King") because Plaintiffs have been unable to establish the necessary 
elements for a prescriptive easement. See Memorandum Decision Upon King Defendants' Motion 
for Reconsideration, dated June 19, 2015. Since the roadway at issue, referred to in this litigation 
as "King Lane", is partially on the property of Low, Low have filed their own motion for summary 
judgment on the same grounds as those already decided by this Court. In response, Plaintiffs do not 
dispute the common use and public use of King Lane, or that Plaintiffs have not met their burden 
of establishing a decisive act of adverse use, but instead argue the following: ( 1) the "common use" 
by Low is somehow distinguishable because the use common use was for agricultural purposes even 
though Plaintiffs provide no citations or authority for the basis of their argument; and (2) that Low 
purchased the property in 2006 and that the prescriptive easement claimed by Plaintiffs ripened 
before Low purchased the property even though the record is clear that the use in common occurred 
while the Low' s predecessor, Samuel Steiner, owned the property and according to Rose King as 
early as 1973. Plaintiffs' arguments lack merit in fact and law and this Court should grant summary 
judgment to Low based upon the same reasoning, facts, law and basis already determined when it 
granted summary judgment to King. 1 
Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Memorandum Decision Upon King 
Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 19, 2015, which is to be argued on the same date 
as the Low's Motion, and Low reserve the right to respond and support the Court's decision and the position 
of King regarding Plaintiffs' Motion. 




The first argument raised by Plaintiffs is that the "common use" by Low was for agricultural 
purposes and not to access their homes. Plaintiffs' Response, pg. 2. In other words, Plaintiffs do 
not dispute that there is common use by Low or their predecessors, which then modifies the 
presumption standards for adverse use, but simply argue the common use is not exactly the same 
because it was not to access homes. Plaintiffs suggest this is a "critical distinction" but then provide 
no argument, citations or basis for this alleged distinction. The reason Plaintiffs do not do so is 
because there is no basis for their unsupported argument. The use in common is for a roadway with 
other vehicles of Low, Low's predecessors, King, and the general public and there is no case law 
suggesting the use must be exactly the same. The fact that both are using the roadway in common 
is sufficient to shift the presumption regarding adverse use and Plaintiffs again fail establish the 
necessary element of adverse use by some decisive act. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to dispute the undisputed evidence that King Lane was used 
by the general public, which is something also relied upon by the Court in its Memorandum Decision 
Upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 19, 2015, and which also rebuts any 
claim to a presumption of adverse use by the Plaintiffs. The Court specifically ref erred to the 
affidavit of the Low's predecessor, Samuel Steiner, to conclude that the use of King Lane was in 
common with the general public. Again, it is not disputed that King Lane was used in common with 
the general public and again there is no support for the argument that the use by the general public 
must be exactly the same as the claimed use by Plaintiffs. That said, there is no dispute that the use 
is the same which is for vehicular access. Whether the particular vehicle was going to the grocery 
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store to get eggs, access a field for agricultural purposes, or to access a pond for hunting does not 
change the fact that the use was in common and the burden is on the Plaintiffs to show adverse use 
by some "decisive act." Plaintiffs have failed to do so. 
While somewhat redundant, it is worth repeating this Court's decision, which is stare decisis, 
as to this issue: 
Based on the record before this Court the plaintiff has failed to make any 
showing on the essential element that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was adverse under 
claim of right. Even when this Court makes all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, 
there is nothing in the record to indicate a decisive act or incident of separate or 
exclusive use from 1977 to 2011. While the use of King Lane may not have started 
with express or even implied permission, the recorded and the testimony of the 
plaintiffs shows that plaintiffs' use of King Lane was in "common with the owner 
and general public." Marshall 130 Idaho at 680; (quoting Simmons, 63 Idaho 136, 
118 P .2d 7 40 (1941 ). A prescriptive easement cannot be granted unless there is 
evidence of a decisive act or incident showing adverse use that could be considered 
an "actual invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner." Hughes, 142 
Idaho at 480. 
Because there is no proof or evidence concerning this essential element of 
plaintiffs' case, that the Fuquays' use was adverse and contrary to the ownership 
rights of the Kings, the King defendants have met their burden of showing there is 
no genuine issue of material fact regarding the element of adverse use. 
Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden shifts to 
the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses 
or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid 
justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56 (f). Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 
389, 392, 179 P.3d 352, 355 (Ct.App. 2008). 
Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for Reconsideration, pg. 10. 
For the reasons already determined by this Court in the Memorandum Decision Upon King 
Defendants' Motion/or Reconsideration, dated June 19, 2015, this Court should grant summary 
judgment to Low because Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing adverse use. 
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The second argument raised by Plaintiffs is that the prescriptive easement ripened before the 
Lows purchased the property in 2006. This argument lacks merit and fails because Plaintiffs have 
again not disputed that the use of King Lane was in common with the Low' s predecessors, namely 
Samuel Steiner, or the general public. While Lows may not owned the property during this time 
frame, they have submitted the affidavit of Samuel Steiner, and again relied upon by this Court, who 
moved to the parcel in 1959 with his parents and was the owner of the property since 1984. See 
Affidavit of Samuel Steiner, filed December 9, 2014. In addition, Plaintiffs simply disregard the 
Affidavit of Rose King, also filed on December 9, 2014, which provided the following: 
What has been referred to as King Lane for purposes oflitigation has also been used 
by Cal and Susie Low, which own the property generally to the south of the King 
property/ranch and their predecessors in interest. When my husband and I 
purchased our ranch in 1973, the property now owned by Lows was owned by Steiner 
family, and the Steiners used the road to access their property to get to and from their 
fields. This use has continued since 1973 to present, including now that the 
property is owned by Cal and Susie Low. 
See Affidavit of Rose King,, 5. 
For Plaintiffs to now suggest that the easement ripened before Low purchased the property 
is flat out incorrect. Again, the evidence is clear that the use was in common and by the general 
public before and during Plaintiffs' alleged use and Plaintiffs have not and cannot meet their burden 
of showing by clear and convincing evidence that their alleged use was adverse. Simply because 
Low purchased their property in 2006 does not alleviate Plaintiffs from establishing adverse use by 
a decisive act given the undisputed evidence of common use and public use. 
Finally, Low contends that Plaintiffs claims against Low are rendered moot by the Court's 
decision granting summary judgment to King because if Plaintiffs cannot establish an easement over 
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the property of King, which there is no dispute that the roadway crosses a portion of the King 
property, then Plaintiffs cannot have a prescriptive easement across any portion of the roadway 
which crosses the property of Low. Plaintiffs have responded by citing to a Montana decision which 
suggests "better rule" is that the existence of intervening land does not itself defeat an easement. 
Plaintiffs fail to point out that the "better rule" cited in the Montana decision, recognizes a 
disagreement among jurisdictions on the issue, but then holds that the "better rule" which the 
Montana court followed applies to an express easement and not implied easements or easements 
by prescription like the one at issue in this case. See Davis v. Hall, 280 P.3d 261 (Mont. 2012). In 
other words, the Court did not hold that there can be intervening land when dealing with implied 
easements. Indeed, the Court stated "this Court adheres to the rule that in order to establish an 
implied easement, the dominant and servient parcels must be held as a single track of land or 
contiguous tracts of land at the time of severance." Id. at 270. Plaintiffs cannot have an easement 
by prescription which goes nowhere and it is illogical to suggest that Plaintiffs can establish an 
easement by prescription as to one defendant property owner and not the other. Again, for the 
reasons this Court granted summary judgment to Kings, this Court should grant summary judgment 
to Low. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the same reasons this Court has granted summary judgment to the Kings, this Court 
should also grant the Low' s motion for partial summary judgment and dismiss all causes of action 
of the Plaintiffs against Low. 
-/>-
DATED this/l day of August, 2015. 
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JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
This matter came on for hearing August 20, 2015 upon the Fuquays' Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Court's June 19, 2015 Memorandum Decision on Kings' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Request for Reconsideration. Appearing on behalf of the Fuquays was 
attorney Matthew Cleverly, of the law finn Fidelity National Law Group. Appearing on behalf of 
the Kings was attorney Ronald Rainey. Appearing on behalf of the Lows was attorney Bryce Farris, 
of the law firm Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC. The Court has considered the briefing, affidavits and 
pleadings of record and hereby renders its decision below. 
BACKGROUND 
The Fuquays seek a declaration of a prescriptive easement over King Lane in Owyhee 
County. King Lane is a private, all-weather road about one-half mile in length. It runs in an east-
west direction from the public Oreana Loop Road until it connects with Castle Lane, which then 
runs south until it connects with Oreana Loop Road. The King defendants own the parcel of land to 
the north of King Lane, the Low defendants own the parcel of land to the south of King Lane, and 
the Fuquays own parcels of land to the west of King Lane, where it ends and connects with Castle 
Lane. The Court went into greater background detail in its Memorandum Decision upon King 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on March 25, 2015. That background 
information is incorporated herein. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STANDARD 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l l(a)(2)(B) allows a party to seek reconsideration of any 
interlocutory order before the entry of judgment. Final judgment as to the King defendants was 
not entered in this case until July 8, 2015, two days after the filing of this motion. Therefore, 
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plaintiffs' motion is timely. On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new 
admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. See PHH 
Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631,635,200 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2009) (citing Coeur 
d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 
(1990)). 
"When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same 
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being 
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012), reh'g 
denied (Aug. l, 2012). In this case, the Court denied King defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment in a memorandum decision filed March 25, 2012. It then reversed itself and granted 
the Kings' Motion for Summary Judgment in its June 19, 2015 Decision on Kings' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Request for Reconsideration. Now, the Fuquays seek reconsideration of 
the Court's June 19th decision granting defendants' motion. Thus, this Court must apply the 
swnmary judgment standard that it applied to its original decision filed March 25, 2012, in which 
it denied Kings' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In a motion for summary 
judgment, this Court should liberally construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draw 
all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Summary judgment 
must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence presented. West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 
86-87, 106 P.3d 401, 412-413 (2005) (citing Iron Eagle Dev., L.L.C. v. Quality Designs Sys., 
Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003); see also Willie v. Bd of Trustees, 138 Idaho 
I 3 I, 133, 59 P.3d 302, 304 (2002). 
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden is always upon the moving party to prove 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. If, however, the basis for a properly supported 
motion is that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an element of the non-
moving party's case, it is incumbent upon the non-moving party to establish an issue of fact 
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regarding that element. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,923 P.2d 416 (1996). 
The burden on the moving party may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on 
an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 
Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (CtApp.1994). A trial court, in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or resolve controverted factual issues. American 
Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600,671 P.2d 1063 (1983). However, "[w]hen an action will 
be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of 
the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at 
the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontrovened evidentiary facts." Loomis v. City 
of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added); see also Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 
(1982) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). On review, the court will look to 
whether the record reasonably supports the inferences drawn by the trial court. lntermountain 
Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233,235, 31 P.3d 921,923 (2001). 
THE PARTIES, ARGUMENTS RE: MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
The Fuquays argue the Court incorrectly interred controverted facts in favor of the Kings 
and present four arguments for the Court to reconsider: ( 1) the Kings failed to bear their burden 
of showing that any use of King Lane, since its inception, has been permissive, therefore the 
Court should have presumed any and all use was adverse; (2) the Court improperly weighed 
evidence in favor of the Kings by concluding the Fuquays use of the road was permissive and "in 
common" with the Kings' use, rather than adverse and an infringement on the Kings' rights; (3) 
the infringement was established in 1977, when the Fuquays began using the road to come and 
go from their home, not in 2011, as the Court concluded; and (4) conflicting evidence exists as to 
whether King Lane was used by the public. 
In their memorandum in opposition, the Kings make the following arguments: (I) the 
presumption of adverse use is inapplicable because the Fuquays use of the road was "in 
common" with the Kings; (2) where a claimant's use is in common with the landowner's. the use 
is presumed permissive; (3) the Fuquays have failed to show their use infringed on the Kings' 
rights prior to 2011; and (4) it is undisputed that the public used King Lane. 
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ANALYSIS 
To acquire a prescriptive easement in Idaho. the Fuquays must show reasonably clear and 
convincing evidence of open. notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of King Lane, under a 
claim of right, with the knowledge of the owner of the servient estate for the prescriptive period 
of five years. I.C. § 5-203; West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,557,511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973). Thus, 
a prescriptive right cannot be obtained if use of the alleged easement is by permission of the 
landowner. Woodv. Hoglund, 131 ldaho 700, 702-03, 963 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1998). Therefore, 
the Fuquays must show through reasonably clear and convincing evidence that their use of King 
Lane was not permissive, but adverse, and for a period of five years. 
The general rule is that a presumption of adverse use arises where it is undisputed that an 
alleged easement has been used, without interruption, for the established period of prescription. 
Eagle Rock Corp. v. ldamont Hotel Co., 59 Idaho 413, 85 P.2d 242 (1938). Where an adverse 
presumption is applied, a landowner bears the burden of showing the use was by virtue of a 
license or permission. Id. This showing must be more than mere inaction and passive 
acquiescence. Smith, 95 Idaho at 557,511 P.2d at 1333. 
An exception to the general rule exists, which, when applicable, presumes use is 
permissive: "Where the owner of real property constructs a way over it for his own use and 
convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be 
presumed to be by way of license or permission." Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 
P.2d, 740, 744 (1941). Where a permissive presumption is applied, the claimant bears the 
burden of showing he or she engaged in some unequivocal conduct giving the landowner notice 
of his or her hostile and adverse use. Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326, 327, 563 P.2d 50, 51 
(1977). 
Here, the Fuquays argue the adverse presumption applies because it is unknown whether 
the general use of the alleged easement began as adverse or permissive. In support of this 
contention, the Fuquays rely on the deposition testimony of Rose King, where she asserts the 
roadway that is now King Lane has been in existence since at least l 894. Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration, pg. 14. The Fuquays also rely on the testimony of Samuel Steiner, who stated, 
"I do not know who, if anyone, constructed King Lane. 1bis was an old fann access roadway 
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that was used occasionally by a variety of people." Id. (quoting Declaration of Samuel V.C. 
Seiner, at ,i 5 ). The Fuquays' argue that since it is unknown whether the historical use of the 
roadway began permissively or adverse to the owner(s), the general rule is that the use is 
presumed adverse. 
Conversely, the Kings argue the adverse presumption only applies where it is unknown 
whether a claimant's use of an alleged easement began as adverse or pennissive. In this case, it 
is known when the Fuquays' use of King Lane began, 1977. When the Kings acquired their 
property in 1973, they took steps to improve the roadway. Thereafter, Jim Fuquay acquired his 
property in 1977, placed a mobile home on his property and began using King Lane at that time. 
It is true that the general rule in Idaho is that proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted 
use of the claimed right of way for the prescriptive period raises the presumption that the use is 
adverse. West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,511 P.2d 1326 (1973). However, there exists an exception 
to that presumption under Idaho law. Specifically, "where the owner of real property constructs a 
way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way 
interferes vvith his use will be presumed to be by way of license or pennission." Simmons v. 
Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941). That exception was reaffirmed as Idaho 
law in Marshall v. Blair, wherein the Idaho Supreme Court articulated: 
... [U]se of a driveway in common with the owner and the general 
public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part 
indicating a separate and exclusive use on his part negatives any 
presumption of individual right therein in his favor.' Simmons v. 
Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (1941) (emphasis added). 
This Court further explained in Simmons that use of a roadway 
must invade or infringe on the owner's rights in order for the use to 
be considered adverse and, thus, to ripen into a prescriptive right of 
way. 
130 Idaho 675,680,946 P.2d 975,980 (1997). 
In this case, it is undisputed that the Kings began improving the roadway, which is now 
King Lane, in 1973 to benefit their farming operation. In her affidavit, Rose King stated that at 
the time of their purchase of this property in 1973, "King Lane was only a path through grass and 
weeds and was wet and muddy most of the year .... We desired to access our fields through the 
use of this filed lane, therefore, we started hauling rocks to build a base for this road so that it 
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would be passable for our farm equipment. We did this annually .... " Affidavit of Rose King, pg. 
2, filed Dec. 9, 2014. Thus, the Kings constructed the roadway for their own use and 
convenience. The law applicable here is that "the mere use thereof by others which in no way 
interferes with his use will be preswned to be by way of license or permission." Simmons v. 
Perkins, supra. Therefore, the permissive preswnption is applicable here. 
As previously addressed, where a permissive presumption is applied, the claimant bears 
the burden of showing he or she engaged in some unequivocal conduct giving the landowner 
notice of his or her hostile and adverse use. Magleby, supra, 98 Idaho at 327, 563 P.2d at 51. 
Here, the Fuquays only argwnent is that when Jim Fuquay purchased his property in 1977 and 
put a mobile home on it and began using the roadway as access to his property that this was the 
decisive act that placed the Kings on notice that his use was hostile. The Court disagrees, 
because Jim Fuquay's use did nothing to interfere with the King's use. Interference is required to 
show adverse use. 
The Fuquays further assert that because they used the road for residential purpose and the 
Kings used the road for business purposes the road was not being used in a similar manner, 
therefore the preswnption of permissive use is not applicable. However, the Fuquays fail to take 
their argwnent to the next and necessary step by way of showing that such use interfered with the 
Kings' use. Simply put, the Fuquays have produced no evidence that their use of King Lane 
interfered with the Kings' rights. 
The Court, in its memorandwn decision filed June 19, 2015 also accepted the premise 
that use of King Lane by the general public also rebutted the Fuquays' claim to a presumption of 
adverse use. In their motion to reconsider, the Fuquays point out that the declarations of the 
school bus driver and the Schwann Truck driver disclosed that those declarants did not use King 
Lane, but rather used the Oreana Loop Road and Castle Lane. Plaintiffs' Motion, pg. 12-13. The 
Fuquays also quote from Rose Kings' testimony that essentially states that she instructed the 
public that they could not use King Lane. Id., at pg. 13. It does appear that there is a question of 
fact as to whether there has been use by the general public. However, it does not change this 
Court's conclusion that because the Fuquays' use did not interfere with the Kings' use of King 
Lane, the presumption applicable in this case is that the Fuquays use was permissive. 
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Based upon the foregoing analysis, Fuquays' Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
Dated this I~ day of September, 2015. 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the following via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery: 
MATTHEW R. CLEVERLY 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200 6m Avenue, Suite 620 
Seattle, Washington 98101 
S. BRYCE FARRIS 
SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 7985 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
RONALD P. RAINEY 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
P.O.Box26 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED JULY 6, 201S Page8 
637
' '' ,,, 
FILED 
~!#A.M. P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY, CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K. 
RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES 
OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. 
KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants. 
GILBERT KING, as Trustee; and ROSE 
M. KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART 

























JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 




CASE NO. CV-2014-0278-M 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON 
LOW DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON LOW DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Pagel 
638
. ' . 







FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
On July 15, 2015, Defendants Susie and Ca1 Low (hereinafter referred to as the "Low 
Defendants") filed a motion for partial summacy judgment The matter came on for hearing on 
August 20, 2015. Appearing on behalf of the Lows was attorney Bryce Farris, of the law firm 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC. Appearing on behalf of the Fuquays was attorney Matthew 
Cleverly, of the law firm Fidelity National Law Group. Appearing on behalf of the Kings was 
attorney Ronald Rainey. The Court has considered the briefing, affidavits and pleadings of record 
and hereby finds as follows. 
The Fuquays argue in this lawsuit that they possess a prescriptive easement by adverse use 
over King Lane located near Oreana, Owyhee County, Idaho. King Lane travels over and through 
property owned by both the Kings and the Lows. It is not !,-pecifically known to what extent the 
road crosses the Low and King properties but there is no dispute that the road crosses a portion of 
each. 
On January 29, 2015, the King Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The 
matter was fully briefed and argued by both the Kings and the Fuquays. The Lows did not file their 
own summary judgment at that time but their legal position has always been clearly in line with the 
King Defendants. The Court initially denied the Kings' motion for summary judgment in its 
Memorandum Decision filed on March 25, 2015. Thereafter, the Kings filed a motion to 
reconsider. After another round of briefing and oral argument, the Court, upon reconsideration 
granted the Kings' motion for summary judgment The Fuquays then filed their own motion for 
reconsideration and another round of briefing, affidavits and oral argument ensued. In its 
Memorandum Decision filed September 11, 2015, the Court affirmed its' Order granting summary 
judgment for the King Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON LOW DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page2 
639
.. 
At the hearing on August 20, 2015, the Court verbally expressed the opinion that because 
the Low Defendants' legal position is identical to the King Defendants' position relating to whether 
the Fuquays possess a prescriptive easement over King Lane. Since the Court has now affirmed its 
Order granting summary judgment to the Kings, the Low Defendants would likewise be entitled to 
summmy judgment. 
Therefore, based upon the analysis of this Court in its Memorandum Decisions of June 19, 
2015 and September 11, 2015 granting the King Defendants summary judgment, the Court hereby 
intends to enter an Order granting swnmary judgment to the Low Defendants. Counsel for the 
Lows is directed to prepare the appropriate Order. 
Dated this Zl~ day of September, 2015. 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-14-0278 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant Lows' counterclaims against Plaintiffs are dismissed with prejudice and 
without the award of fees or costs either party; and 
2. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and the causes of action for Declaratory Judgment 
(Prescriptive Easement) and Injunction against Defendant Lows are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Dated: --'-H+-n ..... /,....•~'--
JUDGMENT-I 
Hon. Thomas J. Ryan 
FlDUlTY NA·t10NAL LAW GROUP 
1100-6"' A VENUE, SUJl'UilO 





NOTICE OF ENTRY 
On the date given below, I served the attached document on the following individuals 
in the manner indicated: 
Ronald P. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@gwestoffice.net 
Attorney for Kings 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
110 l W. River Street, Suite 110 
Boise. ID 83 707 
208-629-7447 
bcyce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Lows 
Matthew R. Cleverley 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200 - 61h A venue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206} 224-6003 
Matthew.C1everley@fnf.com 
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
1200 - 61h A venue, Suite 620 
Seattle, WA 98101 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
_Fl_~mP.M. 
JAN O 6 2016 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING 
as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST 
UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO 
FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO 
FALLS, INC.; THE ESTATE OF GORDON 
G. KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ROSE M. 
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K 




JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Counterdefendants. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200 - 6rn A VENUE, SUITE 620 
SEATTLE, WA 98101 
(206) 223-4525 
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TO: SUSIE LOW and CAL LOW 
And to: 
And to: 
And their Attorney: S. BRYCE FARRIS 
GILBERT KING as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA 
DECEMBER 28, 2012; THE ESTATE OF GORDON G. KING; and ROSE 
M.KING; 
And their Attorney: RONALD P. RAINEY 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD FUQUAY and 
HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from following: 
03/25/2015 Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
06/19/2015 Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration 
07/08/2015 Judgment (Dismissing Plaintiffs Easement Claims against the Kings) 
0911112015 
Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration Filed July 6, 
2015 
09/21/2015 Memorandum Decision Upon Low Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
10/06/2015 Order on Low Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
1212112015 
Judgment dated December 18, 2015 Dismissing Plaintiff's easement claims 
against the Lows (Item #2 of the Judgment. Item #1 is not appealed.) 
That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
I.A.R l l(a)(l). 
2. Preliminary Statement of Issues: 
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondents 
and dismissed Plaintiff/Appellant's Complaint seeking a prescriptive easement. The 
Trial court erred because: 
a. It failed to use the proper legal standards in making its decisions. 
b. It granted summary judgment to Defendants/Respondents even though 
there are disputed issues of material fact. 
c. It construed facts in the light most favorable to the Defendant/Respondents 
instead of the non-moving Plaintiff/ Appellant. 
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d. The Low Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the same 
basis as the King Defendants because the facts and issues are different. 
3. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
If so, what portion? NIA 
4. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? 
No transcripts are requested from the court reporter. The transcripts of 
the preliminary injunction hearing held on September 18, 2014 were 
already transcribed and are included in the 12/8/2014 Affidavit of Bryce 
Farris, which is listed in #6. 
Additional or separate copies of the transcripts from the 12/8/2014 
hearing are not necessary. No other hearings had testimony, and were all 
argument. Since review is de novo, prior oral arguments are irrelevant 
and transcripts of the parties' arguments is not requested. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: None. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record 














Complaint Filed ( Prescriptive Easement) 
Declaration of Raymond Jayo in Support of Ex parte Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order 
Declaration of John Fuquay in Support of Ex parte Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order 
Declaration of Matthew Cleverley in Support of Ex parte Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order 
Answer and Counterclaims by Defendants Trustees for the Heart King Ranch 
Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
Affidavit of Gilbert King 
Affidavit of Rose King 
Declaration of Denice Collett in Support of Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs 
Ex Parte Restraining Order 
Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey 
Declaration of Schwann Delivery Person 
Affidavit of Susie Low 
Answer of Defendants Susie and Cal Low and Counterclaim 
Declaration of Scott Snyder 
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Declaration of Scott Snyder 
Declaration of Seth Thomas 
Affidavit of Bryce Farris (which includes a full transcript of the 
preliminary injunction hearing which was held on September 18, 2014) 
which is related to the above filings 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Susie Low and Cal 
Low 
Declarations of Matthew Cleverley 
Declarations of John Fuquay 
Response and Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Rose King 
Affidavit of Samuel V.C. Steiner 
Affidavit of S. Bryce Farris (which includes a full transcript of the preliminary 
injunction hearing which was held on September 18, 2014) 
Withdrawal of Motion for Summary Judgment Against Lows 
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion For Summary Judgment 
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Memorandum in Support of Notion for Summary 
Judgment 
Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey 
Affidavit of Rose King in Support of the Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Gilbert King in Support of the Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Defendant Lows' Response to Kings' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs Response to Heart K. Ranch's MSJ 
Compilation of Testimony 
Reply Memorandum in Support Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Memorandum Decision upon King defendants' motion for summary judgment 
Amended Complaint Filed/First amended 
Motion/King Defendant's motion for reconsideration under rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) of 
decision denying motion for summary judgment 
Affidavit in support of motion for reconsideration 
Memorandum in Support of King Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration 
Under Rule 1 l(a) (2)(B) of Decision Denying Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs' response to Kings motion for reconsideration 
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Memorandum/Reply memorandum in support of King defendants' motion for 
reconsideration under Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) of decision denying motion for 
summary judgment 
Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' motion for reconsideration 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's June 19, 2015 
Memorandum Decision on King's Motion for Summary Judgment and Request 
for Reconsideration 
Deposition of Rose King 
Deposition of Gilbert King 
Judgment 
Susie and Cal Lowe's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
Memorandum/King Defendants' memorandum in opposition to the Fuquay 
Plaintiffs Motion for reconsideration 
Declaration of Matthew Cleverley 
Reply/Plaintiffs' reply in support of motion for reconsideration of the court's 
June 19, 2015 memorandum decision of King's motion for summary judgment 
and request for reconsideration 
Susie and Cal Low's reply in support of motion for partial summary judgment 
Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration Filed 
July 6,2015 
Memorandum Decision Upon Low Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Order on Low Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
Judgment dated December 18, 2015 Dismissing Plaintifrs easement claims 
against the Lows (Item #2 of the Judgment. Item #1 is not appealed.) 
7. I certify: 
(a) that a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
NOTE: No Additional Transcripts are Requested. 
Name and 
address: ----------------------------
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(b) (1) [ ] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(2) [ ] That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because 
(c) (1) [X] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record will be 
paid upon request. 
(2) [ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the 
record because 
(d) (1) [X] That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(2) [ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
Dated: January 5, 2016 
STATE OF IOAHO } 
County of Owyhee ss 
. I hereby certify that the foregoing 
instrument is a true a orr ct copy of the 
onginal as it appears · ' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Amended Notice of 
Appeal on the following individuals in the manner indicated: 
Ronald P. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@gwestoffice.net 
Attorney for Kings 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W River Street, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83707 
208-629-7447 
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Lows 
Dated: January 5, 2016 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of 
. A,ft\ZIIWLO"I.D 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 













GILBERT KING, as Trustee of the ) 
HEART K RANCH TRUST UT A ) 
DECEMBER28, 2012; THE ESTATE OF ) 
GORDON G. KING; and ROSE M. KING, ) 
as Beneficiary of the HEART K RANCH ) 







AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO ) 
FALLS; and FIRST AMERICAN TITLE ) 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
) 
. Defendants. ) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 43705-2015 
Owyhee County No. CV-2014-278 
Ref. No. 16-34 
RESPONDENT HEART K RANCH'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL and an 
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD P. RAINEY IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT HEART K RANCH'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL with attachments were filed by counsel for Respondent Heart K. 
Ranch Trust on January 19, 2016, requesting this Court for an Order dismissing this appeal on the 
basis that no final appealable judgment has yet been entered in the action below upon which this 
appeal may proceed. Thereafter, PLAINTIFF/APELLANTS' RESPONSE TO HEART K RANCH 
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL was filed by counsel for Appellants on January 22, 2016. The 
Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL-Docket No. 43705-2015 
652
,- . 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that RESPONDENT HEART K RANCH'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and this appeal is DISMISSED. 
DATED this _!l__ day of February, 2016. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge Thomas J. Ryan 
District Court Reporter 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL- Docket No. 43705-2015 
653
2016-03-10 13:42 1 1 >> 208 495 1226 P 6/9 
RONALD P. RAINEY ISB #1022 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 26 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0026 
Phone (208)459-3659 
Facsimile Transmission No:459-9067 
Attorney for Defendants 
Gilbert King as Trustee .for the . 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ~TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD, ) 








SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K. ) 
RANCH TRUST UT A DECEMBER 28, ) 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF ) 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING ) 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN ) 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) _____________ ) 
' GILBERT KING, as Tmstee; and 
ROSE M. KING·, as Beneficiary of the 
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA 













JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD ) 
Case No. CV-2014-0278 
KINGS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PROPOSED JUDGMENT 
KINGS'' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED JUDGMENT l 
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FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) ______________ ) 
P 7/9 
The King defendants, Counterclaimants, have redrat\ed Mr. Cleverley's initial proposed 
judgment on King's counterclaims deleting what were paragraphs 5 and 6 quoted as follows: 
5 The kings have no legal or equitable right to use any part of the Fuquay 
properties or the portion of King Lane that extends west beyond the King 
or Low property boundary. The Kings are c11joined from entry onto or use 
of the Fuquay properties. 
6. To the extent that the Kings have the right to maintain ditches on 
the fuquay properties under I.C. 42-1102» access to the ditches shall 
h~ from along the ditch banks only. The ditches shall not be 
accessed from over any of the Fuquay roads or through the 
Fuquays, fields. 
The b~is for deleting these paragraphs is that the issues addressed jn paragraphs 5 and 6 were 
not raised as iss~es in the case in chief. 
The Kings feel that it is necessary to pursue the three counterclaims in order to clearly 
establish that the Fuquays do not have any right whatsoever to enter King's property in any 
manner. Kings first counterclaim is for a declaratory judgment and merely dismissing Fuquay's 
complaint to establish a prescriptive easement over King Lane does not exlinguish all legal and 
equitable rights that Fuquays may claim in the future. 
King's second counterclaim seeks a permanent injunction to keep Fuquays from using 
King Lane and goes to the future claims that Fuquays may generate which may not be addressed 
by merely dismissing Fuquays claim for prescriptive easement. The contentious nature of the 
relationship between the Fuquays and Kings causes the Kings to be proac.1ive in preventing future 
problems. 
KINGS" MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP PROPOSED JUDOMENT 2 
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prob Ir.ms. 
K inr, ·s tbir<l cou11L1..:n,;laim make.~ it clear that the Puquay 's have no int.~rcst i11Ki11~ Lane 
of any kind whether an e.asemenl. or ownership. 
While I.he Conrt granted the on.lt:r dismissing Fuquay's complaint. for 1,rcscri1>ti ve 
t~ascmc11t over the King's prope:rty, the Kings were inle::nding to eliminate any possible future 
da.iJns Fuquays may havein clrnfl.ing their counterclaims were int.ending tl) eliminale uny possible 
future claims fiuquuys may have t.o complete tcrmirmlion of any legal c,r auy type of claim they 
may misc 1n Lhe future. 
Just dismissing F11q11ay's complaint do~s nol. provide the parlit:s wiJh a complclc 
sctt!cmcut of the fulure issues which may arise. 
DATED This /tJ day of Man:h, 2016. 
RONALD P. RATN.l{Y .P.A. . . ... 
~
-~. --~:::-. .,-·· -.,>·::.r...) 
.-~' ..... ~_.,,,.,:~~·· _<>-~-;~,.,.._ ...... -::.:.' 
__..,.., -:ir.;;:",..-· •·?/~ ... ~ (:;. .. a,;~ • ..~.,··~--
Rima Id P. l{aincy- - ···· .. , ... ,····· 
Attorney for n~fondants, (JilhcrL King as 
Trust<.~~. and l{osc M. King, m, Benefi<:iary 
of Lht: Hemt K Ranch Trust UTA l>t'.ccmbcr 28, 
2CH2 
KlNUS" MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED JUDGMF.Nl' J 
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CERTIFICATE OF :-:i.ERV1CE 
l, H.onalcl P. Raiu~y. herehy certify that on this .Ji...L .. <lay of Much, 2016, I caused a I.rue 
and correct copy of lhe roregoi.ng instrnmc11t lo ht: delivert-.cl t.o the advcrs(; party, via the method 
i11<lil:al.t!d below, addressed as follows: 
.U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid ~-Facsimile Transmission .. Jland Delivery 
Mal.I.hew R. Cl.cvcrlcy 
Fi,lel it.y Nationai Law Group 
1200 (iU1 Avenue, Suite 620 




S. Rryc.:e Farris 
P.O. Box 7985 





.· ~~~~::-__ _ 
-Ronald P. l{iiin~yl /,. .. 
/ 




Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2710 
Seattle, WA 98104 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
_Fl.~P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF 
IDAHO FALLS, INC.; GORDON G. KING; 
ROSE M. KING; FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-14-0278 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
REGARDING ENTRY OF FINAL 
JUDGMENT ON KINGS' 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
This Memorandum is submitted in support of Plaintiffs' proposed form of Judgment as to 
the Kings' counterclaims. 
1. First Counterclaim - Scope of Easement 
Kings' first counterclaim seeks declaratory relief that the Plaintiffs have exceeded the 
scope of their prescriptive easement and that the Fuquays do not have the right to drive trucks 
over King Lane: 
45. The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants seek declaratory relief establishing that 
the Fuquay Counterdefendants have exceeded the nature and scope of their permissive 
right to use King Lane for ordinary and infrequent residential use. 
FUQUA YS' MEMORANDUM RE: ENTRY OF 
FINAL JUDGMENT - 1 
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46. The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants seek declaratory relief establishing that 
the Fuquay Counterdefendants have no legal or equitable right to use King Lane for 
the current uses being made of that access by means of large commercial trucks on an 
almost daily basis. 
Since the Court has determined that the Plaintiffs do not have prescriptive rights over 
King Lane, a declaration regarding specific scope of the easement or use is irrelevant. The 
claim must be denied as moot. 
2. Second Counterclaim - Permanent Iniunction 
The Kings second counterclaim seeks a permanent injunction as follows: 
55. The Fuquay Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, including their employees, invitees, 
agents, and other representatives should be ordered and restrained by entry of 
permanent injunction as follows: 
a. From any entry onto, or use of, King Lane by means of any motor vehicle, 
whatsoever, as the private roadway is owned by and held out only for the use of, 
the Heart K Ranch and its invitees; and 
b. From any in any way, or by any means, interfering with or obstructing the gates, 
chains, or any locks, or other hardware related to the structure and operation of 
those gates, which may have been placed across the entries to King Lane; and 
c. By undertaking to obstruct, by any means, or to molest or harass the users, in the 
rightful use of King Lane by the owners and invitees of Heart K Ranch. 
a. Injunctive Relief is Not a Proper Remedy 
Injunctive relief is only available when there is no adequate remedy at law. "Injunction to 
restrain trespass is ordinarily confined to cases where the nature of the property or frequent 
repetition of the trespass precludes recovery of remedial damages at law. In the case of injury 
to land, injunctive relief will not be granted where the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at 
law." Milbert v. Carl Carbon, Inc., 89 Idaho 471,479,406 P.2d 113, 118 (1965). In this case, 
there has been no evidence that the Plaintiffs have used King Lane since the Court denied 
FUQUAYS' MEMORANDUM RE: ENTRY OF 
FINAL JUDGMENT - 2 
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their Motion for Preliminary Injunction in September 2014. In addition, Plaintiffs have an 
adequate remedy at law: a suit for trespass, the same as any other landowner. 
Further, an injunction should not be granted unless there is irreparable injury to the 
landowner. Johnson v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 66 Idaho 660, 675, 167 P.2d 834, 841 (1946). 
Here there is no showing that the Kings will suffer any irreparable injury if they are not 
granted an injunction. There is no evidence that the Plaintiffs have threatened to continue to 
use the roadway in violation of any orders, to remove or obstruct gates, or remove locks. 
There is no evidence that the Kings would be unable to seek any other remedy afforded to any 
other landowner. Thus, an injunction is not a proper remedy. 
b. The Kings Seek an Injunction Against Unnamed Third Parties. 
The Kings seek an injunction against third parties other than the Plaintiffs who might 
happen to use King Lane. The Court does not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction against 
unnamed third parties. Further, there is no basis for an injunction against a third-party who 
might be looking for the Fuquays' property and who happens to drive down King Lane 
looking for them. That is entirely outside the Fuquays' control. 
c. There is No Evidence to Support an Injunction 
Finally, the only evidence in the case related to the Plaintiffs' use of King Lane under 
their assertion of a legal right. There is no evidence that the Plaintiffs ever "obstructed, 
molested or harassed" any users of King Lane, so there is no evidentiary basis for an 
injunction. 
FUQUAYS' MEMORANDUM RE: ENTRY OF 
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3. Third Counterclaim - Quiet Title 
The Kings' third counterclaim is for quiet title: 
57. The Heart K Ranch Counterclaimants request a determination that no 
prescriptive or adverse rights exist in King Lane as it crosses their property, and that a 
decree quieting title in them, and extinguishing any such claims, or easements, be entered 
by this Court, such as can be recorded in the land title records of Owyhee County. 
Since the Court has determined that the Plaintiffs do not have prescriptive rights over 
King Lane, the most appropriate Judgment is simply that the Plaintiffs do not have a 
prescriptive easement over King Lane. 
There are other issues between the parties that are not involved in the easement dispute. 
That has to do with water rights and scope of access to ditches. Any Judgment in this case 
should address only the Plaintiffs' prescriptive rights over King Lane. The Judgment should 
not be any broader as the parties may have various other access and use rights that are not 
being addressed in this case. 
Dated: March 7, 2016 
Matthew R. Cleverley, 
Fidelity National Law 
701 Fifth A venue, Sui 
Seattle, WA 98104 
(206) 223-4525, ext. 103 
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date given below, I caused to be served the foregoing document entitled 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM RE: ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT ON KINGS' 
COUNTERCLAIMS on the following counsel of record, in the manner of service indicated as 
follows: 
Ronald P. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attorney for Kings 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W. River Street, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83707 
208-629-7447 
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Lows 
Dated: March 9, 2016 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-1 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of ld.:fl.h02G1s 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 




SUSIE LOW and CAL LOW, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
GILBERT KING, as Trustee of the 
HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 
28. 2012; THE ESTATE OF 
GORDON 0. KING; and ROSE M. KING, 
as Beneficiary of the HEART K RANCH 
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Supreme Court Docket No. 43705-2015 
Owyhee County No. CV-2014-278 
TO: THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF OWYHEE. 
The Court having granted Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal on Febtllary 8, 2016, and 
having entered an Order dismissing this appeal February 8, 2016; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal herein from thejudgment of the district court be, 
and hereby is. DISMISSED. M 
DATED this ;t,,;/ day of March, 2016. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TillRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY, CLINTON WARD ) 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
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SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28 
2012; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES 
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to 
the defendants, Gilbert King, as trustee of the Heart K Ranch Trust UTA December 28, 2012; the 
estate of Gordon G. King and Rose M. King. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the King defendants' counterclaims are dismissed 
without prejudice. 
Dated this Zf"k day of March, 2016. 
Thomas J. Ryan 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the following via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery: 
'7/iq 1, LQ 
Date 
J MATTHEW R. CLEVERLY FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
1200 6th Avenue, Suite 620 
.Seattle, Washington 98101 
J S. BRYCE FARRIS SAWTOOTH LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 7985 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
)
RONALD P. RAINEY 
Attorney at Law 
P0Box26 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
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The above-entitled matter came on for hearing February 26, 2016 upon a motion for 
status conference filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. Matthew R. Cleverly, of the law firm Fidelity 
National Law Group, appeared on behalf of the moving plaintiffs (hereinafter "Fuquays"). 
Ronald P. Rainey, Attorney at Law, represented the defendants (hereinafter "Kings"). The issue 
before the Court is the parties dispute exactly what language should be placed in a final judgment 
allowing this matter to proceed to appeal. The Court asked each party to submit their proposed 
Final Judgment. The Kings submitted theirs on March 10, 2016 and the Fuquays submitted 
theirs on March 14, 2016. The Court has considered the parties' briefing and oral argument and 
hereby finds as follows. 
BACKGROUND 
In their Complaint, the Fuquays sought a declaration of a prescriptive easement over 
King Lane in Owyhee County. King Lane is a private, all-weather road about one-half mile in 
length. It runs in an east-west direction from the public Oreana Loop Road until it connects with 
Castle Lane, which then runs south until it connects with Oreana Loop Road. The King 
defendants own the parcel of land to the north of King Lane, the Low defendants own the parcel 
of land to the south of King Lane and the plaintiffs own parcels of land to the west of King Lane 
where it ends and connects with Castle Lane. 
The Court determined that, under the controlling rule of Idaho law, the Fuquays use of 
King Lane was at all times deemed to be permissive, therefore there could not be a prescriptive 
easement, which is dependent upon "adverseness" in order to be established. Based upon the 
Court's decision granting Defendant Kings' motion for summary judgmenC the Court entered a 
Final Judgment dismissing the Fuquays' Complaint. However, that Final Judgment did not 
address the Kings' counterclaims. 
The Kings filed counterclaims alleging the following: (1) that the Court should grant 
declaratory relief finding the Fuquays exceeded the nature and scope of their permissive right to 
use King Lane for ordinary and infrequent residential use; (2) seeking a permanent injunction 
that the Fuquays cannot enter onto King Lane and may not interfere with or obstruct the gates; 
and (3) that the Court quiet title to King Lane to the Kings and determine that no prescriptive or 
adverse rights exist. 
As to (l) and (3) set forth above, the court is of the opinion that the ruling upon Kings' 
summary judgment effectively made those counterclaims moot. The Court will order those 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON 




counterclaims dismissed without prejudice so that in the event the Kings disagree, they may 
refile for said relief. 
As to counterclaim (2) set forth above, the Court agrees with the position of the Fuquays 
that i:ajunctive relief is not a proper remedy. In its Memorandum Decision upon Fuquays motion 
for summary judgment regarding the Lows counterclaims, this Court found: 
The Lows also seek an injunction to prevent the dogs from 
entering their property in the future. "Injunction to restrain trespass 
is ordinarily confined to cases where the nature of the property or 
frequent repetition of the trespass precludes recovery of remedial 
damages at law." Milbert v. Carl Carbon, Inc., 89 Idaho 471, 479, 
406 P.2d 113, 118 (1965). Moreover, "[i]n the case of injury to 
land, injunctive relief will not be granted where the plaintiff has an 
adequate remedy at law." Id. (citing 43 C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 57 
and 60). This court has discretion to grant or refuse irtjunctive 
relief. I.C. § 8-402; Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 
83 Idaho 285, 361 P.2d 788 (1961); White v. Coeur d'Alene Big 
Creek Mining Co., 56 Idaho 282, 55 P.2d 720 (1936); Rowland v. 
Kellogg Power & Water Co., 40 Idaho 216, 233 P. 869 (1925). 
The exercise of such discretion by the trial court in granting or 
refusing an injunction will not be reversed on appeal unless a clear 
abuse of discretion is shown. Milbert v. Carl Carbon, Inc., 89 
Idaho 471,479,406 P.2d 113, 118 (1965). 
Thus, the Court finds that the Kings' second counterclaim should also be dismissed but 
without prejudice. 
Dated this 21-"" day of March, 2016. 
District Judge 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON 
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SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING 
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JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Counterdefendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
Case No. CV-2014-0278 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
FfDWTY NAllONA.. LAW GJWtJp 
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TO: SUSIE LOW and CAL LOW 
And their Attorney: S. BRYCE FARRIS 
And to: GILBERT KING as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA 
DECEMBER 28, 2012; THE ESTA TE OF GORDON G. KING; and ROSE 
M. KING; 
And their Attorney: RONALD P. RAINEY 
And to: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD FUQUAY and 
HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from following: 
03/25/2015 Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
· 06/19/2015 Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration 
, 07/08/2015 Judgment (Dismissing Plaintiffs Easement Claims against the Kings) 
0911112015 Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration Filed July 6, 2015 
09/21/2015 Memorandum Decision Upon Low Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
, l 0/06/2015 Order on Low Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
1212112015 Judgment dated December 18, 2015 Dismissing Plaintiff's easement claims 
against the Lows (Item #2 of the Judgment. Item #1 is not appealed.) 
That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
I.A.R 11 (a)(l ). 
2. Preliminary Statement of Issues: 
The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondents 
and dismissed Plaintiff/Appellant's Complaint seeking a prescriptive easement. The 
Trial court erred because: 
a. It failed to use the proper legal standards in making its decisions. 
b. It granted summary judgment to Defendants/Respondents even though 
there are disputed issues of material fact. 
c. It construed facts in the light most favorable to the Defendant/Respondents 
instead of the non-moving Plaintiff/Appellant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
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(206) 223-4525 
670
d. The Low Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the same 
basis as the King Defendants because the facts and issues are different. 
3. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
If so, what portion? NIA 
4. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? 
No transcripts are requested from the court reporter. The transcripts of 
the preliminary injunction hearing held on September 18, 2014 were 
already transcribed and are included in the 12/8/2014 Affidavit of Bryce 
Farris, which is listed in #6 below. 
Additional or separate copies of the transcripts from the 12/8/2014 
hearing are not necessary. No other hearings had oral testimony, and were 
all argument. Since review is de novo, prior oral arguments are irrelevant 
and transcripts of the parties' arguments is not requested. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter1s 
transcript: None. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk1s record 














Complaint Filed ( Prescriptive Easement) 
Declaration of Raymond Jayo in Support of Ex parte Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order 
Declaration of John Fuquay in Support of Ex parte Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order 
Declaration of Matthew Cleverley in Support of Ex parte Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order 
Answer and Counterclaims by Defendants Trustees for the Heart King Ranch 
Trust UTA December 28, 2012 
Affidavit of Gilbert King 
Affidavit of Rose King 
Declaration of Denice Collett in Support of Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs 
Ex Parte Restraining Order 
Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey 
Declaration of Schwann Delivery Person 
Affidavit of Susie Low 
Answer of Defendants Susie and Cal Low and Counterclaim 
Declaration of Scott Snyder 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
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Declaration of Scott Snyder 
Declaration of Seth Thomas 
Affidavit of Bryce Farris (which includes a full transcript of the preliminary 
injunction hearing which was held on September 18, 2014) which is related to 
the above filings 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Susie Low and Cal 
Low 
Declarations of Matthew Cleverley 
Declarations of John Fuquay 
Response and Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Rose King 
Affidavit of Samuel V.C. Steiner 
Affidavit of S. Bryce Farris (which includes a full transcript of the preliminary 
injunction hearing which was held on September J 8, 2014) 
Withdrawal of Motion for Summary Judgment Against Lows 
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion For Summary Judgment 
Defendant Heart K Ranch's Memorandum in Support of Notion for Summary 
Judgment 
Affidavit of Ronald P. Rainey 
Affidavit of Rose King in Support of the Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion 
for Swnn1ary Judgment 
Affidavit of Gilbert King in Support of the Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Defendant Lows' Response to Kings• Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs Response to Heart K. Ranch's MSJ 
Compilation of Testimony 
Reply Memorandum in Support Defendant Heart K Ranch's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Memorandum Decision upon King defendants' motion for summary judgment 
Amended Complaint Filed/First amended 
Motion/King Defendant's motion for reconsideration under rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of 
decision denying motion for summary judgment 
Affidavit in support of motion for reconsideration 
Memorandum in Support of King Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration 
Under Rule l l(a) (2)(8) of Decision Denying Motion for Swnn1ary Judgment 
Plaintiffs' response to Kings motion for reconsideration 
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Memorandum/Reply memorandum in support of King defendants' motion for 
reconsideration under Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) of decision denying motion for 
summary judgment 
Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' motion for reconsideration 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's June 19, 2015 
Memorandum Decision on King's Motion for Summary Judgment and Request 
for Reconsideration 
Deposition of Rose King 
Deposition of Gilbert King 
Judgment 
Susie and Cal Lowe's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
Memorandum/King Defendants' memorandum in opposition to the Fuquay 
Plaintiff's Motion for reconsideration 
DecJaration of Matthew Cleverley 
Reply/Plaintiffs' reply in support of motion for reconsideration of the court's 
June 19, 2015 memorandum decision of King's motion for summary judgment 
and request for reconsideration 
Susie and Cal Low's reply in support of motion for partial summary judgment 
Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration Filed July 
6,2015 
Memorandum Decision Upon Low Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Order on Low Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
Judgment dated December 18, 2015 Dismissing Plaintiff's easement claims 
against the Lows (Item #2 of the Judgment. Item #1 is not appealed.) 
7. I certify: 
(a) that a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
NOTE: Hearing transcripts are already included as part of other motion papers. 
No Additional Transcripts are Requested. 
Name and 
address: --------------------------
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 FIDELfrY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
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(b) (1) [] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(2) [ J That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because 
( c) (1) [X ] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record will be 
paid upon request 
(2) [] That appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the 
record because 
( d) ( 1) [X J That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(2) [ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
April 27. 2016 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
Matthew R. Cleverle 
Fidelity National w roup 
701 Fifth Avenue Suit 2710 
Seattle, WA 981 
(206) 223-4525, ext 03 
Matthew.C1everley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
i:x,~~ }· 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Notice of Appeal on the 
following individuals in the manner indicated: 
Ronald P. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@gwestofficy.net 
Attorney for Kings 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
110 I W River Street, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83707 
208-629-744 7 
bryce@sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Lows 
Dated: April 27. 2016 
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SEATTLE, WA 98104 
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Matthew R. Cleverley, ISB #5418 
Fidelity National Law Group 
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2710 
Seattle, WA 98104 
(206) 224-6003 
Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
CJn!l.~ED P.M. 
AUG 2 2 2016 
A-tELL, CLERK 
Deputy~ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
v. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING 
as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST 
UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO 
FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO 
FALLS, INC.; THE EST A TE OF GORDON 
G. KING; ROSE M. KING; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
GILBERT KING, as Trustee, and ROSE M. 
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K 




JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Counterdefendants. 
OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD- 1 
Supreme Court No. 44155 
Owyhee District Court No. CV-2014-0278 
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REQUEST 
FOR SUPPLEMENTATION 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
701 F'IFTII AVENUE, SUITE 2710 




The Clerk for the Owyhee County District Court submitted the Clerk's record to the 
Supreme Court on or about July 29, 2016. However, the Clerk's record is missing the following 
documents, even though they were designated in the Notice of Appeal: 
Affidavit of Ron Rainey 
Compilation of Testimony 
9/10/2014 
2/13/2015 
6/19/2015 Memorandum Decision upon King Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration 
Appellants request that the Court enter an Order requiring the Clerk of the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Owyhee to 
supplement the Clerk's record so it includes the designated documents. 
August 17, 2016 
OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD - 2 
B #5418 
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP 
701 FIFTH A VENUE, SUITE 2710 
SEATILE, WA 98104 
(206) 223-4525 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Objection to Clerk's 
Record on the following individuals in the manner indicated: 
Ronald P. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
110 North Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
erainey@qwestoffice.net 
Attorney for Kings 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC 
1101 W River Street, Suite 1 10 
Boise, ID 83 707 
208-629-7447 
bryce(a)sawtoothlaw.com 
Attorney for Lows 
Clerk of the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and 
for the County of Owyhee 
PO Box 128 
20381 State Highway 78 
Murphy ID 83650 
Dated: August 17, 2016 
OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD - 3 
[]] U.S. MAIL I 
DI LEGAL MESSENGER I 
DI EMAIL I 
DI HAND DELIVERED I 
DI EXPRESS DELIVERY I 
DI FACSIMILE I 
[K]j U.S. MAIL I 
DI LEGAL MESSENGER I 
DI EMAIL I 
DI HAND DELIVERED I DI EXPRESS DELIVER y I 
DI FACSIMILE I 
[KJI U.S. MAIL I 
DQ,EGAL MESSENGER I 
DI EMAIL I 
DI HAND DELIVERED I DI EXPRESS DELIVERY I 
DI FACSIMILE I 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JOfJN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
v. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING 
as Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST 
UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO 
FINANCIAL SERVICES OF IDAHO 
FALLS, INC,; nm ESTATJ! OF GORDON 
0. J<ING; ROSE M. IONO; FIR.ST 
~RICAN TITLB INS~CE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
GILBERT KING, as Trustee , and ROSE M. 
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K 




JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLOOON WARD 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY. 
Counterd.efendants. 
Suprome Court No. 44155 
Owyhee District Court No. cv;.2<>14-0278 
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTINQ 
A:PPELLANrs REQUEST FOR THE 
CLERK TO SUPPLEMENT THE 
RECORD 
Plaintiff/ Appellants. objection to the Cl~ '.s feCQl'.d·dated August 17, 2016 .is s~ined. 
The Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial l)imct of the State of Idaho in and for the 




Affidavit of Ron Rainey 
Compilation of Testimony 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date given below I caused to be served the foregoing Orde.r on the following 
individuals in the ~er indicated: 
llonald P. Rainey 
Att9rrtey at X...w 
no North.Ninth Street 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
208-459-3659 
eqinev@awestoffi&c~net 
Attorney for Kings 
S. Bryce Farris 
Sawtooth Law Ofnce$, PLLC 
1101 W Rivet Street, Suite 110 
Boise. ID B3707 . 
208-629-7447 
bme@SlWlQothlaw.qpm 
Attorney for Lows 
Clerk of the District COUt1 of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and 
for the County of Owyhee 
PO Box 128 
20381 State Highway 78 
Murphy ID 83650 
ORDER-3 
XI U.$.MA1L 




D EXPRESS DELIVERY 
D FACSIMILE 
U.S.MAlL 
D LEGAL MESSENGER 
D SMAIL 
D HAND DELIVERED 
EXPRESS· DELIVERY 
(]] U.S. MAIL 
DI LEOAL,MESSENGBR 
DI EMAIL . 
HAND DBLIVERSD 
iXPRESS DELIVERY 
D FACSI LE 
~ · Cierk W:zy: 
iln)ELJTV NA'l'.'l~t. LAW GRQIIP 
'IOl.llln'R A~Stlng11UJ 
SEi\'l'TL&,'\V,'\ ,. ... 
(2116)2%M!l5 
681
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'IY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD. 











SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING, As ) 
Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA ) 
DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO FINANCIAL ) 
SERVICES OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; THE ) 
ESTATE OF GORDON G. KING; ROSE M. ) 
KING; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE ) 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
Defendant-Respondents, 
GILBERT KING, As Trustee, and ROSE M. 
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012, 
Counterclaimants, 
Vs. 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 


















Case No. CV-2014-0278*M 
Docket No. 44155 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Owyhee, do hereby certify that the following 
are being sent as exhibits: NONE 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Murphy, Idaho this/~y o&p1er1tt-t'.,(2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
· in and for the County of Owyhee. 
By: l2ktJava- Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNIY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD. 
FUQUAY and HAILEY ROSE FUQUAY, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
Vs. 
SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING, As 
Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA 
DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO FINANCIAL 
SERVICES OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; THE 
ESTATE OF GORDON G. KING; ROSE M. 
KING; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
Defendant-Respondents, 
GILBERT KING, As Trustee, and ROSE M. 
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012, 
Counterclaimants, 
Vs. 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 

































Case No. CV-2014-0278*M 
Docket No. 44155 
AMENDED 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Owyhee, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled case was compiled and bound under my direction 
as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of 
684
the Idaho AJ:>pellate Rules, except no documents were included from the previous appeal 
in Docket No. 44155. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this {'7-1--day of9tf~'0016. 
• 
ANGELA BARK.ELL, Clerk of the District 
Court ofthe Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Owyhee. 
By: Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD . 











SUSIE LOW; CAL LOW; GILBERT KING, As ) 
Trustee of the HEART K RANCH TRUST UTA ) 
DECEMBER 28, 2012; AVCO FINANCIAL ) 
SERVICES OF IDAHO FALLS, INC.; THE ) 
ESTATE OF GORDON G. KING; ROSE M. ) 
KING; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE ) 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
Defendant-Respondents, 
GILBERT KING, As Trustee, and ROSE M. 
KING, as Beneficiary of the HEART K 
RANCH TRUST UTA DECEMBER 28, 2012, 
Counterclaimants, 
Vs. 
JOHN E. FUQUAY; CLINTON WARD 


















Case No. CV-2014-0278*M 
Docket No. 44155 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Owyhee, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record record, and one copy of the transcripts to each party as follows: 
Matthew R. Cleverly Fidelity National Law Group 1200-6th Ave, Ste 620 Seattle, WA 
98101. 
686
Ronald Rainey 110 N. Ninth St. Caldwell, ID 83707 
S. Bryce Farris 1101 W. River St. Ste. 110 Boise, ID 83707 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Murphy, Idaho this f7:}-- day of S.ep±-crv~b{/l.-, 2016. 
ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Owyhee. 
By:~~ Deputy 
